U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for The , 444 N.J. Super. 94 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2649-13T4
U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
AS TRUSTEE FOR THE STRUCTURED
ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES,
2006-EQ1,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent,
February 1, 2016
v.
APPELLATE DIVISION
JOANN L. CURCIO,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MR. CURCIO, husband of
Joann L. Curcio,
Defendant.
________________________________________
Submitted September 16, 2015 – Decided February 1, 2016
Before Judges Reisner, Hoffman and Leone.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Warren County,
Docket No. F-008037-12.
Joseph A. Chang & Associates, LLC, attorneys
for appellant (Joseph A. Chang, of counsel
and on the briefs; Jeffrey Zajac, on the
briefs).
Reed Smith, LLP, attorney for respondent
(Henry F. Reichner, of counsel; Alex G.
Gross, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LEONE, J.A.D.
Defendant Joann L. Curcio appeals from a final judgment of
foreclosure and an order denying her motion to vacate the
judgment. In considering her appeal, we review differences
between the various Court Rules governing personal and mailed
service of process and proof of service. Based on our
construction of the current versions of those Rules, we find no
merit in defendant's argument that service was improper, or in
any of her other contentions. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
Defendant executed a promissory note in favor of EquiFirst
Corporation in the amount of $240,500 in 2006. Defendant
simultaneously executed a non-purchase money mortgage in favor
of EquiFirst. The mortgage encumbered a single-family residence
located in Bloomsbury, Greenwich Township, in Warren County,
where it was recorded. The mortgage named Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as mortgagee in a nominee
capacity for EquiFirst.
In September 2010, defendant defaulted on the promissory
note. In January 2011, MERS assigned the mortgage to plaintiff
U.S. Bank National Association.
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On September 29, 2011, counsel for plaintiff sent defendant
a "Notice of Intention to Foreclose," addressed to the
encumbered property via regular mail and certified mail, return
receipt requested. On October 3, 2011, counsel for plaintiff
received the certified mail return receipt, which was apparently
signed by defendant. In April 2012, defendant requested and
received a reinstatement quote from plaintiff's counsel.
On May 2, 2012, plaintiff instituted a foreclosure action
in the Chancery Division. In May 2012, a private process server
attempted at least three times to make personal service of the
complaint and summons on defendant at the encumbered property,
without success.
As a result, plaintiff's counsel employed a private
investigator to locate defendant. As detailed in the
subsequently-filed Certification of Inquiry/Mailing, an inquiry
was made with the United States Postal Service (USPS) asking if
defendant still lived at the encumbered property. The
postmaster advised no change of address order was on file. The
investigator performed a "skip trace," which revealed that
defendant still resided at the encumbered property.1 Inquiries
1
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "skiptracing agency" as a
"service that locates persons (such as delinquent debtors,
missing heirs, witnesses, stockholders, bondholders, etc.) or
(continued)
3 A-2649-13T4
to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and the Warren County
Tax Assessor's Office confirmed the same address.
Moreover, the private investigator prepared a report, which
detailed the investigator's efforts to locate defendant. The
investigator checked with defendant's creditors, the telephone
company's directory assistance database, the National Address
Database, and defendant's neighbors. Every inquiry indicated
that defendant still resided at the encumbered property.
As a result of the difficulties in effecting personal
service of the complaint and summons on defendant, on July 26,
2012, plaintiff mailed defendant the complaint and summons to
the encumbered property by regular mail and certified mail,
return receipt requested. The certified mail was returned
marked "unclaimed," and the regular mail was not returned.
Plaintiff set forth its unsuccessful efforts at effecting
personal service, its subsequent inquiries, and its successful
service by mail, in its Certification of Inquiry/Mailing, which
was filed on November 27, 2012. The Certification of
Inquiry/Mailing attached: the process server's affidavit of
unsuccessful personal service; the postmaster's finding of no
change of address; the results of the inquiries to the DMV and
(continued)
missing assets (such as bank accounts)." Black's Law
Dictionary, 1514 (9th ed. 2009).
4 A-2649-13T4
Tax Assessor's Office showing defendant still lived at the
encumbered property; the private investigator's report; and the
USPS "Track & Confirm" printout showing that the certified mail
was "[u]nclaimed."
On November 30, 2012, plaintiff filed a certification of
default, citing defendant's failure to file an answer to the
complaint. Default was entered the same day. In February 2013,
defendant's counsel contacted plaintiff's counsel and requested
that the default be vacated. Plaintiff denied this request.
Defendant failed to file a motion to vacate the default.
On April 22, 2013, plaintiff sent defendant a Notice of
Entry of Default by certified and regular mail to the encumbered
property. Plaintiff also sent a formal notice, as required by
N.J.S.A. 2A:50-58, advising defendant of her right to cure and
of plaintiff's intention to seek a final judgment. Defendant
failed to cure her default.
Plaintiff first moved for entry of final judgment in May
2013. On June 12, 2013, defendant filed opposition to
plaintiff's motion, arguing that plaintiff miscalculated the
interest on the loan and that she did not receive a Notice of
Intention to Foreclose that complied with the Fair Foreclosure
Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:50-53 to -68. Notably, defendant's opposition
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did not raise insufficiency of service. Defendant represents
that plaintiff's motion was denied.
On September 27, 2013, plaintiff filed a second motion for
entry of final judgment. Defendant did not oppose this motion.
On October 11, 2013, the Chancery Division entered a final
judgment of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff in the amount of
$292,780.85, awarded counsel fees of $3,077.81, and ordered a
sheriff's sale of the property.
On November 21, 2013, defendant moved to vacate the entry
of final judgment under Rule 4:50-1. By order dated January 21,
2014, the trial court denied defendant's motion to vacate the
final judgment, and found that plaintiff's three unsuccessful
attempts to effect personal service justified service by mail
pursuant to Rule 4:4-5(a).
II.
Defendant moved to vacate the entry of final judgment of
foreclosure under Rule 4:50-1(a) and (d). Rule 4:50-1 provides,
in pertinent part, that "[o]n motion, with briefs and upon such
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's
legal representative from a final judgment or order for the
following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; . . . [or] (d) the judgment or order is
void."
6 A-2649-13T4
"The decision whether to grant such a motion is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court[.]" Mancini v. EDS ex rel.
N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334
(1993). "The trial court's determination . . . warrants
substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it
results in a clear abuse of discretion." US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v.
Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012). We must hew to that
standard of review.
III.
Defendant first argues the final judgment of foreclosure
was void under Rule 4:50-1(d), because service of the summons
and complaint was insufficient. However, defendant was
indisputably aware of plaintiff's complaint in February 2013,
when her attorney contacted plaintiff and requested vacation of
the default. Nonetheless, she failed to challenge the
sufficiency of service in her June 12, 2013 opposition to the
entry of a final judgment. Indeed, defendant did not raise any
argument relating to the sufficiency of service until her
November 20, 2013 motion to vacate final judgment, nearly
sixteen months after the foreclosure complaint was served by
mail. Because of defendant's delay in raising this claim
despite having notice of the complaint, she "was not equitably
entitled to vacate the judgment." See Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Am.
7 A-2649-13T4
v. Angeles, 428 N.J. Super. 315, 320 (App. Div. 2012) (holding
the defendant's delay in raising the issue of plaintiff's
standing until a last-ditch Rule 4:50-1(d) motion barred
relief). In any event, plaintiff's service by mail complied
with New Jersey's Court Rules.
A.
"The primary method of obtaining in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant in this State is by causing the summons and
complaint to be personally served within this State pursuant to
R. 4:4-3[.]" R. 4:4-4(a). However, "in personam jurisdiction
may be obtained by mail under the circumstances and in the
manner provided by R. 4:4-3." R. 4:4-4(a).
Rule 4:4-3(a) provides, in pertinent part:
If personal service cannot be effected after
a reasonable and good faith attempt, which
shall be described with specificity in the
proof of service required by R. 4:4-7,
service may be made by mailing a copy of the
summons and complaint by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to
the usual place of abode of the defendant
. . . . The party making service may, at the
party's option, make service simultaneously
by registered or certified mail and ordinary
mail, and if the addressee refuses to claim
or accept delivery of registered mail and if
the ordinary mailing is not returned, the
simultaneous mailing shall constitute
effective service. . . . Return of service
shall be made as provided by R. 4:4-7.
Rule 4:4-7 provides, in pertinent part:
8 A-2649-13T4
If service is made by mail, the party making
service shall make proof thereof by
affidavit which shall also include the facts
of the failure to effect personal service
and the facts of the affiant's diligent
inquiry to determine defendant's place of
abode, business or employment. With the
proof shall be filed the affidavit or
affidavits of inquiry, if any, required by
R. 4:4-4 and R. 4:4-5.
Here, plaintiff filed a Certification of Inquiry/Mailing. See
R. 1:4-4(b) (allowing certifications instead of affidavits).
That certificate complied with all of the requirements set forth
in Rule 4:4-7.
Of course, "[s]ervice by mail is not effective" under Rule
4:4-3 "unless plaintiff first made 'a reasonable and good faith
attempt' to serve defendant personally." City of Passaic v.
Shennett, 390 N.J. Super. 475, 483 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting R.
4:4-3(a)). Here, plaintiff employed a private process server
who certified he/she unsuccessfully attempted, on at least three
separate occasions, to serve defendant with plaintiff's
complaint and summons in accordance with Rule 4:4-3.
Further, as "described with specificity in" the
Certification of Inquiry/Mailing, plaintiff made a "diligent
inquiry to determine defendant's place of abode" before making
mail service. R. 4:4-7. Plaintiff employed a private
investigator who relied on numerous sources, including the
postmaster, the DMV, telephone records, tax records, creditors,
9 A-2649-13T4
and a neighbor to determine defendant's correct address. Every
source indicated defendant continued to reside at the encumbered
property. Given plaintiff's repeated efforts at making personal
service and its subsequent diligent inquiries to confirm
defendant's address, service by mail was appropriate.
"Where service is made by registered or certified mail and
simultaneously by regular mail," the plaintiff must file "the
printout of the electronic confirmation of delivery," "provided
by the U.S. Postal Service," or proof that the registered or
certified mail was "unclaimed." R. 4:4-7. Here, plaintiff
included with its Certification of Inquiry/Mailing a copy of the
printout from the USPS website indicating the certified mail
went unclaimed. Ibid. This was sufficient proof.
Defendant contends that plaintiff was required to obtain a
court order before resorting to mail service under Rule 4:4-
3(a)(1). However, Rule 4:4-4 provides that "[i]f service can be
made by any of the modes provided by this rule, no court order
shall be necessary." R. 4:4-4(b)(3). Rule 4:4-4(a) permits
mail service pursuant to Rule 4:4-3. Rule 4:4-3(a) only
requires "a reasonable and good faith attempt" to effect
personal service before resorting to service by mail.
Defendant argues that plaintiff should have filed its
Certification of Inquiry/Mailing prior to resorting to mail
10 A-2649-13T4
service. However, the affidavit or certification must be filed
after the mailing, because it must memorialize not only the
diligent inquiry but also "proof of service," including "the
return receipt card, or the printout of the electronic
confirmation," stating whether the certified mail was delivered
or unclaimed. R. 4:4-7.
Rule 4:4-7 provides that "[p]roof of service shall be
promptly filed with the court within the time during which the
person served must respond thereto[.]" Thus, plaintiff should
have filed the Certification of Inquiry/Mailing "within 35 days
after service of the summons and complaint on that defendant."
R. 4:6-1(a).
Instead, plaintiff filed the Certification of
Inquiry/Mailing four months after effecting service by mail.
However, defendant did not challenge the untimely filing of the
certificate in the Chancery Division. Defendant fails to show
plain error. R. 2:10-2. "Failure to make proof of service does
not affect the validity of service." R. 4:4-7. Moreover,
plaintiff filed the Certification of Inquiry/Mailing before
entry of default, and five months before moving for entry of
default judgment. Thus, defendant had the certification
available to her when opposing entry of default judgment. She
has failed to show that the erroneous delay in filing the
11 A-2649-13T4
certification was "clearly capable of producing an unjust
result." R. 2:10-2.
Defendant next argues that the Certification of
Inquiry/Mailing was insufficient because plaintiff failed to
conduct various other searches, including a title search through
surrogate courts, a vital statistics search, a grantor-grantee
search, or a search of the New Jersey Department of Banking and
Insurance records. However, our Court Rules do not require
specific searches, but only require a "diligent inquiry" before
resorting to service by mail. R. 4:4-7. As set forth above,
plaintiff performed a diligent inquiry. Moreover, defendant
does not argue that such searches would have led to plaintiff
discovering a different address for defendant. Cf. M & D
Assocs. v. Mandara, 366 N.J. Super. 341, 354 (App. Div.)
(finding an inquiry insufficient where search of motor vehicle
and voting records would have disclosed an address for service),
certif. denied, 180 N.J. 151 (2004). Instead, defendant's
certification admits that she has resided at the encumbered
property for thirty-five years. Thus, we find no merit in
defendant's argument.
B.
Defendant contends service by mail had to be performed
under Rule 4:4-4(b)(1). Rule 4:4-4(b)(1) provides for service
12 A-2649-13T4
"[b]y mail or personal service outside the state." "Paragraph
(b)(1) is the long-arm provision, prescribing the modes of
service by which personal jurisdiction may be obtained over a
person not present in New Jersey," including by "mailed
service." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
comment 3 on R. 4:4-4 (2016). Specifically, Rule 4:4-4(b)(1)(C)
allows out-of-state service by mail "[i]f it appears by
affidavit satisfying the requirements of R. 4:4-5(b) that
despite diligent effort and inquiry personal service cannot be
made in accordance with paragraph (a) of this rule[.]" Because
plaintiff served defendant within New Jersey, service by mail
was governed by Rule 4:4-3(a) rather than Rule 4:4-4(b)(1)(c).
Defendant also argues that plaintiff's service by mail
never became effective pursuant to Rule 4:4-4(c) because
defendant did not answer the complaint or otherwise appear
within sixty days. Rule 4:4-4(c) permits "[o]ptional mailed
service" without having to attempt personal service, "provided,
however, that such service shall be effective for obtaining in
personam jurisdiction only if the defendant answers the
complaint or otherwise appears in response thereto, and provided
further that default shall not be entered against a defendant
who fails to answer or appear in response thereto." However,
"[t]his prohibition against entry of default shall not apply to
13 A-2649-13T4
mailed service authorized by any other provision of these
rules." Ibid.Here, "plaintiff did not serve defendant pursuant to [Rule
4:4-4(c)]." Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J. Super. 346, 351
(App. Div. 2000). Rather, plaintiff successfully made service
by mail pursuant to Rule 4:4-3(a) after attempting personal
service. Service by mail under Rule 4:4-3(a) "is valid even if
the defendant does not answer or appear," Russo, supra, 334 N.J.
Super. at 352, and "is as fully effective as personal service.
Thus, entry of default is permitted provided only that the
conditions of the rule are complied with." Pressler & Verniero,
Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 4:4-3 (2016).
C.
The trial court found service proper under Rule 4:4-5(a).
Rule 4:4-5(a) is entitled "Methods of Obtaining In Rem
Jurisdiction." Rule 4:4-5(a)(2) permits "service by mail as
prescribed by R. 4:4-4(b)(1)(C)" in "actions affecting specific
property, or any interest therein, or any res within the
jurisdiction of the court," if "it shall appear by affidavit of
the plaintiff's attorney or other person having knowledge of the
facts, that a defendant cannot, after diligent inquiry as
required by this rule, be served within the State." R. 4:4-
5(a).
14 A-2649-13T4
We need not address when "service may" be made pursuant to
Rule 4:4-5(a) in an action for foreclosure under a mortgage. 2 It
is sufficient to note that service under Rule 4:4-5(a) was not
necessary here because defendant could be and was "served within
the State" by mail service under Rule 4:4-3(a). R. 4:4-5(a).
Where, as here, the sole owner of a property was not an absent
defendant and could be served within the State by mail as
authorized under Rule 4:4-3(a), there was no need to resort to
Rule 4:4-5(a)'s "provision for personal service outside this
State," "service by mail [outside the State] as prescribed by R.
4:4-4(b)(1)(A)," or service "by publication." R. 4:4-5(a)(1),
(2), (3). See M & D Assocs., supra, 366 N.J. Super. at 353(service by publication under Rule 4:4-5 "is an alternative
method of service" that is only available when "the defendant is
not available for service within the State"); see also Montville
v. Block 69, Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1, 20 n.9 (1977) (service by
regular mail and certified mail, return receipt requested, "to
notify a landowner of the foreclosure proceeding," adequately
2
See De Sena v. Prudential Ins. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 235, 243
(App. Div. 1971) ("If the judgment sought will affect the
interests of particular persons in designated property, the
action is quasi in rem," and service may be effected under Rule
4:4-5); see also Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass'n v.
Franzino, 186 N.J. 99, 114 n.5 (2006) ("foreclosure is a quasi
in rem action").
15 A-2649-13T4
"comports with various Court Rules which concurrently deal with
notice requirements," including Rule 4:4-5).
Because defendant was properly served under Rule 4:4-3(a),
an affidavit of inquiry, "if any, [was not] required by R. 4:4-4
and R. 4:4-5." R. 4:4-7. Thus, we need not determine whether
the Certification of Inquiry/Mailing met the requirements for
affidavits under those rules imposed by Rule 4:4-5(c).
D.
Defendant argues that the Chancery Division should have
held a plenary hearing to determine whether she was properly
served. We set aside a trial judge's decision to deny a plenary
hearing only if the judge abused his or her discretion. Colca
v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super. 405, 421-22 (App. Div. 2010). Here,
defendant never asked the Chancery Division to hold a plenary
hearing, and she raised no material issues of disputed fact for
which an evidentiary hearing was required. Her certification
that "I have never been served documents of foreclosure or
judgments against me" and "never knew about the judgments and
all of the prior proceedings until I retained my attorney" in
Spring 2011 does not deny that she received the summons and
complaint served by mail in July 2012. In any event, service by
mail was properly effected under Rule 4:4-3(a).
16 A-2649-13T4
Defendant argues that plaintiff's service by mail offends
constitutional due process requirements. "[T]he only
constitutional requirements of service of process" is "'notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
the opportunity to present their objections.'" O'Connor v.
Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 126 (1975) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed.
865, 873 (1950)). Here, due process was satisfied because
plaintiff made a diligent inquiry confirming defendant's
address, and then effected service to that address by regular
mail and certified mail, return receipt requested. "[C]ertified
mail, return receipt requested, is a mode of service meeting due
process requirements." Shannon v. Acad. Lines, Inc., 346 N.J.
Super. 191, 197 (App. Div. 2001). Indeed, where other service
is not possible, "due process is satisfied when a defendant, who
cannot be found for personal service but is a resident of the
State at the time of the actionable event, is served by ordinary
mail at his or her last known address." First Resolution Inv.
Corp. v. Seker, 171 N.J. 502, 514 (2002) (citing Feuchtbaum v.
Constantini, 59 N.J. 167, 181 (1971)).
17 A-2649-13T4
Service by mail was authorized by our Court Rules and did
not offend due process. Therefore, the judgment was not void
under Rule 4:50-1(d).
IV.
Defendant alternatively argues she showed excusable neglect
under Rule 4:50-1(a) for failing to challenge plaintiff's
complaint. "[A] defendant seeking to reopen a default judgment
[because of excusable neglect] must show that the neglect to
answer is excusable under the circumstances and that [s]he has a
meritorious defense." Mancini, supra, 132 N.J. at 335(alterations in original) (citation omitted); see Intek Auto
Leasing, Inc. v. Zetes Microtech Corp., 268 N.J. Super. 426,
430-31 (App. Div. 1993).
Defendant argues that, although she received and responded
to plaintiff's first motion for default judgment, she was not
given proper notice of plaintiff's "second and third motions"
for final judgment. The record only contains two motions filed
by plaintiff, both of which were served by mail on defendant at
the encumbered property as authorized by Rule 1:5-2. There is
"a presumption that mail properly addressed, stamped, and posted
was received by the party to whom it was addressed." SSI Med.
Servs. v. HHS, Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 146 N.J.
614, 621 (1996). Plaintiff submitted certifications that it
18 A-2649-13T4
satisfied those requirements. Because defendant was properly
put on notice of the motions for final judgment, she cannot show
excusable neglect.
In addition, defendant has not shown a meritorious defense.
"[T]he only issues in a foreclosure action are the validity of
the mortgage, the amount of the indebtedness, and the right of
the mortgagee to resort to the mortgaged premises." Sun NLF
Ltd. P'ship v. Sasso, 313 N.J. Super. 546, 550 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 156 N.J. 424 (1998). Defendant does not deny
that she entered into the mortgage agreement, nor does she
challenge the amount of indebtedness, or that her failure to
make the monthly payments on the mortgage gave plaintiff the
contractual right to foreclose.
Rather, defendant argues plaintiff had unclean hands.
"Foreclosure is an equitable remedy governed by the operation of
traditional equitable principles and is subject to the defense
of unclean hands." N.J. Bank v. Azco Realty Co., 148 N.J.
Super. 159, 166 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 280 (1977).
The essence of the doctrine of unclean hands, "'which is
discretionary on the part of the court, is that a suitor in
equity must come into court with clean hands and he must keep
them clean after his entry and throughout the proceedings.'"
Marino v. Marino, 200 N.J. 315, 345 (2009) (citations omitted).
19 A-2649-13T4
Defendant argues that plaintiff initiated the foreclosure
action with unclean hands when it engaged in the practice of
"dual tracking." Dual tracking is the practice of a mortgagor
initiating foreclosure proceedings while also negotiating a
mortgage modification. Guillaume, supra, 209 N.J. at 468-69.
Our Supreme Court has held that practice is lawful in New
Jersey. Ibid.In Guillaume, borrowers failed to appear in a foreclosure
action and a default judgment was subsequently entered. Id. at
460-61. The defendants attempted to vacate the final judgment
of foreclosure by arguing, among other things, that they were
confused because they were negotiating a "potential loan
modification at a time when the foreclosure action was
underway." Id. at 468. Our Supreme Court held that "[t]here
[was] no evidence that US Bank suggested to the Guillaumes that
it was unnecessary to respond to the foreclosure action; [and]
it expressly advised the Guillaumes that the foreclosure action
could not be ignored." Id. at 468-69.
Here, nothing in the record, including defendant's
certification, suggests that plaintiff misled defendant into
believing she did not have to respond to the foreclosure action.
Engaging in negotiations with defendant regarding a modification
to her mortgage did not preclude plaintiff from seeking
20 A-2649-13T4
foreclosure for defendant's failure to pay back the loan.
"Every [loan modification] application does not guarantee
acceptance." Nat'l Cmty. Bank of N.J. v. G.L.T. Indus., Inc.,
276 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1994).
Defendant also argues that plaintiff engaged in predatory
lending by extending a mortgage she could not afford, and
tricking her into accepting an adjustable rate mortgage.
However, she does not provide evidence nor published New Jersey
cases to support her argument. Thus, "[w]e will not consider"
defendant's entirely unsupported and "conclusionary statement."
Miller v. Reis, 189 N.J. Super. 437, 441 (App. Div. 1983). In
any event, we note defendant signed documents which made clear
she was agreeing to an adjustable rate mortgage.
Affirmed.
21 A-2649-13T4