STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. LARRY D. FISHERÂ (15-08-1690, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5413-15T2
    JASON S. OLESEN,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT
    OF LABOR, and SOMERSET TIRE
    SERVICE, INC.,
    Respondents.
    ____________________________
    Submitted August 22, 2017 – Decided August 31, 2017
    Before Judges Manahan and Gilson.
    On appeal from the Board of Review, Department
    of Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No.
    077,597.
    Jason S. Olesen, appellant pro se.
    Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
    attorney for respondent Board of Review
    (Elizabeth A. Davies, Deputy Attorney General,
    of counsel and on the brief).
    Respondent Somerset Tire Service, Inc. has not
    filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    Jason S. Olesen appeals from a May 12, 2016 final agency
    decision by the Board of Review (Board), which found that he was
    disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits
    under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because he left his job voluntarily
    without good cause attributable to the work.             We affirm.
    Olesen worked as a branch manager for Somerset Tire Service,
    Inc. (employer) from August 2012, until November 9, 2015.             In June
    2015, Olesen injured his shoulder at work.            He underwent surgery,
    received workers' compensation, and returned to work in September
    2015.
    When   he   returned   to    work,    Olesen's     doctor   advised     that
    Olesen's duties should be restricted and that he should not lift
    or carry objects over a certain weight and he should avoid lifting
    above   shoulder   level.        His   employer   was    informed   of     these
    restrictions and agreed that Olesen could perform his duties as a
    branch manager with the medical restrictions.
    Despite his employer's agreement, Olesen felt he had to
    perform activities that violated his medical restrictions because
    he believed his branch was understaffed.              Olesen testified that
    his employer never asked him to perform duties that violated his
    medical restrictions.       Nevertheless, Olesen went on to testify
    that to be a successful branch manager, certain jobs needed to be
    done and because the branch was understaffed, he felt he had to
    perform activities that exceeded his medical restrictions.
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    Olesen had several communications with his supervisors and
    his employer's human resource personnel during which he requested
    additional staff for his branch.                     The employer responded that
    Olesen could perform his duties as branch manager with his medical
    restrictions and they would try to get him more staff.                       Olesen
    testified, however, that the branch remained understaffed.
    On November 2, 2015, Olesen submitted his resignation with
    an effective date of November 16, 2015.                 His employer informed him
    that his services were no longer needed and he was being terminated
    as of November 9, 2015.
    On     November      8,   2015,        Olesen    applied   for   unemployment
    benefits.       The deputy director of the Division of Unemployment
    Insurance informed Olesen that he was disqualified from receiving
    benefits.       Olesen appealed that decision and the Appeal Tribunal
    (Tribunal) conducted a hearing on January 15, 2016.                    Both Olesen
    and his employer presented testimony at the hearing.
    On January 15, 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the deputy's
    determination,      holding     Olesen           disqualified   for   unemployment
    benefits because he left his employment voluntarily without good
    cause attributable to such work under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).                       The
    Tribunal found that on two separate occasions Olesen's employer
    detailed the job duties Olesen was expected to perform and that
    those     job    duties    could       be     performed     within    his   medical
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    restrictions.      The Tribunal also noted that as a manager, Olesen
    could delegate work, but he chose to perform work that exceeded
    his medical restrictions.         Consequently, the Tribunal rejected
    Olesen's contention that his employer did not accommodate his
    medical restrictions.
    Olesen administratively appealed, and on May 12, 2016, the
    Board   affirmed    the   Tribunal's       decision   based    on    the    record
    established at the Tribunal.
    Olesen now appeals from the Board's final agency decision.
    He argues that he is entitled to unemployment benefits because his
    employer failed to adequately staff his branch and, thus, he had
    to perform duties that required him to go beyond his medical
    restrictions.      Olesen also argues that the Board's decision was
    arbitrary, "careless" and unreasonable.
    The   scope    of    our   review     on   an    appeal   from    a     final
    determination of an administrative agency is limited. The agency's
    decision should not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary,
    capricious, or unreasonable.        Brady v. Bd. of Review, 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997) (citing In re Warren, 
    117 N.J. 295
    , 296 (1989)).
    We "can intervene only in those rare circumstances in which an
    agency action is clearly inconsistent with its statutory mission
    or with other State policy."       
    Ibid.
     (quoting George Harms Constr.
    Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 
    137 N.J. 8
    , 27 (1994)).                     Furthermore,
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    "[i]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment
    compensation proceeding, the test is not whether an appellate
    court     would   come   to   the    same   conclusion    if   the   original
    determination was its to make, but rather whether the factfinder
    could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs."            
    Ibid.
     (alteration
    in original) (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 
    200 N.J. Super. 74
    , 79 (App. Div. 1985)).
    Here, the Board found that Olesen was disqualified from
    unemployment      compensation      benefits   under   N.J.S.A.   43:21-5(a),
    which provides that an individual may not receive benefits if he
    or she "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to
    such work[.]"     Although the statute does not define the term "good
    cause," that phrase has been construed to mean a "cause sufficient
    to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the
    employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed."                Domenico v.
    Bd. of Review, 
    192 N.J. Super. 284
    , 287 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting
    Condo v. Bd. of Review, 
    158 N.J. Super. 172
    , 174 (App. Div. 1978)).
    The test for determining whether an employee's decision to
    leave work constitutes "good cause" is one of "ordinary common
    sense and prudence."          Brady, 
    supra,
     
    152 N.J. at 214
     (quoting
    Zielenski v. Bd. of Review, 
    85 N.J. Super. 46
    , 52 (App. Div.
    1964)).     The employee's decision to quit "must be compelled by
    real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary,
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    trifling and whimsical ones."            
    Ibid.
         (quoting Domenico, 
    supra,
    192 N.J. Super. at 288
    ).          "A claimant has the 'responsibility to
    do   whatever    is   necessary    and   reasonable        in   order    to    remain
    employed.'"      
    Ibid.
     (quoting Heulitt v. Bd. of Review, 
    300 N.J. Super. 407
    , 414 (App. Div. 1997)).
    Olesen contends that when he returned to work from a work-
    related injury, his medical restrictions were not accommodated.
    The Board, however, relying on the fact findings made by the
    Tribunal, found that substantial evidence established that the
    employer accepted Olesen's medical limitations and never required
    him to do work beyond his medical limitations.                   Instead, Olesen
    voluntarily chose to perform work outside his medical restrictions
    because   of    his   perceived    needs      of   the    branch.       The    Board,
    therefore,      rejected   Olesen's          contention     that    his       medical
    restrictions were not accommodated.            Those findings are adequately
    supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and we
    discern no basis for disturbing the Board's determination.
    Olesen also argues that the Board failed to consider issues
    outside his medical restrictions in considering his eligibility
    for benefits.      We discern no abuse of discretion in the Board's
    decision not to consider the staffing issues separate from Olesen's
    medical restrictions.
    Affirmed.
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