STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BASSIL E. BASSIL(14-02-0244, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4602-14T1
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    BASSIL E. BASSIL,
    SENECA INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Surety,
    and DAVID TARUSSI, Agent,
    Defendants,
    and
    FLASH BAIL BONDS, Agency,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________________________
    Submitted February 14, 2017 – Decided August 14, 2017
    Before Judges Koblitz and Sumners.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No.
    14-02-0244.
    Law Office of Jarred S. Freeman, LLC,
    attorneys for appellant (Mr. Freeman, on the
    brief).
    Law Office of Christopher J. Kane, LLC,
    attorney for respondent (Mr. Kane, of counsel
    and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Flash Bail Bonds (Flash Bail) appeals from the Law
    Division's   April   23,   2015   order   denying   its   motion   to   stay
    execution of judgment requiring forfeiture of bail posted for
    Bassil E. Bassil.    For the reasons expressed below, we affirm.
    We glean the following relevant facts and procedural history
    from the record on appeal.          On August 10, 2013, Flash Bail
    indemnified the $50,000 bail posted for Bassil for charges arising
    in Bergen County.     Three days after being released, Bassil was
    arrested and incarcerated on new charges occurring in Middlesex
    County.   For those charges, Speedy Bail Bonds posted bail in the
    amount of $150,000 for Bassil on August 19. Flash Bail was unaware
    of Bassil's subsequent arrest and release on bail.
    Following Bassil's failure to appear in court on March 20,
    2014, a judgment of forfeiture of the bail secured by Flash Bail
    was entered on June 25, 2014, with enforcement of the judgment
    stayed until September 9, 2014, to allow Flash Bail the opportunity
    to surrender Bassil.1      Although Bassil remained a fugitive, the
    trial court granted Flash Bail's motion to stay enforcement until
    November 7, 2014.
    1
    Bail posted by Speedy Bail Bonds was also forfeited, but it is
    not a subject of this appeal.
    2                               A-4602-14T1
    When Bassil could not be located, Flash Bail filed another
    request on November 7, 2014, to stay enforcement of the forfeiture
    judgment.2    According to Flash Bail, it had been trying to locate
    Bassil since November 2013, after he failed to report to their
    office, and their investigation led them to believe that he may
    have fled the country.
    For reasons that are unclear from the record, the trial court
    did not conduct argument on the motion until April 23, 2015.
    Considering     Flash    Bail's     motion   as    a   request   to   vacate   the
    forfeiture judgment, the court determined there was no basis to
    do so, and entered an order that day denying the application.
    Flash Bail filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2015.
    Before us, Flash Bail contends that we should "discharge its
    liability with respect to [] Bassil's bail and return the $50,000
    forfeited" because the State did not notify it of the new charges
    and the bail posted by Speedy Bail Bonds days after Flash Bail had
    posted bail.     In support, Flash Bail cites State v. Ceylan, 
    352 N.J. Super. 139
    , 144 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 
    174 N.J. 545
    (2002),   for   the     principle    that    the   new   bail    recognized    the
    increased risk of flight, which was a material change in its bail
    agreement with Bassil.       We are not persuaded.
    2
    Although there was no appeal at that point, Flash Bail also
    sought to post a supersedeas bond in lieu of cash pending appeal.
    3                                 A-4602-14T1
    Initially, we point out that the oral decision supporting the
    April 23, 2015 order lacked a clear statement of reasons as
    required by Rule 1:7-4.       That deficiency does not, however,
    preclude our conclusion that the judgment of forfeiture should not
    be vacated.
    We next address the State's contention that Flash Bail's
    appeal is untimely.     We disagree with the State's argument that
    Flash Bail is appealing the judgment of forfeiture entered on June
    25, 2014. Flash Bail is appealing the April 23, 2015 order denying
    its motion to vacate the judgment of forfeiture after two stays
    of enforcement had been granted.      Thus, Flash Bail's notice of
    appeal filed on June 3, 2015, was timely.    See R. 2:4-1(a).
    Though Flash Bail does not expressly argue that it is entitled
    to vacate the trial court's judgment under Rule 4:50-1, it does
    so implicitly by maintaining that the trial court erred in not
    discharging the judgment of forfeiture because the State failed
    to notify it of the increased risk of flight due to the new bail
    posted for Bassil.     Rule 4:50-1(f) is a catch-all provision that
    authorizes a court to relieve a party from a judgment or order for
    "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
    judgment or order."3    The essence of subsection (f) is to achieve
    3
    Rule 4:50-1(a)-(e) authorizes a court to relieve a party from a
    final judgment or order for reasons such as: mistake or
    4                         A-4602-14T1
    equity and justice in exceptional situations that cannot be easily
    categorized.   DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 
    198 N.J. 242
    , 269-70
    (2009) (citing Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 
    48 N.J. 334
    , 341 (1966)).
    We review a court's determination of a Rule 4:50-1 motion
    under an abuse of discretion standard.    U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
    Guillaume, 
    209 N.J. 449
    , 467 (2012).       There is "an abuse of
    discretion when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation,
    inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
    impermissible basis.'"   
    Ibid. (quoting Iliadis v.
    Wal-Mart Stores,
    Inc., 
    191 N.J. 88
    , 123 (2007)).
    Considering that the matter before us involves the forfeiture
    of bail, we are also mindful that the issue of remission of a
    forfeiture is equitable in nature. State v. Hyers, 
    122 N.J. Super. 177
    , 180 (App. Div. 1973).   Pursuant to Rule 3:26-6(b), the court
    may set aside a forfeiture of bail "in whole or in part, if its
    enforcement is not required in the interest of justice upon such
    conditions as it imposes." R. 3:26-6(b) (emphasis added); see
    State v. Peace, 
    63 N.J. 127
    , 129 (1973).      Thus, we review the
    motion judge's decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Ventura,
    
    196 N.J. 203
    , 213 (2008).
    inadvertence; certain newly discovered evidence; fraud; the
    judgment or order is void; or the judgment or order has been
    satisfied. These provisions do not address the argument raised
    by Flash Bail.
    5                         A-4602-14T1
    Applying these standards, there is no sound reason to justify
    vacation of the judgment of forfeiture.         Flash Bail cites no legal
    authority requiring the State to notify a surety that a bond it
    posted for a criminal defendant increased in risk because the
    defendant was charged with a subsequent offense resulting in a new
    higher bail that was posted by another surety.
    Flash Bail's reliance on Ceylan is misplaced.               There, we
    concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it
    refused to permit the surety to surrender the defendant and obtain
    exoneration   on   the   recognizance   bond    once   the   defendant   was
    convicted at trial on an unrelated charge.             
    Ceylan, supra
    , 352
    N.J. Super. at 145.      We concluded that because the risk of flight
    by the defendant "had changed materially from that existing prior
    to trial [on the unrelated charge]" the judge abused his discretion
    by permitting the defendant to remain free on bail, and by denying
    the surety's motion for exoneration.       
    Id. at 144-45.
    Here, the surety, Flash Bail, did not motion for exoneration
    of the bond based upon the surrender of Bassil.              Significantly,
    it is clear from the record that the trial court gave Flash Bail
    more than ample opportunity to surrender Bassil before executing
    the judgment of forfeiture.     When the judgment was entered on June
    23, 2014, the court stayed execution until September 9, 2014, to
    allow Flash Bail to produce Bassil.            Because Bassil remained a
    6                               A-4602-14T1
    fugitive, stay of enforcement was extended to November 7, 2014.
    In fact, the stay was essentially extended for almost six months
    until April 23, 2015, when the court eventually denied Flash Bail's
    request to vacate the judgment of forfeiture, which had been filed
    on November 7, 2014.
    Furthermore, despite recognizing that a surety should be
    afforded the opportunity to decide whether it is willing to accept
    the increased risk after a defendant failed to appear for court
    proceedings following the surety's issuance of the recognizance,
    Ceylan did not impose an obligation on the State to notify a surety
    of an increased risk of forfeiting a posted bond for a defendant
    who is charged with or found guilty of subsequent offenses.       See
    
    id. at 143.
      Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused
    its discretion in refusing to either vacate the       judgment of
    forfeiture, or continue to stay execution of the judgment.
    Affirmed.
    7                           A-4602-14T1