SONNY CABRERA, JR. VS. FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY (L-2883-15, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4062-17T4
    SONNY CABRERA, JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON
    UNIVERSITY,
    Defendant/Third-Party
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    KB ELECTRIC SERVICES
    COMPANY, INC., and THE
    HARTFORD INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Third-Party Defendants.
    _____________________________
    Argued September 23, 2019 – Decided October 8, 2019
    Before Judges Fasciale and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2883-15.
    Dennis G. Polizzi argued the cause for appellant (Pitts
    & Polizzi, LLP, attorneys; Dennis G. Polizzi, of
    counsel and on the brief).
    Richard Evan Barber argued the cause for respondent
    Fairleigh Dickinson University (Haworth Barber &
    Gertsman LLC, and Post & Schell, PC, attorneys;
    Richard Evan Barber, Richard B. Wickersham, Jr. and
    Matthew Dean Johnson, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In this personal injury case, defendant Fairleigh Dickinson University
    hired KB Electric Services Company, Inc. (KB) to change lights on top of its
    library. Defendant knew about a latent defect on the roof, but failed to warn
    anyone at KB of the danger. Plaintiff, an employee of KB, fell off the roof
    because of this dangerous condition. The judge held that defendant owed
    plaintiff – and KB – no duty to warn about the danger.1 Under the facts here,
    we disagree and reverse.
    Summary judgment may be granted when, considering the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of
    material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. R.
    1
    The judge originally found that fact issues precluded summary judgment to
    defendant. On reconsideration, the judge granted summary judgment to
    defendant holding that no duty existed. Plaintiff appeals from an order denying
    his subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary
    judgment to defendant.
    A-4062-17T4
    2
    4:46–2(c); see also Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540
    (1995). When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply the
    same standards that the trial court applies when ruling on the motion. Oyola v.
    Xing Lan Liu, 
    431 N.J. Super. 493
    , 497 (App. Div. 2013).
    Ordinarily, plaintiff would access the roof by using a KB bucket truck.
    From the bucket, he would do his repair work, while wearing a safety fall
    protection harness that was attached to the bucket.       But in this instance,
    defendant interfered with that practice. After directing plaintiff where to work,
    defendant parked its own truck where the bucket truck needed to be. Plaintiff
    therefore was unable to access the roof from the bucket. Moreover, plaintiff was
    unable to access the roof from inside the library. Plaintiff found an alternate
    way to reach the roof, and while there, leaned on a balustrade to retrieve pliers
    that another worker had tossed to him. Plaintiff fell when the balustrade gave
    way.
    It is undisputed that a dangerous condition existed. The day after the
    accident, defendant's engineer inspected the balustrade and issued a report. In
    his report, he stated:
    The accident occurred at the northeast corner of the
    existing Library building over the Orangerie Room
    ....
    A-4062-17T4
    3
    The balustrade is made using cast stone material. The
    balustrade at the location of the failure consists of six
    (6) balusters supporting a continuous [capstone]
    spanning horizontal from the solid piers at each side of
    the balustrade. . . .
    All of the six balusters failed at their thinnest section,
    approximately [five] (5) inches above the base. . . . The
    top horizontal stone also failed at the connections of the
    [capstone] over the solid pier on each side. . . . The
    top stone has a butt joint at the face of the solid piers
    and is only continuous over the balusters. . . . This butt
    joint appears to have been grouted, however not much
    grout was attached to the remaining [capstones] over
    the solid piers. . . .
    The connection of the balusters to the [capstone]
    appears to be a mortar connection along with a mortar
    connection at the butt joint between the pieces of
    [capstone]. We did not identify any type of mechanical
    fasteners at any connections. Also, the balustrades are
    unreinforced.
    After performing a general inspection of the remaining
    in place balustrade around the perimeter of the roof, it
    appears that most of the mortar joints between the butt
    joints in the [capstones] have deteriorated, with some
    joints being caulked in the past. . . . The mortar joint
    between the top of the balusters and the [capstone] is
    also cracked and loose at some locations.
    However, at the time of our inspection, the remaining
    balustrades appear that they would be substantial and
    appear[] to be stable under normal anticipated loading
    conditions, except for major seismic activity.
    The solid piers at each side of the balustrades also
    appear to be quite substantial and would be stable under
    A-4062-17T4
    4
    anticipated normal type loading conditions, except for
    major seismic activity. . . .
    [Emphasis added.]
    Indeed, defendant's representative testified that the university repaired the
    balustrades before the accident. He explained that before the accident, the
    university joint caulked the balustrades "where the accident occurred." He
    testified that before the accident, he had seen "mismatching caulk" in the area
    of the accident. This representative also said he knew that the repair work
    included caulking "the tops of the rails"; the caulking occurred on the "lower
    level on the upper facing joints" of the balustrades; and that the work was done
    to address "waterproofing issues."        He explained that the water infiltration
    "deteriorates mortar . . . in the joint[s]."
    Although defendant knew about the latent dangerous condition, and even
    though defendant prevented plaintiff from accessing the roof using the bucket,
    defendant remained silent about deteriorating joints, waterproof problems,
    mismatching caulk, and previous repairs to the top of the rails and facing joints.
    We emphasize that the dangerous condition – the unstable balustrades –
    remained not visible to plaintiff, and that the balustrades were unrelated to the
    electrical work.
    A-4062-17T4
    5
    "An occupier of land owes a duty to his invitee to use reasonable care to
    make the premises safe. . . ." Olivo v. Owens–Illinois, Inc., 
    186 N.J. 394
    , 406
    (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). And a landowner has "'the duty
    to provide a reasonably safe working place'" for an independent contractor he or
    she hires.   Muhammad v. N.J. Transit, 
    176 N.J. 185
    , 199 (2003) (quoting
    Wolczak v. Nat'l Elec. Prod. Corp., 
    66 N.J. Super. 64
    , 75 (App. Div. 1961)).
    "The landowner's duty includes the obligation of making a reasonable inspection
    to discover defective and hazardous conditions." Sanna v. Nat'l Sponge Co.,
    
    209 N.J. Super. 60
    , 66 (App. Div. 1986). Here, defendant knew the dangerous
    condition existed before the accident.
    We fully understand defendant's contention as to independent contractors.
    "[T]he law carves out an exception to the requirement that premises be made
    safe for an independent contractor when the contractor is invited onto the land
    to perform a specific task in respect of the hazard itself." 
    Olivo, 186 N.J. at 406
    -
    07. "'[T]he duty to provide a reasonably safe working place for employees of
    an independent contractor does not relate to known hazards which are part of or
    incidental to the very work the contractor was hired to perform.'" 
    Id. at 407
    (quoting 
    Muhammad, 176 N.J. at 199
    ) (emphasis added).
    A-4062-17T4
    6
    Specifically, the duty "does not entail the elimination of operational
    hazards which are obvious and visible to the invitee upon ordinary observation
    and which are part of or incidental to the very work the contractor was hired to
    perform." 
    Sanna, 209 N.J. Super. at 67
    (emphasis added); see also 
    Wolczak, 66 N.J. Super. at 75
    ; Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs., 
    289 N.J. Super. 309
    ,
    318 (App. Div. 1996). This exception exists because "'[t]he landowner may
    assume that the worker, or his superiors, are possessed of sufficient skill to
    recognize the degree of danger involved and to adjust their methods of work
    accordingly.'" 
    Muhammad, 176 N.J. at 199
    (quoting 
    Wolczak, 66 N.J. Super. at 75
    ).
    But here, the dangerous condition did not pertain to an operational hazard
    that was obvious and visible to plaintiff upon ordinary observation. It was
    hidden; only defendant knew about it. And the dangerous condition was not part
    of or incidental to repairing light bulbs. Furthermore, the engineer verified that
    the balusters were made of cast stone material, and that the balusters and the
    solid piers "appear[ed] [to] be substantial and appear[ed] to be stable under
    A-4062-17T4
    7
    normal anticipated loading conditions, except for major seismic activity." Only
    defendant knew that this was not the case.2
    Reversed.
    2
    We conclude defendant's argument—that no duty exists because the balusters
    were ornamental—is without merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
    R. 2:11–3(e)(1)(E). We nevertheless add that the case law cited by defendant in
    its merits brief for that proposition is misplaced entirely.
    A-4062-17T4
    8