STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. VICTOR NORWOOD (11-08-1402, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3329-16T2
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    VICTOR NORWOOD,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________________
    Submitted September 24, 2018 – Decided September 28, 2018
    Before Judges Sabatino and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 11-08-
    1402.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the
    brief).
    Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
    Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Mary R. Juliano,
    Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Victor Norwood appeals from the trial court's denial of his
    post-conviction relief ("PCR") petition without an evidentiary hearing. We
    affirm, substantially for the sound reasons expressed in Judge Leslie-Ann M.
    Justus's January 19, 2017 oral opinion.
    The facts arise out of a motor vehicle stop of defendant in Asbury Park in
    the early morning on May 6, 2011. A traffic officer observed defendant make a
    right turn at a stop sign without appearing to come to a full stop. The officer
    activated his lights and siren and pursued defendant, who increased his speed
    and swerved erratically. After a pursuit of approximately half a mile, defendant
    crashed into a parked vehicle.     He ran from the accident scene and was
    apprehended while trying to climb a fence. He was taken to police headquarters
    and marijuana was found in his shirt sleeve.
    Tried by a jury in 2012, defendant was convicted of second-degree
    eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b) and fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-
    2(a)(2). The trial judge separately found defendant guilty of simple possession
    of under fifty grams of marijuana, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4) and reckless driving,
    N.J.S.A. 39:4-96. Defendant was sentenced to a ten-year custodial term on the
    eluding offense, subject to a five-year parole ineligibility period, plus a
    A-3329-16T2
    2
    concurrent eighteen-month term for the resisting arrest offense. The court also
    suspended his driver's license and imposed fines.
    On direct appeal, this court issued an unpublished opinion affirming
    defendant's conviction but remanding for the limited purpose of merging the
    reckless driving conviction with eluding. State v. Norwood, No. A-1326-12
    (App. Div. May 1, 2015). The Supreme Court denied certification. State v.
    Norwood, 
    223 N.J. 164
     (2015).
    In his PCR petition, defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective in :
    (1) failing to object to the admission of the marijuana evidence at the jury trial;
    (2) failing to object to the court's omission of a standard instruction on burden
    of proof after the jury was empaneled; and (3) failing to file a pretrial motion to
    suppress the marijuana evidence.
    Judge Justus, the PCR judge, 1 issued a detailed oral opinion explaining
    why defendant's petition lacked merit. She also concluded that defendant's
    arguments were procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-4(a) and -5. The judge
    found no need for an evidentiary hearing.
    In his brief contesting the court's denial of PCR, defendant raised the
    following points:
    1
    A different judge had presided over the jury trial.
    A-3329-16T2
    3
    POINT ONE
    MR. NORWOOD IS ENTITLED TO AN
    EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
    TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE
    ADMISSION     OF    IRRELEVANT     AND
    PREJUDICIAL DRUG EVIDENCE, OBJECT TO AN
    IMPROPER JURY CHARGE, OR FILE A MOTION
    TO SUPPRESS.
    POINT TWO
    THE PCR COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT
    MR.     NORWOOD'S    PETITION    WAS
    PROCEDURALLY BARRED.
    Having considered the record in light of the applicable legal principles, we find
    no merit in defendant's arguments. The PCR judge's opinion is legally sound
    and well supported by the record. We add only a few brief comments.
    "Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of
    habeas corpus." State v. Preciose, 
    129 N.J. 451
    , 459 (1992). In cases such as
    this one in which no evidentiary hearing was conducted, we review the PCR
    judge's determinations de novo. State v. Jackson, 
    454 N.J. Super. 284
    , 291
    (App. Div. 2018) (citation omitted); see also State v. Nash, 
    212 N.J. 518
    , 540-
    41 (2013).
    Defendant in this case predicates his PCR application upon a claim that
    his trial counsel was ineffective. Under the Sixth Amendment of the United
    A-3329-16T2
    4
    States Constitution, persons accused of crimes are guaranteed the effective
    assistance of legal counsel in their defense. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 686 (1984). To establish a deprivation of that right, a convicted defendant
    must satisfy the two-part test enunciated in Strickland by demonstrating that: (1)
    counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance actually
    prejudiced the accused's defense. 
    Id. at 687
    ; see also State v. Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    ,
    58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey).
    Before applying these standards regarding the merits to the present appeal,
    we first must consider the PCR judge's conclusion that defendant's claims are
    procedurally barred under Rule 3:22-4(a) and -5. We substantially concur with
    her procedural rulings.
    We agree that defendant's present claims of prejudice arising from the
    admission of the marijuana evidence at trial are barred under Rule 3:22-5. That
    is because our May 2015 opinion specifically rejected defendant's assertion that
    the marijuana proof was erroneously admitted. State v. Norwood, No. A-1326-
    12 (App. Div. May 1, 2015) (slip op. at 5) (specifically finding "no error . . . in
    the admission of the marijuana evidence"). We further concur with the PCR
    judge that defendant's claim of prejudicial error respecting the jury charge was
    unsuccessfully raised on direct appeal, and likewise is precluded under Rule
    A-3329-16T2
    5
    3:22-5. The only aspect of defendant's petition that is not procedurally barred
    is his discrete claim that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to move to
    suppress the fruits of the motor vehicle stop, an issue that was not developed in
    the trial transcripts or on direct appeal.    Because this unadjudicated issue
    involves an allegation of ineffective counsel, we decline to bar it procedurall y
    under Rule 3:22-4(a).
    Turning to the merits, we are satisfied that defendant has neither
    established under the two-part Strickland test deficient performance by his trial
    attorney, nor actual prejudice from any claimed deficiencies. Counsel's decision
    to not object to the marijuana evidence was clearly a strategic one. It enabled
    counsel to impeach the arresting officer about details of his trial testimony and
    the sequence of events leading up to the seizure of the marijuana. Such a
    reasonable strategic choice is "virtually unassailable on ineffective assistance of
    counsel grounds." State v. Cooper, 
    410 N.J. Super. 43
    , 57 (App. Div. 2009).
    Counsel's alleged failure to object to the inadvertent omission of the term
    "reasonable doubt" in the preliminary instructions to the jury is likewise
    unavailing. The "reasonable doubt" concept was amply explained by the trial
    judge in both the jury voir dire instructions and in the final jury charge. The
    A-3329-16T2
    6
    instructions as a collective whole were not prejudicial. State v. Chapland, 
    187 N.J. 275
    , 289 (2006).
    Lastly, defendant fails to demonstrate a suppression motion would have
    any merit, even if counsel had filed one. The record shows the traffic officer
    had a reasonable and articulable basis to stop defendant's car after he observed
    it violating various traffic laws. State v. Bacome, 
    228 N.J. 94
    , 103 (2017). It is
    "inconsequential" defendant was ultimately acquitted of failing to stop at a stop
    sign. State v. Heisler, 
    422 N.J. Super. 399
    , 413 (App. Div. 2011).
    There was no need for an evidentiary hearing on the PCR petition, as
    defendant failed to establish a prima facie basis for relief. State v. Porter, 
    216 N.J. 343
    , 357 (2013). The PCR judge did not misapply her discretion in denying
    a hearing. State v. Brewster, 
    429 N.J. Super. 387
    , 401 (App. Div. 2013) ("[W]e
    review under the abuse of discretion standard the PCR court's determination to
    proceed without an evidentiary hearing.").
    Affirmed.
    A-3329-16T2
    7