Com. v. Stubbs, D. ( 2017 )


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  • J. S36041/17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :               PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                       :
    :
    DARNELL STUBBS,                              :            No. 3764 EDA 2015
    :
    Appellant          :
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, November 19, 2015,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0004871-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                          FILED JUNE 27, 2017
    Darnell    Stubbs    appeals    from       the    judgment   of   sentence   of
    November 19, 2015, following his conviction of sexual offenses. We affirm.
    The trial court has aptly summarized the history of this case as
    follows:
    The complainant (“F.C.”) gave a statement to
    police officers on February 23, 2013, indicating
    sometime between February 10, 2013, and
    February 14, 2013, at 3 a.m., she encountered a
    black male, five foot nine inches or taller, in his
    thirties, with nappy hair, carrying a Save-A-Lot bag.
    Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”) April 7, 2015, at p. 4.
    The encounter took place at or near 3500 Kensington
    Avenue in the City and County of Philadelphia. Id.
    F.C. told the police that she had seen the individual
    approximately five times before. Id. She later
    identified him as [appellant]. Id. F.C. reported that
    she and [appellant] agreed to go to a house at
    1901 E. Venango Street where she would provide
    him with sexual services in exchange for money. Id.
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    When they arrived at the house, there was an
    altercation where [appellant] pushed her to the floor.
    Id. [Appellant] pulled his pants down and [anally]
    penetrated her with his penis. N.T. March 31, 2015,
    at p. 6. After the assault, [appellant] told her to “get
    the fuck out of the house” and she left the residence.
    Id. at 6-7.
    Trial court opinion, 8/19/16 at 2-3.
    On April 10, 2015, a jury found [appellant]
    guilty of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse by
    forcible compulsion (“IDSI”),[Footnote 1] unlawful
    restraint,[Footnote 2] sexual assault,[Footnote 3]
    and simple assault.[Footnote 4] The court deferred
    sentencing for a pre-sentence investigation and an
    assessment by the Sexual Offenders Assessment
    Board (“SOAB”) pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.[A.]
    § 9799.24 to determine if [appellant] meets the
    criteria of a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”).
    Following an SVP hearing, on November 19, 2015,
    the court concluded that the Commonwealth proved
    by clear and convincing evidence that [appellant]
    meets the criteria for a sexual [sic] violent predator.
    On that same date, [appellant] was sentenced to an
    aggregate sentence of five to twelve years of
    incarceration followed by seven years of sex offender
    probation.[Footnote 5] On December 1[5], 2015,
    [appellant] filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
    [Footnote 1] 18 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 3123(a)(1)[.]
    [Footnote 2] 18 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 2902(a)(1)[.]
    [Footnote 3] 18 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 3124.1[.]
    [Footnote 4] 18 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 2701(a)[.]
    [Footnote 5] [Appellant] was sentenced to
    five to twelve years of incarceration
    followed by seven years of sex offender
    probation on the IDSI charge.         For
    sentencing purposes the sexual assault
    charge merged with the IDSI charge.
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    [Appellant] was sentenced to five years of
    probation on the unlawful restraint charge
    and two years of probation on the simple
    assault charge. All probation sentences to
    run concurrently.
    Trial court opinion, 8/19/16 at 1-2.
    No post-sentence motions were filed; however, on December 15,
    2015, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.     On December 17, 2015,
    appellant was ordered to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal within 21 days pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 7, 2016,
    appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement, alleging that the evidence was
    insufficient to prove that he met the statutory definition of a sexually violent
    predator.   (Docket #6.)     Appellant also requested permission to file a
    supplemental statement after receiving all the notes of testimony. (Id.) On
    January 12, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting appellant
    permission to file a supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement within 7 days of
    receiving all of the notes of testimony.     (Docket #8.)     Appellant filed a
    supplemental concise statement on March 30, 2016, and on August 19,
    2016, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.     (Docket #9, 10.)     On
    January 5, 2017, this court dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief.
    On January 6, 2017, appellant filed a motion to reinstate the appeal, which
    was granted on January 23, 2017.
    Appellant has raised the following issue for this court’s review: “Did
    not the Commonwealth fail to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
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    the appellant met the statutory definition of ‘sexually violent predator’ where
    the doctor relied on erroneous and incomplete information?”       (Appellant’s
    brief at 3.)1
    Appellant argues that Barry Zakireh, Ph.D., the SOAB expert, relied on
    inaccurate and incomplete information to support his conclusion that
    appellant suffers from anti-social personality disorder and is likely to
    reoffend. Appellant complains that Dr. Zakireh relied, in part, on appellant’s
    prior arrest and adjudication for simple assault and indecent assault at
    age 12, but did not review any materials related to that case. (Appellant’s
    brief at 15.)   In his SOAB report, Dr. Zakireh noted that appellant was
    arrested on November 3, 1999 and charged with various offenses including
    rape and IDSI.     (Appellant’s brief, Exhibit C, Sexually Violent Predator
    Assessment, 7/7/15 at 3, 5.) The complainants were two infant females, not
    older than one year. (Id.) However, there was limited information relating
    to the specific offenses, including the context, duration, or appellant’s
    relationship to the victims. (Id.)2
    Dr. Zakireh also noted that appellant was committed to multiple
    residential programs for adolescent sexual offenders after his adjudication at
    1
    A second issue raised in appellant’s concise statement and addressed by
    the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, whether the trial court erred in
    denying appellant’s motion to suppress identification, has been abandoned
    on appeal.
    2
    The parties stipulated to the contents of Dr. Zakireh’s report, and he was
    not called to testify at the SVP hearing. (Trial court opinion, 8/19/16 at 7.)
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    age 12, including programs in Virginia, Utah, and Massachusetts. (Sexually
    Violent Predator Assessment, 7/7/15 at 5.)        Dr. Zakireh concluded that
    appellant has likely struggled to make progress or satisfactorily complete the
    programs.    (Id. at 6.)    Appellant argues that this was conjecture on
    Dr. Zakireh’s part and that Dr. Zakireh did not review any records from
    appellant’s juvenile residential placements.    (Appellant’s brief at 15.)   In
    addition, appellant contends that Dr. Zakireh’s diagnosis of anti-social
    personality disorder was made without the benefit of adequate information
    about appellant’s background, education, family life, employment history,
    etc. (Id. at 17.)
    In appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, appellant alleged that, “The
    evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish by clear and
    convincing evidence that appellant met the statutory definition of a
    “‘sexually violent predator’ pursuant to Megan’s Law, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9791
    et seq. where the doctor relied on erroneous information.”         (Appellant’s
    brief, Exhibit B; supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement, 3/30/16 at 2.)
    Appellant did not specify what allegedly erroneous information Dr. Zakireh
    relied upon to support his findings. The trial court concluded that appellant’s
    Rule 1925(b) statement was vague and resulted in waiver of this issue.
    (Trial court opinion, 8/19/16 at 4.) We agree. Rule 1925(b) provides: “The
    Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant
    intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for
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    the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). “Issues not included in the Statement
    and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this [Rule] are
    waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).
    It has been held that when the trial court directs an
    appellant to file a concise statement of matters
    complained of on appeal, any issues that are not
    raised in such a statement will be waived for
    appellate review. Commonwealth v. Dowling, 
    778 A.2d 683
    ,   686     (Pa.Super.    2001),    citing
    Commonwealth v. Lord, 
    553 Pa. 415
    , 418, 
    719 A.2d 306
    , 308 (1998). Similarly, when issues are
    too vague for the trial court to identify and address,
    that is the functional equivalent of no concise
    statement at all. 
    Id.
     Rule 1925 is intended to aid
    trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those
    issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal.
    Commonwealth v. Lemon, 
    804 A.2d 34
    , 37
    (Pa.Super. 2002).      Thus, Rule 1925 is a crucial
    component of the appellate process. 
    Id.
     “When the
    trial court has to guess what issues an appellant is
    appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review.”
    
    Id.,
     citing Dowling, 
    supra.
    Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    955 A.2d 391
    , 393 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).
    See also In re A.B., 
    63 A.3d 345
    , 350 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“This Court has
    considered the question of what constitutes a sufficient 1925(b) statement
    on many occasions, and it is well-established that Appellant’s concise
    statement must properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal.”
    (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
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    As appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was overly broad and vague
    and failed to specify what allegedly erroneous information Dr. Zakireh
    improperly relied upon, the issue is waived on appeal.3
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Panella, J. joins this Memorandum.
    Olson, J. concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/27/2017
    3
    Moreover, a careful review of Dr. Zakireh’s report and the trial court’s
    opinion supports the finding that appellant met the statutory criteria for
    classification as an SVP. (Trial court opinion, 8/19/16 at 5-9.)
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Stubbs, D. No. 3764 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 6/27/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/27/2017