STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. FRANCIS G. LANGLEY(13-07-0720 AND 15-01-0008, CAPE MAY COUNTY ANDSTATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5129-15T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FRANCIS G. LANGLEY, a/k/a
FRANCIS G. LANGLEY, JR., and
FRAN LANGLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
————————————————————————————————-
Submitted August 8, 2017 – Decided September 13, 2017
Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cape May County, Indictment
Nos. 13-07-0720 and 15-01-0008.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Jay L. Wilensky, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Jane C. Schuster,
Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Francis G. Langley appeals from two judgments of
conviction entered by the trial court on February 27, 2015.
Pursuant to a plea agreement covering two separate indictments,
the judgments of conviction declared defendant guilty of second-
degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b),
and fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2). The
judge sentenced defendant to a five-year term of imprisonment
with no eligibility for parole on the weapons conviction and a
concurrent eighteen-month term on the resisting arrest
conviction. Defendant then moved for bail pending appeal, which
the sentencing judge denied.
On appeal, defendant challenges the judge's pretrial ruling
of April 9, 2014, following a hearing on April 1, 2014, denying
his motion to suppress physical evidence seized by police. He
also challenges the judge's pretrial ruling of January 5, 2015,
following a hearing on that date, denying his motion to suppress
his statements to police. Defendant further appeals the denial
of his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He
presents the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
USE OF THE WEAPON SEIZED HERE IN A CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE ACT, AND NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
COMMUNITY CARETAKING DOCTRINE. ACCORDINGLY,
SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. U.S.
2 A-5129-15T1
CONST., AMEND[S]. IV, XIV; N.J. CONST.
(1947), ART. 1, PAR 7.
POINT II
THE MOTION COURT'S RULING AS TO SUPPRESSION
OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE WAS BASED ON UNADMITTED
"EVIDENCE," AND IS ACCORDINGLY INVALID AND
MUST BE VACATED. U.S. CONST., AMENDS. VI,
XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR 10.
(NOT RAISED BELOW)
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN IN THE
ABSENCE OF NECESSARY MIRANDA WARNINGS, AND
ACCORDINGLY MUST BE SUPPRESSED. U.S.
CONST., AMEND[S]. V, XIV.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA. U.S. CONST.,
AMEND. XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART. 1, PAR.
9.
Finding no merit in these arguments, we affirm. We address the
facts and law relating to each point in turn.
I.
At the April 1, 2014 suppression hearing, the State
presented testimony from Sergeant John Mazzuca of the Ocean City
Police Department. Sergeant Mazzuca stated that on June 27,
2013, at approximately 8:30 p.m., dispatch directed him to a
"domestic dispute" at a residence on Coolidge Road, which a
neighbor had reported to 9-1-1. Dispatch notified the sergeant
that a prior disturbance had occurred at the residence and
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defendant "had returned to the property and . . . forcibly
entered the rear door."
Sergeant Mazzuca arrived at the residence "almost
simultaneously" with two other police officers. Defendant's
mother-in-law met the officers as they approached and informed
them that defendant and his wife, N.L., were "arguing and
fighting inside" and that defendant was "screaming" at her. The
officers also learned that N.L.'s children fled the residence
during the fight.
Sergeant Mazzuca went inside the residence and heard a male
voice yelling. He entered a bedroom to find defendant and N.L.;
he observed N.L. "visibly shaken," upset, crying, and
"distraught because she felt her marriage was going away." The
officers then separated defendant and N.L. to speak with them
individually. Sergeant Mazzuca spoke with defendant in the
bedroom, who told him that he and N.L. "just had a verbal
dispute and no physical altercation had taken place."
Consistent with this explanation, the sergeant did not notice
any signs of physical injury and saw defendant "was packing up
his stuff to leave."
One of the other officers then entered the room and
informed Sergeant Mazzuca about his conversation with N.L.; she
stated defendant "told her to get a shotgun that was under the
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bed and load it and blow her head off." Police moved defendant
to a different bedroom where he admitted he made this statement,
adding that he "just thought she was suicidal" and "it was a bad
choice of words to make." The officers also asked defendant if
he had a shotgun; defendant admitted he had an unloaded shotgun
under his bed in the prior room and gave the officers permission
to check. Defendant further admitted to having a crossbow in
his closet.
Sergeant Mazzuca next inquired whether defendant had any
prior criminal convictions. Defendant replied that he had been
convicted of "theft from a vehicle." At that point, the
officers decided to seize the weapons, "partially for that
reason and also for the safety of his wife, who he had claimed
was suicidal." They retrieved the weapons from the locations
defendant indicated.
Sergeant Mazzuca testified that prior to this incident he
had encountered defendant during a "motor vehicle stop." Based
upon this previous involvement, he believed "there was a strong
possibility that [defendant] was a certain person not to possess
a weapon." However, the sergeant acknowledged he "was going to
have [to] research" the statute to make certain.
Sergeant Mazzuca also discussed with N.L. whether she
wanted to pursue a restraining order against defendant. When
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she responded that she did, he drove her to the police
headquarters. After N.L. "calmed down" at the station, Sergeant
Mazzuca noted he "did not feel she was a threat to commit
suicide at that point." He acknowledged the only indication
that N.L. was suicidal was defendant's statement at the
residence. However, he clarified that during his time at the
residence, "it was not [yet] determined whether she was or
wasn't [suicidal]," and the officers were acting under the
possibility that she "could be."
The officers conducted a criminal history check of
defendant at the station, which revealed "a number of felony
convictions," including some for burglary. Sergeant Mazzuca
noted that a burglary conviction qualifies an individual as a
certain person not to possess a weapon.
In a written opinion, the motion judge denied defendant's
motion to suppress the shotgun under two separate legal
theories. First applying the Prevention of Domestic Violence
Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, the judge found "the
illegal nature of the weapons was immediately apparent when
[d]efendant told the police officers that he had been convicted
of 'car theft,' thus making him a certain person not to have
weapons." She added that defendant had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his criminal records, and thus the
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records check "was not a search." Second, the judge determined
the search and seizure were permissible under the "emergency aid
doctrine," which she termed "a subcategory of [the] community
caretaking exception" to the warrant requirement. The judge
concluded that the possibility N.L. might have harmed herself
gave the officers "an objectively reasonable basis to believe
that an emergency required immediate assistance to preserve life
or prevent serious injury."
Defendant now argues the motion judge erred because neither
the PDVA nor the community-caretaking exception supported denial
of suppression. However, having reviewed the applicable law, we
are satisfied the judge appropriately denied suppression under
the emergency-aid doctrine.
When reviewing a motion to suppress, we "must uphold the
factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long
as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence
on the record." State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013)
(quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009)). "Those
findings warrant particular deference when they are
'substantially influenced by [the trial judge's] opportunity to
hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case,
which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (alteration in
original) (quoting Robinson, supra, 200 N.J. at 15). "To the
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extent that the trial court's determination rests upon a legal
conclusion, we conduct a de novo, plenary review." Ibid.
"Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey
Constitution guarantee an individual's right to be secure
against unreasonable searches or seizures." State v. Minitee,
210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J.
Const. art. I, ¶ 7). Searches and seizures conducted without a
warrant, "particularly in a home, are presumptively
unreasonable." State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 129 (2012)
(quoting State v. Bolte, 115 N.J. 579, 585 (1989)). As such,
the State has the burden of proving that such searches and
seizures are "justified by one of the '"well-delineated
exceptions" to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Shaw, 213
N.J. 398, 409 (2012) (quoting State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586,
598, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 876, 125 S. Ct. 108, 160 L. Ed. 2d
128 (2004)).
The exceptions to the warrant requirement include the
emergency-aid and community-caretaking doctrines. State v.
Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 468 (2015); State v. Keaton, 222 N.J.
438, 452 (2015). Under the community-caretaking doctrine,
"[c]ourts have allowed warrantless searches . . . when police
officers have acted not in their law enforcement or criminal
investigatory role, but rather in a community caretaking
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function." State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009). Our Supreme
Court has held that the community-caretaking doctrine prohibits
"the warrantless entry into or search of a home in the absence
of some form of exigent circumstances" or "objectively
reasonable emergency." State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 305, 321
(2013).
However, the Court made clear that "[p]olice officers
serving in a community-caretaking role are empowered to make a
warrantless entry into a home under the emergency-aid exception
to the warrant requirement." Id. at 323. "The emergency aid
doctrine is derived from the commonsense understanding that
exigent circumstances may require public safety officials, such
as the police, . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for
the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing
serious injury." Hathaway, supra, 222 N.J. at 469 (quoting
Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 598).
Courts apply a "two-prong test" that considers "the
totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the
emergency-aid doctrine justifies a warrantless search of a home.
Id. at 470, 474. The State must show that "(1) the officer had
an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency
require[d] that he provide immediate assistance to protect or
preserve life, or to prevent serious injury and (2) there was a
9 A-5129-15T1
reasonable nexus between the emergency and the area or places to
be searched." Ibid. (quoting Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 132).
The doctrine does not require "certitude" of danger but only
reasonable belief that immediate action is required. Ibid.
(quoting Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599). Reasonableness turns
on the circumstances at the time and "does not depend on whether
it is later determined that the danger actually existed." Ibid.
If an emergency exists, "[t]he emergency-aid doctrine,
particularly when applied to the entry of the home, must be
'limited to the reasons and objectives that prompted' the need
for immediate action." Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 134 (quoting
Frankel, supra, 179 N.J. at 599). "When the exigency that
justifies immediate action dissipates, the rationale for
searching without a warrant is no longer present." Ibid.
Defendant does not dispute that police had the authority to
enter the home due to a report of domestic violence, but he
argues the emergency-aid doctrine does not apply to the gun
search because the PDVA governs the events in question.
However, we have noted that exceptions to the warrant
requirement still apply to searches that implicate the PDVA.
See State v. Perkins, 358 N.J. Super. 151, 161 (App. Div. 2003)
("[U]nless the factual circumstances justify a search under a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, a search and
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resulting seizure under [the PDVA] is deemed reasonable . . . so
long as the results are not used to facilitate a criminal
prosecution."). Moreover, in Edmonds, supra, 211 N.J. at 139-
40, the Court considered the emergency-aid doctrine in the
context of a domestic violence call. Because police discovered
no evidence of a domestic disturbance upon entering a residence,
the Edmonds Court concluded there was no objectively reasonable
basis to search the home. Id. at 121-22.
Here, we conclude that the officers had an objectively
reasonable basis to believe that a danger to life required
immediate assistance, and that there was a nexus between the
emergency and the area searched. Officer Mazzuca observed N.L.
was "distraught," and defendant stated she might be suicidal and
that he told her to take his shotgun and "blow her head off."
Based on these circumstances, the officers reasonably searched
the locations indicated to secure the shotgun and crossbow.
They did not expand their search beyond these specific areas.
Although the officers had separated defendant and N.L. at the
time of the search, the officers' actions were reasonable to
prevent the possibility that N.L. might harm herself.
We are therefore satisfied that the motion judge correctly
applied the emergency-aid doctrine to uphold this search and
seizure. We further note that the criminal history check of
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defendant was lawful, as our Court has held that criminal
background checks are not searches under the state or federal
constitutions. See State v. Sloane, 193 N.J. 423, 436 (2008).
As such, we need not address defendant's arguments relating to
the judge's application of the PDVA.
II.
In Point II, defendant urges this court to vacate the
judge's ruling denying suppression of the physical evidence,
contending the judge improperly based her written opinion on
"unadmitted" evidence outside of the April 1, 2014 motion
record. Specifically, in her recitation of the background
facts, the judge apparently referenced information from police
reports and the neighbor's 9-1-1 calls, which were not testified
to at the motion hearing. Defendant further challenges the
judge's interpretation of certain facts relating to Sergeant
Mazzuca's understanding of his prior convictions.
We reject these arguments and need not consider them at
length. As discussed above, the testimony elicited at the
motion hearing was sufficient to support the judge's ruling.
Moreover, the State provided the court with the police reports
and audio of the 9-1-1 calls in the appendix to its motion
brief. The judge stated on the record that she had both
parties' briefs, and defense counsel did not object. Because
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defendant has failed to show plain error, R. 2:10-2, we decline
to disturb the judge's ruling on this basis.
III.
Defendant next challenges the judge's January 5, 2015
ruling, denying suppression of his statements to police. At
this second hearing, the State presented testimony from Ocean
City Police Officer Joshua Clarke, who was with Sergeant Mazzuca
at the subject residence. Officer Clarke spoke with N.L., who
stated defendant told her to "take my shotgun and kill
yourself"; she informed the officers that defendant kept a
shotgun underneath the bed. Officer Clarke thus became
concerned there were weapons on the premises and went to speak
with defendant. Pursuant to department protocol, he planned to
"secure the scene" and temporarily seize any firearms.
Defendant complied with the officers' request to move from
the master bedroom to the children's bedroom. While speaking
with Officer Clarke, defendant "seemed frustrated and agitated
with the situation" and said his comments "were a stupid thing
to say." Defendant "said that he did keep a shotgun underneath
the bed," "pointed to the bedroom [the officers] were standing
across the hallway from," and gave them permission to check.
According to Officer Clarke, defendant "volunteered" this
information, and he was not under arrest at this time. Officer
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Clarke acknowledged that the officers did not give defendant
Miranda1 warnings during this exchange.
After the officers seized the weapons, defendant asked if
he was free to leave. The officers "allowed him to gather up
some things and then he . . . was free to go." Defendant left
the residence, approximately forty minutes after police first
arrived.
The officers later checked defendant's criminal history at
the police station and then returned to the residence to arrest
him. According to the arrest report, defendant listed his home
address as the Coolidge Road residence where these events
transpired.
The motion judge denied defendant's suppression motion in
an oral opinion, concluding police did not need to give him
Miranda warnings because he was not subjected to a custodial
interrogation. The judge noted defendant "voluntarily provided
information to the police while in his own home and before any
indication that he would be questioned or taken into custody."
She found the police moved defendant to the children's bedroom
not to conduct a custodial interrogation but to "secure the
scene and to secure the safety of the officers and to secure the
persons in the home." The judge determined that the officers
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1062, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966).
14 A-5129-15T1
were conducting an investigation, and thus "[a]n objectively
reasonable man would not [have] felt his freedom was compromised
in any significant way given these circumstances."
Defendant now argues the motion judge erred by finding the
officers did not subject him to a custodial interrogation. As
noted, we grant deference to the judge's factual findings and
review her legal conclusions de novo. Rockford, supra, 213 N.J.
at 440.
It is well established that police officers must provide
Miranda warnings when they conduct a custodial interrogation,
which is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda,
supra, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706.
Custodial interrogations that trigger the obligation to provide
Miranda warnings do not require physical restraint and may take
place in the suspect's home. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249,
266 (2015). When not in custody, an accused has no Miranda
protection because there is no police-dominated atmosphere,
which forms the basis for the United States Supreme Court's
Miranda jurisprudence. State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 406
(citing Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S.
15 A-5129-15T1
Ct. 1612, 1616, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7-8 (1976)), cert. denied, 558
U.S. 831, 130 S. Ct. 65, 175 L. Ed. 2d 48 (2009).
A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in
determining whether an individual is in custody. State v.
Milledge, 386 N.J. Super. 233, 244 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
188 N.J. 355 (2006). "Pertinent factors include the duration of
the detention, the nature and degree of the pressure applied to
detain the individual, the physical surroundings of the
questioning and the language used by the officer in summoning
the individual." Ibid. (quoting State v. Pierson, 223 N.J.
Super. 62, 67 (App. Div. 1988)). "The critical determinant of
custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of
the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective
circumstances, including the time and place of the
interrogation, the status of the interrogator, the status of the
suspect, and other such factors." State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86,
103 (1997).
We consider these standards when police questioning stems
from a reported domestic dispute. See State v. Smith, 374 N.J.
Super. 425, 431-32 (App. Div. 2005). "When considering the need
for Miranda warnings before questioning in a private residence,
our courts have not viewed the home as a location so isolated or
dominated by the police as to lead the reasonable person to
16 A-5129-15T1
conclude he or she is in custody or in danger of abuse." Id. at
432. Though "police action subsequent to entering [a] residence
is likely to involve some restraint on the occupants' freedom of
action," we have analogized the detention involved "to field
investigations of suspicious conduct authorized by Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and
traffic stops authorized by Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984)." Smith, supra, 374
N.J. Super. at 431. In doing so, we held that, absent
circumstances equivalent to arrest, in-home questioning is
insufficient to rise to the level of custody necessitating
Miranda warnings. Id. at 431-33.
Additionally, where a defendant is merely "the subject of
an officer's attempt to gather information, the required
compulsion is not present to necessitate Miranda warnings."
State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 214 (App. Div. 2006),
aff'd in part and modified in part, 189 N.J. 108 (2007).
Applying these principles, we find there are more than
sufficient grounds to treat the events under review as a non-
custodial situation. The officers properly entered defendant's
home in order to investigate a reported domestic disturbance.
After hearing N.L.'s statement that a weapon was located under
the bed, they moved defendant to a different room to secure the
17 A-5129-15T1
scene and asked him limited questions to investigate N.L.'s
account. Defendant voluntarily told the officers he kept a
shotgun under his bed and gave them permission to check. The
officers did not pressure defendant or place him under arrest,
he was in his own home the entire time, and he was free to leave
after police seized the weapon.
Under these circumstances, we conclude an objectively
reasonable person would not have believed they were in police
custody during these events. See Smith, supra, 374 N.J. Super.
at 432. In the absence of custodial interrogation, Miranda
warnings were not required and the motion judge did not err by
declining to suppress defendant's statements. We therefore
discern no basis to disturb the judge's ruling.
IV.
Last, defendant argues the judge should have granted his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. This issue is governed by
the four-factor test expressed by our Supreme Court in State v.
Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009): "(1) whether the defendant
has asserted a colorable claim of innocence; (2) the nature and
strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the
existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would
result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to
the accused."
18 A-5129-15T1
Courts must balance all of the factors in deciding the
motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea. Id. at 162. As no
factor is mandatory, the fact that one may be missing "does not
automatically disqualify or dictate relief." Ibid.
With regard to the first Slater factor, "[a] bare assertion
of innocence is insufficient to justify withdrawal of a plea."
Id. at 158. The defendant must present specific and credible
facts "and, where possible, point to facts in the record that
buttress [his or her] claim." Ibid. Courts may look to
evidence that was available to the parties when the defendant
entered his plea. Id. at 158-59. Courts should not conduct a
"mini-trial" but should "simply consider whether a defendant's
assertion of innocence is more than a blanket, bald statement
and rests on particular, plausible facts." Id. at 159.
Regarding the second Slater factor, a defendant has
adequate reason to withdraw his or her plea where the court or
prosecutor misinforms the defendant about an element of the
plea, or where "the defendant was not informed and thus did not
understand" material terms and consequences of the plea. Ibid.
The record shows that several months after sentencing,
defendant moved to withdraw his plea, or in the alternative, for
reconsideration of his motion for bail pending appeal. In
support of this motion, defendant claimed he only pled guilty
19 A-5129-15T1
because his attorney told him he would receive bail pending his
appeal if he did so. Defendant further asserted his innocence,
claiming the shotgun police recovered actually belonged to his
son, and it arrived at N.L.'s residence after he moved out.
Defendant submitted a letter and affidavit from his plea counsel
and affidavits from friends and family members to support these
claims.
Following a hearing on February 4, 2016, the judge2 denied
defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Applying the Slater
factors, the judge found defendant had not asserted he was
innocent or demonstrated sufficient reasons for withdrawal;
rather, he "simply no longer wants [to] deal with the
consequences of the plea." The judge noted defendant entered
his plea pursuant to an agreement, and she found that withdrawal
would unfairly prejudice the State, which was prepared to go to
trial. The judge also rejected defendant's claim that he was
led to believe he would receive bail pending appeal, citing the
plea transcript and other portions of the record that showed he
was aware the State was opposing his motion. She noted that any
claims regarding his attorney's advice were appropriate for
post-conviction relief (PCR).
2
A different judge conducted defendant's plea withdrawal
hearing.
20 A-5129-15T1
Defendant now argues the judge erred in her application of
the Slater factors. We disagree. First, although defendant
submitted affidavits stating the shotgun was not his, the
suppression record shows defendant freely admitted to possessing
the shotgun. The record further shows that at the time of his
arrest, defendant told police he lived at the address where they
seized the shotgun. For these reasons, we find defendant did
not base his assertion of innocence upon credible facts.
Second, the record shows defendant was informed he was not
guaranteed bail upon pleading guilty. At his plea hearing,
defendant affirmed he understood that the State was going to
object to his application for bail pending appeal. His plea
form further noted the State would oppose bail. As the judge
appropriately noted, any claims defendant has against his
attorney are appropriate for PCR. Similarly, we find the judge
correctly balanced the remaining Slater factors to deny
defendant's motion. We discern no basis to reverse.
Affirmed.
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