Com. v. Mansurov, O. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S11045-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    OZOD MANSUROV,                             :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 2117 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 10, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008729-2015
    BEFORE: OTT, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                               FILED MAY 01, 2018
    Ozod Mansurov (“Mansurov”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed after a jury convicted him of criminal trespass.1 We affirm.
    In its Opinion, the trial court adeptly detailed the relevant factual and
    procedural history, which we incorporate as though fully set forth herein. See
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 1-6.2
    In this timely appeal, Mansurov presents the following issues for our
    review:
    ____________________________________________
    1See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1) (providing, in relevant part, that “[a] person
    commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so,
    he … breaks into any building or occupied structure or separately secured or
    occupied portion thereof.”).
    2 After the trial court sentenced Mansurov, he filed a timely post-sentence
    Motion challenging, inter alia, the weight and sufficiency of the evidence
    supporting his conviction, and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. The
    trial court denied this Motion by an Order entered on June 3, 2016.
    J-S11045-18
    1. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter [of] law to
    find … Mansurov guilty of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503, criminal
    trespass of a building and/or occupied structure[,] as the
    evidence failed to establish Mansurov was not privileged to
    enter the complainant’s apartment[?] Likewise, the evidence
    was insufficient to prove he gained entry to complainant’s
    home “by force, breaking, intimidation, unauthorized opening
    of locks or through an opening not designed for human access.”
    2. Whether the jury’s finding of guilt[] on the charge of criminal
    trespass was against the great weight of the evidence
    presented at trial[,] as the testimony of the complainant was
    simply not credible and should not have been accepted by the
    jury[?] The Complainant did not testify that she told Mansurov
    to leave.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania’s Motion to Admit … Mansurov’s prior bad acts[,]
    pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)[,] involving
    an incident in Montgomery County[,] as it was prejudicial and
    was sought to show [Mansurov’s] propensity to commit the
    acts alleged in the case before this Court[?]
    4. Whether the trial court erred in granting a “stay away order”
    as to three [] individuals and against [] Mansurov[,] as the
    court was without the legal authority to do so and the court
    issued stay away order(s) for individuals who had no real
    relationship to the action[?] This part of the sentence imposed
    by the court was illegal.
    5. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
    [Mansurov] well outside the Pennsylvania Sentencing
    guidelines[,] and giving him a sentence of three (3) to six (6)
    years, when the guideline calculation was []restorative
    sanctions to nine (9) months[,] plus or minus three (3)
    months[,] on the singular charge of criminal trespass[,] and
    [the court] failed to articulate the reason for [] sentencing well
    outside of the guidelines[,] which was excessive[,] and there
    was no rational basis for the sentences as well as being
    unreasonable[?]
    Brief for Appellant at 12-13.
    -2-
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    In his first issue, Mansurov argues that the Commonwealth failed to
    present sufficient evidence for the jury to properly find that all of the elements
    of criminal trespass were met beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
    id. at 20-22.
    Mansurov asserts as follows:
    The Commonwealth was required to show that [Mansurov] knew
    he was not licensed or privileged to go into the apartment of
    complainant[,    i.e., Olena [M]orenska (hereinafter, the
    “complainant”)]. The evidence was insufficient to establish [that]
    Mansurov was not privileged to enter the complainant’s
    apartment. Likewise, the evidence was insufficient to prove he
    gained entry to [c]omplainant’s home “by force, breaking,
    intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks or through an opening
    not designed for human access.”
    
    Id. at 21-22
    (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(3) (setting forth the statutory
    definition of “breaks into”)); see also Brief for Appellant at 22 (asserting that
    “[i]t was never communicated to Mansurov that he was not permitted to enter
    the apartment[,] as his girlfriend[, whom Mansurov had suspected was in the
    complainant’s residence at the time of his forced entry,] would stay there and
    [Mansurov] had been there before to see her.”).
    We apply the following standard of review when considering a challenge
    to the sufficiency of the evidence:
    The standard we apply … is whether[,] viewing all the evidence
    admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
    there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
    above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
    judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that
    the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
    need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
    regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
    unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that[,] as a matter
    of law[,] no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
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    circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
    proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
    means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
    the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
    evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder
    of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
    of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Melvin, 
    103 A.3d 1
    , 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    In its Opinion, the trial court concisely addressed Mansurov’s issue, set
    forth the applicable law, and determined that the evidence was sufficient for
    the jury to find that the Commonwealth had proved all elements of criminal
    trespass beyond a reasonable doubt. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 8-
    9. As we agree with the trial court’s rationale and determination, which is
    supported by the record, we affirm on this basis concerning Mansurov’s
    sufficiency challenge. See 
    id. In his
    next issue, Mansurov contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion in denying his post-sentence Motion for a new trial, where the jury’s
    verdict of guilty on the criminal trespass charge was against the weight of the
    evidence and shocks one’s sense of justice. See Brief for Appellant at 22-23.
    According to Mansurov, “[t]he testimony of the complainant was simply not
    credible and should not have been accepted by the jury.” 
    Id. at 22.
    Mansurov
    further argues that “[t]he [c]omplainant did not testify that she told Mansurov
    to leave[,]” and she “did not see Mansurov enter the apartment, [and] did not
    see him damage the apartment[.]” 
    Id. Finally, Mansurov
    points out that the
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    defense      “presented       a     witness[,    namely,   Inobat    Ramazonova
    (“Ramazonova”),] who stated            [that] the [complainant’s] apartment door
    sustained no noticeable damage.           Further, [an additional defense witness,
    Nukmanzhan Khalilov (“Khalilov”),] testified [that Mansurov] had a key to the
    apartment[,] which would have allowed [Mansurov] to lawfully enter the
    apartment.” 
    Id. at 22-23;3
    see also N.T., 3/11/16, at 28-38.
    Our standard of review of a weight of the evidence claim is as follows:
    The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder
    of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
    and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is
    not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and
    must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
    credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
    determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
    clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
    weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
    On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to
    whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury
    verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a
    weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
    discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
    verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
    ____________________________________________
    3 Mansurov fails to cite the place in the record containing the testimony he
    references, nor does he even identify these two witnesses by name. See
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (stating that “[i]f reference is made to … any [] matter
    appearing in the record, the argument must set forth, in immediate connection
    therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference to the place in the record where
    the matter referred to appears[.]”). We caution Mansurov that it is not the
    responsibility of this court to “scour the record to find evidence to support an
    argument.” Commonwealth v. Beshore, 
    916 A.2d 1128
    , 1140 (Pa. Super.
    2007) (en banc).
    -5-
    J-S11045-18
    Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 
    109 A.3d 711
    , 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v.
    Rabold, 
    920 A.2d 857
    , 860 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that “[o]ne of the least
    assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
    conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence.”)
    (citation omitted).
    Initially, concerning Mansurov’s assertion that the jury should not have
    credited the testimony of the complainant and weighed it in the fashion it did,
    this Court may not reassess the credibility of the witnesses and reweigh the
    evidence presented at trial, which was within the sole purview of the jury.
    See 
    Gonzalez, supra
    .
    Moreover, concerning the testimony of Ramazonova and Khalilov, the
    trial court noted in its Opinion as follows:
    Although [Mansurov] proffered a witness[, Ramazonova,] who
    stated that the apartment door sustained no noticeable damage,
    it was unclear whether [Ramazonova] fully understood the
    questions that were asked during either direct or cross
    examination. [Concerning the testimony of Khalilov, a]lthough
    [Khalilov] initially stated that he had observed [Mansurov]
    entering the unit with a key on several occasions, cross-
    examination and redirect examination revealed that [Khalilov]
    was referring to [Mansurov’s] key to the front door of the multi-
    unit apartment building. Given the fact that [Mansurov’s] family
    also lived in the building, this was not probative of [Mansurov’s]
    rightful access to [the complainant’s] apartment.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 10-11. Our review discloses that the trial
    court’s foregoing rationale is supported by the record, and we discern no
    abuse of its discretion. Accordingly, none of Mansurov’s contentions under his
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    weight challenge entitle him to relief, and the jury’s verdict does not shock
    our collective conscience. Mansurov’s second issue thus fails.
    In his third issue, Mansurov asserts that the trial court abused its
    discretion in granting the Commonwealth’s Motion in limine, which sought to
    introduce at trial evidence of Mansurov’s prior bad acts (namely, his prior
    conviction for breaking into another ex-girlfriend’s residence in August 2014
    – hereinafter, “the prior bad act evidence”). See Brief for Appellant at 23-30.
    According to Mansurov, the prior bad act evidence was irrelevant to the instant
    charges, unduly prejudicial, and improperly introduced to prove that he had a
    bad character and propensity to commit crimes. 
    Id. at 28,
    30. Mansurov
    contends that, contrary to the Commonwealth’s assertion in its Motion in
    limine, the prior bad act evidence was not relevant to establish motive, intent
    or absence of mistake. 
    Id. at 26-28.
    Mansurov protests that “[h]ere, the
    Commonwealth has done nothing more than identify the similarities between
    the prior conviction and the charges” filed in the instant case. 
    Id. at 29;
    see
    also 
    id. at 28
    (asserting that any similarities were “tenuous”).
    When reviewing an order granting a motion in limine, we apply an
    evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review.        Commonwealth v.
    Stokes, 
    78 A.3d 644
    , 654 (Pa. Super. 2013). “The admissibility of evidence
    is a matter directed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and an appellate
    court may reverse only upon a showing that the trial court abused that
    discretion.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    -7-
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    “Relevance    is   the   threshold   for   admissibility   of   evidence.”
    Commonwealth v. Tyson, 
    119 A.3d 353
    , 358 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc);
    see also Pa.R.E. 402. “Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a
    fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,] and the
    fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. However,
    “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed
    by the danger of … unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
    undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
    Pa.R.E. 403.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of
    other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
    person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1).
    However,
    “evidence of prior bad acts, while generally not admissible to
    prove bad character or criminal propensity, is admissible when
    proffered for some other relevant purpose so long as the probative
    value outweighs the prejudicial effect.” [Commonwealth v.]
    Boczkowski, 846 A.2d [75,] 88 [(Pa. 2014)].             See also
    [Commonwealth v.] Arrington, 86 A.3d [831,] 842 [(Pa.
    2014)], citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Morris,
    
    493 Pa. 164
    , 
    425 A.2d 715
    , 720 (Pa. 1981) (law does not allow
    use of evidence which tends solely to prove accused has “criminal
    disposition”). Such evidence may be admitted to show motive,
    identity, lack of accident or common plan or scheme. 
    Arrington, 86 A.3d at 842
    , citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2); Commonwealth v.
    Briggs, 
    608 Pa. 430
    , 
    12 A.3d 291
    , 337 (Pa. 2011) (Rule
    404(b)(2) permits other acts evidence to prove motive, lack of
    accident, common plan or scheme and identity). In order for other
    crimes evidence to be admissible, its probative value must
    outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice against the defendant,
    Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2), and a comparison of the crimes proffered must
    -8-
    J-S11045-18
    show a logical connection between them and the crime currently
    charged. 
    Arrington, 86 A.3d at 842
    .
    Commonwealth v. Hicks, 
    156 A.3d 1114
    , 1125 (Pa. 2017).
    Moreover, evidence of prior bad acts/crimes may also be “admitted to
    show a defendant’s actions were not the result of a mistake or accident, where
    the manner and circumstances of two crimes are remarkably similar.” 
    Tyson, 119 A.3d at 359
    (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also
    Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 
    982 A.2d 483
    , 497 (Pa. 2009) (holding that
    evidence of defendant’s prior physical assaults of his child was admissible to
    show absence of mistake or accident in prosecution for intentional beating
    death of the child).
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Mansurov’s claim and
    determined that the court did not err in admitting the prior bad act evidence,
    as (1) its probative value substantially outweighed any potential for prejudice;
    and (2) it was admitted to establish Mansurov’s lack of mistake, not his
    propensity to commit crimes. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 12-13.
    We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and determination, and therefore
    affirm with regard to this issue based on the trial court’s Opinion. See 
    id. In his
    fourth issue, Mansurov argues that the trial court erred and
    imposed an illegal sentence insofar as it imposed a “stay away Order” in
    connection with the sentence. See Brief for Appellant at 30-33. Mansurov
    urges that “the trial court was initially without authority to order the stay away
    -9-
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    from any of the [three] individuals [at issue4], but more importantly[,] … [the
    court] ordered Mansurov to stay away, not only from the complainant in this
    case, but to also two [] other individuals who were not complainants, not
    victims and had only a tangential relationship to the case itself.” 
    Id. at 31
    (footnote added, emphasis omitted). According to Mansurov, the trial court
    lacked jurisdiction to impose the stay away order, “to the extent that … [such]
    order may be construed as a condition of parole[.]” 
    Id. at 32;
    see also 
    id. at 33
    n.4 (stating that “[a]t sentencing, the trial court indicated that it would
    issue ‘stay away orders.’        It [did] not state the stay away orders are a
    condition of probation.” (citing N.T., 5/10/16, at 4) (emphasis added)).5
    “The determination as to whether the trial court imposed an illegal
    sentence is a question of law; our standard of review in cases dealing with
    questions of law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Atanasio, 
    997 A.2d 1181
    ,
    1183 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and brackets omitted)).        “If no statutory
    authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and
    ____________________________________________
    4The individuals were the complainant and two of Mansurov’s ex-girlfriends,
    Luiza Ramazanova (“Ramazanova”) and Magdalena Zielinska (“Zielinska”).
    5 In support of his claim, Mansurov cites the decision of this Court in
    Commonwealth v. Mears, 
    972 A.2d 1210
    (Pa. Super. 2009), wherein the
    panel held that “the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole has exclusive
    authority to determine parole when the offender is sentenced to a maximum
    term of imprisonment of two or more years[.] Therefore, any condition the
    sentencing court purported to impose on Appellant’s state parole is advisory
    only.” 
    Id. at 1212
    (emphasis added, citation and quotation marks omitted).
    - 10 -
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    subject to correction.” Commonwealth v. Hughes, 
    986 A.2d 159
    , 160 (Pa.
    Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
    Moreover, the Sentencing Code provides that, as a condition of
    probation, a trial court may require a defendant to “satisfy any [] conditions
    reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly
    restrictive of his liberty ….”      42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c)(13); see also
    Commonwealth v. McBride, 
    433 A.2d 509
    , 510 (Pa. Super. 1981) (citing to
    subsection 9754(c)(13) and explaining that an offender placed on probation
    “does not enjoy the full panoply of constitutional rights otherwise enjoyed by
    those who have not run afoul of the law.”) (citation and brackets omitted);
    Commonwealth v. Carver, 
    923 A.2d 495
    , 497 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating
    that probation is rehabilitative in design, protecting the interests of the public
    as well as the defendant).
    Initially, there is no merit to Mansurov’s claim that the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction to impose the stay-away Order.        Mansurov refers to the trial
    judge’s remark made in imposing sentence that “when [Mansurov] comes out
    on parole, he will need a stay away order.” Brief for Appellant at 33 n.4
    (emphasis added by Mansurov) (purporting to quote the transcript from the
    - 11 -
    J-S11045-18
    sentencing hearing, N.T., 5/10/16, at 49).6        However, regardless of this
    purported passing remark, the written sentencing Order, which states that the
    court imposed the stay-away condition as part of Mansurov’s probation,
    controls. See Commonwealth v. Borrin, 
    80 A.3d 1219
    , 1226-27 (Pa. 2013)
    (stating that “[i]n Pennsylvania, the text of the sentencing order, and not the
    statements a trial court makes about a defendant’s sentence, is determinative
    of the court’s sentencing intentions and the sentence imposed.”).
    Additionally, the stay-away condition of Mansurov’s probation was not
    unduly restrictive, and was designed to rehabilitate him. In imposing the stay-
    away Order, the trial court was mindful of Mansurov’s pattern of stalking and
    invading the personal space of women, which included his two ex-girlfriends
    (i.e., Ramazanova and Zielinska) who were covered under the stay-away
    Order.    Accordingly, the stay-away Order was reasonable, and specifically
    tailored to (a) facilitate Mansurov’s recovery and rehabilitation; and (b)
    provide for the safety of the public by preventing him from further harassing
    the subject women. See, e.g., 
    McBride, 433 A.2d at 510-11
    (upholding the
    trial court’s order that the defendant have no contact with the juvenile victim
    whose morals he was convicted of corrupting, where it was reasonable and
    ____________________________________________
    6 The transcript from the sentencing hearing is not contained in the electronic
    record certified to this Court. See Commonwealth v. Lesko, 
    15 A.3d 345
    ,
    410 (Pa. 2011) (explaining that it is the responsibility of the appellant, not the
    trial court, to provide a complete record for review, including any necessary
    transcripts). Moreover, though Mansurov purports to have included a copy of
    this transcript in his reproduced record, it is not contained therein.
    - 12 -
    J-S11045-18
    necessary to rehabilitate the defendant). Accordingly, Mansurov’s fourth issue
    does not entitle him to relief.
    In his final issue, Mansurov contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence.
    See Brief for Appellant at 33-42. According to Mansurov, the trial court, in
    imposing a sentence that is above the applicable sentencing guidelines, failed
    to (a) consider Mansurov’s circumstances and rehabilitative needs; and (b)
    state on the record reasons for the sentence imposed. See 
    id. at 34-35.
    Mansurov challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence, from
    which there is no absolute right to appeal. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 
    66 A.3d 359
    , 363 (Pa. Super. 2013). Rather, where, as here, the appellant has
    preserved the sentencing challenge for appellate review by raising it at
    sentencing or in a timely post-sentence motion, the appellant must (1) include
    in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of
    appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (2) show that there is a substantial question that the
    sentence imposed is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.        
    Hill, 66 A.3d at 363-64
    .
    Here, Mansurov included a Rule 2119(f) Statement in his brief.      See
    Brief for Appellant at 33-35. Moreover, his above-mentioned claims present
    a substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 
    968 A.2d 773
    , 776 (Pa. Super. 2009) (observing that “[t]he failure to set forth
    adequate reasons for the sentence imposed has been held to raise a
    - 13 -
    J-S11045-18
    substantial question. Likewise, an averment that the court … failed to consider
    all relevant factors raises a substantial question.”) (citations omitted);
    Commonwealth v. Holiday, 
    954 A.2d 6
    , 10 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that
    “[a] claim that the sentencing court imposed a sentence outside of the
    guidelines without specifying sufficient reasons presents a substantial
    question for our review.”).
    Mansurov challenges as manifestly excessive the court’s sentence of
    three to six years in prison, where the guideline range was restorative
    sanctions to nine months. See Brief for Appellant at 37. But see also 
    id. (pointing out
    that the statutory maximum for a conviction of criminal trespass
    is five to ten years in prison). Additionally, Mansurov maintains that “[d]uring
    the [sentencing] hearing, the court failed to cite a single reason for its
    sentence[.]” 
    Id. at 39;
    see also 
    id. at 42.
    Finally, Mansurov argues that the
    sentencing court failed to take into account his particular circumstances,
    character, and rehabilitative needs. 
    Id. at 37.
    We review discretionary aspects of sentence claims under the following
    standard:   “[S]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
    manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Fullin, 
    892 A.2d 843
    , 847
    (Pa. Super. 2006). Moreover, the sentencing court has broad discretion in
    choosing the range of permissible confinement that best suits a particular
    defendant and the circumstances surrounding his crime. Commonwealth v.
    Walls, 
    846 A.2d 152
    , 154-55 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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    The Sentencing Code sets forth the considerations a trial court must
    take into account when formulating a sentence, stating that “the court shall
    follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for
    confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of
    the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the
    community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”          42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 9721(b). Additionally, in every case where a sentencing court imposes a
    sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines, the court must provide in open
    court a contemporaneous statement of reasons in support of its sentence. 
    Id. When doing
    so,
    a trial judge ... [must] demonstrate on the record, as a proper
    starting point, its awareness of the sentencing guidelines. Having
    done so, the sentencing court may deviate from the guidelines, if
    necessary, to fashion a sentence which takes into account the
    protection of the public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant,
    and the gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the impact
    on the life of the victim and the community, so long as it also
    states of record the factual basis and specific reasons which
    compelled it to deviate from the guideline range.
    Commonwealth v. Bowen, 
    55 A.3d 1254
    , 1264 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
    and brackets omitted). However, “[a] sentencing court need not undertake a
    lengthy   discourse    for   its   reasons    for   imposing    a   sentence[.]”
    Commonwealth v. Crump, 
    995 A.2d 1280
    , 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    Finally, when evaluating a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
    sentence, it is important to remember that the sentencing guidelines are
    purely advisory in nature. Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 
    923 A.2d 1111
    , 1118
    (Pa. 2007); see also Commonwealth v. Walls, 
    926 A.2d 957
    , 963 (Pa.
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    J-S11045-18
    2007) (stating that “rather than cabin the exercise of a sentencing court’s
    discretion,    the   [sentencing] guidelines merely inform the         sentencing
    decision.”).
    Mansurov’s claim that the sentencing court did not state any reasons for
    the sentence it imposed is belied by the record. In its Opinion, the trial court
    explains that, at sentencing, it stated, inter alia, as follows prior to sentencing
    Mansurov:
    I’ll certainly put on the record the history of [Mansurov] and the
    … the testimony of the officers[, and] the testimony of
    [Mansurov’s] past domestic violence incidents that were
    presented are an aggravating factor. I think the nature of this
    case, the Prior Bad Acts that the [c]ourt admitted into evidence,
    and witnesses -- I believe two witnesses that testified to Prior Bad
    Acts, that certainly is a consideration. All of the testimony
    presented at trial I think make the sentence appropriate. The
    Prior Bad Acts, the testimony at trial, the testimony we heard
    today from the officers, as well as [Mansurov’s] juvenile
    incidents[,] and the other domestic violence incidents presented
    that show a pattern by [Mansurov] of violating women and
    physically attacking women and stalking women, has been
    abundantly shown based on what was presented here today.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 15 (quoting N.T., 5/10/16, at 47). The trial
    court further stated in its Opinion as follows: “Based on the findings of the
    court, the aggravating factors grossly outweighed any mitigation. A standard
    range sentence was not appropriate for the conduct of [Mansurov]. Therefore
    the imposition of sentence in this case was proper and was adequately
    explained on the record.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/17, at 15-16. We agree
    with the trial court’s rationale and discern no abuse of its discretion in
    imposing a sentence, above the guideline range, which was commensurate
    - 16 -
    J-S11045-18
    with the seriousness of the crime, Mansurov’s criminal history, and the danger
    he posed to women and the community.
    Moreover, the sentencing court had the benefit of a pre-sentence
    investigation report (“PSI”). It is well settled that where a sentencing court
    is informed by a PSI, “it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate
    sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so
    informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”         Commonwealth v.
    Ventura, 
    975 A.2d 1128
    , 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing Commonwealth v.
    Devers, 
    546 A.2d 12
    , 18 (Pa. 1988)). Additionally, “[t]he sentencing judge
    can satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on
    the record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the [PSI]; thus
    properly considering and weighing all relevant factors.” 
    Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1135
    (citation omitted).
    Because the sentencing court in the instant case had reviewed
    Mansurov’s PSI, it is presumed that the court considered, inter alia, his
    individualized circumstances and character. See 
    Ventura, supra
    ; see also
    Commonwealth v. Sheller, 
    961 A.2d 187
    , 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (stating that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence
    beyond the aggravated range where the court considered the pre-sentence
    investigation report, sentencing guidelines, protection of the public, and the
    appellant’s rehabilitative needs). Thus, Mansurov’s final issue entitles him to
    no relief.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    - 17 -
    J-S11045-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/1/18
    - 18 -
    Circulated 04/03/2018 11:31 AM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
    FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                                            CP-51-CR-0008729-2015
    vs.
    FILED
    OZOD MANSUROV
    JUL 1 4 2017
    Records
    OPINION               office of Judicial Trial
    Appeats/Post
    NICHOLS, CAROLYN H., J.                                                                                   July 16, 2017
    The Defendant, Ozod Mansurov, appeals from the judgement of sentence entered in the
    Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his conviction for Criminal Trespass (18
    Pa C.S.A. §3503 §§A1). The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows.
    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On May 14, 2015, Defendant was arrested and charged with Burglary (18                               §   3502(a)(1)),
    Intimidating a Witness (18      §   4952(a)(1)), Criminal Trespass (19         §   3503(a)(1), Theft by Unlawful
    Taking (18   §   3921(a)), Receiving Stolen Property (18        §   3925(a)), Terroristic Threats with Intent
    to Terrorize Another (18    §   2706(a)(1)), Stalking (18   §   2709.1(a)(1)), and Harassment (18                    §
    2709(a)(1). See, Bill of Information. Prior to trial, on February            1,    2016, the Commonwealth filed
    a motion to introduce prior bad acts       of the defendant under Pa.R.E.           §   404(b). At the conclusion
    of oral argument on February 10, 2016, the motion was granted. On February                         16, 2016,
    Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's 404(b) ruling. Defense counsel made
    CP-51-CR-0008728-2015 Comm v Mansurov,
    Ozod
    Opinion
    1
    1111111,11,11!1916111111111_
    oral argument on March 9, 2016, at which point the motion was denied and the matter proceeded
    to trial. At the conclusion   of the two-day trial on March   11,   2016, the jury found Defendant
    guilty of criminal trespass. He was found not guilty on the charges of Burglary and Stalking, but
    hung on the remaining charges, which the Commonwealth moved to nolle prosse. At that time,
    sentencing was deferred to allow for preparation of a presentence investigation report. On May
    10, 2016,   Defendant was sentenced to three to six years state incarceration plus a three-year
    probationary tail.
    Defendant filed a timely Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on
    July 5, 2016. This court ordered Defendant to file a 1925(b) on July 12, 2016. After this court
    granted Defendant an extension, Defendant timely filed a statement of matters on August 2,
    2016.
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    After finishing work on May 2, 2015, Olena Horenska ("Ms. Horenska") returned to her
    apartment at 2101 Winchester Avenue in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. N.T. 3/10/16 at 24. At that
    time, Ms. Horenska lived with two roommates: Fatima and her daughter, Elena. 
    Id. at 20.
    In
    addition, Elena's sister Luiza periodically visited the apartment, staying there when she fought
    with Defendant, who was her boyfriend at the time. 
    Id. After arriving
    home from work, Ms. Horenska went to her bedroom to take a nap. 
    Id. at 24.
    Some time later, she awoke to the sound of very loud knocking on the front door. 
    Id. Ms. Horenska
    went to the front door, where she heard the voice of Defendant, who she immediately
    recognized as Luiza's boyfriend. 
    Id. at 25.
    She informed Defendant that his girlfriend was not
    there, and also explained that because she was alone in the home, she did not want to let him
    2
    inside. 
    Id. at 25.
    At that time, the front door was secured with two locks and a chain. 
    Id. at 26.
    However, Ms. Holenska soon noticed that door was "very close to open" and was only being
    held closed by one chain. 
    Id. Before Defendant
    could enter the home, Ms. Holenska ran to her
    bedroom and closed her door. 
    Id. Shortly thereafter,
    she heard Defendant going through each
    area of the apartment, repeatedly asking where his girlfriend, Luiza, and her mother, Fatima, had
    gone. 
    Id. at 28.
    Defendant approached the bedroom door and asked Ms. Horenska to open it; she asked
    Defendant to promise that he would not hurt her; he obliged. Id, at 27. After opening the door,
    Ms. Horenska stepped aside, and Defendant proceeded to check the closet and other areas where
    people might potentially hide. 
    Id. Throughout this
    exchange, he continued to ask Ms. Horenska
    questions about when his girlfriend and her mother left and appeared to be "very angry." 
    Id. Ms. Horenska
    told Defendant that Luiza and her mother had left the country. 
    Id. at 28.
    Defendant
    asked her if she had called the police; she said that she did not, and offered to show Defendant
    her phone so he could verify her claim. 
    Id. He declined,
    but explained that if she did, she would
    "have problems" and that he would kill her. 
    Id. During this
    exchange, Defendant was still in Ms. Holenska's bedroom, where the two
    were standing only a few feet away. 
    Id. Ms. Holenska
    testified that she felt very afraid, given that
    Defendant "said he's going to kill me, he swears to God." 
    Id. at 29.
    After finishing their
    conversation in the bedroom, Defendant retreated to the living room, where he took two stuffed
    animals from the corner and began to leave the apartment. 
    Id. at 30.
    Ms. Holenska asked who
    would fix the door; Defendant replied that it was not his problem, as she should have opened the
    door for him. 
    Id. 3 At
    this point, Ms. Holenska observed that wooden door was crooked and could not be
    closed completely. 
    Id. at 31
    . There were also wooden pieces all over the surrounding area. 
    Id. Ms. Horenska
    went to the window overlooking the parking lot at the apartment building; she
    observed Defendant getting into his car, then carelessly backing out and loudly accelerating as he
    left the area. 
    Id. At this
    time, Ms. Holenska testified that she sat down to cry before calling to ask
    a friend if he could help repair the door, as she was too afraid to call the police. 
    Id. After Ms.
    Holenska's friend arrived, they contacted maintenance to ask whether the door could be fixed. 
    Id. at 32.
    They were informed that in order for maintenance to repair the door, they would need to
    provide them with a police report; at this time, she contacted the police. 
    Id. Following her
    statement to police, Ms. Holenska was shown a series of photographs and was asked to make an
    identification. 
    Id. at 34.
    She identified Defendant. 
    Id. Ms. Holenska
    and her friend returned to the apartment, where maintenance was able to
    -   fix the door enough so it would close. 
    Id. Ms. Holenska
    asked her friend to stay with her at the
    apartment, as she did not feel safe there alone. 
    Id. Sometime after
    midnight, Ms. Holenska heard
    knocking on the front door. 
    Id. She went
    to the bathroom (the room furthest from the front door)
    and called 911; her friend went to the front door. 
    Id. Through the
    bathroom window, Ms.
    Holenska heard Defendant's voice in a very angry and loud tone. 
    Id. at 35.
    At this point,
    Defendant left and the police arrived, at which point Ms. Holenska provided the officer with a
    statement. 
    Id. The following
    day, Ms. Holenska and her friend left the house at roughly 8:30am. 
    Id. at 36.
    Upon her return later that afternoon, Ms. Holenska observed pieces of the wood door on the
    ground. 
    Id. She entered
    the apartment and tried not to touch anything; she noticed that the glass
    4
    coffee table was broken, there were small pieces of glass on the floor, there was a broken mirror
    hanging on the wall, and the apartment smelled like gas, even though all of the burners were off.
    
    Id. At this
    point, Ms. Horenska made a third call to the police. 
    Id. at 37.
    After giving the
    responding officer   a   statement, Ms. 1-Tolenska then packed up her things and left the apartment to
    relocate to another state. 
    Id. At trial,
    Kaleen Harrigan ("Ms. Harrigan") testified for the Commonwealth regarding an
    incident that occurred on August 2, 2014 involving Defendant. 
    Id. at 57.
    At that time, Ms.
    Harrigan was living in the Blair Mill East Apartments in Horsham, Pennsylvania. 
    Id. at 58.
    Ms.
    Harrigan's unit was located on the bottom floor of the building and featured a patio, which was
    directly below her upstairs neighbor's balcony. 
    Id. At some
    time in the afternoon on the date in question, Ms. Harrigan heard "extremely
    loud banging" on the door of a nearby apartment unit. Id, at 59. She then witnessed Defendant
    "get boosted up into the top apartment," at which point the glass door on the upstairs unit's
    balcony was "ripped open." 
    Id. Ms. Harrigan
    recognized Defendant as the boyfriend of her
    upstairs neighbor, indicating that the two had a "huge fight" about a week prior to the incident.
    
    Id. Ms. Harrigan
    stated that because it was the middle of the day, she knew her neighbor was not
    at home, so she called the police. 
    Id. Officer Clarence
    Dickerson ("Officer Dickerson") also testified regarding the August
    2014 incident, in which he responded to a call for a burglary while on duty for the Upper
    Moreland Township Police Department. 
    Id. at 63.
    Officer Dickerson knocked on the door of the
    unit and stated that he was a police officer, but no    ne answered. 
    Id. at 66.
    At that point, he
    5
    notified building maintenance of the situation and obtained a key to enter the property. 
    Id. Once inside,
    Officer Dickerson discovered Defendant in the shower. 
    Id. Magdalena Zielinska
    ("Ms. Zielinska") also testified regarding August 2014 incident. 
    Id. at 97.
    On that date, Ms. Zielinska was in a fight with Defendant and refused to answer his calls.
    At the time of the incident, Ms. Zielinska was not home, but had received numerous phone calls
    from Defendant, which she declined to answer. 
    Id. Although Defendant
    had spent the night at the
    apartment on at least one prior occasion, Ms. Zielinska stated that he never paid rent, nor did he
    leave any personal items behind when he left. 
    Id. at 100.
    She indicated that she did not give
    Defendant keys to her apartment, nor did she give him permission to enter her apartment or
    retrieve any items. 
    Id. Additionally, she
    said there was no "normal" way of entering the
    apartment other than through the front door; the only possible point of entry was to climb
    through the balcony, as her unit at the time was on the second floor. 
    Id. MATTERS COMPLAINED
    OF ON APPEAL
    1.   The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to find defendant, Ozod Mansurov guilty
    of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3503, criminal trespass of a building and/or occupied structure as the
    evidence failed to establish Mansurov was not privileged to enter the complainant's
    apartment. Likewise, the evidence was insufficient to prove he gained entry to
    complainant's home "by force, breaking, intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks or
    through an opening not designed for human access."
    2.    The jury's finding of guilty on the charge of criminal trespass was against the great
    weight of the evidence presented at trial as the testimony of the complainant was simply
    not credible and should not have been accepted by the jury. The complainant did not
    testify that she told Mansurov to leave.
    3.   The trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Motion to Admit
    defendant, Ozod Mansurov's prior bad acts pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
    404(b) involving an incident in Montgomery County as it was prejudicial and was sought
    6
    to show defendant's propensity to commit the acts alleged in the case before this Court.
    4.   The trial court erred in denying defendant, Ozod Mansurov's Motion for a Mistrial during
    the course of the trial proceedings. Counsel has requested a copy of the Notes of
    Testimony from the Trial to Review, however, the trial notes have not been reproduced.
    Therefore, counsel would request leave of court to amend this 1925(b) Statement upon
    receipt of the Notes of Testimony with respect to the mistrial issue.
    5.   The trial court erred in granting a "stay away order" as to three (3) individuals and
    against Mr. Mansurov as the court was without the legal authority to do    s  and the court
    issued stay away order(s) for individuals who had no real relationship to the action. This
    part of the sentence imposed by the court was illegal.
    6.   The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing defendant well outside the
    Pennsylvania Sentencing guidelines and giving him a sentence of three (3) to six (6)
    years when the guideline calculation was "restorative sanctions to nine (9) months plus or
    minus three (3) months on the singular charge of criminal trespass and failed to articulate
    the reason for the sentencing well outside of the guidelines which was excessive and
    there was no rational basis for the sentences as well as being unreasonable.
    7. The trial court erred in allowing two (2) police officers with no  connection to the case
    testify at the time of sentencing on grounds of hearsay and relevance and the erred in
    allowing a letter to be read by a mother of the complainant which was clearly hearsay and
    which she was not a victim and which was not a victim impact statement.
    DISCUSSION
    1.        Sufficiency Claim - The evidence presented was sufficient to support the
    efendant's conviction for criminal trespass.
    When evaluating   a   sufficiency claim, the standard is whether, viewing all evidence and
    reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the factfinder
    reasonably could have determined each element of the crime was established beyond            a
    reasonable doubt. Commonwealth           v.   Kane, 
    10 A.3d 327
    , 332 (Pa. Super. 2010). The Superior
    Court considers all the evidence admitted, without regard to any claim that some of the evidence
    7
    was wrongly allowed. 
    Id. The Superior
    Court will not weigh the evidence or make credibility
    determinations. 
    Id. Moreover, any
    doubts concerning a defendant's guilt were to be resolved by
    the fact finder, unless the evidence was so weak and inconclusive that no probability of fact
    could be drawn from that evidence. 
    Id. The Commonwealth
    may meet its burden by proving a crime's elements with evidence
    which is entirely circumstantial and the trier of fact, who determines credibility of witnesses and
    the weight to give the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Riley, 
    811 A.2d 610
    , 614 (Pa. Super. 2002), quoting Commonwealth             v.   Brown,
    
    701 A.2d 252
    , 254 (Pa. Super. 1997). Ultimately, "the test is whether the evidence, thus viewed,
    is sufficient to   prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth      v.   Whiteman, 
    485 A.2d 459
    , 462 (Pa. 1984).
    To sustain a conviction for criminal trespass, the Commonwealth must prove that
    Defendant entered premises, knowing that he was not licensed or privileged to do so. 18 Pa.C.S.
    §3503; See also, Commonwealth         v   Goldsborough, 
    426 A.2d 126
    (Pa. Super. 1981). It is a
    defense to prosecution under this section if "the actor reasonably believed that the owner of the
    premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter
    or remain." 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3503(c)(3). However, "in most cases the Commonwealth will meet its
    burden of proving that the defendant was not licensed or privileged to enter by having the owner
    or occupant of the building testify that he or she did not give the defendant permission to enter."
    Commonwealth        v   Knight, 
    419 A.2d 492
    , 500 (Pa. Super. 1980).
    In the instant case, Defendant claims that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that
    (1) he was not privileged to enter the complainant's apartment; and (2) that he gained entry to the
    8
    home "by force, breaking, intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks or through an opening not
    designed for human access." However, for the reasons that follow, these claims are without
    merit.
    First, it was established at trial that Ms. Horenska explicitly denied Defendant permission
    to enter the apartment. Additionally, nothing in the record indicates that Defendant had a
    reasonable belief that he was otherwise authorized to enter the apartment, as his only connection
    to the unit was through his girlfriend Luiza, who was not a resident. Therefore, it is clear that
    Defendant lacked the requisite authorization to enter the apartment unit, which necessarily
    invalidates his argument regarding privilege.
    Next, Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he gained entry
    to the home "by force, breaking, intimidation, unauthorized opening    of locks or through an
    opening not designed for human access." At trial, Ms. Horenska testified that after she denied
    Defendant access to the residence, she noticed that the front door locks were close to open. Ms.
    Horenska then ran and hid with the Defendant still outside the door and the door secured. During
    that time, Defendant grew increasingly frustrated, eventually using some manner of force to
    break through the front door (which was locked) and enter Ms. Horenska's home. The mere fact
    that Defendant was in the apartment is enough to establish this element, as he was not authorized
    to enter the residence.
    II.     Weight of the Evidence - The Trial Court's verdict was not against the weight of the
    evidence.
    The Defendant also claims that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, as (1)
    the complainant's testimony was not credible; and (2) the complainant did not ask Defendant to
    leave. In reviewing a weight claim, the appellate court focuses solely on whether the trial court
    9
    abused its discretion; it does not consider the underlying question of whether the verdict itself
    was against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v Widmer, 
    744 A.2d 745
    , 751 (Pa.
    2000). "Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented,
    an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
    trial judge when reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is against the weight of
    the evidence." Commonwealth v. Johnson, 910 A.2d, 60 (Pa. 2006).
    A weight claim actually concedes sufficiency of the evidence, as the appellate court is to
    focus only on quality of the trial court's discretion. 
    Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751
    . Therefore, "[t]he
    test is not whether the court would have decided the case in the same way, but whether the
    verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to make the award of a new trial imperative so that right
    may be given another opportunity to prevail." Commonwealth v. Whiteman, 
    485 A.2d 459
    , 462
    (Pa. 1984). Accordingly, in order to reverse a trial court's ruling on a weight of evidence claim, it
    "must determine that the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to 'shock one's sense of
    justice.- Commonwealth     v.   Hitner, 
    910 A.2d 721
    , 733 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    In the instant case, several witnesses testified for the Commonwealth as to their
    observations of the condition of the front door. Although Defendant proffered a witness who
    stated that the apartment door sustained no noticeable damage, it was unclear whether the
    witness fully understood the questions that were asked during either direct or cross examination.
    Although the witness initially stated that he had observed Defendant entering the unit with a key
    on several occasions, cross-examination and redirect examination revealed that the witness was
    referring to Defendant's key to the front door of the multi -unit apartment building. Given the fact
    10
    that Defendant's family also lived in the building, this was not probative of Defendant's rightful
    access to Ms. Horenska's apartment.
    III.      The Commonwealth's Motion to Introduce Prior Bad Acts was properly granted, as
    the evidence was relevant to show Defendant's lack of mistake.
    Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be
    reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Reefer, 
    393 Pa. Super. 193
    , 
    573 A.2d 1153
    , 1154 (1990) (citation omitted). The decision whether to admit or exclude evidence
    lies within the sound discretion of this Court, which is not subject to reversal except for abuse of
    that discretion. Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 
    536 Pa. 271
    , 
    639 A.2d 421
    , 431 (1994). An abuse of
    discretion is not merely an error in judgment but a gross misapplication of the law, manifestly
    unreasonable judgment, or demonstrable bias or partiality. Commonwealth        v.   Kublac, 
    550 A.2d 219
    , 223 (1988).
    Relevant evidence of other crimes or bad acts committed by the defendant are admissible
    as long as they are for a purpose other than propensity to commit crime. Commonwealth         v.
    Brown, 
    342 A.2d 84
    (Pa. 1972). Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence §404(b)(2),
    "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of
    motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake.
    Additionally, if such evidence is found relevant and its uses is for the purpose other than showing
    a   propensity to commit crime, its probative value must outweigh its potential prejudice. Pa.R.E.
    §404(b)(3).
    Evidence of other crimes is admissible to show the defendant's actions were not the result
    of a mistake or accident "where the manner and circumstance of the two crimes are remarkably
    11
    similar." Commonwealth      v.   Tyson, 
    119 A.3d 353
    at 359 (Pa. Super. 2015). In its motion, the
    Commonwealth cites to the Tyson case, in which the Superior Court found that the trial court
    should have admitted prior act evidence of the defendant committing a rape in the prosecution of
    another rape; in so holding, the court noted similarities between the crimes including that the
    defendant was acquainted with both victims, who were both black females in their 20s, that he
    was a guest in their home, that both victims were in a weakened or compromised state, that both
    victims lost consciousness and that both awoke to the defendant having vaginal intercourse with
    them 
    Id. at 360.
    In the instant case, Defendant argues that the evidence was inadmissible as it was (1)
    prejudicial; and (2) was used solely for the purpose of demonstrating propensity. For the reasons
    that follow, these points are without merit.
    First, Defendant claims that the evidence is prejudicial, which would necessarily render it
    inadmissible. However, this is clearly not the case. In ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the
    test is not whether it is prejudicial; instead, the test is whether the probative value of the evidence
    is   substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Here, the court found that the
    probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect.
    Next, Defendant claims that the evidence itself was admitted for the improper purpose of
    showing Defendant's propensity. However, the prior bad acts evidence was admitted not to show
    propensity, but to establish Defendant's lack of mistake. The accusations by Ms. Harrigan and
    Ms. Horenska serve to clearly demonstrate this principle. First, the incidents occurred nine
    months apart, with the second           taking place only five days after Defendant pled guilty to the
    charges in the initial case. Not only were the two incidents close in time, but they were also
    12
    similar in character. In both instances, Defendant targeted ex -girlfriends who were not at home
    when he arrived to break into their respective residences. The ex -girlfriends were both young
    females, as were the witnesses to the illegal entries in both cases. Also, in both instances,
    Defendant not only forcibly entered the premises, but engaged in varying degrees of evasion
    from law enforcement, hiding in the shower in one instance and actually running away from the
    scene in the other. Therefore, the admission of the prior acts by Defendant was properly
    admitted.
    IV.    Defendant's claim that the court erred by denying the Motion for a Mistrial               is too
    vague and does not comport with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(B)(4).
    Rule I 925(b)(4)(ii) provides, "The Statement shall identify each ruling or error that the
    appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the
    judge.... Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). Rule 1925    is   "intended to aid trial judges in identifying and
    focusing on those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal." Commonwealth          v.   Dowling,
    
    778 A.2d 683
    , 686 (Pa. Super 2001), (citation omitted). "Rule 1925 is thus a crucial component
    of the appellate process." 
    Id. When a
    court has to guess what issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for
    meaningful review. When an appellant fails adequately to identify in a concise manner
    the issues sought to be pursued on appeal, a trial court is impeded in its preparation of a
    legal analysis which is pertinent to those issues.
    
    Dowling, 778 A.2d at 686
    (internal citations omitted). Commonwealth         v.   Dowling, 
    778 A.2d 683
    (Pa. Super. 2001). When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the Appellant
    must specify which elements of the charge were not proven by a sufficiency of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v Gibbs, 
    2009 Pa. Super. 181
    , 
    981 A.2d 274
    , 281 (2009).
    13
    In the instant case, the Defendant does not cite with any specificity what aspect          of the
    evidence presented was insufficient to find him guilty of Intimidation of a Witness. Additionally,
    he does not identify which element of the charge was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt with
    the evidence presented. Therefore Appellant's claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
    was not properly preserved and is waived.
    The trial court did not commit any error at sentencing.
    It is well -settled that   challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle a
    petitioner to review as    a    matter of right. Commonwealth   v.   Allen, 
    24 A.3d 1058
    , 1064 (Pa. Super.
    2011). Accordingly, before a discretionary challenge can be reviewed by an appellate court, the
    defendant must satisfy     a    four-part test (1) whether the appellant has filed a timely notice of
    appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider
    and modify sentence; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect; and (4) whether there is a
    substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
    Code. Commonwealth         v.   Evans, 
    901 A.2d 528
    , 533 (Pa. Super. 2006). In the instant case,
    Defendant filed   a   timely notice of appeal. He also included in his brief a concise statement of
    reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence. Therefore, the only issue is whether Defendant has raised a substantial question.
    A. The  trial court was within its discretion to impose a stay-away order as             a   term of
    Defendant's probation.
    "The court may impose probation, including 'such reasonable conditions as it deems
    necessary to insure or assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life' including those
    conditions 'related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty
    14
    or incompatible with his freedom     f   conscience." 42 Pa.C.S.A.   §   9754(b), (c)(13).
    Commonwealth      v.   Hall, 
    80 A.3d 1204
    (Pa. 2013). Court imposed conditions, however, cannot
    "exceed the maximum term for which the defendant could be confined." 42 Pa.C.S.A.             §   9754(a).
    In the instant case, Defendant was found guilty of Criminal Trespass, which carries a
    minimum guideline sentence of RS -9 +/-      3   and a maximum statutory limit of 10 years.
    Accordingly, Defendant was sentenced to 3-6 years state incarceration to run consecutively with
    a   three-year probationary period, which included the stay -away order as a condition of his
    probation. Therefore, even at the maximum, Defendant's aggregate sentence would amount to a
    period of up to nine years.
    Notwithstanding Defendant's assertion the contrary, the record clearly indicates that the
    court articulated the reasons for imposition of the aggravated sentence at sentencing. The court
    explained:      certainly put on the record the history of the defendant and the -- presented today,
    the testimony of the officers the testimony of his past domestic violence incidents that were
    presented are an aggravating factor. I think the nature of this case, the Prior Bad Acts that the
    Court admitted into evidence, and witnesses -- I believe two witnesses that testified to Prior Bad
    Acts, that certainly is a consideration. All of the testimony presented at trial I think make the
    sentence appropriate. The Prior Bad Acts, the testimony at trial, the testimony we heard today
    from the officers, as well as the juvenile incidents and the other domestic violence incidents
    presented that show a pattern by the defendant of violating women and physically attacking
    women and stalking women, has been abundantly shown based on what was presented here
    today. N.T. 5/10/17 at 47. Based on the findings of the court, the aggravating factors grossly
    outweighed any mitigation. A standard range sentence was not appropriate for the conduct of the
    15
    Defendant in the present case. Therefore the imposition of sentence in this case was proper and
    was adequately explained on the record.
    B. Admissibility of hearsay evidence at sentencing was proper.
    Defendant next challenges the admissibility       f   hearsay evidence at sentencing. The
    admissibility of hearsay evidence at a sentencing hearing is a general and standard practice in the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Cownonwealth           Y   Medley, 
    725 A.2d 1225
    , 1230 (Pa. Super.
    1999). Nearly every sentencing proceeding that occurs in the Commonwealth involves hearsay
    evidence in the form of a presentence investigation report. The objection by the Defendant is
    wholly without merit with regard to the admissibility of hearsay evidence at sentencing.
    Therefore the issues raised by the Defendant with regard to the sentencing hearing are
    without merit and the sentence of this court should be upheld.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's appeal should be denied and the judgment         f   this
    court affirmed.
    BY THE COURT:
    VAROLYN H. NICHOLS, J.
    16