BRUCE A. PATERSON VS. THE COMBINED PLANNING BOARD/ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF THE BOROUGH OFGARWOOD(L-3224-14, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2328-15T1
    BRUCE A. PATERSON, ILEEN
    CUCCARO, HORACE CORBIN and
    DAVID CORBIN,
    Plaintiffs-Respondents,
    v.
    THE COMBINED PLANNING BOARD/
    ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF
    THE BOROUGH OF GARWOOD,
    Defendant-Respondent,
    and
    ANGELA VILLARAUT and SANDRO
    VILLARAUT,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ________________________________
    Argued June 6, 2017 – Decided June 28, 2017
    Before Judges Yannotti and Gilson.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-3224-
    14.
    Stephen F. Hehl argued the cause for
    appellants (Hehl & Hehl, P.C., attorneys; Mr.
    Hehl, of counsel and on the brief; Cory Klein,
    on the brief).
    John DeNoia argued the cause for respondents
    Bruce A. Paterson, Ileen Cuccaro, Horace
    Corbin and David Corbin (Kochanski, Baron &
    Galfy, P.C., attorneys; Mr. DeNoia, on the
    brief).
    New Jersey State Bar Association, amicus
    curiae (Thomas H. Prol, Howard D. Geneslaw,
    Cameron W. MacLeod, and Michael D. DeLoreto,
    on the brief).
    Respondent The Combined Planning Board/Zoning
    Board of Adjustment of the Borough of Garwood
    has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Defendants    Sandro     Villaraut    and   Angela       Villaraut     (the
    Villarauts) appeal from an order entered by the Law Division on
    November 4, 2015, which reversed a decision by                    the Combined
    Planning Board and Zoning Board of Adjustment of the Borough of
    Garwood (Board), and remanded the matter to the Board for a new
    hearing. The Villarauts also appeal from an order entered by the
    court    on     January   19,     2016,     denying     their      motion     for
    reconsideration. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
    the matter to the Board for further fact-finding.
    I.
    The Villarauts are the owners of approximately one acre of
    land in the Borough of Garwood. The property is located in the
    Borough's RA zone, where single-family residences are permitted
    uses    but   multi-family    uses   are    not.   On   March    4,   2014,    the
    2                                  A-2328-15T1
    Villarauts filed an application with the Board seeking a use
    variance to permit the construction on the property of a multi-
    family development consisting of four three-bedroom and five two-
    bedroom townhouses.
    The   Villarauts    also   sought    bulk   variances   for   building
    height, floor area, and density for the development. The Villarauts
    bifurcated their application and initially sought only the use and
    bulk variances, reserving the site plan application for a later
    date depending on whether the Board granted the variances.
    On May 8, 2014, notice of a public hearing on the application
    was published in The Westfield Leader, a newspaper distributed in
    Garwood and other municipalities. Notices also were mailed to the
    owners of properties within two-hundred feet of the site of the
    proposed development.
    The notices stated that on May 28, 2014, at 7:30 p.m., the
    Board   would   be   considering   an    application   for   use   and   bulk
    variances for the proposed construction of nine multi-family units
    in the RA zone where multi-family uses are not permitted. The
    notices identified the property involved.
    The notices also stated that variance relief was being sought
    from the zoning restrictions for maximum floor area, the number
    of units permitted per acre, and the principal building height,
    as well as such other restrictions as may be required. The notices
    3                                A-2328-15T1
    informed the public and neighboring property owners that they
    could appear at the scheduled hearing and present any objections
    they may have to the application.
    On May 28, 2014, the Board held a public hearing on the
    application.    At    the   start    of       the   hearing,    counsel     for    the
    Villarauts explained the variances that were being sought and
    stated   that   the    Villarauts     would         be   willing     to   commit    to
    restricting occupancy in the proposed development to persons who
    are aged fifty-five years or older. Counsel for the Villarauts
    then presented expert testimony in support of the application from
    professional engineer Thomas J. Quinn, traffic engineer Joseph J.
    Staigar, architect Glenn Potter, and professional planner John
    McDonough.
    Quinn discussed the proposed height of the buildings, noting
    that the buildings would have a height of thirty-six feet, which
    exceeds the existing thirty-foot limit. Quinn also discussed the
    density and floor-area ratio of the structures. He stated that the
    proposed     residential    use     would       eliminate      the   current      non-
    conforming use on the property, and bring the property more into
    conformity with the intent of the Borough's zoning ordinance.
    Quinn asserted that the property could accommodate the proposed
    development.
    4                                  A-2328-15T1
    Staigar discussed the traffic-impact study that he prepared
    with regard to the proposed development. He reviewed the existing
    roadways and traffic conditions in the area, and estimated the
    volume of traffic the proposed development is expected to generate.
    Staigar said he did not believe the proposed development would
    have a negative impact upon traffic. He noted that age-restricted
    townhouses would have less of an impact on traffic than dwellings
    that are not age-restricted. Staigar also discussed the safety of
    the proposed entrances and exits for traffic in the development.
    Potter testified as to the size and interior configurations
    of the proposed buildings. Potter noted that the buildings each
    would be three stories tall. In addition, McDonough testified
    about the property, the location, and the development's proximity
    to the local train station. He discussed the purposes of zoning,
    and stated that granting the variances would advance several of
    those purposes.
    The Board then gave members of the public an opportunity to
    comment. Four residents opposed the application. They expressed
    concerns about traffic, whether the project complied with the
    Borough's master plan, the run-off of water from the site, and
    whether the development was appropriate for the location. Those
    who opposed the application did not present any expert testimony.
    5                           A-2328-15T1
    The Board voted to approve the application, but conditioned
    the approval upon restricting occupancy in the townhouses to
    persons    aged    fifty-five     years   or     older.   Plaintiffs    Bruce        A.
    Paterson    and    Ileen      Cuccaro   were    members   of    the   Board      that
    considered        the   application.          Paterson    voted     against         the
    application, and Cuccaro recused herself from the matter.
    Thereafter,        the    Board    memorialized      its     decision     in     a
    resolution dated July 23, 2014. In the resolution, the Board
    summarized the expert testimony and the comments of the public.
    The Board credited the testimony presented by Quinn, Staigar,
    Potter, and McDonough.
    The Board found that special reasons existed for the proposed
    use variance, and that the project would be consistent with the
    Borough's master plan. The Board also found that the development
    would improve the aesthetics of the property, and it would have
    little negative impact upon the surrounding properties or upon the
    Borough's zone plan or zoning ordinance. In addition, the Board
    found that strict application of the zoning ordinance would result
    in a hardship to defendants.
    II.
    On September 8, 2014, plaintiffs filed an action in lieu of
    prerogative writs in the Law Division, alleging that the notice
    of the hearing on the application did not comply with the Municipal
    6                                  A-2328-15T1
    Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -163, because the notice
    mischaracterized the nature of the relief sought. Plaintiffs also
    alleged that the Board's resolution was "insufficient" because it
    did not make the required findings of fact or "special reasons"
    required to obtain the use variance.
    The Law Division judge conducted a hearing in the matter on
    October 14, 2015. The parties agreed that plaintiffs Horace Corbin
    and David Corbin had standing to challenge the Board's decision.
    Therefore, the court did not address whether Paterson and Cuccaro
    also had standing to maintain this action.
    The judge filed an order dated November 4, 2015, reversing
    the Board's decision and remanding the matter to the Board for
    further proceedings. In an accompanying statement of reasons, the
    judge noted that the MLUL requires that the notice of the hearing
    state, among other things, "the nature of the matters to be
    considered." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11.
    The parties did not present the court with a copy of the
    actual notice used, but they agreed that the notice set forth the
    date, time, and place of the hearing. The notice also identified
    the property involved, and the location and time when maps and
    documents pertaining to the application would be available for
    inspection.
    7                          A-2328-15T1
    The judge found that the notice of the hearing did not comply
    with N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11 because it failed to inform the public or
    neighboring property owners that occupancy in the townhouses would
    be age-restricted. The judge stated that the reference in the
    notice to multi-family townhouses was not specific enough to inform
    the public and affected property owners of the proposed use.
    The judge wrote that, "[i]f the public and nearby property
    owners had been properly apprised, it is reasonable to believe
    that additional individuals may have attended this meeting to
    object to the use." The judge decided that the matter must be
    remanded to the Board for a new hearing with proper notice.
    The judge also discussed the sufficiency of the Board's
    resolution,   "so   that   if   the   matter   is   presented   again,   the
    deficiencies can be corrected." The judge stated that the Board's
    factual findings regarding the grant of the use variance were
    insufficient because they were conclusory. The judge stated that
    the Board should specify those findings of fact that apply to the
    positive and negative criteria for the variance "and explain the
    rationale behind these conclusions."
    On November 24, 2015, the Villarauts filed a motion for
    reconsideration. They presented the court with a copy of the notice
    used, and argued that the judge erred by finding that the hearing
    notice was deficient. On January 8, 2016, the judge heard oral
    8                             A-2328-15T1
    argument on the motion, and on January 19, 2016, the judge filed
    an order denying the motion, with an accompanying statement of
    reasons.   The    judge   determined       that   there     was   no   basis   for
    reconsideration of her prior order. This appeal followed.
    III.
    On appeal, the Villarauts argue that: (1) the trial court
    erred by finding that the notice of the hearing did not comply
    with   N.J.S.A.   40:55D-11;   (2)     the    judge    misapplied       Pond   Run
    Watershed Ass'n v. Township of Hamilton Zoning Board of Adjustment,
    
    397 N.J. Super. 335
     (App. Div. 2008), by holding that the hearing
    notice was defective; (3) the notice of the hearing does not have
    to inform the public of the potentially limitless number of
    mitigating conditions a Board might impose upon approval of a
    variance; (4) imposition of an age restriction on occupancy does
    not render the hearing a nullity; (5) it is irrelevant when the
    age    restriction   first   arose,    provided       the    Board     adequately
    considered the condition; (6) in ruling on the adequacy of notice,
    the court must consider the actual form of notice employed; (7)
    in deciding that the notice was deficient, the court improperly
    considered whether members of the public could have prepared for
    the hearing differently; (8) neither plaintiffs nor the trial
    court identified any actual or hypothetical concern with the age
    restriction, which was a mitigating condition designed to lessen
    9                                  A-2328-15T1
    public concern; (9) existence of members of the public who might
    be interested in purchasing a residential unit is not relevant to
    determining     whether      the   notice     was   adequate;   (10)    plaintiffs
    waived their right to challenge the notice because a number of
    plaintiffs attended the hearing; (11) the hearing notice was
    sufficient because the age restriction relates to ownership and
    occupancy and was irrelevant to the proposed use from a municipal-
    land-use-notice perspective; (12) occupancy of the units could
    have been restricted at any time without the need for Board
    approval;     and     (13)     this      court      should   exercise     original
    jurisdiction and affirm the Board's grant of the variances because
    the   Board's       decision       was   not     arbitrary,     capricious,       or
    unreasonable.
    We granted the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) leave
    to appear in this appeal as amicus curiae. The NJSBA argues that:
    (1) the trial court erred by imposing notice requirements that are
    more stringent than those provided in the MLUL; (2) the court
    failed to recognize that securing land use approvals is a process
    that requires a dialogue between a developer, the Board, and the
    public in a limited time period; and (3) the court's decision will
    undermine the finality and repose generally accorded to land use
    approvals.
    10                                A-2328-15T1
    In response to these arguments, plaintiffs argue that the
    trial court correctly determined that the hearing notice was
    deficient because the public and neighboring property owners were
    not informed that the proposed use would be age-restricted. They
    further argue that the Board's findings of fact were inadequate.
    IV.
    We turn first to the Villarauts' argument that the trial
    court erred by finding that the hearing notice did not comply with
    N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11. The Villarauts contend that the notice met the
    statutory   requirements    because       in   addition   to    the   required
    information about the hearing, the notice informed the public and
    neighboring property owners of the nature and character of the
    application that the Board would be considering. They argue that
    the notice did not have to refer to the fact that occupancy in the
    proposed townhouses would be age-restricted.
    When   reviewing   a   trial   court's      decision      regarding    the
    validity of a local board's determination, "we are bound by the
    same standards as was the trial court." Fallone Props., L.L.C. v.
    Bethlehem Twp. Planning Bd., 
    369 N.J. Super. 552
    , 562 (App. Div.
    2004). Generally, a court must give deference to the actions and
    factual findings of local boards and may not disturb such findings
    unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 
    Id. at 560
    . A board's decision must be based on substantial evidence in
    11                                 A-2328-15T1
    the record. Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    172 N.J. 75
    , 89 (2002). We review any issue of law de novo. Wilson v.
    Brick Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    405 N.J. Super. 189
    , 197
    (App. Div. 2009).
    It is undisputed that the MLUL required the Board to give the
    public and owners of properties within two-hundred feet of the
    property involved notice of the hearing at which the Villarauts'
    application would be considered. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-12(b). The MLUL
    requires that the notice
    state the date, time and place of the hearing,
    the nature of the matters to be considered
    and, in the case of notices pursuant to
    [N.J.S.A.   40:55D-12]   of   this   act,   an
    identification of the property proposed for
    development by street address, if any, or by
    reference to lot and block numbers as shown
    on the current tax duplicate in the municipal
    tax assessor's office, and the location and
    times at which any maps and documents for
    which approval is sought are available
    pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(b)].
    [N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11.]
    It is well established that public notice in accordance with
    the MLUL "is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a zoning board's
    exercise of its authority." Pond Run, supra, 
    397 N.J. Super. at 350
    . The notice must "fairly apprise" the public and neighboring
    property owners of the "nature and character of the proposed
    12                          A-2328-15T1
    development." Perlmart of Lacey, Inc. v. Lacey Twp. Planning Bd.,
    
    295 N.J. Super. 234
    , 237 (App. Div. 1996).
    Here, the Board provided the following notice to the public
    and owners of property within two-hundred feet of the subject
    property:
    PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that on Wednesday, May 28,
    2014 at 7:30PM in the Borough of Garwood
    Municipal Building, Council Chambers, . . . a
    PUBLIC HEARING will be held by the [Board] for
    use and bulk variance approvals (Sections 106-
    91B: multi-family use not permitted in RA
    Zone; 106-91C(8): maximum floor area – [3500]
    sf. permitted, 27,020 sf. proposed; 106-91A:
    density – 8 units per acre permitted, 9 units
    per acre proposed; 106-91C(5): principal
    building height – 2.5 stories/30 ft. maximum,
    3 stories/36 ft. proposed) and such other
    variances, relief and/or waivers that may be
    required upon an analysis of the plans and
    testimony at the PUBLIC HEARING on the
    bifurcated Application submitted by the
    Applicants/Owners . . . .
    The notice "fairly apprised" the public and neighboring property
    owners with information concerning the "nature and character of
    the proposed development." 
    Ibid.
    The notice made clear that the applicant was seeking to
    construct     multi-family     structures    on    property     zoned    for
    residential    single-family    dwellings.   The   notice     detailed   the
    number of structures proposed for construction, and informed the
    public that variances were being sought from zoning requirements
    for building height, number of stories, and maximum floor area.
    13                               A-2328-15T1
    The notice described the proposed structures and informed the
    public of the extent to which the structures deviated from the
    zoning requirements for which the variances were sought.
    As noted, the judge found that the notice was deficient
    because it did not state that occupancy in the proposed development
    would be restricted to persons aged fifty-five years or older.
    However, the fact that the units will be age-restricted does not
    raise        a    "heightened     concern"     to   the    public    regarding     the
    application.           Shakoor    Supermarkets,     Inc.    v.   Old    Bridge    Twp.
    Planning Bd., 
    420 N.J. Super. 193
    , 203 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
    
    208 N.J. 598
     (2011). Indeed, the restriction of occupancy to
    persons aged fifty-five or older would not affect the essential
    use     of       the   property    for   multi-family       structures.     The    age
    restriction also would not affect the number of buildings to be
    constructed, or the other building features for which variances
    were requested.
    Our decision in Pond Run does not compel a different result.
    In that case, we determined that a notice of a hearing was
    deficient because it informed the public that the zoning board
    would        be    considering      an   application       for   a     variance    for
    "retail/office" uses, while the proposed development included
    plans for a large sit-down restaurant that would seek a liquor
    license. Pond Run, supra, 
    397 N.J. Super. at 352
    .
    14                                 A-2328-15T1
    We   found   the   "generic    reference"   in    the   notice    to
    "retail/office uses" did not "reasonably put a neighbor, or an
    interested resident, on notice that a substantial restaurant was
    contemplated for the site." 
    Id. at 352-53
    . We observed that the
    proposed restaurant would be open seven days per week until ten
    or eleven o'clock at night and that the restaurant was not an
    accessory use of any other building in the proposal. 
    Id. at 353
    .
    The concerns we expressed in Pond Run as to the notice are
    not present in this case. As we have explained, the notice of the
    hearing fairly apprised the public and neighboring property owners
    of the nature and character of the proposed use and the variances
    requested.
    Our decision in Shakoor Supermarkets supports our conclusion
    that the notice used here met the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-
    11. In that case, the applicant sought site plan approval for the
    construction of a retail store of 150,000 square feet. Shakoor
    Supermarkets, supra, 
    420 N.J. Super. at 196
    . The notice did not,
    however, identify the store as a Walmart. 
    Ibid.
           We found that the
    notice met the statutory requirements. 
    Id. at 203
    .
    We emphasized that a hearing notice does not have to be
    exhaustive. 
    Id.
     at 201 (citing Perlmart, 
    supra,
     
    295 N.J. Super. at 239
    ). The notice need only provide a "common sense description
    of the nature of the application, such that the ordinary layperson
    15                           A-2328-15T1
    could understand its potential impact upon him or her." 
    Ibid.
    (quoting Perlmart, 
    supra,
     
    295 N.J. Super. at 239
    ).
    We concluded that the notice adequately informed the public
    that a major "big box" store was proposed for the site, and alerted
    the public to concerns typically associated with such stores. Id.
    at 203. We stated that none of the uses anticipated for the store
    raised any "heightened concern" for the public. Ibid. (quoting
    Pond Run, 
    supra,
     
    397 N.J. Super. at 354
    ).
    Here,   the   same   conclusion   applies.   The   hearing    notice
    provided a common sense description of the proposed development
    and its impact. The limitation of occupancy to persons aged fifty-
    five or older did not raise a "heightened concern" for the public
    as to the proposed use. Indeed, as the evidence presented at the
    hearing showed, age-restricted multi-family dwellings are likely
    to have less impact upon the community than dwellings without such
    restrictions.
    We conclude that that the hearing notice used here complied
    with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-11. In         view   of      our
    decision, we need not consider the other issues raised by the
    Villarauts and the NJSBA regarding the notice.
    V.
    The Villarauts note that because the trial court ruled that
    the hearing notice was inadequate, the court did not determine
    16                              A-2328-15T1
    whether the Board's decision to grant the application complied
    with the MLUL. The Villarauts therefore argue that we should
    exercise original jurisdiction and address this issue.
    Rule 2:10-5 provides that "[t]he appellate court may exercise
    such     original     jurisdiction    as     is     necessary   to   complete
    determination of any matter on review." We may exercise such
    jurisdiction "when there is 'public interest in an expeditious
    disposition of the significant issues raised[.]'" Price v. Himeji,
    LLC, 
    214 N.J. 263
    , 294 (2013) (quoting Karins v. City of Atlantic
    City, 
    152 N.J. 532
    , 540-41 (1998)). Original jurisdiction also may
    be exercised "to eliminate unnecessary further litigation." 
    Ibid.
    We     are   convinced,   however,    that    the    exercise   of   original
    jurisdiction in this matter would not be appropriate.
    As we noted previously, the Law Division judge stated that
    the Board failed to provide adequate findings of fact to support
    its decision granting the variances. We agree with the judge's
    assessment of the Board's findings, and conclude that more detailed
    fact-findings are necessary.
    In    this   matter,   the   Villarauts      sought   variance    relief
    pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d), which provides that a board of
    adjustment has the power
    [i]n particular cases for special reasons,
    [to] grant a variance to allow departure from
    [zoning] regulations . . . to permit: (1) a
    17                                A-2328-15T1
    use or principal structure in a district
    restricted against such use or principal
    structure . . . .
    . . . .
    No variance or other relief may be granted
    under the terms of this section, including a
    variance   or  other   relief  involving   an
    inherently beneficial use, without a showing
    that such variance or other relief can be
    granted without substantial detriment to the
    public good and will not substantially impair
    the intent and the purpose of the zone plan
    and zoning ordinance.
    In Medici v. BPR Co., 
    107 N.J. 1
    , 21 (1987), the Court stated
    that the grant of a use variance requires "an enhanced quality of
    proof and clear and specific findings by the board of adjustment
    that the variance sought is not inconsistent with the intent and
    purpose of the master plan and zoning ordinance." The Court also
    stated that the applicant's proofs and the board's findings must
    reconcile the proposed use with its omission of the uses permitted
    in the applicable zoning district. 
    Ibid.
    The Court observed that, when a use variance is challenged,
    "a   conclusory   resolution     that      merely   recites      the   statutory
    language will be vulnerable to the contention that the negative
    criteria   have   not   been    adequately     established."       
    Id. at 23
    .
    Conclusory   findings   in     the   resolution     will   not    reflect     "the
    deliberative and specific determination" required to satisfy the
    negative criteria. 
    Id. at 25
    .
    18                                 A-2328-15T1
    In her statement of reasons, the Law Division judge wrote
    that the Board's resolution in this case
    states special reasons exist for the proposed
    use   variance.    While   the    [r]esolution
    incorporates    [ninety-four]     points    of
    testimony, this conclusory statement alone
    regarding special uses is insufficient. The
    [r]esolution also states in a conclusory
    fashion: that the proposed use is not
    inconsistent with the master plan of Garwood,
    there will be improvements to the aesthetics
    of the property, little if any negative impact
    upon the surrounding properties, or upon the
    zone plan or the zoning ordinances, and a
    hardship to applicant would result from the
    strict application of the zoning ordinance.
    While these statements may be supported by the
    record before the Board, the [r]esolution's
    conclusions should specify which findings of
    fact apply to the positive and negative
    criteria for the variance and explain the
    rationale behind those conclusions. As stated
    in Medici, a conclusory statement that merely
    recites the statutory language is vulnerable
    to the contention that the criteria have not
    been adequately establish[ed].
    We   agree   with   the   judge's   conclusion   that   the   Board's
    resolution lacks the fact-finding required by Medici. We therefore
    affirm the provision of the trial court's November 4, 2016 order
    remanding the matter to the Board, but limit the remand to further
    fact-finding. On remand, the Board shall issue a new resolution,
    setting forth specific findings of fact to support its decision.
    19                              A-2328-15T1
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the Board
    for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not
    retain jurisdiction.
    20                          A-2328-15T1