MARGALIE ORLEANS VS. WM. S. RICH & SON (SC-000269-17, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4310-16T3
    MARGALIE ORLEANS,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    WM. S. RICH & SON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________
    Submitted October 17, 2018 – Decided August 14, 2019
    Before Judges Fuentes and Accurso.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Union County, Docket No. SC-000269-17.
    Anthony H. Guerino, attorney for appellant.
    Margalie Orleans, respondent pro se.
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Wm. S. Rich & Son, a pawnbroker, appeals from the judgment
    entered by the Law Division, Special Civil Part, Small Claims, 1 which found
    defendant failed to return a diamond pendant pledged by plaintiff Margalie
    Orleans as collateral for a $500 loan. We affirm.
    Judge James Wilson conducted a bench trial at which plaintiff appeared
    pro se and defendant was represented by counsel. Plaintiff testified that on
    August 4, 2016, she gave defendant "a piece of carat diamond pendant," which
    she described as a "diamond circle . . . with little diamonds all inside of it . . .
    [a] pair of diamond earrings . . . a three-stone diamond engagement ring, [and]
    a diamond ring," as collateral for a $500 loan. This transaction occurred at
    defendant's store located at Stuyvesant Avenue in the Township of Union.
    Plaintiff testified she repaid the loan on January 13, 2017, which consisted
    of $500 in principal and $139 in interest, for a total of $639. The pledge ticket
    admitted into evidence shows on its face that defendant charged plaintiff an
    annualized interest rate of 54.8 percent. However, plaintiff claimed defendant
    did not return the diamond pedant, which was among the jewelry she pledged as
    1
    Pursuant to Rule 6:1-2(a)(2), this matter was tried as a Small Claims case
    because the amount in dispute, including any applicable penalties, does not
    exceed $3,000.
    A-4310-16T3
    2
    collateral for the loan. In an effort to clarify the basis for plaintiff's claim against
    defendant, Judge Wilson asked plaintiff the following question:
    PLAINTIFF: So Mr. Rich's staff stated, according to
    the defendant, this pendant was removed from this
    silver necklace. That's how he explained why this was
    inventoried the way it was. According to him, the chain
    was separate, which is what you see first. The pendant
    was the second item, which he stated is two units.
    THE COURT: So . . . you're saying that you gave him
    a necklace with a diamond pendant on it.
    PLAINTIFF: Yes.
    THE COURT: And then you gave him a separate
    diamond pendant?
    PLAINTIFF: Correct.
    ....
    Your Honor, I would like to bring to the [c]ourt's
    attention that the diamond pendant we're discussing is
    very small. It's a half a diamond, originally that were a
    pair of tiny studs which were given to me as a gift when
    I graduated from corrections. Because they were so
    tiny, when I wore them they were invisible, so I decided
    to take them apart and turn them into a diamond
    pendant. So we're looking at something that's maybe a
    little bigger than . . . a few inches. So it's pretty small.
    It's all pure diamonds.
    THE COURT: And you're saying that it's worth $2,000?
    PLAINTIFF: It is. It was from Macy's. It is worth
    $2,000.
    A-4310-16T3
    3
    As part of defense counsel's cross-examination, plaintiff testified she had
    dealt with defendant before and, up to this point, had not had any problems.
    Plaintiff also testified the pendant was purchased at the Macy's store located in
    the Short Hills Mall.
    Defendant called as its only witness Mark Desanctis, the manager of the
    store located in Union Township. According to Desanctis, Wm. S. Rich & Son
    owns and operates twelve pawnshops located throughout the State. He also
    acknowledged being familiar with plaintiff's case and confirmed that plaintiff
    pledged this jewelry on August 4, 2016. The notations on the pledged record
    confirmed the receipt of "a chain, a diamond pendant, a diamond cluster ring, a
    three-stone diamond ring, and a pair of diamond and stone earrings." According
    to Desanctis, these five items were returned to plaintiff. However, Desanctis
    corroborated plaintiff's testimony that the chain was separated from the pendant
    and was thus considered two separate items of jewelry. Desanctis identified a
    copy of a redeem ticket dated August 4, 2016, with plaintiff's signature,
    reflecting five items of jewelry.
    On cross-examination by plaintiff, Desanctis testified he was at the store
    on January 13, 2017.      However, the redeem ticket was not time-stamped.
    Desanctis also confirmed that the writing on the redeem ticket was from Kelly,
    A-4310-16T3
    4
    "one of the workers . . . at the store." The store at Union Township had three
    fulltime employees at the time. When plaintiff asked Desanctis why Kelly was
    not in court to testify, he responded: "She doesn’t need to be here. . . . I'm the
    manager of the store."
    At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Wilson found defendant's witness's
    testimony "fraught with hearsay, as he had no firsthand knowledge of what
    actually happened[.]"      Judge Wilson thus found plaintiff had sustained her
    burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence:
    that on August 4th, 2016 . . . she came to the defendant's
    shop, tendered six items to the defendant for collateral
    for a $500-loan, and that when she paid off the loan she
    only received five of those items back, and she was
    missing a diamond pendant, half a carat that was
    merged together, and that was worth $2,000.
    The court entered judgment against defendant in the amount of $2,000, plus
    court costs.
    Against this record defendant argues the trial court's decision must be
    reversed because there was no evidence to support the value of the pendant,
    Judge Wilson's decision "could not have been reasonably reached," and t he
    testimony about insurance coverage for this loss constituted plain error under
    Rule 2:10-2.
    A-4310-16T3
    5
    Defendant is regulated by the New Jersey Department of Banking and
    Insurance as a licensed pawnbroker under the General Provisions Regulating
    Pawnbrokers, N.J.S.A. 45:22-1 to -33, officially known as the "pawnbroking
    law." N.J.S.A. 45:22-1. Under this statutory scheme, defendant is:
    liable for the loss of a pledge or part thereof, or for
    injury thereto, whether caused by fire, theft, burglary or
    otherwise, resulting from his failure to exercise
    reasonable care in regard to it, but he shall not be liable,
    in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary,
    for the loss of a pledge or part thereof, or for injury
    thereto, which could not have been avoided by the
    exercise of such care. The burden of proof to establish
    reasonable care shall be upon the pawnbroker.
    [N.J.S.A. 45:22-24 (emphasis added).]
    Furthermore, we review the factual determinations made by a judge sitting
    as the trier of fact in a bench trial guided by the following deferential standard:
    Final determinations made by the trial court sitting in a
    non-jury case are subject to a limited and well-
    established scope of review: "we do not disturb the
    factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge
    unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly
    unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent,
    relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend
    the interests of justice[.]"
    [D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 
    216 N.J. 168
    , 182 (2013)
    (quoting Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 
    205 N.J. 150
    , 169 (2011) (alteration in original)).]
    A-4310-16T3
    6
    Based on this well-settled common law standard of review, as augmented
    by defendant's burden of proof under N.J.S.A. 45:22-24, we discern no legal or
    factual basis to disturb Judge Wilson's findings.
    Affirmed.
    A-4310-16T3
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4310-16T3

Filed Date: 8/14/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019