HAN HONG VS. COMMUNITY TRANSPORTATION, INC. (L-2460-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5693-16T4
    HAN HONG,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    COMMUNITY TRANSPORTATION,
    INC. and RANDY BREESE,
    Defendants-Respondents,
    and
    PAULA A. OLMEDO and
    MARIBEL VELASCO,
    Defendants.
    _____________________________________
    Argued October 29, 2018 – Decided November 19, 2018
    Before Judges Messano and Gooden Brown.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-2460-16.
    David M. Wasserman argued the cause for appellant
    (Andrew Park, PC, attorneys; David M. Wasserman, on
    the brief).
    Neal A. Thakkar argued the cause for respondents
    (Sweeney & Sheehan, PC, attorneys; Christopher J.
    O'Connell, of counsel; Neal A. Thakkar, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Han Hong appeals from an August 4, 2017 Law Division order
    dismissing his complaint with prejudice in accordance with Rule 4:23-5(a)(2).
    We affirm.
    By way of background, on March 18, 2016, plaintiff filed a personal injury
    complaint against defendants Community Transportation, Inc. and Randy
    Breese for injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Defendants
    filed a contesting answer and cross claims against co-defendants Paula A.
    Olmedo and Maribel Velasco. On January 31, 2017, counsel for defendants
    Community Transportation and Randy Breese (collectively defendants),
    propounded     interrogatories,   specifically   Form   A    and   Supplemental
    Interrogatories, and a Notice to Produce upon plaintiff, which was served upon
    plaintiff's counsel.   When plaintiff failed to respond within sixty days as
    prescribed by Rule 4:17-4(b), defense counsel sent a letter to plaintiff's counsel
    requesting the discovery answers within ten days. When plaintiff again failed
    to respond, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint
    without prejudice in accordance with Rule 4:23-5(a)(1). Plaintiff did not oppose
    A-5693-16T4
    2
    defendant's motion, which was granted on May 12, 2017. Defense counsel
    served the May 12, 2017 order on plaintiff's counsel on May 24, 2017.
    Because plaintiff neither provided the outstanding discovery nor moved
    to reinstate his complaint, on July 17, 2017, defendants moved to dismiss the
    complaint with prejudice in accordance with Rule 4:23-5(a)(2). Two days later,
    on July 19, 2017, plaintiff moved to vacate the dismissal and reinstate his
    complaint. In a supporting certification, plaintiff's counsel certified that "on or
    around July 18, 2017," his office "served [d]efendant[s] with [p]laintiff's
    Answers to Form A Interrogatories, [p]laintiff's Response to Request for
    Admission, [p]laintiff's Response to Notice to Produce, [p]laintiff's Answers to
    Supplemental Interrogatories, along with HIPPA authorizations, and any and all
    medical records within [p]laintiff's possession to date." Thus, according to
    plaintiff's counsel, "at this time, there is no outstanding discovery."
    In opposition to plaintiff's motion, defense counsel certified that plaintiff's
    "purported answers" were "completely unresponsive." Specifically, defense
    counsel certified that plaintiff "refused to provide even the most basic factual
    responses to over sixteen interrogatory questions." Further, in demonstrating
    how plaintiff's answers were "not remotely responsive to [the] discovery
    demands as propounded," defense counsel pointed out that to corroborate his
    A-5693-16T4
    3
    injuries, plaintiff "provide[d] only a copy of the police report, [a] report from
    Ridgefield Imaging Center . . . , [a] report from South Dean Orthopedics . . . and
    three invoices from medical providers."        Plaintiff's counsel countered in a
    certification that "[d]uring the course of discovery," his office "had difficulty in
    obtaining medical records from [p]laintiff's treating facilities which delayed the
    service of [p]laintiff's [a]nswers to [i]nterrogatories." However, "after obtaining
    the medical records," his office "served [p]laintiff's certified [a]nswers to
    [i]nterrogatories, responses to Notice to Produce, and provided medical
    authorizations," along with filing "a motion to vacate [the] dismissal and
    reinstate."
    On August 4, 2017, during oral argument on the motions, defense counsel
    specified that "plaintiff's social security number" was still outstanding "even
    though [it is] required under . . . the court rule [F]orm A [I]nterrogatories."
    Additionally, according to defense counsel, although plaintiff's insurance carrier
    was listed, there was "no [declaration] sheet, no claim number, [and] no policy
    number" provided. Also, defense counsel noted plaintiff's "medical bills" were
    not provided. As to the medical records, defense counsel stated that although
    plaintiff listed several medical providers and described a litany of injuries that
    "sounds like it[] [is] from [a] medical report," only "three medical records" were
    A-5693-16T4
    4
    provided. According to defense counsel, "[t]here[] [was] an indication that
    maybe [these medical reports] exist, but they did[] [not] provide [them] to us."
    Defense counsel also asserted that at least "eight" of the responses "in the
    [S]upplemental [I]nterrogatories" were "upon information and belief," and were
    thus non-responsive. In response, plaintiff's counsel acknowledged that the
    discovery was "incomplete," and that plaintiff had been uncooperative and
    difficult to contact.     However, he argued that the "remedy for incomplete
    discovery . . . [was] for the discovery process to continue."
    Following oral argument, the motion judge granted defendants' motion to
    dismiss the complaint with prejudice and denied plaintiff's motion to reinstate.
    The judge acknowledged that pursuant to Rule 4:23-5(a)(2), dismissal with
    prejudice is mandated "unless a motion to vacate the previously entered order
    of dismissal . . . without prejudice has been filed by the delinquent party and,
    either the demanded and fully responsive discovery has been provided or
    exceptional circumstances are demonstrated." The judge accepted defendants'
    representation that "they still [did] not have a full set of records supporting the
    plaintiff's claims, including and most prominently . . . plaintiff's social security
    number" as well as an "expert report . . . in light of all of the . . . injuries" plaintiff
    listed "in [q]uestion [n]umber [three]" of the interrogatories. As a result, the
    A-5693-16T4
    5
    judge determined that "fully responsive discovery ha[d] not been provided . . .
    nor ha[d] any exceptional circumstances been demonstrated."
    The judge explained:
    This complaint was filed on March 18, 2016. At
    the point in time that defendants filed their initial
    motion to dismiss on April 20, 2017[,] no discovery had
    been produced and hence the [c]ourt dismissed the
    complaint without prejudice on May 12[, 2017].
    Since then, since May 12 all the way through
    July[,] no discovery had been produced. And now what
    we have are incomplete answers, including a refusal to
    turn over the social security number to the defense as
    well as producing a very routine and expected
    document, namely, an expert report by the plaintiff.
    ....
    At this point after the dismissal without
    prejudice[,] plaintiff should have moved on his case.
    Candidly[,] plaintiff['s] attorney has described that his
    client has not been cooperative. He also represented
    . . . that the plaintiff has been noticed of these
    proceedings[,] including . . . defendant's attempt to
    dismiss the complaint with prejudice after the dismissal
    without prejudice was obtained.
    Still no social security number, still no expert
    report. Two fundamental elements of proof that
    plaintiff should turn over to the defense so they can
    properly investigate the case.
    ....
    A-5693-16T4
    6
    . . . [P]laintiff himself not being cooperative does
    not show exceptional circumstances. It merely shows
    his lack of interest in this litigation. . . . In any event,
    that[] [is] . . . plaintiff's own doing. I[] [am] not
    blaming plaintiff['s] attorney on this. . . . I[] [am]
    pointing the finger at plaintiff himself and what this
    motion record has . . . led the [c]ourt to conclude, that
    plaintiff has been uncooperative.
    The judge entered a memorializing order and this appeal followed.
    Plaintiff asserts that because "the outstanding discovery consisted of
    different discovery than the subject matter of the first-step order," the motion
    judge "abused her discretion in continuing to consider [defendants'] request to
    dismiss the action with prejudice." According to plaintiff, "the first- step order
    and the second-step order must regard the same discovery," and "[i]f there is a
    mismatch between the two dismissal orders, the dismissal with prejudice does
    not comply with [Rule] 4:23-5."
    Our scope of review of a dismissal of a complaint with prejudice for
    failure to provide discovery is limited to whether the trial court abused its
    discretion. Abtrax Pharm., Inc. v. Elkins-Sinn, Inc., 
    139 N.J. 499
    , 517 (1995).
    We will decline to interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless we view
    an injustice has been done. St. James AME Dev. Corp. v. City of Jersey City,
    
    403 N.J. Super. 480
    , 484 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Cooper v. Consol. Rail
    Corp., 
    391 N.J. Super. 17
    , 23 (App. Div. 2007)).
    A-5693-16T4
    7
    "The dismissal of a party's cause of action, with prejudice, is drastic and
    is generally not to be invoked except in those cases in which the order for
    discovery goes to the very foundation of the cause of action, or where the refusal
    to comply is deliberate and contumacious." Abtrax, 
    139 N.J. at 514
     (quoting
    Lang v. Morgan's Home Equip. Corp., 
    6 N.J. 333
    , 339 (1951)). "Since dismissal
    with prejudice is the ultimate sanction, it will normally be ordered only when
    no lesser sanction will suffice to erase the prejudice suffered by the non-
    delinquent party, or when the litigant rather than the attorney was at fault." 
    Ibid.
    (quoting Zaccardi v. Becker, 
    88 N.J. 245
    , 253 (1982)).
    The well-settled purpose of Rule 4:23-5 is to elicit outstanding discovery
    "rather than to punish the offender by the loss of his cause of action . . . ."
    Zimmerman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 
    260 N.J. Super. 368
    , 374 (App. Div.
    1992). To that end, to succeed on a motion to dismiss with prejudice under Rule
    4:23-5 for failure to provide discovery, the moving party must strictly comply
    with the requirements of the rule, 
    id. at 373
    , which "involves a two-step
    process." Sullivan v. Coverings & Installation, Inc., 
    403 N.J. Super. 86
    , 93
    (App. Div. 2008).
    "First, the aggrieved party may move for dismissal for non-compliance
    with discovery obligations" under paragraph (a)(1) of the rule, and "if the motion
    A-5693-16T4
    8
    is granted, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice." 
    Ibid.
     Rule 4:23-
    5(a)(1) dismissals expressly apply to non-compliance with discovery pursuant
    to Rule 4:17, pertaining to interrogatories, Rule 4:18, pertaining to demands for
    documents, and Rule 4:19, pertaining to demands for medical examinations.
    Next,
    [i]f an order of dismissal . . . without prejudice has been
    entered pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this rule and not
    thereafter vacated, the party entitled to the discovery
    may, after the expiration of [sixty] days from the date
    of the order, move on notice for an order of dismissal
    . . . with prejudice. . . . The motion to dismiss . . . with
    prejudice shall be granted unless a motion to vacate the
    previously entered order of dismissal . . . without
    prejudice has been filed by the delinquent party and
    either the demanded and fully responsive discovery has
    been provided or exceptional circumstances are
    demonstrated.
    [R. 4:23-5(a)(2).]
    The rule imposes a duty on the motion judge "to take action to obtain compliance
    with the requirements of the rule." A & M Farm & Garden Ctr. v. Am. Sprinkler
    Mech. L.L.C., 
    423 N.J. Super. 528
    , 532 (App. Div. 2012).
    Here, the record clearly shows the motion judge adhered to the procedural
    safeguards established in Rule 4:23-5. Thus, we are satisfied the judge did not
    abuse her discretion by dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on
    plaintiff's failure to provide "fully responsive discovery" or demonstrate
    A-5693-16T4
    9
    "exceptional circumstances." We reject plaintiff's assertion that there was a
    mismatch between the discovery requested in step one and step two. Plaintiff
    simply selectively responded to duly served discovery demands and failed to
    cure the discovery deficiencies in a timely fashion. Under these circumstances,
    delay, neglect, and lack of interest on the part of plaintiff coupled with the
    failure to produce the requested discovery justify the dismissal with prejudice
    under Rule 4:23-5(a)(2).
    Affirmed.
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    10