JP Morgan v. Stranieri, S. ( 2015 )

J-S49013-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SARA STRANIERI,
Appellant No. 222 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered January 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Civil Division at No(s): 2010 -02759
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2015
Appellant, Sara Stranieri, appeals pro se from the trial court’s January
30, 2015 order granting the motion to proceed with sheriff’s sale filed by
Appellee, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“JPMC”). Because we conclude that
this Court does not have jurisdiction, we are compelled to quash this appeal.
On April 20, 2010, JPMC filed a complaint in mortgage foreclosure
against Appellant regarding the mortgaged premises located at 813 West
Elm Street, Scranton, Pennsylvania. A default judgment was entered in
favor of JPMC on June 18, 2010. However, the court subsequently granted
Appellant’s motion to open/strike default judgment on July 29, 2010. JPMC
proceeded with the filing of an amended complaint on March 24, 2011. After
the dismissal of her preliminary objections, Appellant filed an answer to the
amended complaint on April 26, 2012. JPMC later filed a motion for
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summary judgment, and by order dated August 30, 2013, JPMC was granted
summary relief.
The docket indicates a long and complicated history following the entry
of the August 30, 2013 summary judgment order. We need not reiterate the
complex history of this case for the purposes of this appeal.1 Rather, we
note only the most relevant facts which gave rise to this appeal. After
numerous challenges to JPMC’s summary judgment relief,2 the trial court
entered an order on January 30, 2015, which granted JPMC permission to
proceed with a scheduled sheriff’s sale on the mortgaged premises and
dismissed all of Appellant’s outstanding motions.
On February 2, 2015, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, in which she
expressly states that she is appealing from the January 30, 2015 order
entered by the trial court in the aforementioned foreclosure matter. 3 The
notice of appeal states: “This order has been entered in the dockets as
evidenced by the attached copy of the docket entry sheets.” Notice of
____________________________________________
1
See Trial Court Opinion, dated 3/6/15, at 2-4, for a more detailed
summary of the facts and procedural history of the foreclosure matter.
2
Appellant filed multiple pleadings with the trial court, objecting to the
summary judgment order in favor of JPMC and attempting to prevent the
sale of the mortgaged premises. However, Appellant failed to follow the
local rules and did not properly present said pleadings to the motions court.
Accordingly, said pleadings remained outstanding on the court’s docket and
were never heard by the court.
3
The trial court did not direct Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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Appeal, dated 2/2/15. However, no copy of the January 30, 2015 order is
attached to Appellant’s notice of appeal, nor is the order reflected in the
docket. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 301(a) provides, in
pertinent part, that “no order of a court shall be appealable until it has been
entered upon the appropriate docket in the lower court.” Pa.R.A.P.
301(a)(1). Moreover, we note that the following issues presented by
Appellant in her brief do not make any reference to the January 30, 2015
order:
1. Did the Lackawanna [C]ounty [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas,
Judge Kane, commit harmful and palpable error when the
[j]udge [g]ranted [JPMC] [s]ummary [j]udgment?
2. Did the Lackawanna [C]ounty [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas
Judge Kane commit harmful and palpable error when the
[j]udge allowed [Appellant’s] legal counsel of record, Gary R.
Katz[,] to do nothing on her behalf?
3. Did the Lackawanna [C]ounty [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas
Judge Kane commit harmful and palpable error by not
protecting the [Appellant’s] [r]ights, in direct violation of due
process of law, discovery, competent and effective assistance
of counsel, an opportunity to a fair and impartial trial, etc.?
4. Was [Appellant] irreparably injured and harmed by the
Court’s nonfeasance and/or failure to protect her [r]ights?
5. Whether the judgment amount of $168,267.35, dated 6-30-
14, is in excess of the original claim of $126,681.79, dated 6-
18-10?
Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.
After reviewing Appellant’s brief and statement of questions involved,
it is apparent that Appellant is attempting to appeal from the August 30,
2013 order granting JPMC summary judgment. “In order to preserve the
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right to appeal from a final order of the Court of Common Pleas, a notice of
appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of entry of that order.”
Valley Forge Center Assoc., v. Rib-It/K.P., Inc., 693 A.2d 242, 245 (Pa.
Super. 1997). See also Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). As we explained in Valley Forge
Center Assoc., “[t]his Court is without jurisdiction to excuse a failure to file
a timely notice, as the 30-day period must be strictly construed. Further,
we note that an untimely appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction.” Valley
Forge Center Assoc., 693 A.2d at 245. (citations omitted). “Pennsylvania
courts have consistently held that an untimely appeal must be quashed.”
Fingles v. Green, 409 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa. Super. 1979) (citations omitted).
Here, Appellant improperly filed a notice of appeal from an order that
was not entered on the docket. Additionally, were we to treat this matter as
an appeal from the August 30, 2013 order, which appears to be Appellant’s
intention based on the issues presented on appeal, then we must conclude
that the appeal is untimely. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction and,
therefore, must quash this appeal as improper and untimely.
Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/28/2015
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