In the Interest of: K.S., a Minor ( 2017 )


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  • J-S10032-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: K.S., A MINOR                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: PHILADELPHIA DEPARTMENT
    OF HUMAN SERVICES
    No. 1662 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Dispositional Order dated April 27, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0015141-2005
    IN THE INTEREST OF: T.B., A MINOR               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: THE CITY OF
    PHILADELPHIA, DEPARTMENT OF
    HUMAN SERVICES
    No. 1677 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 27, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000921-2016
    IN THE INTEREST OF: M.B., A MINOR               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: THE CITY OF
    PHILADELPHIA, DEPARTMENT OF
    HUMAN SERVICES
    J-S10032-17
    No. 1681 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 27, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000920-2016
    IN THE INTEREST OF: N.B., A MINOR               IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: THE CITY OF
    PHILADELPHIA, DEPARTMENT OF
    HUMAN SERVICES
    No. 1684 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 27, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Domestic Relations at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000922-2016
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SOLANO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.:                            FILED JULY 31, 2017
    Appellant, the City of Philadelphia Department of Human Services
    (“DHS”), appealed from the orders of the family court dated April 27, 2016,
    adjudicating minors K.S. (born 2000), N.B. (born January 2005), T.B. (born
    December 2005), and M.B. (born 2007) (collectively, “the Children”) as
    dependent, but declining to find that DHS had made “reasonable efforts” to
    prevent or eliminate the need for placement.    We dismiss the appeals as
    moot.
    As set forth in our prior memorandum decision, In re K.S., No. 1662
    EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. Mar. 29, 2017) (unpublished memorandum), the
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    J-S10032-17
    family court found the Children dependent but stated “that the Philadelphia
    Department of Human Services made NO Reasonable Efforts to prevent or
    eliminate the need for removal of this child from the home.”      Family Ct.
    Orders, 4/27/16 (emphasis in original). DHS appealed to this Court from the
    determination that it made no reasonable efforts, explaining that the finding
    implicated DHS’ funding under the Social Security Act.     After determining
    that DHS had standing to pursue the appeal, we held that the family court
    incorrectly based its determination regarding DHS’ reasonable efforts on
    Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, which deals with permanency hearings,
    rather than Section 6351(b), which deals with placement hearings.        See
    generally 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(b), (f).    Because this matter is governed by
    Section 6351(b), we remanded with a direction that the family court
    determine within thirty days “‘whether reasonable efforts were made prior to
    the placement of the child to prevent or eliminate the need for removal’ or
    ‘for an emergency placement, whether such lack of services was reasonable
    under the circumstances,’” pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(b)(2) and (3). In
    re K.S., No. 1662 EDA 2016, at 15-16. We retained panel jurisdiction.
    On May 15, 2017, the family court entered orders finding, among
    other things, “that Reasonable Efforts were made to Prevent or Eliminate
    Removal” of N.B., T.B., and M.B.    Orders, 5/15/17 (emphasis added). On
    July 18, 2017, the family court entered a similar order regarding K.S. Order,
    -3-
    J-S10032-17
    7/18/17.*    Hence, the family court has now complied with our mandate in
    full. Accordingly, we now return to the merits of DHS’s appeal, and, in light
    of the family court’s May 15 and July 18, 2017 orders, we conclude that
    DHS’ appeal is moot.
    By way of background:
    The mootness doctrine requires that an actual case or
    controversy must be extant at all stages of review. Where the
    issues in a case are moot, any opinion issued would be merely
    advisory and, therefore, inappropriate. An issue before a court is
    moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when
    rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing
    controversy.
    *       *   *
    However, if the issues raised by an appeal are substantial
    questions or questions of public importance, and are capable of
    repetition, yet likely to evade appellate review, then we will
    reach the merits of the appeal despite its technical mootness.
    In re 2014 Allegheny Cty. Investigating Grand Jury, 
    147 A.3d 922
    ,
    923-24 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
    In re Gross, 
    382 A.2d 116
    , 119-20 (Pa. 1978) (legal question can become
    moot on appeal as result of intervening change in facts of case); Erie Ins.
    Exch. v. Claypoole, 
    673 A.2d 348
    , 353 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc) (“a
    change in the facts may render a case moot even though it had once been
    ____________________________________________
    *
    In the body of the order, the date is listed as May 15, 2017; however, the
    order reflects that it was printed, and faxed to this Court, on July 18, 2017.
    It appears that the family court initially overlooked our mandate with respect
    to K.S. The court corrected that oversight after we contacted the court, and
    it then issued an order for K.S. that was identical (including the date) to that
    issued for the other children.
    -4-
    J-S10032-17
    actual”). On remand to the family court, DHS obtained the relief it sought
    on appeal — a determination that DHS made reasonable efforts for the
    Children. Because DHS is no longer an aggrieved party, there is no extant
    case or controversy for this Court to resolve. In re 2014 Allegheny Cty.
    Investigating Grand Jury, 147 A.3d at 923-24. We further conclude that
    whether the family court properly resolved whether DHS made “reasonable
    efforts” is an issue unlikely to evade appellate review, as that issue turns on
    the specific facts of each case and DHS may always appeal from any an
    adverse determination on that issue.     For these reasons, we deem DHS’s
    appeal moot.
    Appeal dismissed as moot.
    Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
    case.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/31/2017
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: In the Interest of: K.S., a Minor No. 1662 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 7/31/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021