State Of Washington, Resp. v. Rodney Willis, App. ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 73903-4-I
Respondent, )
) DIVISION ONE
v. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
KAVAHN ELIJAH MATTHEWS-SMITH, )
QIANTRE JAMIEL TAYLOR, AM )
QIUAN-TRE JAMIEL DAEVION )
TAYLOR, AM QIUAN-TRE JAMIEL )
DAZ TAYLOR, EARNETRA SHALIA )
TURNER, ) Na n
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and ) rv -n-T1
RODNEY LEE WILLIS, "...
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Appellant. ) FILED: July 24, 2017 to
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TRICKEY, A.C.J. — Rodney Willis appeals his conviction for first degree
murder. He argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the lead detective in
his case, Detective Christina Bartlett, to give her opinion on his guilt while
testifying. Willis also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
his motion for a new trial after he learned that jurors had observed Detective
Bartlett's facial expressions as she sat at the State's counsel table throughout the
trial.
Because we conclude that Willis invited any error in eliciting Detective
Bartlett's testimony and that the record does not establish that her facial
expressions amounted to a serious trial irregularity, we affirm.
No. 73903-4-1/ 2
FACTS
In September 2012, Herman Tucker died from a gunshot wound to the chest
at a Motel 6. There is no dispute that Willis shot Tucker, although Willis claims it
was accidental.
The State charged Willis with murder in the first degree. At trial, Willis's
younger sister, Earnetra Turner, and Willis's friend, Kavahn Matthews-Smith,
testified that Tucker was shot during an attempted robbery. Tucker had been
supplying Turner with marijuana for some time, but was angry at her because she
would not have sex with him.l On the night of his death, Tucker had left Turner at
the Motel 6 when she, once again, refused to have sex with him.
Willis, Matthews-Smith, and two other people used Turner's cell phone to
lure Tucker back to the Motel 6, planning to rob him. But, when they confronted
Tucker he charged at them. In the struggle that followed, Willis ended up shooting
Tucker. Text messages exchanged between Willis, the other witnesses, and
Tucker indicate that there was a plan to rob Tucker.
At trial, Willis denied that he attempted to rob Tucker. He testified that he
went to the Motel 6 just to pick up his younger sister. Willis testified that Tucker
became violent when Willis tried to leave with Turner. According to Willis, he
accidentally shot Tucker in the struggle that followed.
The State played audio recordings of Detective Bartlett's pretrial interview
with Willis for the jury. During the interview, Willis repeatedly denied being at the
Motel 6 or being involved In any way with Tucker's death. He also initially denied
' At that time, Tucker was 47 years old and Turner was 16 years old.
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No. 73903-4-1 / 3
knowing his sister, Turner. Detective Bartlett testified that, during the interview,
she had told Willis things that were not true to elicit responses from him. Willis's
counsel cross-examined Detective Bartlett at length about her strategies during
the interview.
The jury found Willis guilty of first degree murder. After the jury delivered
its verdict, the attorneys and their investigators met informally with the jury.
Several jurors teased Detective Bartlett about her lack of a poker face. Some joked
that she was trying to tell them not to believe Willis while he was testifying.
Willis moved for a new trial, arguing that Detective Bartlett's facial
expressions amounted to unsworn and improper testimony about her opinion of
Willis's guilt. Willis also sought access to the jurors' contact information. The court
denied Willis's motion.
Willis appeals.
ANALYSIS
Opinions on Guilt — Invited Error
Willis argues that his right to a fair trial was violated when Detective Bartlett
expressed her current opinion on his guilt at the time of trial. The State argues
that Willis invited any error by eliciting the challenged testimony from Detective
Bartlett during cross-examination. We agree with the State.
Under the invited error doctrine, "a party who sets up an error at trial cannot
claim that very action as error on appeal and receive a new trial." State v. Momah,
167 Wash. 2d 140, 153,217 P.3d 321 (2009). In determining whether the defendant
invited the error, the court considers "whether the defendant affirmatively assented
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No. 73903-4-1/4
to the error, materially contributed to it, or benefited from it? In re Coggin, 182
Wash. 2d 115, 119, 340 P.3d 810 (2014). The defendant must engage in "some type
of affirmative action through which he knowingly and voluntarily sets up the error."
State v. Mercado 181 Wash. App. 624, 630, 326 P.3d 154 (2014).
The Invited error doctrine applies when a defendant objects to testimony
that was given as a direct response to his questions. See. e.g., State v.
McPherson 111 Wash. App. 747, 764, 46 P.3d 284 (2002) (holding that any error in
admitting testimony alleged to be an opinion on guilt was "clearly invited" because
It was a "direct response" to the defense's question); State v. Vandiver, 21 Wn.
App. 269, 273, 584 P.2d 978 (1978) (holding that the invited error doctrine
precluded review of statements made by witnesses in response to defense's
questions).
The State bears the burden of proving invited error. State v. Thomas, 150
Wash. 2d 821, 844, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
Here, Willis argues that the trial court erroneously admitted opinions on his
guilt. Personal opinions on the defendant's guilt and credibility are improper
because they invade the defendant's right to have a jury determine the facts. State
v. Demerv, 144 Wash. 2d 753, 759, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001). Because police officers,
like the prosecution, represent the State, their opinions are "especially likely" to
Influence the jury. Demerv, 144 Wash. 2d at 762-63.
Willis argues that two of Detective Bartlett's statements were improperly
admitted. First, on cross-examination during the State's case-in-chief, Willis's
counsel asked Detective Bartlett about the way she had interviewed Willis. His
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No. 73903-4-1 /5
counsel emphasized that Detective Bartlett had told Willis that it was significant
whether he had always intended to rob and kill Tucker or had intended only to rob
Tucker but killed him in the struggle that ensued:2
[Defense Counsel:] So you tell him, "I don't think you planned a
murder, but I think this was a [robbery]."
In fact, 1 counted, and I think you tell him about 12 times that you
don't think he intended to murder anybody, but you do believe that
he intended to rob somebody?
[Detective Bartlett] 1 do believe that he intended to rob Herman
Tucker.
[Defense Counsel:] So given that, that you are telling him over and
over and over again and he is denying that he intended to rob him,
but you absolutely are not listening to him. Do you ever offer him -
(31
It Is clear that Detective Bartlett, adopting the tense used by Willis's counsel,
was describing what she told Willis during the interview, not her view of his guilt at
the time of her testimony. There was an implied, "I was telling him that" before her
answer, which Willis's counsel understood. Willis's counsel's response was to say
that Detective Bartlett was telling Willis "that" — apparently her belief that he
intended to rob Tucker — over and over again. She continued to ask Detective
Bartlett about what she said during the interview, without a request for clarification.
Detective Bartlett made the second statement on cross-examination during
the State's rebuttal. Willis's counsel returned to the subject of Detective Bartlett's
2 According to the defense, this was not true, because both could be charged as first
degree murder. But, as the State points out, there is a difference. Homicide may be
charged as first degree murder when it is premeditated or committed in the course of a
robbery or attempted robbery. RCW 10.95.030(1). But premeditated murder committed in
furtherance of a robbery may be charged as aggravated first degree murder. RCW
10.95.020(11)(a).
3 Report of Proceedings (RP) (June 1, 2015) at 47.
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No. 73903-4-1 /6
interview with Willis. This time, counsel emphasized that Detective Bartlett's
Interview strategy had involved lying to Willis. She suggested that Detective
Bartlett and Willis were "playing with each other back and forth" and "trying to hide
from each other" what they knew.4 After Detective Bartlett said that she had given
Willis "every opportunity to say that he was trying to rescue his sister," VVillis's
counsel asked:
[Defense Counsel:] Well, let's see. You said you gave him every
opportunity. But, in fact, there were eight times, and we can go
through there, that you absolutely told him I don't believe you, and I
think you did this for sure. Starting with number one of page 18.
[Detective Bartlett] I do believe that he committed this murder.
[Defense Counsel:] Okay. And you —
[Detective Bartlett] That's not a lie.
[Defense Counsel:] And no matter what he told you from page 18 all
the way to the last page you told him I don't believe you. Absolutely
don't believe that I think maybe you didn't murder him, but I think you
went there to do a [robbery], and I don't believe otherwise; isn't that
true?
[Detective Bartlett] I said that I believe that you went there to rob
him. I had the text messages and I believed it.im
Again, Detective Bartlett was clarifying what she had said to Willis during
the interview and not improperly stating her opinion on his guilt at the time of trial.
Counsel had just directed her to page 18 of the transcript of her interview, which
Included her statement to Willis that the crime looked to her, "like murder one."6
1NiIlis's counsel used the present tense as she paraphrased Detective Bartlett's
4 RP (June 9, 2015) at 982.
5 RP (June 9, 2015) at 982-83.
° Ex. 77 at 18.
6
No. 73903-4-1 17
statements during the interview back to her, and Detective Bartlett responded in
the same tense.
Apparently reading along, Detective Bartlett responded that she believed
that Willis committed the murder. She completed her answer by saying, 'That's
not a lie."7 It is reasonable to conclude that the "that" refers to both what she had
just said and her statement during the interview, suggesting that the former is just
a restatement of the latter.
As before, Willis's counsel continued with her line of questioning, without
indicating that she believed Detective Bartlett was improperly referring to her
opinion at the time of trial. Further, Detective Bartlett's next response made it clear
that the line of questioning was about what she had said and believed during the
interview.
Willis's counsel's questions to Detective Bartlett about what she said or
believed during the interview were affirmative and voluntary acts. They created or
materially contributed to Detective Bartlett's testimony. Accordingly, we conclude
that Willis invited any error in eliciting her testimony and, therefore, cannot
challenge it on appeal.
Willis argues that he did not invite any error because Detective Bartlett
offered her opinion at the time of trial, not her opinion during the interview, and
consequently her answers were not responsive to the questions. We reject this
argument for two reasons. First, as just explained, although she gave her answers
In the present tense, Detective Bartlett was describing what she said and believed
7 RP (June 9, 2015) at 982.
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No. 73903-4-1/ 8
during the interview.
Second, the invited error doctrine may apply even when a witness gives a
more detailed answer than the question calls for. For example, in State v.
Vandiver, the defendant's counsel asked a witness if he had arrested the
defendant pursuant to a warrant. 21 Wash. App. at 273. The witness responded
that he had not had a warrant but had received permission from the defendant's
parole officer. Vandiver, 21 Wash. App. at 273. The Court of Appeals held that the
defendant had invited any error in admitting this evidence of the defendants
criminal history. Vandiver, 21 Wash. App. at 273.
Here, by aggressively questioning Detective Bartlett about her interview
strategies, Willis's counsel invited her to explain herself. Her explanation gave
more information than was strictly necessary to answer the question, but was
clearly related to her answer. Thus, we conclude that, even if Detective Bartlett's
answers were not directly responsive to Willis's counsel's questioning, Willis
Invited the error,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The State argues that Willis cannot challenge Detective Bartlett's
statements on appeal because he failed to object at trial. Willis argues that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to
Detective Bartlett's testimony.
But Willis does not argue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
°Willis argues that he can raise the issue for the first time on appeal as a manifest error
affecting a constitutional right under RAP 2.5(a)(3). But a defendant may not raise an
error on appeal that he invited, even if that error is a manifest error affecting a
constitutional right State v. Henderson, 114 Wash. 2d 867, 870, 792 P.2d 514 (1990).
8
No. 73903-4-1 /9
because his trial counsel questioned Detective Bartlett about her opinions and
statements at the time of the interview. In fact, Willis acknowledges that Detective
"Bartlett's opinion at the time of the interrogation was certainly relevant to" the
defense's theory that Willis did not tell Detective Bartlett the truth during the initial
interview because he did not trust her, and that his lack of trust was justified.9
Since Willis is not arguing that his counsel was ineffective for pursuing the line of
questioning that invited the error, it is irrelevant whether Willis's trial counsel was
Ineffective for failing to object to any error.
Motion for a New Trial
Wills argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion for a new trial. Specifically, he argues that Detective Bartlett's facial
expressions while seated at the State's counsel table amounted to unsworn and
improper opinion testimony on his guilt, which, in turn, constituted extrinsic
evidence considered by the jury or a serious trial irregularity. We disagree.
Because the record does not establish that Detective Bartlett's facial expressions
amounted to opinions on guilt, Willis cannot show the prejudice required for a new
trial.
The trial court may order a new trial when certain events occur during trial
that materially affect one of the defendant's substantial rights. CrR 7.5(a). "A new
trial is warranted in such circumstances only when the defendant 'has been so
prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can insure that the defendant will be
treated fairly.'" State v. Pete, 152 Wash. 2d 546, 552, 98 P.3d 803 (2004) (internal
9 Reply Br. of Appellant at B.
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No. 73903-4-1 /10
quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Bourgeois, 133 Wash. 2d 389, 406, 945 P.2d
1120 (1997)).
When determining whether to grant a new trial, the court may not consider
matters that inhere in the verdict. Cox v. Charles Wright Acad., Inc., 70 Wash. 2d
173, 179,422 P.2d 515 (1967). Factors inhering in the jury's process, and thus in
the verdict itself, include the "mental processes by which individual jurors reached
their respective conclusions, their motives in arriving at their verdicts, the effect the
evidence may have had upon the jurors or the weight particular jurors may have
given to particular evidence, [and] the jurors' intentions and beliefs." Cox, 70
Wash. 2d at 179-80. Statements concerning matters that inhere in the verdict "are
inadmissible to impeach the verdict? Cox, 70 Wash. 2d at 180.
For example, in State v. Bourgeois, the court had to determine the effect of
two trial irregularities. 133 Wash. 2d at 408-09. Both were alleged incidents of
spectator misconduct: first, two spectators glared at a witness, and second, one of
those spectators made a gun gesture at the witness with his hand. Bourgeois, 133
Wash. 2d at 408. The court quickly dismissed the glaring, noting that the difference
between glaring and staring "is largely a subjective determination." Bourgeois, 133
Wash. 2d at 408. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the gun gesture could be
viewed as a threat to discourage the witness from testifying but concluded there
was no indication the defendant directed the spectator to make the gesture.
Bourgeois, 133 Wash. 2d at 409. In reaching that conclusion, the court deemed
irrelevant the fact that one of the jurors had assumed that the spectator who made
the gun gesture was associated with the defendant in some way, because the
10
No. 73903-4-1 Ill
Juror's assumption showed the juror's "thought process" and, therefore, inhered in
the verdict. Bourgeois, 133 Wash. 2d at 409.
We will not reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial absent a
clear abuse of discretion, which occurs when no reasonable judge would have
reached the same conclusion. Pete 152 Wash. 2d at 552.
Here, immediately after the trial ended, the prosecutors, defense attorneys,
defense investigator, and Detective Bartlett spoke informally with members of the
jury. The attorneys, investigator, and Detective Bartlett all submitted sworn
statements describing their conversation.10 According to the defense investigator,
one juror said that Detective Bartlett "'wins a prize for the most facial
expressions." Similarly, according to one of the defense attorneys, "several
jurors told [D]etective Bartlett that she, 'has more facial expressions than anyone
they had ever seen."12 One of the prosecutors agreed that several "jurors told
Detective Bartlett that she had very expressive eyes and face."13
Another juror told Detective Bartlett that she "should not play poker
because the jurors could read her facial expressions." And one juror commented,
"'Oh yeah you definitely were trying to tell us not to believe Mr. VVillis.'"15 The
State's witnesses agreed that several jurors teased Detective Bartlett about her
lack of a poker face and that some had joked that Detective Bartlett was trying to
1° Neither of the parties have raised hearsay concerns about the fact that the affidavits are
from non-jurors, recollecting the jurors' statements, rather than affidavits from the jurors
themselves.
11 Clerk's Papers (CP) at 97.
12 CP at 93.
" CP at 223.
14 CP at 93.
Is CP at 93.
11
No. 73903-4-I 112
tell them not to believe Willis when he testified.
Detective Bartlett stated that she was not aware of having made any
"observable expressions with [her] eyes or face during trial while seated at counsel
table.7'° She also stated that she did not intend to "convey any message or
Information or to influence the jury in any way with any expressions."' Neither
side stated that they had observed Detective Bartlett make any particular gestures
or facial expressions during trial.
But before reaching Willis's arguments about what impact Detective
Bartlett's facial expressions may have on the trial, we must determine whether any
statements in the affidavits contain matters that inhere in the verdict.
The affidavits contain descriptions of how the jurors interpreted Detective
Bartlett's facial expressions. By saying (1) that Detective Bartlett lacked a poker
face, or (2) was trying to tell them not to believe Willis, the jurors offered their
conclusions about whether she was intending to express a particular message."
We disregard both conclusions because such determinations inhere in the
verdict. Therefore, we consider Willis's claims based solely on the objective
descriptions of Detective Bartlett's facial expressions contained in the affidavits:
there were many of them, her eyes and face were very expressive, and no one
else involved in the trial observed her making them.
" CP at 220.
17 CP at 220.
18 In fact, these two conclusions demonstrate how individuals may interpret the same facial
expressions in different ways. Saying Detective Bartlett has no poker face suggests that
other people can tell what she Is thinking or feeling, despite her attempts to conceal her
thoughts. That is the opposite of the jurors' other conclusion, that Detective Bartlett was
deliberately trying to convey a specific message with her facial expressions.
12
No. 73903-4-1/ 13
Willis contends that Detective Bartlett's facial expressions constituted
extrinsic evidence or a serious trial irregularity. He also argues that the jurors'
observations of Detective Bartlett's facial expressions require a new trial because
substantial justice was not done. As noted above, a new trial is not warranted
absent a strong showing of prejudice. Pete 152 Wash. 2d at 552.
Willis argues that he was prejudiced because Detective Bartlett's facial
expressions amount to her giving her opinion on his guilt or credibility. For
example, in his brief, Willis implies that Detective Bartlett expressed her opinion
on Willis's credibility through "physical manifestations of disdain, disgust and/or
disbelief.“19 The record does not support that implication. The affidavits do not
contain any descriptions of these alleged physical manifestations, nor did any of
the jurors say that Detective Bartlett expressed disdain, disgust, or disbelief.
Therefore, regardless of whether the expressions might constitute extrinsic
evidence or a trial irregularity, we conclude that there is nothing in the record to
establish that Detective Bartlett's facial expressions amounted to an opinion on
guilt.
Without an opinion on guilt, Willis cannot show prejudice. And, without
prejudice, Willis cannot show he is entitled to a new trial. Therefore, we conclude
that the trial court did not err by denying Willis's motion for a new trial, and we do
not consider whether Detective Bartlett's facial expressions amount to extrinsic
evidence or trial irregularities.
19 Br. of Appellant at 32.
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Sufficiency of the Record
Willis argues that, if the record is insufficient to determine whether Detective
Bartlett's facial expressions warrant a new trial, we should conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied Willis's request to interview the jurors.
Because Willis did not establish good cause below, we disagree.
"Individual juror information, other than name, is presumed to be private."
GR 31(j). After the conclusion of a jury trial, the court may allow a party's attorney
access to juror information upon a showing of good cause.
We review the trial court's decision on access to juror information for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Blazina, 174 Wash. App. 906, 909, 301 P.3d 492 (2013).
The trial court abuses its discretion when the decision is "'manifestly unreasonable,
or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.'" Blazina 174 Wn.
App. at 909-10 (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash. 2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d
775 (1971)).
In his request to interview the jurors, Willis did not show good cause. He
argued that he needed to access the jurors' information to make a record of "how
they considered the facial expressions of Detective Bartlett."2° Willis also stated
that he "must be allowed to question the jurors about the facts and extrinsic
evidence that was considered by the jurors to show that the misconduct
occurred."21
At oral argument below, Willis argued that, while that the parties and the
court knew "that the exaggerated facial expressions were not[iced] by the jurors,
"CP at 91.
21 CP at 88.
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No. 73903-4-1 /15
otherwise, they wouldn't have noted them," unless they spoke to the jurors, they
could not know whether the jurors observed Detective Bartlett's face while she was
at counsel table or while she was testifying.22 Willis argued that they also did not
know if the jurors did not believe Willis because of Detective Bartlett's facial
expressions, which was "exactly why [Willis] wanted to talk to them."23
In its oral ruling, the trial court stated that, during their conversation with the
Jurors, the parties disclosed "previously inadmissible character evidence about"
Tucker.24 The court was concerned that the jury's impressions might have been
contaminated by this information. The court also stated that it had not observed
anything out of the ordinary during trial.
Ultimately, the trial court denied Willis's request because it determined that
Willis was seeking information that inhered in the verdict. First, the court assumed
that the jurors observed Detective Bartlett's facial expressions while she sat at
counsel table.25 The court then stated that u[t]he only additional information that
the defendant appears to want has to do with such matters as how the jurors
interpreted Detective Bartlett's facial expressions, whether and how they were
discussed in deliberations, and/or whether and how they affected the verdict."26
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Willis's motion to interview the jurors. Willis did not show that he was seeking more
22 RP (July 1, 2015) at 6-8.
23 RP (July 1,2015) at 8:22-9:1.
24 RP (July 1,2015) at 33.
25 In his opening brief, Willis objects to the court assuming this instead of actually finding
it from the facts. But, as mentioned above, Willis himself said the court could not
determine when the jurors were observing Detective Bartlett from the current record.
" CP at 189.
15
No. 73903-4-1 /16
Information about the precise nature of the facial expressions and, thus, did not
establish good cause." Moreover, the trial court's concern that the juror's
Impressions of the trial may have been contaminated by learning negative facts
about the victim's character was not unreasonable.
Cumulative Error
Willis argues that, even if neither Detective Bartlett's testimony nor her facial
expressions alone requires reversal, the combination of the two require reversal
under the cumulative error doctrine. 'Under this doctrine, a defendant may be
entitled to a new trial when errors, even though individually not prejudicial,
cumulatively result in a trial that was fundamentally unfair." State v. Asaeli, 150
Wash. App. 543, 597, 208 P.3d 1136 (2009). Here, Willis has not established that
there were multiple errors or that any of the errors resulted in a fundamentally
unfair trial. His arguments, again, assume that Detective Bartlett's testimony was
Improper and that her expressions amounted to opinions on guilt. We reject these
arguments for the reasons stated above.
Appellate Costs
Willis asks that no costs be awarded on appeal if the State substantially
prevails. Appellate costs are generally awarded to the substantially prevailing
party on review. RAP 14.2. But, when a trial court makes a finding of indigency,
that finding remains throughout review "unless the commissioner or clerk
27 On appeal, Willis focuses on the need to have jurors describe "precisely what they saw
as Detective Bartlett made facial expressions from [the] counsel table." Br. of Appellant
at 42. He contends that this information is necessary to complete the record and does not
Inhere in the verdict. We agree that jurors' accounts of their observations would not Inhere
In the verdict. But, since Willis did not make that request below, he cannot raise it now.
RAP 2.5(a).
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No. 73903-4-1/ 17
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenders financial
circumstances have significantly improved since the last determination of
indigency." RAP 14.2.
Here, the trial court found that Willis was impoverished. We assume that
Willis is still indigent. The State may file a motion for costs with the commissioner
if it has evidence indicating that Willis's financial circumstances have significantly
Improved since the trial court's determination.
Affirmed.
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