Globe Motor Company and the Margolis Law Firm, LLC Vs. ilya Igdalev and Julia Igdalev , 436 N.J. Super. 594 ( 2014 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0897-12T1
GLOBE MOTOR COMPANY, a corporation
of the State of New Jersey, and
THE MARGOLIS LAW FIRM, LLC,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
August 7, 2014
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
ILYA IGDALEV and JULIA IGDALEV,
Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________________
Argued December 11, 2013 - Decided August 7, 2014
Before Judges Sapp-Peterson, Lihotz and
Hoffman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket
No. L-8638-11.
Christopher J. Koller argued the cause for
appellants.
Sara A. Kimball argued the cause for
respondents (The Margolis Law Firm LLC,
attorneys; Ms. Kimball, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LIHOTZ, J.A.D.
Defendants, Ilya and Julia Igdalev,1 appeal from a May 11,
2012 order denying their motion for summary judgment and a
separate order entered the same day granting summary judgment in
favor of plaintiffs Globe Motor Company (Globe) and The Margolis
Law Firm (Margolis). Defendants further appeal from the final
judgment filed on September 12, 2012, awarding plaintiffs
damages of $42,381, which included an award of attorney's fees.
On appeal, defendants raise several arguments maintaining entry
of summary judgment was erroneous. We disagree and affirm.
These are the facts viewed most favorably toward
defendants. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.
520, 529–30 (1995). Plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment
action (BER-L-8638-11) seeking a determination that defendants
were responsible to pay various costs and expenses resulting
from defendants' failure to comply with the terms of the
parties' settlement agreement (Globe II). Prior to addressing
the issues presented, we must provide background information
regarding the settlement in the underlying action and events
supporting plaintiffs' declaratory judgment complaint.
The underlying action (BER-C-203-08) was initiated by
Globe, as represented by Margolis, which alleged breach of
1
To avoid confusion, when referring to each individual
defendant, we use his or her first name.
2 A-0897-12T1
contract and fraud against defendants and two others (Globe I).
That action was settled by a six-page written settlement
agreement. Among the terms of settlement was paragraph 2, which
stated:
That ILYA and JULIA shall jointly pay to
GLOBE the amount of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
($75,000.00) DOLLARS, by certified or
attorney trust account check payable to "The
Margolis Law Firm LLC, as attorneys for
Globe Motor Company" and delivered to The
Margolis Law Firm LLC not later than 1:00pm
on Friday, October 2, 2009 TIME BEING
EXPRESSLY MADE OF THE ESSENCE.
The settlement agreement also provided that "[i]n the event
ILYA does not pay, for any reason or no reason, any portion of
the settlement amount, then in such event, JULIA shall pay the
entire SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND ($75,000.00) DOLLARS of the
settlement amount, as required by the provisions of paragraph #2
hereof." Upon "full payment" plaintiffs would enter a
stipulation dismissing the litigation and the agreement
contained a full mutual release of claims between the parties.
By October 2009, Margolis received two certified bank
checks totaling $75,000. More specifically, one check was for
$12,000 and the other for $63,000, each made payable to "The
Margolis Law Firm, LLC as Attorneys for Globe Motor Company."
The larger check contained a notation stating: "Remitter Mike
Povolotsky."
3 A-0897-12T1
Margolis accepted the certified checks as defendants'
payment under the terms of the settlement agreement. A
stipulation of dismissal, with prejudice, was later filed
concluding Globe I.
Almost one year later, Globe and Margolis were served with
a complaint filed by Brian Leonard, the designated Chapter 7
Trustee assigned to supervise the bankruptcy case initiated by
the debtor Auto Point, Limited (Auto Point).2 Leonard, on behalf
of the debtor's estate, filed an adversary proceeding to recover
$75,000 alleged to have been fraudulently transferred from the
debtor's assets and paid to Margolis and Globe. Leonard
asserted Auto Point "was not a client of, and owed no
obligations to" Margolis or Globe, and the debtor had "received
less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
[t]ransfers." Furthermore, Leonard's complaint maintained the
transfers were made when Auto Point was insolvent or the debtor
became insolvent as a result of the transfers. Leonard alleged
the transfers were voidable under various provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Plaintiffs learned Povolotsky, defendants' friend and
business associate, owned Auto Point. The trustee had
2
Auto Point filed its voluntary petition pursuant to Chapter
7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Minnesota on April 23, 2010.
4 A-0897-12T1
determined the monies transmitted to Margolis to satisfy
defendants' obligations under the settlement agreement were
taken from Auto Point's funds.
Margolis and Globe hired separate bankruptcy counsel. A
settlement resolving Leonard's claims was reached, requiring
payment of $22,500. Additionally, they incurred attorney's fees
and costs.
When the bankruptcy action was terminated, plaintiffs filed
Globe II, seeking to recover damages sustained in defending and
settling the adversary proceeding. Plaintiffs alleged
defendants had breached the terms of settlement in the
underlying action by "fail[ing] to tender the amount due under
the Settlement free and clear from claims of others and not
subject to surrender . . . ." Plaintiffs alleged defendants'
breach caused plaintiffs to suffer damages equivalent to the
amounts paid to Leonard to settle the trustee's claims, along
with attendant attorney's fees and costs, both in the bankruptcy
action and the declaratory judgment matter. The Globe II
complaint also alleged unjust enrichment, breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and also sought
indemnification from Julia.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs' counsel restated the facts regarding the Globe I
5 A-0897-12T1
litigation, settlement agreement, checks received, Minnesota
bankruptcy proceedings, terms of settlement of the adversary
proceeding, and attorney's fee expense incurred. Globe's vice
president affirmed these facts.
In support of defendants' motion for summary judgment, Ilya
certified:
4. In order to resolve that litigation, I
entered into a Settlement Agreement, wherein
Globe was to receive $75,000.00, payable to
The Margolis Law Firm LLC, as Attorneys for
Globe Motor Company.
5. This settlement was made as a business
decision by all parties.
6. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement
and Release, I was to pay the sum of
$75,000.00 and my former wife, Julia
Igdalev, was a guarantor of said payment and
in addition, entered into a confession of
judgment if those payments were not made.
7. At approximately the same time the
Settlement Agreement was executed, my New
Jersey bank accounts had been restrained due
to allegations in a criminal action against
me.
8. Prior to the restraint of my funds, in
the New Jersey bank accounts, I had a
business and personal relationship with an
individual named Michael Povolotsky.
9. Michael Povolotsky was a buyer and
seller of cars in Minnesota, and also
operated a business in Minnesota called
"Auto Point Limited."
10. About the same time the Settlement
Agreement was reached, Michael Povolotsky,
6 A-0897-12T1
individually, was holding more than
$75,000.00 of money owed to me from prior
dealings.
11. I requested Michael Povolotsky to make
checks payable to The Margolis Law Firm LLC,
in the total amount of $75,000.00 in
settlement of this case.
Ilya averred neither he nor Julia "were asked, nor agreed
to indemnify or hold [plaintiffs] harmless from any claims[,]"
stating "[t]here was absolutely no provision in the Settlement
Agreement . . . that the funds were to come from my wife or
myself, individually, or [from] any specific payor."
Maintaining he acted "in good faith," Ilya insisted he made the
payment required under the settlement agreement, and based on
the release, neither he nor Julia had a further obligation to
plaintiffs.
Julia too filed a certification adopting as true and
correct all statements made by Ilya. "In addition, [she noted]
all payments were timely made and accepted without protest by
[p]laintiff[s], who had dismissed the . . . action with
prejudice."
Following a lengthy oral argument, the Law Division judge
denied defendants' and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment. The judge found defendants had materially breached
the settlement agreement because the monies tendered were
determined to have been transferred from the debtor Auto Point,
7 A-0897-12T1
without consideration, and were legally subject to recovery.
The judge therefore concluded Ilya did not pay the $75,000 as
required by the settlement agreement. He entered orders
memorializing this decision on May 11, 2012. Subsequent motions
were filed regarding recovery of attorney's fees and costs.
Final judgment was entered on September 12, 2012. Defendants'
appeal ensued.
We review the trial court's summary judgment order de novo,
applying the same standard that governs the trial court. W.J.A.
v. D.A., 210 N.J. 229, 237 (2012); Lapidoth v. Telcordia Tech.,
Inc., 420 N.J. Super. 411, 417 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208
N.J. 600 (2011). Pursuant to Rule 4:46, we "consider whether
the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to
permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed
issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill, supra, 142 N.J.
at 540. "[W]hen the evidence is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law, the trial court should not
hesitate to grant summary judgment." Ibid. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). If no genuine factual
dispute exists, we must decide whether the trial court's ruling
on the law, to which we owe no deference, was correct. W.J.A.,
supra, 210 N.J. at 237-38.
8 A-0897-12T1
Also implicated in our review are principles governing the
enforcement of the parties' terms of settlement. "Public policy
favors the settlement of disputes. Settlement spares the
parties the risk of an adverse outcome and the time and expense
-- both monetary and emotional -- of protracted litigation."
Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 215
N.J. 242, 253-54 (2013). See also Herrera v. Twp. of S. Orange
Vill., 270 N.J. Super. 417, 424 (App. Div. 1993) (noting
"[t]here is a clear public policy in this state favoring
settlement of litigation"), certif. denied, 136 N.J. 28 (1994).
"Settlements avert the risks of litigation, spare the parties
ruinous litigation expenses, and conserve judicial resources."
Pinto v. Spectrum Chems. & Lab. Prods., 200 N.J. 580, 594
(2010). Moreover, settlements permit "litigants to resolve
disputes on mutually acceptable terms in place of risking
exposure to an adverse judgment[.]" DEG, LLC v. Twp. of
Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 259 (2009) (citation omitted). "A
defendant's likely settlement calculation is whether the payout
is less than the 'cost of the predicted judgment, discounted by
its probability, plus the transaction costs of further
litigation.'" Pinto, supra, 200 N.J. at 594 (quoting Evans v.
Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 734, 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1541, 89 L. Ed. 2d
747, 762 (1986)).
9 A-0897-12T1
"'An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract, which
like all contracts, may be freely entered into and which a
court, absent a demonstration of fraud or other compelling
circumstances, should honor and enforce as it does other
contracts.'" Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601
(2008) (quoting Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25
(App. Div.), certif denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983)). The
"[i]nterpretation of a settlement agreement implicates
significant legal and policy principles[.]" Kaur v. Assured
Lending Corp., 405 N.J. Super. 468, 474 (App. Div. 2009). Our
review of legal questions is plenary. Zabilowicz v. Kelsey, 200
N.J. 507, 512 (2009).
When examining the terms of a settlement agreement, we are
guided by the rules of contract construction. Brundage, supra,
195 N.J. at 601. See also Thompson v. City of Atl. City, 190
N.J. 359, 379 (2007). "The polestar of contract construction is
to discover the intention of the parties as revealed by the
language used by them." Karl's Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Gimbel
Bros., Inc., 249 N.J. Super. 487, 492 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 127 N.J. 548 (1991). In interpreting a contract, the
focus is on "the intention of the parties to the contract as
revealed by the language used, taken as an entirety; and, in the
quest for the intention, the situation of the parties, the
10 A-0897-12T1
attendant circumstances, and the objects they were thereby
striving to attain . . . ." Lederman v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co. of Am., Inc., 385 N.J. Super. 324, 339 (App. Div.) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted), certif. denied, 188 N.J.
353 (2006). In that regard, the court may not re-write a
contract or grant a better deal than that for which the parties
expressly bargained. Solondz v. Kornmehl, 317 N.J. Super. 16,
21 (App. Div. 1998).
Recognizing the parties' autonomy in resolving their
disputes, "[i]t follows that any action which would have the
effect of vitiating the provisions of a particular settlement
agreement and the concomitant effect of undermining public
confidence in the settlement process in general, should not be
countenanced." Dep't. of Pub. Advocate, Div. of Rate Counsel v.
N.J. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 206 N.J. Super. 523, 528 (App. Div.
1985). With these principles in mind, we consider defendants'
arguments.
On appeal, defendants contend the judge incorrectly granted
summary judgment to plaintiffs, asserting the only "competent
evidential material[]" before the court was Ilya's certification
stating the $75,000 transferred by Povolotsky was Ilya's money.
Therefore, the funds could not belong to the debtor, Auto Point.
Because defendants challenged plaintiffs' claim regarding the
11 A-0897-12T1
ownership of the money used to satisfy the obligations under the
settlement agreement, defendants argue material factual disputes
obviated entry of summary judgment.
To support this contention, defendants claim "all parties
were aware of the restraint on Ilya['s] . . . funds in Bergen
County." Defendants' brief purports to quote from Ilya's
certification filed in support of defendants' motion and in
opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. However,
the certification as filed contains no statement placing
plaintiffs on notice of the restraint of defendants' funds or
the need to rely on Povolotsky. In fact, the recitals recounted
and relied on by defendants' in their brief materially differ
from the actual facts of record.
Nevertheless, accepting as true Ilya's statement Povolotsky
was "holding . . . money owed . . . from prior dealings" does
not prove funds sent to plaintiffs by Povolotsky were Ilya's or
refute that the money transferred to plaintiffs actually
belonged to Auto Point. Defendants' contrary suggestion made to
create a dispute of material facts is illusory. See Shelcusky
v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 200-01 (2002) ("The very object of
the summary judgment procedure then is to separate real issues
from issues about which there is no serious dispute."). Quite
12 A-0897-12T1
simply, the assertion that Povolotsky held Ilya's money does not
mean he sent Ilya's money.3
Also, defendants mistakenly contend that absent a judgment
from the Bankruptcy Court determining the funds actually were
Auto Point's must mean they were Ilya's funds in Povolotsky's
possession. That Povolotsky held Ilya's money creates no
dispute of a material fact, which should subject plaintiffs to
the burden of a trial. Merely because Povolotsky held Ilya's
money does not establish he used those funds when making payment
to plaintiffs. Indeed, Ilya asserts no personal knowledge
establishing his money was actually transferred; at its best,
defendants' suggestion in this regard is merely supposition,
which is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
The record, viewed most favorable to defendants, shows only
that after Ilya asked his friend and business associate to
satisfy the settlement obligation with money owed to him,
Povolotsky did so using assets of his company, Auto Point. Ilya
does not maintain Auto Point owed him money.
3
Our dissenting colleague maintains it is reasonable to
"infer . . . that the funds Povolotsky used to buy the checks
were those owed to Ilya." Post at ___ (slip op. at 7). We
cannot abide by such a conclusion. Auto Point was a
corporation. As such, it is an independent legal entity. Thus,
if Povolotsky owed Ilya money, payment could not reasonably or
permissibly come from Auto Point's funds. Importantly, Ilya
never asserts Auto Point owed him money, as the dissent assumes.
Post at ___ (slip op. at 7).
13 A-0897-12T1
Auto Point's ownership of the funds is evident from the
bankruptcy pleadings. Leonard is a fiduciary appointed by the
United States Bankruptcy Court to oversee the debtor's estate.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 321 to § 323 (stating eligibility and general
duty of bankruptcy trustee). After examining the debtor's books
and records, Leonard filed the adversary proceeding to recover
money he found was taken from Auto Point's account and
transferred to plaintiffs. There is no dispute regarding the
amount transferred, which matched the sums delivered to
plaintiffs or that the checks as issued were made payable to
Margolis as attorney for Globe. Further, there is no evidence
Auto Point owed a debt or obligation to plaintiffs or Ilya.
Because the transfer was without consideration, it is subject to
recovery. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (allowing trustee to avoid
fraudulent transfers made by a debtor within the four-year
limitations period). The settlement of the adversary action
represented a compromise by the parties with respect to the
contested and disputed issues, accepting the trustee's evidence,
along with each side's assessment of the cost and expense in
proceeding to trial.4
4
The dissent suggests the judge improperly faulted
defendants for their "fail[ure] to participate in [the
bankruptcy action] to which they had never been made a party."
Post at ___ (slip op. at 9). We provide only these brief
(continued)
14 A-0897-12T1
We conclude plaintiffs cannot be faulted for settling
rather than trying the adversary proceeding. See Frank Stamato
& Co. v. Lodi, 4 N.J. 14, 21 (1950) (citing Ramsey v. Perth
Amboy Shipbuilding Eng'g Co., 72 N.J. Eq. 165 (Ch. 1906), aff'd.
73 N.J. Eq. 742 (E. & A. 1908)). ("[I]t is well established that
a party who has been injured by a breach of contract must make
reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages[.]"). To suggest
(continued)
comments. Joinder implicates establishment of subject matter
jurisdiction, which is grounded in and limited by statute.
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307, 115 S. Ct. 1493,
1498, 131 L. Ed. 2d 403, 410 (1995). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §
157(b)(1), bankruptcy judges hear all core proceedings and "may
enter final orders and judgments with respect to such
proceedings." In re J.T. Moran Fin. Corp., 124 B.R. 931, 936
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). Core proceedings are those "arising
under Title 11 or arising in or related to a case under Title
11[.]" Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1234
n.9 (3d Cir. 1994). See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2)
(providing a non-exhaustive list of core proceedings). "By
contrast, proceedings which are 'related to' a bankruptcy case
are non-core." Id. at 1235. "In non-core proceedings, unless
the parties consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, the
bankruptcy judge has the power only to 'submit proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law to the district court,' and the
parties are entitled to de novo review of any matter to which
they 'timely and specifically' object." In re Arnold Print
Works, Inc., 815 F.2d 165, 167 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting 28
U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(1)). Jurisdiction over a non-core matter is
permissible only if "the outcome of that proceeding could
conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in
bankruptcy[.]" Celotex Corp., supra, 514 U.S. at 308, 115 S.
Ct. at 1499, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 411 n.6. Here, plaintiffs' action
to enforce the settlement agreement had no impact on the estate.
Further, as we noted, Ilya's suggestion that Povolotsky held his
funds would not defeat the trustee's position that funds were
transferred from Auto Point and paid to plaintiffs.
15 A-0897-12T1
plaintiffs were required to complete a trial and obtain a
judicial determination is specious. Pinto, supra, 200 N.J. at
594.
We additionally reject defendants' argument suggesting the
motion judge's determination was erroneously based on his
finding Ilya was not credible. The judge's cited comments were
not a determination of contested facts; rather, the statements
represent an assessment that the asserted facts do not create a
material dispute. As the Court held in Shelcusky:
The determination that an offsetting
affidavit creates only a sham factual
dispute is squarely within the trial court's
authority at the summary judgment stage,
when the court is required to evaluate,
analyze, and sift evidence to determine
whether the evidential materials, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the
opposing party, would permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of
the opposing party. That rule does not
intrude on the function of the jury because
it does not require the trial court to
determine credibility, or to determine the
relative weight of conflicting evidence. We
are confident that trial courts have the
ability to distinguish sham affidavits from
affidavits that raise a genuine issue of
material fact.
[Shelcusky, supra, 172 N.J. at 201.]
Defendants next assert they fully complied with the
settlement terms as drafted and were innocent because they
lacked knowledge of any wrongdoing by their friend Povolotsky.
16 A-0897-12T1
Essentially, defendants believe their presentation of certified
checks that were accepted by plaintiffs, who thereafter filed a
full release and stipulation of dismissal, ends our inquiry.
Additionally, defendants argue plaintiffs could have rejected
the tender of the funds drawn on a Minnesota Bank or after
noticing one check contained Povolotsky's name as remitter. We
examine these points.5
Evaluating the relative innocence of the parties, when
deciding who bears the burden of Povolotsky's actions, we
conclude the manner and methods chosen were controlled by
defendants and accomplished at their direction. Therefore, the
consequences of Povolotsky's unseemly conduct falls to them
rather than plaintiffs. Povolotsky's failure equates to
defendants' failure to perform and strikes at the very heart of
the settlement agreement, defeating its purpose and representing
a material breach of its terms. See Restatement (Second)
Contracts § 241 comment a (1981) (discussing a material breach
of contract).
Defendants' contention that they complied with the letter
of the settlement agreement when they tendered a cashier's and a
5
Defendants also argue the judge erred because the
settlement agreement did not contain a specific term that, if
Ilya did not pay, a judgment would be entered against him. This
argument lacks merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
17 A-0897-12T1
bank check totaling $75,000 is legally unfounded. An essential
element of the agreement was that plaintiffs received the
agreed-upon amount. Because legal claims attached to the money
tendered, which were not immediately apparent, payment was
illusory.
The constrained construction of the contractual obligations
asserted by defendants completely ignores the reality that legal
defenses attached to the funds, which prevented plaintiffs'
retention. By accepting the compromise set forth in the
settlement agreement, plaintiffs sought to end the litigation
with defendants and had no intention of becoming embroiled in a
new suit. When the monies used to satisfy defendants'
obligation were not free of the claims of others, the essence of
the settlement agreement was breached. Although Ilya delivered
payment, the funds used did not belong to Povolotsky and could
not be transferred to another. Therefore, the trustee's
recovery of $22,500 results in defendants not paying plaintiffs
the agreed sum of $75,000.
We also find defendants' argument that plaintiffs should
have been suspect of the out-of-state checks highly
disingenuous. After all, defendants commissioned Povolotsky to
act. Plaintiffs had no reason to doubt the efficacy of the
negotiable instruments, N.J.S.A. 12A:3-104(c), or know the money
18 A-0897-12T1
tendered actually belonged to Auto Point. The mode of payment
specified in the settlement agreement was intended to provide
some security that receipt of the designated instruments
evidenced existence of the funds. See Merchants' Nat'l Bank v.
State Bank, 77 U.S. 604, 648 (10 Wall.), 19 L. Ed. 1008, 1019
(1870) (acknowledging "[t]he practice of certifying checks has
grown out of the business needs of the country," and noting
"[t]hey enable the holder to keep or convey the amount specified
with safety. They enable persons not well acquainted to deal
promptly with each other, and they avoid the delay and risks of
receiving, counting, and passing from hand to hand large sums of
money."). Defendants' provision of a cashier's check and a bank
check, paid to the order of plaintiffs, reflected monies drawn
on the banks' funds, again a mode implying security of the
payment. N.J.S.A. 12A:3-104(g). However, even a cashier's
check is not free of legal defenses. See Santos v. First Nat'l
State Bank of N.J., 186 N.J. Super. 52, 63 (App. Div. 1982).6
6
We do not agree with our dissenting colleague that
cashier's checks are the functional equivalent of cash. Post at
___ (slip op. at 13). In fact, Parks v. Commerce Bank, 377 N.J.
Super. 378 (App. Div. 2005), makes clear federal regulatory
treatment of the speed with which banks must process these
instruments makes it "reasonable for the marketplace to treat
them as the functional equivalents to cash." Id. at 385.
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code remain applicable and
"it is a mistake to conclude that cashier's checks are like cash
in all situations." Santos, supra, 186 N.J. Super. at 63. We
(continued)
19 A-0897-12T1
Contrary to the inference sought by defendants, there is no
evidence plaintiffs were party to Povolotsky's actions.7 As
such, plaintiffs qualified as a holder in due course, as defined
under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), codified
as N.J.S.A. 12A:3-101 to -605. A "holder in due course" is a
holder who takes the instrument (a) for value, (b) in good faith
and (c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored
or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person. N.J.S.A. 12A:3-302(a)(2).
Our assessment that defendants are liable under these facts
(rather than suggesting plaintiffs are at fault), aligns with
this concept.
The basic philosophy of the holder in due
course status is to encourage free
negotiability of commercial paper by
removing certain anxieties of one who takes
the paper as an innocent purchaser knowing
no reason why the paper is not as sound as
(continued)
can agree that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, if a certified check,
cashier's check, or teller's check is taken for an obligation,
the obligation is discharged to the same extent that discharge
would result if an amount of money equal to the amount of the
instrument were taken in payment of the obligation." N.J.S.A.
12A:3-310(a). However, if legal defenses defeat the payment,
the obligation must be restored. This refutes our dissenting
colleague's assertion that defendants complied with the
settlement as a matter of law. Post at ____ (slip op. at 13).
7
As noted above, defendants' reliance on the proposition
that plaintiffs knew what Povolotsky was doing was premised on a
certification that is not part of the record.
20 A-0897-12T1
its face would indicate. It would seem to
follow, therefore, that the more the holder
knows about the underlying transaction, and
particularly the more he [or she] controls
or participates or becomes involved in it,
the less he [or she] fits the role of a good
faith purchaser for value; the closer his
[or her] relationship to the underlying
agreement which is the source of the note,
the less need there is for giving him [or
her] the tension-free rights considered
necessary in a fast-moving, credit-extending
commercial world.
[Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 109-10 (1967).]
We also reject defendants' contention plaintiffs should
have included provisions in the settlement agreement restricting
payment solely from Ilya's funds, or otherwise requiring
indemnification, including in the event of third-party recovery,
as occurred here.8 Any notion that settlement agreements must
include language to curb all possible sharp or illicit practices
is antagonistic to one's obligation to negotiate in good faith.
Perhaps it was unforeseen that Povolotsky would be a scoundrel,
but we cannot ignore Ilya controlled that process. Therefore,
8
We understand the dissent finds the absence of such
provisions compelling. Post at ____ (slip op. at 12-14). We
disagree because the practical application of requiring the
enumeration of all provisions that could defeat the apparent
obligation of payment would be burdensome as impractical and,
thus, discourage settlement arrangements. We also cannot
accept that when weighing the responsibilities presented by
these facts, Margolis should have rejected the cashier's check,
because it did not reflect Ilya was the remitter. Post at ____
(slip op. at 13).
21 A-0897-12T1
he may not be relieved of the responsibility to tender full
payment if the process he chose was flawed. Under the terms of
the agreement, Julia was responsible if Ilya failed to pay "for
any reason or no reason." Thus, she too is liable. Globe is
due $22,500.9
We turn to defendants' challenges to the award of
attorney's fees. Citing the American Rule,10 defendants maintain
the fee award was legally unsupported. We are not persuaded.
In accordance with the American Rule, generally, attorney's
fees are not recoverable unless authorized by statute or
recognized as available by our Court Rules. See R. 4:42-9.
However, fee awards have been ordered when incurred as damages
sustained by a party forced into litigation with another as a
result of fraud, see Hagen v. Gallerano, 66 N.J. Super. 319, 333
(App. Div. 1961), and for third-party litigation arising because
9
We agree with our dissenting colleague that Margolis does
not have a claim against defendants for breach of the settlement
agreement. Post at ____ (slip op. at 9). We do not agree the
payment to Leonard was differentiated between Margolis and
Globe, as such an allocation of liability is not evident in the
settlement terms. Nevertheless, if Margolis received money, it
was for attorney's fees paid by Globe from the $75,000 recovery.
Globe would remain liable for the fees recovered; therefore,
defendants must repay the entirety of the sum remitted to
Leonard.
10
The American Rule generally requires each party to bear all
legal expense incurred in representation and generally precludes
recovery of counsel fees from an adversary. N. Bergen Rex
Transp., Inc. v. Trailer Leasing Co., 158 N.J. 561, 569 (1999).
22 A-0897-12T1
of a party's breach of contract, Dorofee v. Planning Bd. of
Pennsauken, 187 N.J. Super. 141, 144 (App. Div. 1982). "The
award of counsel fees as traditional damages in such settings is
not precluded by R[ule] 4:42-9." Ibid. (citing Cohen v. Fair
Lawn Dairies, Inc., 86 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd
44 N.J. 450 (1965)).
The judge found the fees incurred were necessary
consequences of defendants' breach of the settlement agreement.
Noting the fees incurred were causally related to defendants'
breach, the judge reasoned, "defendants put you in this
situation. You had no other choice [but] to do it [i.e., defend
the adversary proceeding]." Counsel's certification in support
of the fee request detailed the basis of all costs and expenses.
The judge found the request reasonable. Following our review we
cannot determine the judge misapplied his reasoned discretion.
Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001).
Affirmed.
23 A-0897-12T1
________________________________________
SAPP-PETERSON, P.J.A.D., dissenting.
To accept the majority's decision is to conclude the facts
are so one-sided that plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Their decision, however, reflects consideration
of the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, contrary
to the appropriate standard for granting summary judgment.
Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 523. In addition, they place the
burden of proof on defendants as to the ownership of the funds
transferred. For the reasons that follow, I respectfully
dissent.
These are the facts viewed most favorably toward
defendants. Ibid. On October 1, 2009, Globe reached a
settlement agreement with defendants Ilya and Julia Igdalev in
an underlying dispute (Globe I), requiring that defendants
jointly pay Globe $75,000 by certified or attorney trust account
check payable to Margolis, Globe's counsel in that matter and
co-plaintiff here, and that payment would be delivered to
Margolis by October 2, 2009. The terms also provided that if
Ilya failed to timely deliver the checks, Julia would have to
pay the entire amount in the same manner, as guarantor. The
parties agreed a stipulation of dismissal would be filed "[u]pon
full payment in accordance with th[e] [a]greement."
A-0897-12T1
Within days of reaching the settlement, defendants
presented two cashier's checks totaling the full obligation,
both made payable to Margolis on Globe's behalf. One of them
explicitly named a Mike Povolotsky, rather than either of
defendants, as the remitter, and the other specified no
remitter. For reasons unexplained, plaintiffs did not file the
stipulation of dismissal until March 23, 2010.
In April 2010, Auto Point filed a petition for Chapter 7
Bankruptcy. On February 24, 2011, sixteen months after
defendants paid the $75,000 and eleven months after the
stipulation of dismissal was filed, the bankruptcy trustee,
Brian Leonard, filed a complaint (adversary proceeding) against
plaintiffs in Minnesota bankruptcy court, claiming that Auto
Point "made two payments to [Margolis and Globe] on October 1,
2009, in the amount of $12,000.00 and $63,000.00 for a total of
$75,000.00. The payments were made from [Auto Point's] assets"
and "Auto Point was not a client of, and owed no obligations to,
The Margolis Law Firm, LLC. The Debtor did not owe any
obligations to Globe Motor Company."
The bankruptcy court admitted Margolis pro hac vice, but
both Margolis and Globe retained separate local counsel.
Leonard reached a settlement with Globe and Margolis for
$22,500, which amounted to thirty percent of the $75,000 he
2 A-0897-12T1
originally demanded. Both Globe and Margolis also each paid
$4000 in counsel fees to local Minnesota counsel.
Plaintiffs thereafter initiated the present action (Globe
II) against defendants, asserting defendants breached the
settlement agreement and release because the bankruptcy
proceedings in Minnesota effectively negated the settlement
payment, along with claims for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, fraud, unjust enrichment, and
indemnification. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for summary
judgment and defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. The
court granted plaintiffs' motion and entered judgment in favor
of plaintiffs for $22,000, the exact amount plaintiffs paid to
resolve the adversary proceeding. The court also entered an
order awarding counsel fees to plaintiffs, allocated as follows:
$19,000 in counsel fees with $8,000 and $2,000 applied to the
Minnesota bankruptcy action and $9,000 for prosecution of the
present action.
In granting summary judgment, the motion judge found
incredible Ilya's certification that the funds used to purchase
the two checks belonged to or were owed to Ilya,1 noting that
1
While the majority is correct that defense counsel's quotation
of that certification in his brief differs from the copy of the
certification in the record, counsel may well have been quoting
from a different certification filed in a related bankruptcy
(continued)
3 A-0897-12T1
defendants never went to Minnesota to challenge the bankruptcy
trustee's position that the checks were assets of the debtor.
The court also found there were no genuinely disputed issues of
fact as to whether defendants breached the settlement agreement.
The court expressed: "They were supposed to pay $75,000. The
Court finds the $75,000 wasn't paid. Start from the initial
agreement. This isn't a novation. It's not an assignment.
It's none of that. They guaranteed they will be paid $75,000,
and they weren't paid $75,000." The present appeal followed.
Our review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion
for summary judgment is de novo. Agurto v. Guhr, 381 N.J.
Super. 519, 525 (App. Div. 2005). Under our de novo standard of
review, we employ the same standard as that of the trial court.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super. 162,
167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J. 608 (1998). Our
analysis requires that we first determine whether the moving
party has demonstrated there are no genuine disputes as to
material facts, and then we decide "whether the motion judge's
application of the law was correct." Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
(continued)
matter involving Auto Point that was mentioned during oral
argument. Moreover, plaintiffs' counsel never disputed that
plaintiffs had been aware of Ilya's financial circumstances,
notwithstanding that both defense counsel and the court
referenced this fact during oral argument.
4 A-0897-12T1
Hillside Bottling Co., 387 N.J. Super. 224, 230–31 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 189 N.J. 104 (2006). In so doing, we view the
evidence in the "light most favorable to the non-moving
party[.]" Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 523 (1995). Because our
review of issues of law is de novo, we accord no special
deference to the motion judge's legal conclusions. Zabilowicz,
supra, 200 N.J. at 512. Even where, as here, both parties move
for summary judgment, that relief may not be granted so long as
a trial remains necessary to resolve disputed issues of material
fact, O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 487 (1980), particularly
where issues of credibility remain, D'Amato v. D'Amato, 305 N.J.
Super. 109, 114-15 (App. Div. 1997).
Every theory of liability plaintiffs assert presumes the
funds they had to return to the bankruptcy estate were
legitimately subject to return, that is, that the transactions
were legitimately avoidable — but this is only so if the funds
actually belonged to Auto Point. 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a). The
majority accepts as true for purposes of summary judgment that
Povolotsky was holding funds owed to Ilya, but maintains it was
"evident from the bankruptcy pleadings" that the funds
Povolotsky actually sent were drawn from accounts owned by Auto
Point. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 13). Because Auto Point never
owed Ilya any money, at least as the majority interprets Ilya's
5 A-0897-12T1
certification, the money Povolotsky sent could not have been
Ilya's and must have belonged to Auto Point. Ante at ___ (slip
op. at 13).
However, the only evidence plaintiffs have thus far
presented that the money even originated from Auto Point's
accounts is an untested allegation in a complaint from another
matter. The majority may treat that allegation as established
fact, but neither of the checks in the record names Auto Point
as the remitter, one explicitly names Povolotsky personally, and
the other bears no name for the remitter. Ilya certified that
Povolotsky, not Auto Point as the majority itself points out,
was to send him the money. Plaintiffs may well have settled the
bankruptcy matter in good faith, in light of the trustee's
evidence, but they have not shared any of that evidence here,
save the checks, which reveal no connection to Auto Point on
their face. One may certainly reasonably infer from the
bankruptcy complaint, as the majority does here, that the reason
the trustee's investigation turned up these particular
transactions is that the money at some point had been drawn from
Auto Point's accounts. But that inference is not favorable to
defendants, and it is disputed by the balance of the record.
Ilya certified that he and Povolotsky had a business
relationship, that Povolotsky operated Auto Point, that
6 A-0897-12T1
Povolotsky "was holding more than $75,000.00 of money owed to
[him] from prior dealings," and that he requested Povolotsky
send the checks to Margolis. One may reasonably infer from
those circumstances that the funds Povolotsky used to buy the
checks were those owed to Ilya. Moreover, even if the funds
were drawn from Auto Point's accounts, an unfavorable inference
not permitted on summary judgment, Ilya never specified,
notwithstanding the majority's assertion to the contrary, who
owed him the money, only that Povolotsky was the one who was
holding it. Given that Ilya claimed the money was owed from
prior business dealings, it would not be unreasonable to infer
that the money was owed by Auto Point, Povolotsky's business.2
Finally, even if we draw the contrary inference, again, not one
permitted on summary judgment, that the money was owed
personally by Povolotsky, it would not be inconceivable that
Povolotsky, whom the majority, after all, characterizes as a
"scoundrel," ante at ___ (slip op. at 21), might have
intermingled his own funds with those of his corporation. Of
course, one could also reasonably conclude, as the majority
does, that Povolotsky personally owed money to Ilya, and that
2
In that case, the transfer may yet have been avoidable, 11
U.S.C.A. § 547(b)-(c), but the record is not yet sufficient to
resolve that issue, and the trustee never pleaded that ground
for relief.
7 A-0897-12T1
Ilya asked him to use that money to buy the checks, but that he
used Auto Point's funds instead. One could even decline to
credit Ilya at all and conclude that neither Povolotsky nor Auto
Point ever owed him any money in the first place.
The point to all of this is that these are all reasonable
inferences, but not all of them inexorably lead to the ultimate
conclusion the majority reaches, namely that the funds were Auto
Point's, not Ilya's. Because the facts here are not so one-
sided as to demand that conclusion, the task of weighing them
must be left to the trier of fact. See Gilhooley v. Cnty. of
Union, 164 N.J. 533, 545 (2000) (stating that "it was not the
court's function to weigh the evidence and determine the outcome
but only to decide if a material dispute of fact existed" and
that "[o]nly when the evidence is utterly one-sided may a judge
decide that party should prevail as a matter of law" (citing
Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540)). Our task, for summary judgment
purposes, is to accept the inferences favorable to defendants
that may reasonably be drawn from Ilya's certification, which
clearly raise a genuine dispute as to a central material fact in
this case.
The trial court should not have rejected Ilya's
certification on credibility grounds, see D'Amato, supra, 305
N.J. Super. 109 at 114-15 (explaining that credibility issues
8 A-0897-12T1
must always be reserved for the trier of fact), and, at that,
merely because defendants failed to participate in a proceeding
to which they had never been made a party. The case on which
the majority relies, Shelcusky, supra, 172 N.J. at 199-202, is
not to the contrary. It authorizes use of the sham affidavit
doctrine on summary judgment to reject an affidavit that
contradicts the affiant's own prior statements or position so as
to invent a dispute of material fact. Ibid. That was not the
case here, and the trial court never recognized it as such, but
explicitly made a credibility evaluation. The judgment must be
reversed for that reason alone.
Moreover, plaintiffs' breach of contract claim should have
been dismissed. Margolis could not pursue such a claim, because
it was never a party to the settlement agreement. Parkway Ins.
Co. v. N.J. Neck & Back, 330 N.J. Super. 172, 186-87 (Law Div.
1998). Globe could do so, but, for the following reasons, the
record was sufficient to establish as a matter of law that
defendants complied with the explicit terms of the agreement,
contrary to plaintiffs' allegations.
It is well settled that the "'settlement of litigation
ranks high in our public policy.'" Brundage, supra, 195 N.J. at
601 (quoting Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 472, 476
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 35 N.J. 61 (1961)). This strong
9 A-0897-12T1
public policy is based upon "'the notion that the parties to a
dispute are in the best position to determine how to resolve a
contested matter in a way which is least disadvantageous to
everyone.'" Ibid. (quoting Peskin v. Peskin, 271 N.J. Super.
261, 275 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 137 N.J. 165 (1994)).
Thus, courts give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever
possible and honor them "'absent compelling circumstances.'"
Ibid. (quoting Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990)).
Settlement agreements are generally governed by principles
of contract law. Thompson, supra, 190 N.J. at 379. Therefore,
they may be entered freely and enforced like all other
contracts. Pascarella, supra, 190 N.J. Super. at 124-25. In
interpreting a contract, the focus is on "'the intention of the
parties to the contract as revealed by the language used, taken
as an entirety; and, in the quest for the intention, the
situation of the parties, the attendant circumstances, and the
objects they were thereby striving to attain are necessarily to
be regarded.'" Lederman, supra, 385 N.J. Super. at 339 (quoting
Biovail Corp. Int'l v. Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft, 49 F. Supp.
2d 750, 774 (D.N.J. 1999)). "'[C]ourts should interpret a
contract considering the objective intent manifested in the
language of the contract in light of the circumstances
surrounding the transaction.'" Id. at 340 (quoting Biovail
10 A-0897-12T1
Corp., supra, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 774) (internal quotation
omitted).
Significantly, our Supreme Court has held
that "the legal effect of a release on other
parties should be determined by the intent
of the parties to the release, with due
consideration being given to whether the
compensation paid was fully adequate."
Cartel Capital Corp. v. Fireco of N.J., 81
N.J. 548, 559 (1980). Similarly, we have
observed that "a release of a defendant will
release him only in respect of those claims
by those parties as are actually or intended
to be encompassed thereby." Goncalvez v.
Patuto, 188 N.J. Super. 620, 629 (App. Div.
1983). "[A] release is merely a form of
contract and the general rules that apply to
contract interpretation apply to releases."
Domanske v. Rapid-American Corp., 330 N.J.
Super. 241, 246 (App. Div. 2000).
[Sweeney v. Sweeney, 405 N.J. Super. 586,
596-97 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 199 N.J.
519 (2009).]
Contractual interpretation, such as of the settlement
agreement at issue here, is a legal matter ordinarily suitable
for resolution on summary judgment. Celanese Ltd. v. Essex
Cnty. Improvement Auth., 404 N.J. Super. 514, 528 (App. Div.
2009). The touchstone for interpretation is the parties' shared
intent in reaching the agreement, Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J.
258, 266 (2007), and, so long as that intent is evident from the
contract's clear, unambiguous terms, the agreement will be
enforced as written. Karl's Sales, supra, 249 N.J. Super. at
493.
11 A-0897-12T1
To the extent any ambiguity exists, that is, to the extent
that a contractual term is susceptible of more than one
reasonable interpretation, Powell v. Alemaz, Inc., 335 N.J.
Super. 33, 44 (App. Div. 2000), a court may discern the parties'
intent from evidence bearing on the circumstances of the
agreement's formation, Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 187
N.J. 259, 269 (2006), and of the parties' behavior in carrying
out its terms, Savarese v. Corcoran, 311 N.J. Super. 240, 248
(Ch. Div. 1997), aff'd, 311 N.J. Super. 182 (App. Div. 1998).
The required factual inquiry to resolve any such ambiguity
typically precludes summary judgment unless the evidence is so
one-sided as to compel judgment as a matter of law for one party
or the other. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc. v. Checchio, 335
N.J. Super. 495, 502 (App. Div. 2000).
The agreement here plainly provided that defendants would
have to timely pay the settlement amount by certified or
attorney trust account check, that Julia would guarantee the
obligation if payment were not made in that manner, and that
only "[u]pon full payment in accordance" with the terms of the
agreement, would the stipulation of dismissal be filed. The
parties do not dispute that defendants timely presented two
cashier's checks totaling the full amount of their settlement
obligation and that plaintiffs filed the stipulation of
12 A-0897-12T1
dismissal. The checks were honored, and the funds were neither
counterfeit nor stolen.
Ordinarily, cashier's checks are the functional equivalent
to cash, Parks v. Commerce Bank, 377 N.J. Super. 378, 380 (App.
Div. 2005), and "[u]nless otherwise agreed, if a certified
check, cashier's check, or teller's check is taken for an
obligation, the obligation is discharged to the same extent that
discharge would result if an amount of money equal to the amount
of the instrument were taken in payment of the obligation."
N.J.S.A. 12A:3-310(a). Moreover, Margolis accepted the checks
notwithstanding that one clearly listed someone other than
defendants as the remitter, and Globe filed the stipulation of
dismissal, confirming its understanding that defendants had
satisfied the terms of the agreement. See Savarese, supra, 311
N.J. Super. at 248 (intent of parties may be discerned from
their behavior in carrying out the agreement). In other words,
defendants satisfied those terms no matter whose funds were used
to pay the settlement. Consequently, the primary dispute here,
ownership of the funds, is not one of material fact with regard
to this particular theory of liability, and defendants should
have been granted summary judgment on the breach of contract
claim.
13 A-0897-12T1
Nor, for that matter, may plaintiffs pursue their
indemnification claim specifically against Julia as guarantor.
The settlement agreement explicitly provided that Julia's
obligation in that capacity was only triggered insofar as Ilya
failed to timely deliver payment by certified or attorney trust
account check. Because he discharged that obligation, Julia
may no longer be called upon to satisfy the terms of the
settlement agreement as guarantor. See Ctr. 48 Ltd. P'ship v.
May Dep't Stores Co., 355 N.J. Super. 390, 405 (App. Div. 2002)
(explaining that a "guarantor is not bound beyond the strict
terms of its promise and its obligation cannot be extended by
implication").
That said, both defendants may still have liability here.
The trier of fact could find, for example, that defendants
arranged the transfer knowing that the funds would likely be
subject to recovery in an impending bankruptcy with the
intention that Globe thereby unknowingly risks losing the benefit
of the agreement. In that case, defendants could be liable for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 420 (1997),
despite their compliance with the express terms of the
settlement agreement, Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J.
14 A-0897-12T1
236, 244 (2001).3 If it is found, based upon any additional
evidence presented, defendants knowingly misrepresented to Globe
there would be no such risk, with the intention that Globe
reasonably rely on that misrepresentation in order to agree to
the settlement, defendants could be liable for fraud. Gennari
v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 610 (1997).
Moreover, even in the absence of bad faith or fraud on
defendants' part, there remains a common-law claim for
indemnification. Ilya was undisputedly the one who arranged the
transfers, and both defendants were beneficiaries of those
transfers insofar as they satisfied their settlement
obligations. If the evidence establishes the transfers were
fraudulent and plaintiffs accepted them in good faith,
plaintiffs could equitably call at least upon Ilya for
indemnification, particularly under the peculiar circumstances
of this case. See Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey,
Inc., 103 N.J. 177, 190 (1986) (noting that "one who in good
faith and at the direction of another commits a tort is allowed
indemnity against the person who caused him to act"); see also
3
To be sure, this course of conduct would also constitute a
breach of contract, 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli,
Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 461 (App. Div. 2004), in the sense
that the breach is of a covenant implied in the contract,
Wilson, supra, 168 N.J. at 244. But our courts also recognize
breach of the implied covenant as a separate cause of action,
see id. at 240, 244, and plaintiffs pleaded it as such here.
15 A-0897-12T1
Promaulayko v. Johns Manville Sales Corp., 116 N.J. 505, 511
(1989) (explaining common-law indemnity as an equitable
doctrine). Alternatively, defendants could be held liable for
unjust enrichment to the extent that they received the benefit
of the transfers, and the trial court concludes that it would be
inequitable to permit them to keep that benefit without
remunerating plaintiffs. Callano v. Oakwood Park Homes Corp.,
91 N.J. Super. 105, 108-09 (App. Div. 1966).
Plaintiffs have advanced all of these claims. Whether any
would prove successful in a trial, of course, would depend on
whether the funds were actually subject to recovery in the
bankruptcy action. Further, to the extent any of the theories
of liability advanced here sound in equity, recovery would be
premised upon plaintiffs' good faith and the reasonableness of
their settlement with the bankruptcy trustee. Worthy of note in
this regard is that Margolis appears to have had significant
basis upon which to avoid liability in the adversary proceeding
as a "mere conduit" of the funds to its client, rather than as
an "initial transferee" liable to the estate under the
bankruptcy code, Gropper v. Unitrac, S.A. (In re Fabric Buys of
Jericho, Inc.), 33 B.R. 334, 336-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), even
if, as the case may be here, it kept its fee and remitted only
the balance to Globe, Kirschenbaum v. Leeds Morelli & Brown P.C.
16 A-0897-12T1
(In re Robert Plan of N.Y. Corp.), 456 B.R. 150, 159-60 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2011). For reasons not apparent in the record, it did
not pursue this defense in the adversary proceeding.
Consideration of its failure to do so, along with the weighing
of any equities, would be relevant to any award of attorney's
fees to it, as well.
In sum, I dissent, as the judgment in plaintiffs' favor
should be reversed, and the matter remanded for dismissal of
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim, as well as their
indemnification claim against Julia as guarantor, and for
further proceedings on their remaining claims.
17 A-0897-12T1