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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-10455
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-00222-CG-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VICTOR SOLORCINO TAVIA,
a.k.a. Victor Solorcino-Tavia,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(August 23, 2018)
Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Victor Solorzano-Tavia1 received a statutory-maximum 24-month sentence
for violating the terms of his supervised release. On appeal, he argues that his
sentence was greater than necessary and thus substantively unreasonable. We
disagree.
“We review the sentence imposed [by the district court] upon the revocation
of supervised release for reasonableness.” United States v. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d
1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks, citation omitted). A district
court’s decision to exceed the guideline sentencing range is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Aguillard,
217 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000).
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that the sentence is
unreasonable. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
Upon finding that a defendant has violated a condition of supervised release,
a district court may revoke the term of supervised release and impose a term of
imprisonment after considering the following criteria: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the Sentencing
Guidelines and policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to
avoid unwarranted disparity among defendants; and (7) the need to provide
restitution to victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (cross-referencing § 3553(a)(1),
1
Solorzano’s name has been incorrectly spelled in lower court documents as “Solorcino.”
2
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(a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7)). When considering what sentence is substantively
reasonable regarding revocation of supervised release, the sentencing court should
“sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a
limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation.” U.S.S.G. § 7A
Introduction 3(b). Additionally, the Guidelines advise that “any sentence of
imprisonment for a criminal offense that is imposed after revocation of probation
or supervised release be run consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed
upon revocation.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3 n.4. We will only vacate a sentence if we are
convinced that the sentence falls beyond the reasonable range of sentences for a
given case. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
Here, Solorzano has not met his burden of demonstrating that his sentence is
unreasonable. See
Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378. First, it is undisputed that Solorzano
had, at the time of this trial, tried to illegally reenter the United States on seven
prior occasions, three of which had resulted in convictions. In imposing its
sentence, the court followed 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and considered, among other
things, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics
of the defendant, and the need for deterrence. The court remarked that this was
“the most egregious case of illegal reentry that [it had] seen,” and further explained
that it could see no way aside from a maximum sentence to impress upon
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Solorzano the need for him to obey the law and refrain from coming back to the
United States illegally. Tr. Trans. at 6, 12. Considering Solorzano’s record of
reentry, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in providing the
maximum statutory sentence. See
Aguillard, 217 F.3d at 1320.
Solorzano also argues that it was inappropriate for the district court to
effectively sentence him to four years’ imprisonment for a single act of reentry.
Br. of Appellant at 6-7. The premise on which this argument relies is incorrect; the
court did not sentence Solorzano twice for the same conduct. Rather, the court
sentenced him first for illegal reentry, and then again—and separately—for
violating the terms of his supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 7A Introduction 3(b).
And, as noted above, the district court’s concurrent sentencing was in keeping with
the Guidelines’ suggestion. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3 n.4.
And finally, Solorzano insists that he was not previously notified of his
supervised release, thus warranting reversal. This argument also fails. It is
undisputed that the record before the sentencing court reflected that Solorzano had
been placed on supervised release following a prior conviction in Texas for illegal
reentry. It is also undisputed that a condition of Solorzano’s supervised release
was that he not reenter the United States illegally. While Solorzano disputes that
he was ever given notice of being placed on supervised release at all, he has not
proven that he lacked notice, nor has he provided any reason why the previous
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court’s records would be unreliable. Accordingly, Solorzano has failed to meet his
burden of showing that the court was unreasonable to rely on the official record of
the preceding court in imposing its sentence.
Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378.
In light of Solorzano’s history—i.e., three prior convictions for illegal
reentry and at least eight illegal-reentry attempts—we conclude that his sentence
was substantively reasonable, and therefore that the district court did not abuse its
discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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