LIBERAL FINANCE SERVICE VS. GABRIEL HORACE (DC-000026-17, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0969-17T1
    LIBERAL FINANCE SERVICE,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    GABRIEL HORACE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________
    Submitted September 18, 2018 – Decided October 2, 2018
    Before Judges Suter and Firko.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-000026-17.
    Denbeaux & Denbeaux, attorneys for appellant (Joshua
    W. Denbeaux, on the briefs).
    Randolph Walzer & Associates LLC, attorneys for
    respondent (Randolph Walzer, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant appeals from two orders denying his motions to vacate
    judgment and reconsideration. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    I.
    Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant after he defaulted on an
    installment sales contract to purchase a vehicle. The parties entered into a
    settlement and defendant agreed to pay $200 per month until the balance was
    paid. Plaintiff agreed not to enforce the judgment as long as payments were
    made. Counsel for plaintiff memorialized the settlement terms in a letter w hich
    stated that plaintiff "[does] intend to take a [J]udgment against [defendant]
    . . . ." and that the $200 monthly payments would be made directly to plaintiff's
    counsel. No answer was filed.
    After making payments for several months, defendant defaulted and
    plaintiff proceeded to obtain a default judgment, which was enforced by way of
    wage garnishment. 1       Plaintiff denies it refused payments, as alleged by
    defendant.
    Thereafter, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment and for leave
    to file an answer, affirmative defenses, counterclaims, and a third-party
    complaint, which was denied. The judge found that "defendant admitted that he
    owed the money and there is no basis to vacate the judgment pursuant to Rule
    4:50-1." In clarifying his prior order, the judge also found that "[d]efendant
    1
    According to plaintiff, the balance due was less than $1,000.
    A-0969-17T1
    2
    agreed to the entry of judgment and to pay $200 a month until the judgment was
    paid and he cannot now change his mind." This appeal followed.
    II.
    Defendant presents the following arguments in this appeal:
    I.    THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN REFUSING
    TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF DEFAULT
    BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED
    IN VIOLATION OF THE CLEAR LANGUAGE
    OF THE SUMMONS, THE DEFENDANT WAS
    NOT IN DEFAULT AND BECAUSE THE
    DEFENDANT MET ALL THE CONDITIONS
    OF R. 4:50-1[.]
    a.  [R.] 4:50-1(a) - DEFENDANT GABRIEL
    HORACE       COMPLIED      WITH   THE
    INSTRUCTIONS IN THE SUMMONS FROM
    THE COURT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE
    BEEN DEFAULTED BY THE COURT WHICH
    HAD NOT BEEN MADE AWARE OF THE
    SETTLEMENT AT THE TIME OF THE
    JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT[.]
    b.  R. 4:50-1(e) [-] THE CASE WAS
    SETTLED BEFORE AN ANSWER WAS DUE
    TO HAVE BEEN FILED BY DEFENDANT
    HORACE AND THE CONTINUATION OF
    THE JUDGMENT AFTER SUFFICIENT
    NOTICE OF THE SETTLEMENT WAS
    PROVIDED    TO    THE   COURT  [IS]
    INEQUITABLE[.]
    c.  R. 4:50-1(f) [-] IF THE COURT
    CONCLUDES THAT NO SPECIFICALLY
    ENUMERATED SUBSECTION OF [R.] 4:50-1
    A-0969-17T1
    3
    APPLIES, THE COURT SHOULD VACATE
    THE    JUDGMENT     PURSUANT     TO
    SUBSECTION (f) AS THE PLAINTIFF AND
    NOT DEFENDANT IS IN BREACH OF THE
    SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT[.]
    d.   THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN
    CONCLUDING     THAT  [DEFENDANT]
    LACKED A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO
    THE COMPLAINT[.]
    e.  [R.] 4:30A – UNLESS THIS COURT
    VACATES FINAL JUDGMENT, THE ENTIRE
    CONTROVERSY       DOCTRINE    WILL
    INSULATE FROM LIABILITY THE SELLER
    OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND PERMITTING
    THIS [JUDGMENT] TO STAND WOULD
    PERVERT THE PURPOSE OF THE ENTIRE
    CONTROVERSY DOCTRINE[.]
    We note that defendant does not seek to invalidate the settlement
    agreement. Indeed, he initially made payments, thereby ratifying the settlement
    terms. He now seeks to reverse course and defend the action.
    Defendant argues that plaintiff was remiss by not dismissing the complaint
    or notifying the court that the matter was settled. He further contends that he
    "complied" with the instructions set forth in the summons, and therefore , the
    trial judge wrongfully allowed default and default judgment to enter.        We
    disagree.
    The summons provided as follows:
    A-0969-17T1
    4
    IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THE PLAINTIFF'S
    CLAIMS, A WRITTEN ANSWER OR SIGNED
    AGREEMENT MUST BE RECEIV[E]D BY THE
    COURT ABOVE, ON OR BEFORE 02/14/2017, OR
    THE COURT MAY RULE AGAINST YOU. IF YOU
    DISAGREE WITH THE PLAINTIFF, YOU MUST DO
    ONE OR BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING:
    1.    Answer the Complaint […]
    2.    Resolve the Dispute. Contact the plaintiff's
    attorney, or contact the plaintiff if the plaintiff does not
    have an attorney, to resolve this dispute. The plaintiff
    may agree to accept payment arrangements. If you
    reach an agreement, mail or hand deliver the SIGNED
    agreement to the court's address listed above on or
    before 02/14/2017.
    Prior to the deadline, defendant called plaintiff's counsel, spoke to a
    paralegal, and voluntarily reached a settlement. The terms were clearly set forth
    in a letter prepared by the firm which stated:
    Thank you for telephoning our office on 13 February
    2017, and for speaking with Cathy Baatz, a paralegal in
    our office. You have reported that you have now been
    served with the Summons and Complaint in the
    captioned matter. As you were advised, we do intend
    to take a [J]udgment against you, a [J]udgment being
    the [C]ourt's determination that money is owed. You
    have admitted that you do, in fact, owe this money.
    Now, you have promised to forward regular payments
    of $200[.00] each month directly to our office
    commencing 23 February 2017. Please note the money
    must be in our office by the 23rd or you will call our
    office and do a check by phone payment on that date.
    A-0969-17T1
    5
    There is a fee of $7.95 for this service until such time
    as the entire [J]udgment has been satisfied. Each of
    these payments must be forwarded regularly and
    promptly as promised.
    All payments should be made payable to "Randolph
    Walzer, Esq." and forwarded directly to this office in
    one of the enclosed self-addressed envelopes. If you
    have any questions, please do not hesitate to telephone
    this office.
    III.
    We are cognizant of the strong and longstanding social values that favor
    the settlement of litigation. "[T]he settlement of litigation ranks high in our
    public policy." Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 
    195 N.J. 575
    , 601 (2008)
    (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 
    65 N.J. Super. 472
    , 476 (App. Div. 1961)).
    Settlements provide a measure of repose and finality to disputes that would
    otherwise persist and burden the litigants and our court system if they were not
    amicably resolved. A settlement of a legal claim between parties is a contract
    like any other contract, "which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud or other
    compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other contracts."
    Pascarella v. Bruck, 
    190 N.J. Super. 118
    , 124-25 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting
    Honeywell v. Bubb, 
    130 N.J. Super. 130
    , 136 (App. Div. 1974)). We will not
    interfere with a trial judge's factual findings and conclusions concerning a
    A-0969-17T1
    6
    settlement agreement that are amply supported by the record. Lahue v. Pio
    Costa, 
    263 N.J. Super. 575
    , 597 (App. Div. 1993).
    We disagree with defendant that the failure of the parties to notify the
    court of the settlement agreement serves as a basis to vitiate its terms. This
    would contravene this State's longstanding public policy of valuing the
    settlement of litigation. We "strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement
    whenever possible." Brundage, 
    195 N.J. at 601
     (quoting Dep't of Pub. Advocate
    v. N.J. Bd. of Pub. Util., 
    206 N.J. Super. 523
    , 528 (App. Div. 1985)).
    In sum, we are convinced that this settlement was voluntarily entered into
    and was properly enforced by the trial judge.
    To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we
    find them without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
    2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    A-0969-17T1
    7