STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DANIEL J. MARKS (17-03-0575, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4239-17T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL J. MARKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted April 3, 2019 – Decided April 30, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz, Currier and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 17-03-0575.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Michael Timothy Denny, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Daniel J. Marks appeals from his March 23, 2018 conviction
after trial of third-degree theft of services over $500, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8(a) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b)(2)(a), by driving his girlfriend's car, without an E-ZPass
transponder, through an E-ZPass lane 224 times in six months. The judge
sentenced defendant to five years of probation, $1,210 in restitution and 125
hours of community service. Because the judge incorrectly instructed the jury
over defendant's repeated objection, we reverse.
In 2016, a 2011 Hyundai Elantra with New Jersey plates drove through
the E-Z Pass lanes of the Ben Franklin and Walt Whitman bridges a total of 224
times without an E-ZPass transponder. Each time, the tollbooth camera
photographed the license plate—but not the driver—and a notice of violation
was mailed to the car's registered owner, defendant's girlfriend.
Defendant lived with his girlfriend, her father, sister, brother, two nieces,
and defendant's daughter. Delaware River Port Authority Police Corporal
Richard Zappile testified that when he called defendant's girlfriend on
November 23, 2016 regarding the toll violations, she denied any knowledge and
said her boyfriend, who drove the car, would call the officer back. Defendant
called and agreed to meet the officer. Shortly after this telephone conversation,
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Zappile wrote a report noting that defendant admitted on the telephone that "he
was responsible for all the violations," with no further specificity.
Defendant gave a statement at the police station a week later on November
30 and was arrested; however, after a Miranda1 hearing in September 2017, the
court suppressed the contents of that police station statement. The suppression
order did not cover the telephone conversation, which the court held admissible.
Testifying at the Miranda hearing, Zappile described the telephone conversation
as briefly as he had in his original written report.
Upon receiving a subpoena within a month of trial—and over a year after
he wrote the report—Zappile drafted a supplemental report, which added details.
He reported that defendant admitted on the telephone that he alone had driven
the car and his girlfriend had no part in the violations; he threw away all the
violation notices that arrived in the mail; and he drove through the E-ZPass lanes
without a transponder "because it was easy." Zappile also put in this
supplemental report that defendant arrived at the police station on November 30
in his girlfriend's Elantra.
At trial, defendant's girlfriend confirmed that in 2016 she lived with
defendant, who drove her to and from Cherry Hill, where she worked five days
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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a week from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. She stated that defendant had possession of
her car during the day, but her other family members also used it at times. She
also testified that defendant admitted to her that he drove through the E-ZPass
lane without a transponder, but only "[a] couple of times."
The defense theory was that one or more of his girlfriend's relatives living
with her committed the violations. The defense also argued that, contrary to
Zappile's supplemental report, defendant never admitted to committing the
violations "because it was easy" or throwing out the notifications . Defense
counsel argued:
All we know is that [defendant] wanted to take
responsibility for his girlfriend . . . and he came to the
police station, he wanted to pay the tickets, and he told
the officer please don't charge my girlfriend. He did
not want [her] to get in trouble.
To discredit Zappile's account of the telephone conversation, the defense
highlighted that neither the officer's initial report nor his testimony at the
Miranda hearing mentioned defendant's alleged admission to throwing out the
notices and committing the violations "because it was easy." He only mentioned
these admissions in his supplemental report, which he wrote in preparation for
trial over a year after the telephone call, and again in his in-court testimony.
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Zappile also brought up the suppressed station house statement in front of the
jury, although the court did not allow Zappile to describe the statement.
Because defendant contested Zappile's recent version of the unrecorded
telephone conversation, the judge instructed the jury about the unreliability of
such statements. At the Rule 1:8-7 charge conference, the judge read to counsel
his proposed jury charge. Neither attorney had a written copy, but the judge
assured counsel he would provide the final draft the next day, before he
delivered it to the jury. The proposed instruction contained an error: it quoted
Zappile as testifying that defendant admitted to committing the crime "because
it was easy" at the police station—instead of on the telephone.
The judge read the proposed charge to counsel:
Corporal Richard Zappile of the Delaware River Port
Authority testified . . . he called the registered owner of
the motor vehicle depicted in the photograph and spoke
to a woman who identified herself as [defendant's
girlfriend], the owner of the motor vehicle. [She] said
her boyfriend drives the vehicle and she would have
him call the officer. Approximately two hours later the
officer received a call from a man who identified
himself as [defendant]. The individual indicated he was
responsible for the violations as he ha[d] driven the car.
When he continued to speak about the various
violations, the officer indicated [defendant] should
come to the police department and made a date and time
for him to come in. At the agreed upon time, the
defendant . . . drove to the police department, identified
himself by producing his driver[']s license and met with
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the officer. At th[at] time in the conversation the
defendant admitted he was the driver of the vehicle in
the photographs, his girlfriend had nothing to do with
this. He indicated he continued to drive through E-
ZPass lanes without paying because it was so easy.
After the judge read the proposed charge, defense counsel objected:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I believe you said that there
was a conversation with [defendant] and the corporal .
. . [at] the police station.
THE COURT: That's exactly what the officer said.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, that should be stricken
because --
THE COURT: Why? That's a -- that's an oral
statement.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He did not go into -- he did
not discuss -- he did not testify that there was a
conversation at the police station.
THE COURT: Counsel, isn't that when he said that he
-- that he remembered he said that he drove through
because it was easy?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. That was during the
telephone call.
[THE STATE]: That's correct, Judge.
THE COURT: Okay. Fine. I'll change that to the
telephone calls.
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Upon reviewing the final draft of the charge the next day, counsel
discovered the judge had not corrected the error. Defense counsel again
objected that the proposed jury charge should relate only to the telephone
conversation, not the suppressed statement at the police station.
The judge replied to the defense, "Counsel, this is exactly the way I read
it to you yesterday. There was no objection yesterday." He went on, "All that
this is doing is giving a sequence to the jury as to when the conversations may
have occurred, and there's nothing that isn't part of the record here." Defense
counsel clarified that she had, in fact, objected the previous day. The trial judge
nonetheless stated he did "not see how this is objectionable in any way, it's just
giving [context] to what had occurred, in this case, and testimony at trial." The
judge delivered the jury instruction with the error uncorrected, misstating
Zappile's testimony. The defense renewed its objection after the judge delivered
the charge.
Defendant raises the following single issue on appeal:
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED BY GIVING A
FACTUALLY INACCURATE INSTRUCTION
ABOUT DEFENDANT'S ORAL OUT-OF-COURT
STATEMENT, EVEN THOUGH THE
INACCURACY WAS FLAGGED BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL MULTIPLE TIMES AND
ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE STATE AS BEING
WRONG.
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Where a defendant timely objects to a judge's erroneous presentation of
the facts, we review under the harmless error standard—that is, whether a real
possibility exists that the error "might have contributed to the conviction." State
in re A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 153 (2010) (quoting State v. Sanchez, 129 N.J. 261,
278 (1992)). Under this standard, we should reverse a conviction unless we can
"say with assurance" that the error "did not influence [the fact-finder's]
conclusion of guilt." State v. Miller, 64 N.J. Super. 262, 265 (App. Div. 1960);
State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263, 272-73 (1973) ("We cannot say the proof was so
overwhelming as to foreclose a real possibility that the jury gave decisive weight
to the improper hearsay testimony."). An error is not harmless merely because
the evidence suffices to convict or to persuade the appellate court of the
defendant's guilt. State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 20 (App. Div. 1970).
Because "proper charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial," a charge
that "tend[s] to confuse or mislead" warrants reversal "where the jury outcome
might have been different had the jury been instructed correctly." Velazquez ex
rel. Velazquez v. Portadin, 163 N.J. 677, 688 (2000) (quoting State v. Green, 86
N.J. 281, 287 (1981)).
The judge erred while instructing the jury to regard defendant's alleged
telephone statement with caution. State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 421 (1957),
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which applies to testimony concerning a defendant's out-of-court oral statement,
requires a warning to the jury about the general lack of reliability of second-
hand oral statements. A Kociolek charge should stress the inherent dubiousness
of such evidence, not because of concerns of strong-arming but due to a witness's
"generally recognized risk of inaccuracy and error in" recalling what another
person said. Ibid.; State v. Baldwin, 296 N.J. Super. 391, 400 (App. Div. 1997);
Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Statements of Defendant" (rev. June 14, 2010).
While the jury charge here warned about the dangers of crediting second-
hand oral statements, it simultaneously bolstered Zappile's credibility by
mistakenly placing defendant's alleged admissions at the police station, rather
than on the telephone. This misstatement occurred after the officer improperly
raised the issue of a station house statement before the jury, thus potentially
confusing the jury.
Defendant challenged Zappile's account not only as a second-hand oral
report but also as contradicting Zappile's own previous written and oral
accounts. The first report referenced the telephone conversation in a single
sentence: "[defendant] contacted me via telephone and advised me he was
responsible for all the violations." Zappile testified similarly at the Miranda
hearing. Only after the station house statement was suppressed, in preparation
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for trial over a year after the telephone conversation, did Zappile add
information. He explained that the new facts only occurred to him when he
received the trial subpoena. This inconsistency was enough to call into question
Zappile's credibility, but the jury needed the assistance of clear jury instructions,
because the jury was unaware that the officer could be embellishing the
telephone conversation to compensate for the suppression of defendant's station
house statement.
The version of events as the judge represented them had a substantial
capacity to prejudice defendant’s case. While the evidence—including
defendant's undisputed remark on the telephone about taking responsibility for
the violations—was sufficient to convict him, the defense advanced a different
theory explaining that evidence—namely, that defendant assumed responsibility
for what someone else had done. A reasonable doubt exists that the jury
discredited this alternative version in part because it believed defendant
admitted to committing all of the violations "because it was easy" and to
throwing out all of the notices, which implied an admission of his own guilt for
all violations.
The judge did instruct the jurors to disregard the court's recital of the
evidence where it differed from their own recollection. Courts have often relied
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on similar statements about the jury's fact-finding duty in declining to reverse
because a judge misstated the facts. See State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 72 (1998);
State v. Conklin, 54 N.J. 540, 547 (1969); State v. Tansimore, 3 N.J. 516, 538
(1950); State v. Kennedy, 135 N.J. Super. 513, 527 (App. Div. 1975); State v.
Long, 67 N.J. Super. 207, 211-12 (App. Div. 1961). However, those decisions
differ from this case in two significant respects.
First, in several of those decisions the appellate court applied the plain -
error standard because the error was not raised in the trial court, permitting
reversal only where an error could clearly produce an unjust result. See Feaster,
156 N.J. at 72; Conklin, 54 N.J. at 547; Long, 67 N.J. Super. at 212. Thus, the
ample incriminating evidence in those cases made it unlikely that a judge's error
prejudiced the outcome. Second, those cases involved mostly trivial
misstatements of fact that did not go to the heart of the defense. See Tansimore,
3 N.J. at 538; Kennedy, 135 N.J. Super. at 527.
Here, by contrast, because defense counsel preserved the issue, we review
for harmless error; therefore, the relevant question is whether a reasonable doubt
exists that the misstatement confused the jury and affected their own recollection
of the facts. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 338 (1971). A reasonable doubt exists
whether the error contributed to the jury's decision. This is particularly true
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because, to convict defendant of a third-degree theft, the State had to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant accumulated more than $500 worth of
toll evasions while he was driving the car.2 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(b). A reasonable
doubt that defendant drove through the E-ZPass enough times to avoid $500 in
tolls should have resulted in an acquittal.
The additional admissions, instead of merely showing that defendant
"took responsibility"—which he explains as a chivalrous attempt to shield his
girlfriend—tied defendant to all of the 224 violations, because he allegedly
admitted to discarding each notice mailed to the house. See Kern, 325 N.J.
Super. at 444 ("To dismiss a confession of guilt as 'not critical in light of the
other fact findings' is, we think, contrary to human nature.").
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
2
Prior to trial another judge denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment
for failure to charge a crime. Defendant contended the behavior charged
amounted to a civil wrong only. He does not appeal from this July 14, 2017
order.
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