McShane Construction Company v. Gotham Insurance Company , 867 F.3d 923 ( 2017 )


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  •                   United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 16-2632
    ___________________________
    McShane Construction Company, LLC
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    Gotham Insurance Company
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
    ____________
    Submitted: May 10, 2017
    Filed: August 11, 2017
    ____________
    Before RILEY, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
    McShane Construction, LLC (McShane), a general contractor, sued Gotham
    Insurance Company (Gotham) directly for failing to pay its insurance claim related
    to the alleged improper installation of a fire protection and suppression system by one
    of McShane’s subcontractors, Mallory Fire Protection Services (Mallory)—whom
    McShane has sued separately in Nebraska state court. The district court1 granted
    Gotham’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
    state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and McShane now appeals. Having
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I. Background
    In 2012, McShane began general contract work on the construction of a 196-
    unit, $15 million apartment complex (Project) in Omaha, Nebraska. McShane hired
    Mallory as a subcontractor to design and install a fire suppression and protection
    system for the Project.
    McShane and Mallory executed a subcontract on June 8, 2012, that included
    a provision requiring Mallory to obtain insurance policies and to list McShane as an
    Additional Insured on the Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance policy.
    Mallory subsequently purchased and Gotham issued on September 15, 2012, Gotham
    Policy No. GL2012FSC00451(Policy) to fulfill this requirement. The “Additional
    Insured” endorsement modified the insurance provided under the “Commercial
    General Liability Coverage Part.” It listed “Blanket where required by written
    contract”—which includes McShane since it contracted with Mallory—as the
    Additional Insured, and Gotham provided McShane with a Certificate of Liability
    Insurance verifying McShane as an Additional Insured.
    1
    The Honorable John M. Gerrard, United States District Judge for the District
    of Nebraska.
    -2-
    Under its subcontract with McShane, Mallory designed and installed a fire
    suppression and protection system, which McShane determined was faulty. To
    replace the faulty system, McShane removed previously installed drywall and
    installation leading to damages and losses that McShane alleges exceed $614,291.17.
    Mallory and McShane each filed independent claims with Gotham to cover the
    damages and losses. Gotham eventually combined the two claims into a single claim
    with Mallory listed as the insured. After a comprehensive adjustment process
    including McShane, Gotham’s primary adjuster for this claim sent a final report
    recommending payment of $499,453.57 “for payment of the claim relating to the
    improper installation of the fire sprinkler system.” Gotham subsequently stopped
    communicating with McShane other than through an attorney and ultimately refused
    to provide McShane with a formal coverage determination.
    McShane filed this lawsuit on December 23, 2014, asserting eight causes of
    action including (in the order asserted by McShane) violation of the Nebraska Unfair
    Insurance Trade Practices Act (Count 1), violation of the Nebraska Unfair Insurance
    Claims Settlement Practices Act (Count 2), violation of the implied covenant of good
    faith and fair dealing (Count 3), a claim for attorney’s fees under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-359
     (Count 4), breach of contract (Count 5), waiver and estoppel (Count 6), a
    claim under the rescue doctrine (Count 7), and declaratory relief (Count 8).
    On March 29, 2016, the district court granted Gotham’s motion to dismiss all
    counts. McShane subsequently filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion
    to reconsider and vacate the judgment, which the district court denied on May 9,
    2016. McShane now appeals.2
    2
    McShane has not appealed dismissal of counts 4 and 8.
    -3-
    II. Analysis
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, “accepting
    as true the complaint’s factual allegations and granting all reasonable inferences to
    the non-moving party.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    588 F.3d 585
    , 591 (8th Cir.
    2009).
    To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
    factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
    complaint must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
    of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
    factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
    defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
    . Two working
    principles underlie the analysis: (1) the court’s obligation to accept the non-movant’s
    allegations as true “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” such that “[t]hreadbare
    recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
    statements, do not suffice”; and (2) “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
    relief survives a motion to dismiss, . . . [and] [d]etermining whether a complaint states
    a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
    court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” 
    Id. at 678-79
    .
    We find that the district court’s dismissal of all counts was proper. To explain,
    we will group McShane’s six remaining causes of action into (A) statutory claims, (B)
    those pertaining to breach of contract, and (C) waiver and estoppel.
    -4-
    A. Statutory Claims
    Two of McShane’s claims are based upon Nebraska statutes that provide no
    private right of action and thus, are subject to dismissal for failing to state a claim
    upon which relief can be granted. In asserting its claim under Nebraska’s Unfair
    Insurance Trade Practices Act, McShane alleges that Gotham has “not been
    forthright, truthful, or timely in its adjustment of . . . the [] claims,” and alleges that
    Gotham has acted in bad faith in violation of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-1525
    (9). In
    asserting its claim under Nebraska’s Unfair Insurance Claims Settlement Practices
    Act, McShane alleges that Gotham violated 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-1540
     which lists
    numerous acts or practices that may be considered unfair claims settlement practices
    under Nebraska law.
    However, neither of these statutes provides McShane with a private right of
    action. In Nebraska, “[w]hether a statute creates a private right of action depends on
    the statute’s purpose and whether the Legislature intended to create a private right of
    action.” Prof’l Mgmt. Midwest, Inc. v. Lund Co., 
    826 N.W.2d 225
    , 233 (Neb. 2012).
    The Nebraska Unfair Insurance Trade Practices Act “does not contemplate private
    suits, but instead vests powers and duties in the State Director of Insurance, who is
    empowered to enjoin and penalize certain prohibited acts.” Allied Fin. Servs., Inc.
    v. Foremost Ins. Co., 
    418 F. Supp. 157
    , 162 (D. Neb. 1976). Likewise, “[t]he purpose
    of the Unfair Insurance Claims Settlement Practices Act is to set forth standards for
    the investigation and disposition of claims arising under policies issued to residents
    of this state,” and no private right of action is provided by the Nebraska legislature
    under this statute. 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-1537
    . Therefore, both of these claims were
    properly dismissed because neither rests upon a private right of action and thus, both
    fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
    -5-
    B. Breach of Contract and Related Claims
    McShane asserts four claims arising from the insurance agreements including
    (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
    dealing, (3) failure to recognize third-party beneficiary status, and (4) mitigation.
    McShane argues that “[t]here is an absence of a reasonable basis for [Gotham’s]
    failure to assume and pay for damages . . . sustained by McShane” and alleges that
    Gotham “breached its obligations and duties [under the Policy] to McShane as an
    Additional Insured . . . and/or [as] a Third Party Beneficiary.”
    1. Breach of Contract
    In Nebraska, “[t]he meaning of an insurance policy is a question of law, in
    connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach its own
    conclusions independently of the determination made by the lower court.”
    Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Home Pride Cos., 
    684 N.W.2d 571
    , 575 (Neb. 2004). “In
    construing insurance policy provisions, a court must determine from the clear
    language of the policy whether the insurer in fact insured against the risk involved.”
    
    Id.
     “In an appellate review of an insurance policy, the court construes the policy as
    any other contract to give effect to the parties’ intentions at the time the writing was
    made.” 
    Id.
     “Where the terms of a contract are clear, they are to be accorded their
    plain and ordinary meaning.” 
    Id.
    Here, McShane is listed as an “Additional Insured” under the Policy. In
    Nebraska, “[s]ubject to restrictions in the additional insured endorsement, an
    additional insured has the same coverage rights and obligations as the principal
    insured under the policy.” Federated Serv. Ins. Co. v. Alliance Constr., LLC, 
    805 N.W.2d 468
    , 476 (Neb. 2011). Thus, McShane has the same liability coverage as
    Mallory under the parts of the Policy applicable to McShane. The Additional Insured
    -6-
    endorsement includes McShane as an Additional Insured “only with respect to
    liability for ‘bodily injury,’ ‘property damage’ or ‘personal and advertising injury’
    caused . . . by . . . [Mallory’s] acts or omissions or . . . acts or omissions of those
    acting on [Mallory’s] behalf.” (emphasis added).
    The nature of the Policy as a third-party liability policy is evident in its
    language. “A ‘first-party insurance’ policy protects the insured from his or her own
    losses, while a ‘third-party’ policy provides liability insurance that protects the
    insured from claims resulting from the losses of others.” Metro Renovation, Inc. v.
    Allied Grp., Inc., 
    389 F. Supp. 2d 1131
    , 1132 n.2 (D. Neb. 2005) (citing Douglas R.
    Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their Insureds, 
    88 Ky. L.J. 1
    ,
    2 (2000)). “In the third-party situation, the insurance company will typically have the
    power to defend and control litigation regarding the claims of strangers asserted
    against the insured.” 
    Id.
     Here, the Policy states, “We will pay those sums that the
    insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or
    ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” (emphasis added). Likewise, the
    “Additional Insured” endorsement says that the additional insureds are covered “only
    with respect to liability.” (emphasis added). Thus, the policy covers liability to third
    parties, not first-party losses.
    The Nebraska Supreme Court has determined in a case involving an insurance
    contract with similar language that the insurance company “[did] not have an
    obligation to pay for all acts committed by the insured even though the act by the
    insured may produce an injury covered by the policy” because “until it is determined
    that [the insured] is legally obligated to pay . . . , the question of [the insurance
    company’s] obligation is uncertain and contingent.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Novak, 
    313 N.W.2d 636
    , 639 (Neb. 1981). Here, McShane fails to plausibly allege that any third
    party obtained a judgment denoting a legal obligation for McShane to pay. Because
    McShane failed to allege a legal obligation to pay covered under the terms of the
    Policy, the district court properly granted Gotham’s motion to dismiss.
    -7-
    2. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
    McShane accuses Gotham of “an act or series of acts performed in bad faith.”
    The Nebraska Supreme Court has stated that “in order to establish a claim for bad
    faith, a plaintiff must show an absence of a reasonable basis for denying the benefits
    of the insurance policy and the insurer’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack
    of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.” LeRette v. Am. Med. Sec., Inc., 
    705 N.W.2d 41
    , 47-48 (Neb. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, McShane
    fails to allege that Gotham lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits because it
    failed to state a plausible claim that McShane was legally obligated to pay damages
    covered under the Policy. Therefore, McShane failed to plausibly claim the absence
    of a reasonable basis for denying the benefits, so its claim of bad faith is properly
    dismissed.
    3. Third-Party Beneficiary
    In addition to its claims as an Additional Insured, McShane claims that it is a
    third-party beneficiary to other parts of the Policy not covered by the Additional
    Insured endorsement. “In order for those not named as parties to a contract to recover
    thereunder as third-party beneficiaries, it must appear by express stipulation or by
    reasonable intendment that the rights and interests of such unnamed parties were
    contemplated and provision was made for them.” Props. Inv. Grp. of Mid-Am. v.
    Applied Commc’ns, Inc., 
    495 N.W.2d 483
    , 488 (Neb. 1993). “A third-party
    beneficiary’s rights depend upon, and are measured by, the terms of the contract
    between the promisor and promisee.” Haakinson & Beaty Co. v. Inland Ins. Co., 
    344 N.W.2d 454
    , 458 (Neb. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The right of a
    third party benefitted by a contract to sue thereon rests upon the liability of the
    promisor, which must affirmatively appear from the language of the instrument when
    -8-
    properly interpreted or construed . . . .” Osmond State Bank v. Uecker Grain, Inc.,
    
    419 N.W.2d 518
    , 520 (Neb. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Here, McShane claims third-party beneficiary status under Part D of the Policy,
    in which Mallory is the promisee and Gotham the promisor. Part D is an endorsement
    modifying the CGL coverage and titled “Coverage D—Errors and Omissions
    Liability.” Part D says Gotham will pay “those sums that the insured becomes legally
    obligated to pay as damages because of errors or omissions committed by the Insured
    resulting from the services provided in the declarations.” The “declarations” lists
    “fire suppression” as the “form of business.”
    McShane fails to plausibly allege that its rights and interests were contemplated
    when Mallory and Gotham entered into the portion of the Policy agreement pertaining
    to Mallory’s errors or design liability. McShane alleges no “express stipulation” that
    it is included in Part D—even though McShane is expressly included in other parts
    of the Policy. Instead, the Additional Insured endorsement includes McShane as an
    Additional Insured using language that corresponds to coverage provided only under
    Section I, Parts A and B of the Policy—not Part D. The language does not mention
    coverage for Mallory’s “errors,” for which Mallory has coverage under the “Errors
    and Omissions Coverage Extension” endorsement in Part D. Therefore, McShane
    fails to plausibly allege that the terms of the Policy demonstrate a “reasonable
    intendment” to include McShane in Mallory’s Errors and Omissions coverage or
    allege that such coverage “affirmatively appear[s] from the language of the [Policy],”
    so Gotham’s motion to dismiss was properly granted. Id.; Applied Commc’ns, 495
    N.W.2d at 488.
    4. Mitigation
    McShane’s mitigation claim was first framed under the rescue doctrine.
    McShane’s claim under the rescue doctrine is without merit because the rescue
    -9-
    doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case. “The rescue doctrine contemplates
    a voluntary act by one who, in an emergency and prompted by spontaneous human
    motives to save human life, attempts a rescue which he had no duty to attempt by
    virtue of a legal obligation or duty fastened on him by his employment.” Buchanan
    v. Prickett & Son, Inc., 
    279 N.W.2d 855
    , 858 (Neb. 1979). Here, no facts alleging
    an “emergency . . . prompt[ing] . . . spontaneous human motives to save human life”
    were cited by McShane.
    Apparently recognizing that the rescue doctrine is inapplicable, McShane
    argues that it meant to claim mitigation of damages and that the claim was mislabeled
    in the complaint. McShane cites a case that we decided under Missouri law, Slay
    Warehousing Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 
    471 F.2d 1364
     (8th Cir. 1973), for the
    proposition that it should be compensated for mitigation of damages. However, Slay
    provides no help to McShane, because the Slay policy included language expressly
    requiring mitigation by the insured, while McShane fails to identify any similar
    express language in the Gotham Policy. 
    Id. at 1365
    . “Even assuming [McShane] had
    an implied duty to mitigate or prevent damages, the [Gotham] policy expressly placed
    the burden of such costs on [McShane].” Clarinet, LLC v. Essex Ins. Co., 
    712 F.3d 1246
    , 1250 (8th Cir. 2013). Specifically, the Policy expressly states, “No insured
    will, except at the insured’s own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume an
    obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without our consent.”
    (emphasis added). From a policy standpoint, this makes sense as a business decision
    of the insurance company to prevent the insured from uncontrolled expenditures in
    the name of mitigation without the insurance company’s input.
    Likewise, McShane’s decision to proceed with repairs prior to the
    determination of any legal obligation or entry of judgment was a business decision.
    McShane may be right that it was required to comply with building codes and
    contractually obligated to the owner of the Project. But McShane’s remedy is to sue
    Mallory, not the insurance company directly. McShane is properly a claimant, not an
    -10-
    insured under the Policy for Mallory’s errors and omissions. Further, the Policy does
    not cover contractual liability saying, “This insurance does not apply to . . . ‘property
    damage’ for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by reason of the
    assumption of liability in a contract or agreement.” McShane can and has sued
    Mallory to recover its losses. McShane has failed to state a basis for which its alleged
    mitigation could give it the right to successfully sue Mallory’s insurance company
    directly for Mallory’s alleged errors.
    For the reasons stated above, McShane has failed to state a claim for which
    relief can be granted with regard to its breach of contract theories, and we affirm the
    district court’s dismissal of those counts.
    C. Waiver and Estoppel
    McShane alleges that Gotham waived denial of coverage or should be estopped
    from denying coverage to McShane under the Policy because McShane detrimentally
    relied upon Gotham and the Policy in its decision to hire Mallory. McShane also
    argues reliance because Gotham engaged in a long claim-adjustment process with
    McShane delaying its lawsuit against Mallory, caused McShane to expend resources
    during the prolonged adjustment, and engaged in “other related conduct” indicating
    Gotham did not dispute the claim during the adjustment process.
    The complaint fails to plausibly allege waiver here. The Nebraska Supreme
    Court has stated:
    A waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right,
    privilege, or claim, and may be demonstrated by or inferred from a
    person’s conduct. We have long held that an insurer may waive any
    provision of a policy that is for the insurer’s benefit, including vacancy
    provisions. Ordinarily, to establish a waiver of a legal right, there must
    be a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of a party showing such a
    -11-
    purpose, or acts amounting to an estoppel on his or her part. A party
    may waive a written contract in whole or in part, either directly or
    inferentially. A party may prove the waiver by (1) a party’s express
    declarations manifesting the intent not to claim an advantage or (2) a
    party’s neglecting and failing to act so as to induce the belief that it
    intended to waive.
    D & S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 
    789 N.W.2d 1
    , 17-18 (Neb. 2010) (emphases
    added).
    Here, McShane does not plausibly allege that Gotham waived its rights under
    the Policy. First, there is no allegation of an express declaration by Gotham waiving
    its right to deny McShane’s claim. Second, while McShane may have believed that
    Gotham intended to pay for McShane’s damages, McShane alleges no clear,
    unequivocal, and decisive acts by Gotham indicating that it intended to waive its right
    to deny the claim. To be sure, Gotham did engage in a comprehensive adjustment
    process investigating the reasonableness of McShane’s claimed costs. However,
    Gotham’s communications indicate that it was defending Mallory, with Mallory being
    named as the “Insured” in the communications and with the claim being consolidated
    into the claim number with Mallory listed as the “Insured.” For example, the “Final
    Report” letter that resulted from the adjustment process and recommending
    $499,453.57 in payment clearly lists Mallory as the “Insured,” not McShane. As
    another example, McShane’s May 20, 2013, demand letter to Mallory says Mallory
    should submit the costs for reimbursement on “[Mallory’s] general liability policy.”
    McShane thus understood that the adjustment process was occurring under Mallory’s
    policy. Finding no plausible allegation in the complaint of a clear, unequivocal, and
    decisive act by Gotham to justify any assumptions McShane may have made
    regarding Gotham’s intent to waive its right to deny the claim, we affirm the district
    court’s dismissal of the waiver claim.
    -12-
    Likewise, we find that McShane has failed to sufficiently allege that Gotham
    should be estopped from denying McShane’s claim. Estoppel in Nebraska is defined
    generally by six elements: (1) calculated false representation or concealment of
    material facts, (2) intention or expectation that the other party will act upon or be
    influenced by the first element, (3) knowledge of the real facts, (4) lack of knowledge
    (or means of knowledge) of the truth as to the real facts, (5) good faith reliance upon
    the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped, and (6) resulting change in the
    position or status of the party claiming estoppel. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Regent
    Ins. Co., 
    846 N.W.2d 170
    , 192-93 (Neb. 2014). “[E]stoppel cannot be invoked to
    expand the scope of coverage of an insurance contract absent a showing of
    detrimental good faith reliance upon statements or conduct of the party against whom
    estoppel is invoked which reasonably led an insured to believe coverage was
    present.” Design Data Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 
    503 N.W.2d 552
    , 560 (Neb. 1993)
    (emphasis added). “As a general rule, the doctrine of estoppel may not be used to
    bring within the coverage of a policy risks not covered by its terms, or risks expressly
    excluded therefrom.” First United Bank of Bellevue v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 
    496 N.W.2d 474
    , 480 (Neb. 1993) (emphasis added). Here, as noted above, Part D of the
    Policy covering Mallory’s errors and omissions expressly excluded the property
    damage claimed by McShane from coverage.
    “A widely recognized exception to the general estoppel rule is that when an
    insurance company assumes the defense of an action against its insured, without
    reservation of rights, and,with knowledge, actual or presumed, of facts which would
    have permitted it to deny coverage, it may be estopped from subsequently raising the
    defense of non-coverage.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added). “The exception to the general
    estoppel rule applies when an insured is able to show (1) that the insurer had
    sufficient knowledge of facts or circumstances indicating non-coverage, (2) that the
    insurer assumed or continued defense of the insured without obtaining an effective
    reservation of rights agreement, and (3) that the insured suffered some type of harm
    or prejudice.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    -13-
    Here, McShane does not plausibly allege that Gotham assumed or continued
    defense of any claim against McShane. As noted above, Gotham’s communications
    internally and with McShane indicated that it was defending Mallory. Upon receipt
    of a demand letter from McShane, Mallory tendered defense of the action to Gotham
    leading Gotham to open a claim file into which it eventually merged McShane’s
    claim—indicating that Gotham was treating McShane’s claim as one directed against
    Mallory by McShane, and not one covering McShane as an Additional Insured.
    McShane’s May 20, 2013, demand letter to Mallory instructed Mallory to submit the
    costs on “[Mallory’s] general liability policy”—not under McShane’s Additional
    Insured policy. Likewise, communications between McShane and Gotham did not
    assert the claim based upon McShane’s status as an Additional Insured. Instead, the
    demand letter clearly says that McShane is making a claim against Mallory for
    damages due to design errors committed by Mallory and covered under Mallory’s
    general liability policy. McShane fails to allege that Gotham assumed its defense
    qualifying for an exception to the general estoppel rule. 
    Id.
     Thus, McShane fails to
    plausibly allege that it relied, in good faith, on any promises by Gotham, and is
    therefore not entitled to estoppel.
    For the reasons stated above, McShane failed to state a claim upon which relief
    can be granted based upon waiver or estoppel, so those counts were properly
    dismissed.
    III. Conclusion
    After giving all reasonable inferences to McShane and accepting the factual
    allegations as true while drawing on our judicial experience and common sense, we
    find that McShane has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
    Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of Gotham’s Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
    -14-
    BEAM, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
    It is my view that McShane Construction Company, LLC, as an endorsed
    "Additional Insured" under the Gotham insurance policy, enjoys such insurance
    coverage as is provided by the policy's "Commercial General Liability" part. This
    would include, absent presently unstated limitations, coverage for any actionable
    claims McShane may have against its subcontractor Mallory. Thus, within the time
    frame of an applicable statute of limitations, McShane may state a cause of action
    against Mallory, if any exists. To date, McShane has not done so.
    Accordingly, as the court points out, Nebraska law prevents McShane from
    seeking redress within this litigation. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Novak, 
    313 N.W.2d 636
    , 639 (Neb. 1981).
    ______________________________
    -15-