State of Washington v. Dennis Gerald Lowe ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                 FILED
    AUGUST 21, 2018
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                         )         No. 34805-9-III
    )
    Respondent,              )
    )
    v.                                     )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    DENNIS GERALD LOWE,                          )
    )
    Appellant.               )
    PENNELL, A.C.J. — Dennis Lowe appeals his conviction for second degree taking
    a motor vehicle without permission. We affirm.
    FACTS
    The State initially charged Mr. Lowe with one count of possession of a stolen
    motor vehicle. It later amended the charge to include a second count of second degree
    taking a motor vehicle without permission. During a pretrial hearing that took place prior
    to amendment, the trial court raised concerns about the nature of the State’s charge. The
    following colloquy ensued:
    Judge: Alright. I do have one comment, okay? You—I’m looking at
    your proposed jury instructions. You’ve alleged that Mr. Lowe was in
    possession of this motor vehicle. He was a passenger [inaudible]—. I’m
    not sure passengers are people who possess motor vehicles.
    [Prosecutor]: It’s under the accomplice—principal accomplice—
    Judge: You didn’t—your instructions don’t include anything about
    accomplices.
    No. 34805-9-III
    State v. Lowe
    [Prosecutor]: I would—I would change that.
    Judge: So, I—I, you know, just as an editorial comment, this is really
    a riding in a motor vehicle knowing it’s stolen. This is what it really is.
    But,—and we’ll see where we are at the closing of the State’s case—
    [Prosecutor]: Sure.
    Judge: —whether this case survives the half-time motion or not, so.
    Report of Proceedings (Aug. 24, 2016) at 37. Later that day, the State filed an amended
    information adding the second count. When the court asked defense counsel for their
    response to the additional charge, defense counsel waived “formal arraignment, formal
    reading, and enter[ed] a plea of not guilty,” and made no objection to the State’s filing.
    
    Id. at 39.
    Trial began the following day. The jury found Mr. Lowe guilty of second degree
    taking a motor vehicle without permission and not guilty of possession of a stolen motor
    vehicle. Mr. Lowe appeals.
    ANALYSIS 1
    CrR 2.1(d) allows an information to be amended any time before a verdict or
    finding if the defendant’s substantial rights are not prejudiced. So long as the State does
    not wait until after the closing of its case in chief to file for amendment, a defendant
    1
    Mr. Lowe’s arguments are presented through a statement of additional grounds,
    filed under RAP 10.10. The issues briefed by Mr. Lowe’s attorney have been resolved by
    agreement with the State.
    2
    No. 34805-9-III
    State v. Lowe
    challenging an amendment must show prejudice. State v. Schaffer, 
    120 Wash. 2d 616
    , 621,
    
    845 P.2d 281
    (1993). CrR 2.1(d)’s protection against prejudicial amendment fulfills the
    constitutional protection of notice guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Washington
    Constitution. 
    Id. Because the
    State filed its amended information the day before trial, Mr. Lowe is
    obliged to show prejudice. He has failed to do so. The State’s amended information was
    factually and legally similar to the original charge. 
    Id. (The greater
    the similarity between
    the amended information and original charge, the less risk there is of prejudice.). At the
    time of filing, counsel did not object or request a continuance. State v. Gosser, 33 Wn.
    App. 428, 435, 
    656 P.2d 514
    (1982) (Failure to request a continuance “is persuasive of
    lack of surprise and prejudice.”). Mr. Lowe simply has not demonstrated how his trial
    strategy would have changed had he been given more notice of the amended charge.
    Nor has Mr. Lowe established that the manner in which charges were amended
    deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair tribunal. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis,
    
    152 Wash. 2d 647
    , 692, 
    101 P.3d 1
    (2004) (A party alleging misconduct bears the burden of
    establishing misconduct.). A judge does not improperly assume a dual role of accuser
    and adjudicator simply by warning a prosecutor about the weakness of the State’s case.
    Cf. Williams v. Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __, 
    136 S. Ct. 1899
    , 1905, 
    195 L. Ed. 2d 132
    3
    No. 34805-9-111
    State v. Lowe
    (2016) (due process violation when the judge previously had a significant, personal
    involvement as a prosecutor in the defendant's case); In re Murchison, 
    349 U.S. 133
    , 139,
    
    75 S. Ct. 623
    , 
    99 L. Ed. 942
    (1955) (due process violation when judge previously served
    as one-man grand jury). That is all that happened here. The trial judge did not act as a
    prosecutor and did not direct the State to seek an amended information. There was no
    due process violation.
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Mr. Lowe asks that we not award
    appellate costs. In accordance with RAP 14.2, we defer the question of appellate costs to
    our commissioner or clerk/administrator.
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
    RCW 2.06.040.
    Pennell, A.C.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    4