State of New Jersey v. Ryan J. Rinker , 446 N.J. Super. 347 ( 2016 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1238-14T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
Plaintiff-Respondent,
July 29, 2016
v. APPELLATE DIVISION
RYAN J. RINKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
———————————————————————————————————————————————————
Submitted February 29, 2016 – Decided July 29, 2016
Before Judges Messano, Carroll and Sumners.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,
Indictment No. 13-04-0577.
Wronko & Loewen, attorneys for appellant
(Gilbert G. Miller, of counsel and on the
brief).
Andrew C. Carey, Middlesex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Joie D.
Piderit, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MESSANO, P.J.A.D.
Following a jury trial, defendant Ryan Rinker was convicted
of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b) (count one), and third-degree theft of that handgun,
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a) (count two).1 Defendant was sentenced on
count one to a five-year term of imprisonment with a three-year
period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the Graves Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), and a concurrent three-year term on count
two.2
Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED THE
TESTIMONY OF [DEFENDANT'S] FATHER AT THE CO-
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL UNDER N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9),
A HEARSAY EXCEPTION CODIFYING THE COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE OF FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING,
THEREBY ADMITTING TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY WHICH
VIOLATED [DEFENDANT'S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO CONFRONTATION.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE DETECTIVES VIOLATED
[DEFENDANT'S] STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
THE REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AT TRIAL BY
APPROACHING AND SPEAKING TO HIM IN THE
ABSENCE OF COUNSEL DURING THE COURSE OF THE
TRIAL.
1
Count three, charging defendant with third-degree violation of
regulatory provisions pertaining to firearms, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
10(e), was dismissed prior to trial. Co-defendant Raphael
Edwards was also charged in count one of the same indictment,
tried separately before defendant's trial and convicted. In a
separate opinion, we reversed Edwards's conviction. State v.
Edwards, No. A-2248-14 (App. Div. Apr. 20, 2016).
2
Effective August 8, 2013, the mandatory minimum sentence was
increased to forty-two months. See Pub. L. 2013 c. 113 § 2.
2 A-1238-14T3
POINT III
NUMEROUS OF THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS ON
SUMMATION WERE EGREGIOUSLY IMPROPER AND
SINGULARLY AND CUMULATIVELY DEPRIVED
[DEFENDANT] OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL. (Not raised
below).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT HIS DEFENSE.
POINT V
IN THE EVENT THE COURT AGREES WITH
[DEFENDANT'S] CONTENTION IN POINT I THAT THE
COURT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED THE ADMISSION OF
[DEFENDANT'S FATHER'S] TESTIMONY IN THE CO-
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL, THE COURT AT A MINIMUM
MUST ENTER A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL REGARDING
THE CHARGE THAT [DEFENDANT] UNLAWFULLY
POSSESSED A HANDGUN.
We have considered these arguments in light of the record and
applicable legal standards. We reverse and remand for a new
trial.
I.
The State contended that defendant stole his father's
revolver from the family home and sold it to co-defendant
Edwards. On January 21, 2013, South Brunswick Police Sergeant
Ronald Seaman spoke to defendant's father, who reported his
3 A-1238-14T3
revolver was stolen from his residence.3 Later that day,
defendant called Seaman from a substance abuse treatment
facility in Pennsylvania. Defendant told Seaman he took the
loaded gun from his father's dresser and sold it to someone he
knew as "R.B." for drugs and money. Defendant said the sale was
arranged through text messaging, and that he met R.B. on a
street in South Brunswick where the exchange was made.
Seaman met with defendant the following day in
Pennsylvania, in the company of defendant's counselor and
another detective. After waiving his Miranda4 rights, defendant
consented to a search of his cellphone and also provided R.B.'s
phone number. Defendant identified Edwards as R.B. from a
photographic array, and Seaman had defendant unsuccessfully
attempt to contact Edwards by phone and text message. Seaman
recorded defendant's statement, which was played for the jury.
Additionally, the parties stipulated to records from the
cellphone provider of the sent and received phone calls and text
messages from defendant's phone for January 15 through January
31, 2013. Seaman read from a summary of these records which
3
We note that in overruling defense counsel's hearsay objection
to this testimony, the judge specifically determined the
statement was not being introduced for its truth. The judge
later gave conforming limiting instructions to the jury.
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).
4 A-1238-14T3
allegedly documented the transaction surrounding the handgun.
Without objection, the detective was permitted to read and
interpret the texts sent from defendant's phone number, and the
texts received from Edwards.5
State Police records revealed that defendant's father was
the registered owner of a Colt .38 caliber Detective Special
revolver, the make and model specified in the indictment, and
neither defendant nor Edwards were ever issued permits to
purchase firearms. Over defendant's objection, Seaman was
recalled on the second day of trial and permitted to identify a
picture of a Colt .38 caliber Detective Special revolver, albeit
not defendant's father's gun, which was never recovered.
The State also called Philip Sassaman as a witness. He
knew defendant and Edwards and testified that he would "get
high" with Edwards. Sassaman claimed that one or two years
earlier, while in a house with Edwards and another friend, he
saw Edwards remove a handgun from beneath his mattress.
5
The statements attributed to Edwards were clearly hearsay. We
assume they may have been admitted pursuant to N.J.R.E.
803(b)(5), which excepts from the hearsay rule statements made
by co-conspirators in furtherance of a conspiracy, but the issue
was not addressed since there was no objection. To qualify
under that exception, the statement "must have been made in
furtherance of the conspiracy," "must have been made during the
course of the conspiracy," and "there must be evidence,
independent of the hearsay, of the existence of the conspiracy
and defendant's relationship to it." State v. Phelps, 96 N.J.
500, 509-10 (1984) (citations omitted).
5 A-1238-14T3
The State intended to call defendant's father as a witness,
but he had not responded to a subpoena mailed to his home. At
the close of the first day of trial, the judge rejected the
State's argument that Mr. Rinker had been properly served. In
the middle of the second trial day, after the State admitted
that defendant's father's whereabouts were unknown, the judge
apparently granted the prosecutor's request for, as the judge
himself later described, "an in camera hearing to determine the
efforts made by the [S]tate to secure the attendance of Edward
Rinker, material witness in this case, and . . . the progress of
that investigation."6
On the record, the judge stated that during the in camera
hearing, one of the State's witnesses, Detective Sergeant Marc
Levy, "said something . . . that caused the prosecutor to change
course." The prosecutor now sought to admit defendant's
father's testimony at Edwards's earlier trial pursuant to
N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9), the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to
the hearsay rule. The judge conducted a hearing outside the
presence of the jury pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104(a).
Levy testified that in preparing for Edwards's trial
several months earlier, the State mailed defendant's father a
6
Whatever testimony was taken during this "in camera" hearing
was not included in the appellate record.
6 A-1238-14T3
subpoena at his home. Shortly thereafter, Levy spoke with Mr.
Rinker regarding his upcoming testimony. According to Levy, Mr.
Rinker stated, "I know I have to come in, but I will not trial
prep, and I will not bury my son. . . . I will come in and
testify, but I will not bury my son." Defendant's father
subsequently testified at Edwards's trial.
A few weeks before defendant's trial, the State again
mailed a subpoena to defendant's father at the same address.
Levy testified that based on information obtained from other
agencies, Mr. Rinker had not left the country.
Levy also testified that he spoke to Sassaman earlier that
morning. Sassaman told Levy that "he received a phone call,
yesterday, from a friend of [defendant's], advising him not to
come today, that he didn't have to come. He was the only one."
When asked to clarify, Levy said, "I guess he meant that to be
he was the only one coming to testify."
Detective Rodney Blount testified that earlier in the
morning, he attempted to serve defendant's father with a
material witness warrant. Blount and another officer were
greeted at the front door by defendant, who identified himself
by name. The officers asked defendant if his father was home,
and defendant responded that he was not. When asked if he knew
when his father would return, defendant said: "I know why
7 A-1238-14T3
you're here. He's not here. He's not going to come." When
told to have his father call the officers if he returned,
defendant said: "[d]on't waste your time, he's not coming."
Detective Ryan Tighe testified that he called the Rinker
home approximately one month before trial and spoke to Mr.
Rinker's wife, who acknowledged having received trial subpoenas
for her husband and herself. Tighe detailed his other efforts
to locate Mr. Rinker, including leaving a subpoena at his
residence the day before.
The judge found the officers' testimony credible. He cited
Levy's conversation with Sassaman earlier that morning,
concluding, "presumably the inference [was] that [Sassaman] was
the only one that was really testifying against . . . defendant,
and the suggestion being, at least indirectly, that . . . he
should not testify in this case."7 The judge concluded "there is
circumstantial evidence that [defendant] has . . . maybe not
7
No one identified defendant's "friend" who allegedly called
Sassaman. At Edwards's trial, over which the same judge
presided, the State produced Sassaman and another individual as
witnesses, and both testified to having seen Edwards with a gun
on the same occasion. But, neither Levy nor Sassaman claimed
this other person was the same "friend" who spoke to Sassaman
the night before his testimony. We note that in rejecting
defense counsel's further argument, the judge listed the reasons
for his decision, stating that the State had made "many efforts
. . . to locate the witness who did testify in the trial of the
co-defendant." These efforts are not detailed in the record.
8 A-1238-14T3
directly, but indirectly engaged in wrongdoing . . . that was
intended to procure the unavailability of his father as a
witness in this case."
In further argument, defense counsel claimed that an
individual who was in court had text messaged Sassaman after
Levy testified, and Sassaman denied making the statement Levy
attributed to him. Defense counsel did not seek any specific
relief, such as an adjournment or continuance. Without
addressing the issue directly, the judge reiterated the basis
for his ruling, which included Levy's testimony, "that he was
told by Sassaman that he got a phone call not to . . . show up,
that this was . . . defendant's friend, and that he was the only
one . . . who would . . . possibly tie the gun, at least in the
defendant's mind to . . . the defendant." The judge concluded,
"[t]he circumstantial evidence is not compelling, but . . . it
does preponderate in the [S]tate's favor." The judge permitted
the State to play an audio recording of Mr. Rinker's testimony
at Edwards's trial.
Defendant's father had testified that he went to police
headquarters to report his handgun was missing on January 21,
2013. He provided police with a range of dates when the gun was
taken because those were dates defendant had stayed in his home.
Mr. Rinker described his son's drug dependence and treatment
9 A-1238-14T3
problems. He also testified as to the make and model of the
revolver, and the fact that it was loaded. During cross-
examination, Mr. Rinker acknowledged reporting to police that he
believed defendant had stolen the gun.
Defendant elected not to testify and called no witnesses.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on the two counts submitted.
II.
A.
In Point I, defendant argues the State failed to prove that
he engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did procure
his father's absence from trial, predicates for admission of
defendant's father's prior testimony under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9),
the so-called forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the hearsay
rule. Defendant argues that admission of this hearsay violated
his rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
The State argues otherwise and also contends, alternatively,
that any error was harmless. We agree with defendant that his
father's testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and the State
should not have been permitted to introduce it at trial.
We begin by noting that "'[a] trial court's evidentiary
rulings are entitled to deference absent a showing of an abuse
of discretion, i.e., there has been a clear error of judgment.'"
State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 402 (2015) (quoting State v.
10 A-1238-14T3
Harris, 209 N.J. 431, 439 (2012)). However, when the trial
court fails to apply the proper test in analyzing the
admissibility of proffered evidence, our review is de novo.
See, e.g., State v. Lykes, 192 N.J. 519, 534 (2007) (applying de
novo review when trial judge failed to recognize evidence was
subject to N.J.R.E. 404(b) analysis).
Defendant's father's testimony from Edwards's trial was
hearsay. See N.J.R.E. 801(c) (defining "hearsay" as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial . . . , offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted"). Hearsay is generally inadmissible,
except as provided by our Rules of Evidence or some other law.
N.J.R.E. 802.
Exceptions to the hearsay rule fall into two broad
categories — those not dependent on the declarant's
unavailability, see N.J.R.E. 803, and those dependent on the
declarant's unavailability. See N.J.R.E. 804. While subsection
(a) of Rule 804 lists several circumstances by which a declarant
may be deemed "unavailable," only one is relevant here. A
declarant "is 'unavailable'" if he "is absent from the hearing
because of physical or mental illness or infirmity, or other
cause, and the proponent of the statement is unable by process
11 A-1238-14T3
or other reasonable means to procure the declarant's attendance
at trial." N.J.R.E. 804(a)(4).8
In State v. Byrd, 198 N.J. 319 (2009), our Supreme Court
stated
that the time ha[d] come for New Jersey to
follow the course taken by many other
jurisdictions and codify a forfeiture-by-
wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule.
That rule w[ould] allow the admission of a
witness's statement offered against a party
who has engaged, directly or indirectly, in
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the witness.
[Id. at 324.]
As a result, N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9) (the Rule) was drafted by the
Court, approved at a Judicial Conference and, in accordance with
the Evidence Act of 1960, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-33 to -44, became
effective July 1, 2011. See State v. Rose, 425 N.J. Super. 463,
466-67 (App. Div. 2012) (explaining process).
The Rule provides that
[s]ubject to Rule 807, the following [is]
not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness[:]
. . . .
8
This must be contrasted with those situations "when the
declarant's unavailability has been procured or wrongfully
caused by the proponent of declarant's statement for the purpose
of preventing declarant from attending or testifying." N.J.R.E.
804(a) (emphasis added). In those circumstances, the declarant
is not "unavailable" for purposes of N.J.R.E. 804's exceptions
to the hearsay rule.
12 A-1238-14T3
A statement offered against a party who has
engaged, directly or indirectly, in
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did,
procure the unavailability of the declarant
as a witness.
[N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9).]
N.J.R.E. 807, in turn, specifically permits the judge to exclude
the evidence when "it appears that the proponent's intention to
offer the statement in evidence was not made known to the
adverse party at such time as to provide that party with a fair
opportunity to meet it." The Rule parallels its federal
counterpart, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which provides:
"[a] statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused --
or acquiesced in wrongfully causing -- the declarant's
unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result."
See Byrd, supra, 198 N.J. at 337; see also Biunno, Weissbard &
Zegas, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 7 to N.J.R.E.
804(b)(9) (2016).
The Byrd Court clearly prescribed the process by which
otherwise inadmissible hearsay could be admitted under the new
Rule. Initially,
[w]hen the State intends to introduce a
witness's statement through the forfeiture-
by-wrongdoing exception to the hearsay rule,
it must make known its intention as soon as
reasonably practicable. Ordinarily, the
State should advise defense counsel and the
court as soon as it becomes aware that the
defendant's wrongful conduct has made the
13 A-1238-14T3
witness unavailable and that it intends to
offer the witness's out-of-court statement
into evidence. The State must reveal the
identity of the witness and the particulars
of the statement that will be offered into
evidence.
[Byrd, supra, 198 N.J. at 350.]
The judge must conduct a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104(a)
outside the presence of the jury, "to determine whether the
witness's out-of-court statement should be admitted into
evidence because the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct,
making the witness unavailable." Ibid. (emphasis added). A
witness is considered unavailable if he cannot be located as a
result of defendant's wrongdoing. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).
At the Rule 104 hearing, the State bears the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence and "must demonstrate
that the defendant by his wrongful conduct, directly or
indirectly, caused the witness's unavailability." Ibid.
Lastly, the judge must determine that the proffered statement
bears "some indicia of reliability"; statements that meet the
requirements of N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1)(A) or (B), like defendant's
father's testimony in this case, are presumptively reliable. 9
Id. at 352-53.
9
N.J.R.E. 803(a)(1)(A) and (B) except from the hearsay rule
prior inconsistent statements of witnesses "contained in a sound
recording or in a writing made or signed by the witness in
(continued)
14 A-1238-14T3
The United States Supreme Court has held that the admission
of hearsay testimony pursuant to the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
doctrine does not offend the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause. Id. at 339 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
62, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 199 (2004)). "The
Sixth Amendment, however, requires that the wrongdoer have as
his intent 'the particular purpose of making the witness
unavailable' to testify at trial." Id. at 340 (quoting Giles v.
California, 554 U.S. 353, 366, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2687, 171 L. Ed.
2d 488, 500 (2008)). The Rule, "which reflects constitutional
precedents, only extinguishes a defendant's confrontation rights
to keep a hearsay statement from the jury when the defendant has
procured the unavailability of a witness through his wrongful
conduct." State v. Cabbell, 207 N.J. 311, 335 (2011).
B.
In Cabbell, the Court addressed the State's alternative
argument that a recalcitrant, testifying witness's prior
statement was admissible through retroactive application of the
Rule. Id. at 333-34. The Court rejected the argument, finding
among other things that the Rule was not adopted until five
(continued)
circumstances establishing its reliability or . . . given under
oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or other
judicial . . . proceeding[.]"
15 A-1238-14T3
years after the trial, and the trial court never conducted a
Rule 104 hearing, never made specific findings that the
defendant had engaged in "'wrongdoing'" to silence the witness
and never found the witness was unavailable, since she was not.
Id. at 334. Moreover, the Court concluded that the statement
was admissible under another exception to the hearsay rule,
N.J.R.E. 803(c)(5) (past recollection recorded); therefore "the
issue . . . [was] not about the admissibility of [the witness's]
statement." Ibid.
The Court's dicta in Cabbell is certainly helpful to
reiterate the predicates necessary for admission of hearsay
pursuant to the Rule. But, no reported decision has squarely
addressed the nature and extent of evidence necessary to satisfy
the Rule.
We start by recognizing that "[w]e interpret an evidence
rule, as we would a statute, by first looking at its plain
language." State ex rel. J.A., 195 N.J. 324, 338 (2008). The
language of the Rule clearly and unambiguously provides that the
proponent of the hearsay, in this case the State, must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence three specific predicates: 1)
that defendant "engaged, directly or indirectly, in wrongdoing";
2) that the wrongdoing "was intended to . . . procure the
unavailability of the declarant as a witness"; and 3) that the
16 A-1238-14T3
wrongdoing "did[] procure the unavailability of the declarant as
a witness." N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9). As noted, in order to satisfy
the Confrontation Clause, the second predicate is critical,
because the proponent must demonstrate that the adverse party's
wrongdoing was committed with a specific intent, i.e., making
the declarant unavailable for trial. Giles, supra, 554 U.S. at
366, 128 S. Ct. at 2687, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 500.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have been the source of many,
although not all, of our Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., State v.
Harris, 209 N.J. 431, 442 (2012) (noting the 1993 revisions to
our rules "adopted the numbering used in the Federal Rules of
Evidence and followed those rules in many instances"). We
therefore frequently consider as instructive federal precedent
construing analogous Federal Rules of Evidence. Parker v.
Poole, 440 N.J. Super. 7, 19 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 223
N.J. 163 (2015).
Although our Rule parallels its federal counterpart, it
requires the proponent of the hearsay to prove that the adverse
party "engaged, directly or indirectly, in wrongdoing," while
the federal rule only requires that the proponent demonstrate
the adverse party "wrongfully caused -- or acquiesced in
wrongfully causing" the witness's unavailability. Fed. R. of
17 A-1238-14T3
Ev. 804(b)(6) (emphasis added).10 For our purposes, we consider
the federal precedent without regard to this distinction.
The proponent of hearsay under the federal rule must also
prove three predicates prior to its admission. "To admit a
hearsay statement under Rule 804(b)(6), the government must
demonstrate: '(1) that the defendant engaged or acquiesced in
wrongdoing, (2) that the wrongdoing was intended to procure the
declarant's unavailability, and (3) that the wrongdoing did
procure the unavailability.'" United States v. Jonassen, 759
F.3d 653, 661-62 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
Scott, 284 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1031, 123 S. Ct. 582, 154 L. Ed. 2d 448 (2002)), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 152, 193 L. Ed. 2d 114 (2015); see also
United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir.) (citing
10
At least one federal court of appeals has held that in order
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, the rule's use of the word
"acquiescence" requires proof of "active, culpable conduct, as
Giles requires," and not "simple acquiescence in another's
decision not to appear or to cause someone else not to appear."
Carlson v. AG of Cal., 791 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2015); but
see, United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 385 (4th Cir. 2012)
("The term 'acquiesce,' within the meaning of Rule 804(b)(6),
encompasses wrongdoing that, while not directly caused by a
defendant co-conspirator, is nevertheless attributable to that
defendant because he accepted or tacitly approved the
wrongdoing."), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1278, 185 L.
Ed. 2d 214 (2013)).
18 A-1238-14T3
Scott, supra, 284 F.3d at 762) (same), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
912, 126 S. Ct. 275, 163 L. Ed. 2d 245 (2005).
Federal courts have admitted hearsay under the federal rule
without direct proof of a defendant's wrongful conduct. For
example, in United States v. Johnson, 767 F.3d 815, 818 (9th
Cir. 2014), the defendant was tried for the robbery of an
armored truck and the murder of one of its guards. A government
informant overheard the defendant and other gang members
planning the heist, but, shortly before trial, the government
could no longer locate her. Ibid. At a pretrial hearing, the
government produced evidence that the witness had received death
threats from members of the gang, the defendant's mother had
contacted the witness's live-in boyfriend looking for her, the
defendant had informed other gang members that the witness was
set to testify against him and the threats began the day that
the defendant's attorney visited him in prison and likely first
disclosed the government's witness list. Id. at 818-19. Prison
guards explained how, although in custody, the defendant could
communicate with someone outside the institution. Id. at 819.
In affirming the district court's decision to admit the
witness's hearsay statements under Rule 804(b)(6), the court of
appeals concluded "the evidence tended to show that [the
defendant] alone had the means, motive, and opportunity to
19 A-1238-14T3
threaten [the witness], and did not show anyone else did." Id.
at 823. See also Jonassen, supra, 759 F.3d at 662 (noting that
"[t]he evidentiary foundation for admitting hearsay under Rule
804(b)(6) will almost always be circumstantial").
The Johnson court distinguished an earlier case from the
Second Circuit, Perkins v. Herbert, 596 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 562 U.S. 954, 131 S. Ct. 318, 178 L. Ed. 2d 253
(2010), and the factual distinctions are relevant to our
consideration in this case. In Perkins, a habeas corpus case,
the court affirmed the district court's conclusions that the
prosecution's proofs for admission of the hearsay statements of
a threatened robbery victim who refused to testify at trial were
insufficient and admission of the statements violated the
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 173. The court found that while
the prosecution "demonstrated [the defendant] had a motive to
procure [the witness's] silence," it failed to demonstrate that
the defendant "took any steps to orchestrate the intimidation of
[the witness]," nor did it demonstrate he "had the opportunity
to do so," since he was in custody the entire time and prison
logs showed no contact with either the witness or a man
defendant identified as his accomplice, and who allegedly
conveyed the threats and obviously had his own motive to silence
the witness. Ibid.
20 A-1238-14T3
Returning to this case, the judge was certainly permitted
to consider circumstantial evidence of defendant's direct or
indirect "wrongdoing." However, the State failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that defendant "engaged, directly
or indirectly, in wrongdoing" that was intended to and did cause
Mr. Rinker's unavailability.
Arguably, the only proof that defendant "engaged, directly
or indirectly, in wrongdoing," was the alleged phone call an
unidentified friend of defendant made to Sassaman the night
before the witness testified. Sassaman, who actually testified
in this case, was never asked about it, nor was he produced at
the Rule 104 hearing. When asked to clarify what Sassaman's
hearsay statement meant to him, Levy surmised, "I guess he meant
that to be he was the only one coming to testify." Moreover,
defense counsel brought to the judge's attention a claim, albeit
never fully fleshed out on the record and also hearsay, that
Sassaman denied making the statement to Levy.11
Assuming arguendo that this evidence was sufficient to show
defendant engaged in wrongdoing, it was inadequate to prove that
11
We acknowledge that, in hearings held pursuant to N.J.R.E.
104(a) regarding the admissibility of evidence, the Rules of
Evidence do not apply. Ibid. Therefore, the judge's crediting
of Levy's testimony regarding Sassaman's hearsay statements was
seemingly appropriate. The Byrd Court did not express any
opinion to the contrary, and, since, the issue is not before us,
we avoid directly addressing it.
21 A-1238-14T3
the wrongdoing "was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability" of Mr. Rinker as a witness. N.J.R.E. 804(b)(9).
Months before defendant's trial, Mr. Rinker reluctantly
testified at Edwards's trial and indicated that he had no
intention to "bury his son." It is difficult to imagine a
clearer indication that Mr. Rinker was not "made unavailable by
. . . defendant's wrongdoing," if indeed there was any. Byrd,
supra, 198 N.J. at 353. More importantly, there was no evidence
that defendant engaged in any wrongdoing designed to make his
father unavailable as a witness. In short, the State failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence the necessary
predicates for admission of Mr. Rinker's testimony from
Edwards's trial as evidence in defendant's case pursuant to the
Rule.
The more difficult issue is whether admission of the
evidence requires reversal. The State argues there was
substantial evidence otherwise establishing defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. It cites defendant's admissions and
recorded statement, as well as the text messages that describe
the negotiations between defendant and Edwards for the sale of
the gun.
Defendant contends that without Mr. Rinker's testimony, the
evidence was insufficient to prove either charge. In
22 A-1238-14T3
particular, defendant argues that there was insufficient
corroboration of his statements, and the balance of the evidence
failed to prove he stole or possessed the particular handgun
identified in the indictment. Alternatively, defendant argues
that the State's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
prove his guilt on count one beyond a reasonable doubt, because
there was no evidence proving the gun was a handgun as defined
by N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(f) and (k), or that it was Mr. Rinker's
handgun.
We reject defendant's arguments regarding the legal
sufficiency of the balance of the evidence. As to the
inadequate corroboration of defendant's admissions, our case law
clearly holds that "[a] trial court should properly refuse to
grant a judgment of acquittal on these grounds when the State
provides 'any legal evidence, apart from the confession of facts
and circumstances, from which the jury might draw an inference
that the confession is trustworthy.'" State v. Reddish, 181
N.J. 553, 617 (2004) (quoting State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 62
(1959)). Here, the State introduced the text messages sent by
and between defendant and Edwards. To the extent Edwards's
statements were independently admissible, they corroborate
defendant's admission to both taking his father's gun and
selling it for drugs and money. It could reasonably be inferred
23 A-1238-14T3
that defendant did not have his father's permission.
Additionally, official records established that a "Mr. Edward
Rinker" was the owner of a Colt .38 caliber Detective Special
revolver, and that neither defendant nor Edwards had applied for
a gun license. Defendant's admission that he believed the gun
was "loaded" was sufficient to sustain the State's burden of
proof as to whether the gun was a "handgun" as defined by the
Criminal Code.
Nevertheless, we must consider the nature of the erroneous
evidence ruling and its effect upon defendant's right to a fair
trial. Was the error, as the State contends, harmless?
We have said that "[t]o state the harmless error test, at
least with respect to constitutional errors, is easier than to
apply it." State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. Super. 249, 276 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 177 N.J. 572 (2003). In a case involving
a Confrontation Clause violation, the Court said, "where the
trial court commits a constitutional error, that error is to be
considered 'a fatal error, mandating a new trial, unless we are
"able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."'" State v. Slaughter, 219 N.J. 104, 118-19
(2014) (quoting Cabbell, supra, 207 N.J. at 338) (in turn
quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824,
828, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710-11 (1967)). "'[T]he question is
24 A-1238-14T3
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the [error]
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" Id.
at 119 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting State
v. Dennis, 185 N.J. 300, 302 (2005)).
The State's argument, i.e., without the offending evidence
a jury would have still reached the same verdict because of the
balance of the evidence, misstates the standard guiding our
review. In Pillar, our colleague, Judge Weissbard, explained
the constitutional underpinnings for the "contribution
analysis":
Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee,
the question it instructs the reviewing
court to consider is not what effect the
constitutional error might generally be
expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but
rather what effect it had upon the guilty
verdict in the case at hand. Harmless-error
review looks, we have said, to the basis on
which "the jury actually rested its
verdict." The inquiry, in other words, is
not whether, in a trial that occurred
without the error, a guilty verdict would
surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the
error. That must be so, because to
hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never
in fact rendered — no matter how inescapable
the findings to support that verdict might
be — would violate the jury - trial
guarantee.
[Pillar, supra, 359 N.J. Super. at 277-78
(quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275, 279-80, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82, 124
L. Ed. 2d 182, 189 (1993)).]
25 A-1238-14T3
We conclude that the admission of Mr. Rinker's testimony from
co-defendant Edwards's trial was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because there is a reasonable possibility that
it contributed to the guilty verdicts in defendant's case.
This was the testimony of defendant's own father. In her
brief summation, the assistant prosecutor stated Mr. Rinker was
not produced because the State "can't find him," and thereafter
referred to his testimony "under oath" three times. She recited
the essential points regarding the theft of the gun, and Mr.
Rinker's belief that defendant had stolen it, noting "[t]hose
words came out of Edward Rinker's own mouth." Later, she
reiterated the testimony as it supported the elements of the
theft count. Finally, she cited Mr. Rinker's testimony as
corroborating defendant's own statement. In light of the
significance of Mr. Rinker's testimony to the elements of both
crimes, it is clear to us that the inadmissible evidence
contributed to the verdict. We are, therefore, constrained to
reverse defendant's conviction and remand the matter for a new
trial.12
12
There is no authority supporting defendant's argument that he
is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the evidence was
inadmissible. See State v. Gibson, 219 N.J. 227 (2014).
26 A-1238-14T3
[At the court's direction, Section III of
its opinion, which concerns discrete issues,
has been redacted from the published opinion
because it does not meet the criteria set by
R. 1:36-2(d) for publication. The published
part of the opinion continues as follows.]
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
27 A-1238-14T3