HEATHER LERCH VS. BOARD OF TRUSTEES (TEACHERS' PENSION AND ANNUITY FUND) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5638-16T2
    HEATHER LERCH,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
    TEACHERS' PENSION AND
    ANNUITY FUND,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    ______________________________
    Submitted January 8, 2019 – Decided September 30, 2019
    Before Judges Hoffman and Suter.
    On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Teachers'
    Pension and Annuity Fund, Department of the
    Treasury.
    Hagner & Zohlman, LLC, attorneys for appellant
    (Thomas A. Hagner, on the brief).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Sadyhè Tanyse Bradley, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    SUTER, J.A.D.
    Heather Lerch appeals from the Board of Trustees of the Teachers'
    Pension and Annuity Fund (Board) denial of her application for ordinary
    disability retirement benefits. The Board rejected appellant's application after
    it adopted, without further comment, the findings and conclusions reached by
    an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). We affirm the Board's decision.
    I
    Appellant was employed as an elementary school teacher, beginning as a
    kindergarten teacher in 2000 and then as a second grade teacher, until she retired
    in May 2013. Just before retiring, appellant applied for an ordinary disability
    pension, claiming she was disabled by reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD). Her
    application was denied in 2015, and she contested the decision. Her case was
    transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing before an ALJ.
    The Initial Decision by the ALJ denied appellant's ordinary disability pension
    application. On July 7, 2017, the Board adopted the Initial Decision, and
    affirmed it. This appeal followed.
    In the spring of 2008, after having taught for eight years, appellant
    testified she began to have vision problems, weakness on her right side, and was
    A-5638-16T2
    2
    dropping things. She went to see neurologist Dr. Robert Schwartzman, who
    ordered blood tests, a spinal tap, MRIs1 of the brain and spine, an EMG 2 and
    nerve conduction studies.       He diagnosed appellant with Guillain-Barre
    syndrome, treating her with "plasma exchange therapy" that was to remove
    inflammatory proteins from her blood. She reported having other symptoms that
    included pain, swelling and skin color changes and motor weakness. In June
    2008, Dr. Schwartzman diagnosed appellant with RSD, now known as complex
    regional pain syndrome (CRPS).        She received ketamine infusions at Dr.
    Schwartzman's direction to treat her CRPS symptoms.
    Appellant testified that by this time there were certain things that were
    "very difficult to do" such as "[l]ifting, carrying around things, being able to
    assist the students as needed . . . ." Her husband helped her set up her classroom,
    moved and cleaned desks, brought in her supplies and got "everything set to
    make it easier for [her] to be able to teach." She took a leave of absence in the
    spring of 2008, but then returned to teaching.
    1
    MRI stands for magnetic resonance imaging, and it is a kind of scan that can
    produce detailed pictures of parts of the body. Stedman's Medical Dictionary
    1232, B13 (28th ed. 2008).
    2
    EMG stands for electromyography and is a diagnostic procedure to assess the
    health of muscles and the nerve cells that control them. Id. at 622.
    A-5638-16T2
    3
    In March 2011, appellant took another leave of absence because she was
    pregnant and it was "the consensus of both [her] neurologist, Dr. Schwartzman,
    and [her obstetrician] at that time, that [she] should stop working." She testified
    that her pain had increased. She was cutting and pasting her lesson plans from
    previous years, and had the children come up to her desk for her to check their
    work. She was absent at times to attend to her medical treatments. Her use of
    the computer was more limited.        She only used the lower portion of the
    blackboard to write because elevating her arm hurt. Nonetheless, appellant
    received good evaluations. She did not return to work after this leave of absence
    although it had been her intent to do so.
    Dr. Schwartzman retired and his protégé, Dr. Enrique Aradillas-Lopez,
    took over appellant's treatments beginning in July 2013. Appellant had a child
    in December 2015. She continued to receive ketamine injections.
    Appellant testified that if she were teaching, she no longer would be able
    to go outside for bus duty or greet the children because of the effect on her of
    the cold. She would have difficulty writing on the blackboard, carrying around
    lesson plans, handing out materials, keeping them clean, physically getting
    down to the level of the children, using a computer and setting up the classroom.
    A-5638-16T2
    4
    She would need to take breaks. She has not tried to work anywhere since leaving
    in 2011.
    Appellant's husband testified he now worked from home because it gave
    him more flexibility to get things done at the house and for their one-year-old
    child. By 2009, he was helping appellant set up her classroom. In 2010, he
    testified that appellant would come home from school and be in bed by 6:00
    p.m. He also testified about his increased responsibilities at home compared to
    earlier in their marriage. In 2011, appellant intended to return to work after her
    maternity leave, but according to her husband, "she definitely, physically had
    much more trouble following that point." Appellant's friend and a neighbor both
    testified about appellant's lack of energy, swollen hands and less frequent social
    outings. Another friend testified that sometimes she assisted appellant in the
    classroom by making copies, cleaning the classroom or lifting things.
    Dr. Aradillas-Lopez, a board certified neurologist, testified for appellant.
    He took over appellant's treatment after Dr. Schwartzman retired, although he
    may have "seen her a couple of times prior" to that. He based his opinion on
    Dr. Schwartzman's initial consultation in 2008 and his review of Dr.
    Schwartzman's records. Dr. Aradillas-Lopez acknowledged there was "no test
    to diagnose" CRPS and that "[a]ny pain is subjective." Dr. Schwartzman had
    A-5638-16T2
    5
    diagnosed appellant with CRPS because she had pain "out of proportion,"
    painful stimulations spread to other parts of her body, she had swelling, skin
    color changes, motor weakness and atrophy. Dr. Aradillas-Lopez acknowledged
    that all this information was based upon self-reported information from
    appellant.
    Dr. Aradillas-Lopez agreed with Dr. Schwartzman's diagnosis. He opined
    that this "disables her from performing the regular and assigned duties of a
    schoolteacher." He testified "he would think" she was "not able to perform her
    duties as a schoolteacher." She could not carry anything heavier than five
    pounds or it would be a "severe burden." He testified that whether her ability to
    use a computer was affected would "all depend[]." The stamina of any CRPS
    patient is altered.   Sleeping a lot was consistent with this diagnosis.        He
    acknowledged she also was diagnosed with hypothyroidism and rheumatory
    arthritis.
    Dr. Steven Lomazow, a board certified neurologist, testified for the Board.
    In his examination of appellant on August 26, 2013, he did not observe "any
    objective evidence of any neurological disease on the basis of any objective
    tests." His examination findings of appellant were "normal." Contrary to Dr.
    Aradillas-Lopez's report, Dr. Lomazow's examination did not show "changes in
    A-5638-16T2
    6
    skin condition, in color" or "glove-stocking sensory" findings. He did not agree
    with the diagnosis of Guillain-Barre because the test results from 2008
    contraindicated that diagnosis. The doctor did not agree with the diagnosis of
    CRPS on the basis of his examination. Her hands were not gnarled-up or cold.
    There were no skin color changes.           He testified "[h]er examination was
    completely benign and you just don't see that in chronic patients of this nature."
    Dr. Lomazow found no "objective evidence of any neurological disease on the
    basis of any objective tests," although he admitted the diagnosis of CRPS did
    not require "diagnostic test findings." He was critical of another peer-reviewed
    report that supported the CRPS diagnosis because the doctor who prepared that
    report made the diagnosis without taking a medical history.
    The ALJ concluded that Dr. Lomazow's opinion was more persuasive
    than Dr. Aradillas-Lopez's about appellant's "ability to perform the functions of
    her job as a teacher." Dr. Aradillas-Lopez had not undertaken a new evaluation
    of appellant. He made his diagnosis based upon Dr. Schwartzman's records. In
    contrast, Dr. Lomazow's made "detailed observations."          He elaborated on
    appellant's "lack of physical symptoms that should have accompanied her
    complaints." The ALJ found the medical evidence presented by appellant to be
    A-5638-16T2
    7
    "less credible than the evidence presented by the Board." He reasoned that
    appellant's complaints of pain were subjective.
    The physical limitations that appellant and Dr. Aradillas-Lopez testified
    about did not indicate appellant was "totally disabled from teaching elementary
    school." She was diagnosed with CRPS in 2008 and continued teaching until
    2011, with the intent to return. Her evaluations remained good. She prepared
    lesson plans by cutting and pasting, assisted the children from her desk, could
    use the lower portion of the blackboard and respond to emails. The ALJ found
    she "demonstrated ability for restricted work, and she demonstrated ability for
    her essential job duties as a grade-school teacher." He found that "[appellant's]
    condition was not enough to cause her to be totally disabled and unable to
    perform her work duties. Her duties were of such a nature that she could
    continue working as well as undertake and perform a majority of the functions
    required of her." The Board adopted the Initial Decision.
    On appeal, appellant argues the Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious
    and unreasonable because it was premised on contradictory findings of fact and
    conclusions of law. Appellant complains the Board should have given greater
    weight to the testimony of her treating physician. She argues the Board's
    decision was based on misstatements and mischaracterizations of material facts.
    A-5638-16T2
    8
    She also claims the Board's decision was contrary to public policy to ensure
    student health and safety.
    II
    The scope of our review of a final agency decision is limited. Russo v.
    Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 
    206 N.J. 14
    , 27 (2011) (citing In re
    Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27 (2007)). We will uphold an agency's decision "unless
    there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or that
    it lacks fair support in the record." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. at
    27-
    28). However, we are not "bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute or
    its determination of a strictly legal issue." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Mayflower Sec. Co.
    v. Bureau of Sec., 
    64 N.J. 85
    , 93 (1973)).
    We accord deference to the credibility determinations of the ALJ, who
    had the opportunity to hear the testimony of the witnesses and consider the
    exhibits. Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 
    109 N.J. 575
    , 587 (1988). We may not
    "engage in an independent assessment of the evidence as if [we] were the court
    of first instance." In re Taylor, 
    158 N.J. 644
    , 656 (1999) (quoting State v.
    Locurto, 
    157 N.J. 463
    , 471 (1999)).
    Under the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:66-1
    to -93, an education professional, upon becoming permanently incapacitated,
    A-5638-16T2
    9
    can receive either ordinary disability or accidental disability retirement benefits.
    Kaspar v. Bd. of Trs. of Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 
    164 N.J. 564
    , 573
    (2000). To qualify for ordinary disability retirement benefits under N.J.S.A.
    18A:66-39(b), a teacher must demonstrate he or she is "physically or mentally
    incapacitated for the performance of duty and should be retired." Appellant has
    the burden of proof. Bueno v. Bd. of Trs., Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund,
    
    404 N.J. Super. 119
    , 126 (App. Div. 2008).
    An applicant must establish an incapacity to perform duties in the general
    area of her regular employment, rather than merely showing an inability to
    perform his or her specific job. See Bueno, 
    404 N.J. Super. at 130-31
    . An
    appellant does not need to prove she is "generally unemployable" or "disabled
    from performing the specific function[s] for which [she] was hired." Getty v.
    Prison Officers' Pension Fund, 
    85 N.J. Super. 383
    , 390 (App. Div. 1964). "[T]he
    criterion is whether or not [the appellant] is employable in the general area of
    [their] ordinary employment."      Skulski v. Nolan, 
    68 N.J. 179
    , 205 (1975)
    (quoting Getty, 
    85 N.J. Super. at 390
    ).
    Applying Skulski and Bueno with our limited scope of review, there was
    nothing arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable in the Board's decision. The ALJ
    weighed the expert testimony and concluded that Dr. Lomazow's opinion
    A-5638-16T2
    10
    regarding appellant's health and ability to work as a teacher was more persuasive
    than that presented by Dr. Aradillas-Lopez.      Appellant bore the burden of
    proving by a preponderance of the credible evidence that she is "physically or
    mentally incapacitated for the performance of duty and should be retired."
    N.J.S.A. 18A:66-39(b).      However, as noted by the ALJ, the evidence
    demonstrated appellant's duties were such that she could continue working and
    perform many of the functions of a teacher. He found Dr. Lomazow's testimony
    was more credible. The Board's determination was amply supported by credible
    evidence and was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
    Appellant claims the Board relied on contradictory facts and conclusions
    of law because the ALJ referred three times to appellant's "condition." This
    argument is without merit. Read in context, this was simply the ALJ's shorthand
    way of referring to appellant's constellation of alleged health complaints and
    was not an endorsement of Dr. Schwartzman's diagnoses.
    Appellant claims the Board should not have given more weight to Dr.
    Lomazow's opinion because Dr. Aradillas-Lopez was her treating physician.
    Generally, "where the medical testimony is in conflict, greater weight should be
    accorded to the testimony of the treating physician." Bialko v. H. Baker Milk
    Co., 
    38 N.J. Super. 169
    , 171 (App. Div. 1955). However, the opinion of a
    A-5638-16T2
    11
    treating physician and the opinion of other testifying experts may be given equal
    weight if the treating physician did not "acquire[] any knowledge in the course
    of treatment that enabled him to give a more reliable opinion on causation than
    was given by" the other expert witness. Markant v. Hommer Tool & Mfg. Co.,
    
    28 N.J. Super. 566
    , 571 (App. Div. 1953).
    Dr. Aradillas-Lopez did not conduct an independent examination of
    appellant to reach his conclusions.      Dr. Schwartzman was the doctor who
    actually diagnosed appellant. Although Dr. Aradillas-Lopez may have seen her
    before Dr. Schwartzman retired, his testimony and diagnosis were based on Dr.
    Schwartzman's records and the tests from 2008.      Thus, Dr. Aradillas-Lopez's
    opinion did not merit greater weight.
    It was the duty of the fact-finder, in this case the ALJ, to assess the
    credibility of the testifying experts and the weight accorded to each witness.
    Angel v. Rand Express Lines, Inc., 
    66 N.J. Super. 77
    , 85-86 (App. Div. 1961).
    The ALJ found Dr. Lomazow more credible; he explained why. The ALJ's
    credibility findings regarding these witnesses should be entitled to deference
    because the ALJ heard the actual testimony and was in the best position to assess
    their credibility. See S.D. v. Div. of Med. Assistance, 
    349 N.J. Super. 480
    , 485
    (App. Div. 2002).
    A-5638-16T2
    12
    Appellant contends the Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious and
    unreasonable because it was based on five factual misstatements or
    mischaracterizations of material facts by the ALJ.    After carefully reviewing
    the record, we do not find merit in this argument.
    Whether or not Dr. Aradillas-Lopez testified that appellant was "not able
    to perform her duties as a school teacher," appellant testified about how she was
    able to prepare lesson plans, use a computer, write on the blackboard and assist
    students even though she testified that she modified the way in which she
    performed these tasks. Dr. Aradillas-Lopez may have seen appellant at some
    point before Dr. Schwartzman retired, but his testimony was that he relied on
    Dr. Schwartzman's records and tests. Whether Dr. Aradillas-Lopez agreed with
    Dr. Schwartzman's diagnosis of CRPS, the ALJ found Dr. Lomazow to be
    credible and his analysis to be more persuasive. The ALJ's decision reflected
    his consideration of all the testimony including appellant's. Finally, the record
    did not include evidence that Drs. Schwartzman and Aradillas-Lopez discussed
    appellant's diagnosis or that Dr. Aradillas-Lopez conducted his own examination
    of appellant.
    Appellant complains for the first time on appeal that the Board's decision
    violated public policy. This was not raised before the Board and because of this,
    A-5638-16T2
    13
    we need not consider it. Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rothman, 
    208 N.J. 580
    ,
    586 (2012); Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 
    162 N.J. 229
    , 234 (1973).
    Appellant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
    discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    A-5638-16T2
    14