STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. L.A.G. (15-08-2405, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5980-17T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    L.A.G.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________
    Submitted October 15, 2019 – Decided October 22, 2019
    Before Judges Geiger and Natali.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 15-08-2405.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Steven J. Sloan, Designated Counsel, on the
    brief).
    Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Kevin Jay Hein, Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant L.A.G. appeals from a Law Division order denying his petition
    for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm
    substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Samuel D. Natal in his
    comprehensive written opinion.
    Defendant is the father of a minor daughter, K.G. In April 2013, defendant
    was sentenced to special Drug Court probation under Indictment No. 12-06-
    1513. During the first year of his probationary term, K.G.'s mother learned that
    K.G. had contracted a sexually transmitted disease. K.G. alleged she had been
    sexually assaulted by defendant on two separate occasions in June or July 2013.
    An investigation led to defendant being charged with the sexual assault.
    A Camden County Grand Jury returned Indictment No. 15-08-2405,
    charging defendant with two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(2)(a) (counts one and seven); first-degree aggravated
    sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7) (count eight); second-degree sexual
    assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1) (count two); two counts of third-degree
    aggravated criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(a) (counts three and five);
    two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b)
    (counts four and six); second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A.
    A-5980-17T4
    2
    2C:24-4(a) (count nine); and third-degree tampering with witnesses, N.J.S.A.
    2C:28-5(a)(1) (count ten).
    Defendant was also charged with violation of probation (VOP) as a result
    of the new charges. On February 4, 2014, defendant was sentenced on the VOP
    to a four-year prison term subject to sixteen months of parole ineligibility. He
    completed that sentence on May 25, 2015, but remained incarcerated on the
    pending charges under Indictment No. 15-08-2405 (the sexual assault charges).
    Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement on the sexual assault
    charges on March 7, 2016. In exchange for defendant's guilty plea to second-
    degree sexual assault (count two), the State agreed to recommend a five -year
    prison term subject to an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility under
    the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and dismiss the
    remaining charges. The plea form stated defendant would receive "all lawful
    jail credit from December 13, 2013." At the plea hearing, trial counsel stated:
    With regard to jail credit, [Defendant] has been
    in the Camden County Jail since December 13th of
    2013. . . . [Defendant] was in Drug Court, and they
    . . . violated him out of Drug Court and sent him to
    prison.
    So there was a brief period of time where he was
    serving a prison sentence as a result of [a] Drug Court
    violation, which I think was for this new charge really.
    A-5980-17T4
    3
    And so, . . . there's going to be a gap in his jail credit
    which we'll address at sentencing.
    So, if the parties are amenable at sentencing, he
    would get credit from that date. If not, then there's
    going to be an issue with regard to that little gap when
    he was away.
    Trial counsel then addressed defendant's understanding of this issue, stating:
    But I wanted to make clear before we . . . did anything
    else, so that [defendant] understands on the record that.
    And I explained to him that he wouldn't necessarily be
    entitled to that credit even though . . . the detainer was
    lodged, because he was serving a sentence for a period
    of time. . . . I reviewed everything with him. He
    understands it.
    Following defendant's testimony at the plea hearing, the trial court accepted
    defendant's guilty plea to count two.
    The presentence report stated defendant was entitled to 393 days of jail
    credit but no gap-time credit. At the sentencing hearing on April 29, 2016, trial
    counsel stated that both he and defendant had reviewed the presentence report
    and there were "no substantive modifications to be made." The amount of jail
    credit was not discussed. Defendant chose not to allocute.
    Defendant was sentenced on count two in accordance with the plea
    agreement to a five-year NERA term, Parole Supervision for Life, registration
    under Meghan's Law, compliance with the sex offender restraining order
    A-5980-17T4
    4
    requirements of Nicole's Law, and appropriate fines and penalties. He was
    awarded 393 days of jail credits for the periods from December 13, 2013 to
    February 4, 2014 and May 26, 2015 to April 28, 2016. The other nine counts
    were dismissed.
    Defendant filed an untimely direct appeal from his sentence.               We
    dismissed the appeal "without prejudice to defendant's ability to move before
    the trial court to correct an allegedly illegal sentence." Defendant then filed a
    pro se PCR petition. Counsel was appointed to represent him.
    In an amended PCR petition, defendant claimed trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to ensure defendant was awarded all of the jail credits that
    were part of the negotiated plea agreement. Defendant claimed he was promised
    jail credits for his time imprisoned on the VOP and was entitled to an additional
    474 days of jail credit. This additional credit would result in a max-out date of
    March 13, 2018 on the sexual assault conviction, rather than a max-out date of
    July 1, 2019. He claimed the promised jail credit "was a significant factor in his
    decision to accept the [S]tate's plea offer and if not for the award of jail credits
    he would not have accepted the plea deal."
    Defendant contended he was entitled to jail credits from February 5, 2014,
    the date he was sent to prison on the VOP sentence, to May 26, 2015, the date
    A-5980-17T4
    5
    he completed the VOP sentence.           He requested an evidentiary hearing.
    Defendant did not seek to vacate his plea or his conviction.
    At oral argument before the PCR court, the State conceded defendant was
    entitled to an award of gap-time credits for the days defendant served on his
    VOP sentence. The PCR court issued a July 30, 2018 order and written opinion
    denying PCR without an evidentiary hearing but awarding gap-time credits from
    February 5, 2014 to May 25, 2015. The court found defendant was not entitled
    to an evidentiary hearing because he had not established a prima facie case of
    ineffective assistance of counsel. 1 The court noted trial counsel advised PCR
    counsel that he had no recollection of defendant not receiving proper jail credits.
    PCR counsel argued trial counsel should testify because "he possibly could
    remember something." The court characterized this as "an attempt at fishing in
    hope of a good result. Not a proper reason for an evidentiary hearing."
    The court concluded that "[a]ll the facts necessary for the [c]ourt to make
    its determination are contained in the [c]ourt record."        The court labeled
    defendant's claim that trial counsel promised him he would receive all jail credits
    1
    PCR counsel acknowledged that "everything's right in the transcript that
    [defendant] needs to get his relief."
    A-5980-17T4
    6
    from December 13, 2013, as "clearly mistaken or wishful thinking" and
    "contrary" to the plea form and transcript of the plea hearing.
    The court explained that a defendant receives jail credit for any time spent
    in custody that is "directly attributable to the particular offense giving rise to the
    initial incarceration" "between arrest and the imposition of sentence," citing
    Rule 3:21-8. A defendant receives gap-time credit "when the defendant has been
    sentenced to a term of imprisonment [and] is sentenced subsequently to another
    term; and both offenses occurred prior to imposition of the first sentence," citing
    N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b). Gap-time credits "are applied to the back end of the
    sentence, but do not reduce a parole ineligibility term." The court "does not
    have the discretion to convert [g]ap-[t]ime into jail credits," citing State v.
    Hernandez, 
    208 N.J. 24
    , 50 (2011), overruled in part on other grounds, State v.
    C.H., 
    228 N.J. 111
    , 123 (2017).
    The PCR court concluded defendant received all of the jail credit he was
    entitled to, but failed to receive gap-time credit from February 5, 2014 to May
    25, 2015, which the State conceded. With that award of gap-time, defendant
    suffered no prejudice.
    The court rejected defendant's "bald" assertion that he would not have
    accepted the plea offer if the award of the disputed jail credits was not made part
    A-5980-17T4
    7
    of the deal. The court noted defendant was facing three counts of first-degree
    aggravated sexual assault. "The [facts] of the case were particularly egregious.
    . . . The probability of a conviction was great." Rejecting the plea offer would
    have exposed defendant to a ten-to-twenty-year term of imprisonment upon
    conviction for first-degree aggravated sexual assault. The court found defendant
    "ha[d] not demonstrated that a decision to reject the plea would have been
    rational under the circumstances." In addition, the court found defendant's
    allegation, that the prosecutor had agreed to award him jail credit for the time
    period he was serving his VOP sentence, was not credible.
    The PCR court denied the petition, finding defendant failed "to
    demonstrate that his [trial] counsel was deficient or that but for counsel's advice,
    he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted to proceed to trial on t he
    ten charges under the indictment." The court awarded gap-time credit from
    February 5, 2014 to May 25, 2015. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, defendant argues:
    POINT I
    DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL
    474 DAYS OF JAIL CREDITS PURSUANT TO RULE
    3:21-8.
    POINT II
    A-5980-17T4
    8
    THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
    EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S
    CLAIM    HE   WAS  DENIED   EFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL OR THIS COURT
    MUST FIND THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED
    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
    REGARDING THE ADDITIONAL 474 DAYS OF
    JAIL CREDITS.
    Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we
    affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge Natal in his comprehensive
    written opinion. We add the following comments.
    We will affirm the PCR court if sufficient credible evidence in the record
    supports the judge's findings.    State v. Nash, 
    212 N.J. 518
    , 540 (2013).
    However, we review a PCR court’s interpretation of the law de novo. State v.
    Harris, 
    181 N.J. 391
    , 416 (2004). The defendant carries the burden to establish
    the right to relief by a preponderance of credible evidence. State v. Echols, 
    199 N.J. 344
    , 357 (2009).
    In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
    defendant must meet a two-prong test. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984); State v. Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    , 58 (1987). First, the defendant must show
    counsel "made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
    guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687
    . Second, the defendant must show the defect in performance prejudiced his
    A-5980-17T4
    9
    or her rights to a fair trial such that there exists "reasonable probability that, but
    for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different." 
    Id. at 694.
    We apply a similar standard in the context of guilty pleas. To prove
    ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show "(i) counsel's
    assistance was not 'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
    criminal cases'; and (ii) 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have
    insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Nuñez–Valdéz, 
    200 N.J. 129
    , 139 (2009)
    (alteration in original) (quoting State v. DiFrisco, 
    137 N.J. 434
    , 457 (1994)).
    The award of gap-time and jail credits raises issues of law that we review
    de novo. See State v. L.H., 
    206 N.J. 528
    , 543 (2011) (applying de novo standard
    in gap-time credit case); 
    Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 48
    –49 ("there is no room for
    discretion in either granting or denying [jail] credits").
    A defendant is entitled to jail credits "for any time served in custody . . .
    between arrest and the imposition of sentence." R. 3:21-8(a). Jail credits "are
    applied to the 'front end' of a defendant's sentence, meaning that he or she is
    entitled to credit against the sentence for every day defendant was held in
    custody for that offense prior to sentencing."        
    Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 37
    .
    A-5980-17T4
    10
    "[O]nce the first sentence is imposed, a defendant awaiting imposition of
    another sentence accrues no more jail credit under Rule 3:21-8." 
    Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 50
    .
    Conversely, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(b) governs gap-time credit. 
    Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 38
    . This statute "awards a defendant who is given two separate
    sentences on two different dates credit toward the second sentence for the time
    spent in custody since he or she began serving the first sentence." 
    Ibid. A defendant is
    entitled to gap-time credit when "(1) the defendant has been
    sentenced previously to a term of imprisonment[;] (2) the defendant is sentenced
    subsequently to another term[;] and (3) both offenses occurred prior to the
    imposition of the first sentence." 
    Ibid. (alterations in original)
    (quoting State v.
    Franklin, 
    175 N.J. 456
    , 462 (2003)). "If the defendant meets those requirements,
    the sentencing court is obligated to award gap-time credits." 
    Ibid. "Unlike jail credits,
    gap-time credits are applied to the 'back end' of a sentence." 
    Ibid. (quoting Booker v.
    N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    136 N.J. 257
    , 260 (1994)). Gap-time
    credits do not affect a period of parole ineligibility but may otherwise affect the
    actual date of parole eligibility. 
    Booker, 136 N.J. at 263-65
    . Thus, gap-time
    credit will not reduce the period of parole ineligibility imposed by NERA.
    
    Hernandez, 208 N.J. at 41
    .
    A-5980-17T4
    11
    Judge Natal correctly applied these principles. The record fully supports
    his findings and conclusions. Defendant did not establish a prima facie case of
    ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing was not
    necessary or warranted. Defendant ultimately received all of the lawful jail
    credits and gap-time credits he was entitled to, and no further relief is warranted.
    Affirmed.
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    12