NIVIA CARDENAS VS. MARK SEVERINO (L-3835-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1262-18T4
NIVIA CARDENAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MARK SEVERINO and
ANTHONY T. SEVERINO,
Defendants-Respondents.
_______________________________
Argued October 15, 2019 – Decided December 5, 2019
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-3835-16.
Barry A. Knopf argued the cause for appellant (Cohn
Lifland Perlman Herrmann & Knopf, and Robert B.
Linder, attorneys; Barry A. Knopf, of counsel and on
the briefs; Audra De Paolo and Robert B. Linder, on the
briefs).
Megan K. Foster argued the cause for respondents
(Clark & Fox, attorneys; John Michael Clark and
Megan K. Foster, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this sidewalk liability action, plaintiff Nivia Cardenas appeals the Law
Division's order granting summary judgment dismissal of her complaint alleging
she fell and injured herself due to a defective sidewalk in front of vacant
property owned by defendants Mark and Anthony T. Serverino. The motion
judge determined that because the property was not being used for commercial
purposes, defendants had no duty to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition.
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in determining the property was not
commercial because the property was a non-owner occupied two-family home
with a potential to generate income at the time of her alleged injury. Because
we agree that the property was not being used for commercial purposes at the
time of plaintiff's accident, summary judgment was properly granted.
I
As a summary judgment motion order granted to defendants, our recitation
of the facts is derived from the evidence submitted by the parties in support of,
and in opposition to, the motion, viewed in the light most favorable to pla intiff,
and giving plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences. Angland v. Mountain
Creek Resort, Inc., 213 N.J. 573, 577 (2013) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995)).
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Plaintiff was walking to a store when she fell on an uneven sidewalk,
suffering broken ribs and injuries to her back and shoulders. The accident took
place in front of a home, co-owned by the defendants, which at the time was
vacant. Plaintiff subsequently sued defendants claiming her injuries were due
to defendant's failure to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition.
Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment.
Defendants contended they were not liable to plaintiff because the property was
not used for commercial purposes when plaintiff fell, and under well-settled law,
owners of residential property cannot be held liable for a defective sidewalk.
Plaintiff opposed, arguing the test to determine whether defendants are subject
to sidewalk liability is whether their property had the ability or potential to
generate income at the time of the accident.
The motion record revealed the following undisputed facts. Defendants
are father and son, who lived together across the street from the property. They
purchased the property in 2008 following the death of the previous owners, who
had resided in the home their whole lives. Their plan was to renovate the
property and eventually, the son, Mark, would reside there. Mark stated in his
deposition he was "probably" going to live there. The renovations, which were
done by defendants along with a sheetrock contractor and family members who
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specialized in electrical wiring and HVAC, had stretched over the seven years
prior to plaintiff's accident and were not completed until about six months
thereafter.
Once the renovations were finished, Mark did not move into the property
because defendants decided to rent it instead.1 Mark stated in his deposition,
"[w]hen we finished the work[,] that's when I was starting to think, hey, is it
better for me to stay where I'm living[,] because we just spent a lot of money for
the house[,] or get the tenants in to help pay the mortgage."
When defendants purchased the property, it was insured under a
residential dwelling policy for a two-family residence. The policy, however,
was cancelled in 2011, after the insurance carrier discovered the property was
vacant. At the carrier's insistence, defendants acquired commercial general
liability and property insurance for the property, which was in effect at the time
of plaintiff's accident.
Judge John D. O'Dwyer granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants, entering an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint. In a rider
accompanying the order, the judge explained the property was not commercial
1
Defendants' affidavits reflect that Mark did not move in the property because
of unspecified "health reasons," but due to identical language used in the two
affidavits, it is indiscernible whether Mark or Anthony suffered from ill health.
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at the time of the accident because it was not being used for business activity in
any fashion. Relying on our decision in Ellis v. Hilton United Methodist
Church, 455 N.J. Super. 33 (App. Div. 2018), the judge reasoned the dispositive
factor in his analysis was not "the capacity of the property to generate income
at some indeterminate point in the future, but rather on whether the property
ha[d] in the past or at the [time of the alleged injury been] used to generate
income."
The judge distinguished plaintiff's claim from our decision in Gray v.
Caldwell Wood Prods., Inc., 425 N.J. Super. 496 (App. Div. 2012) because here,
defendants were not actively marketing the home for sale or rental, nor made it
accessible to potential buyers or tenants. In Gray, we held that sidewalk liability
attached to a vacant storefront, which was boarded up and locked with an iron
gate because it had the capacity to generate income, was accessible to potential
buyers, and was insured, presumably to protect against injuries to invitees. Id.
at 501-02. We thus stated, "[the property] had the capacity to generate income
and, had, in fact, generated income in the recent past." Id. at 501.
II
Before us, plaintiff contends summary judgment should not have been
granted because the property, at the time of the accident, was more akin to a
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rental home, and therefore should be considered commercial subject to sidewalk
liability for defendants. She explains that even though the property was vacant
at the time of her injury, it still could have been rented out, and because there
were people making renovations to the property, defendants were liable to them
and anyone else traversing the sidewalk adjoining the front of the property.
Plaintiff argues since the property was a rental home, it should be considered
commercial property. Wilson v. Jacobs, 334 N.J. Super. 640, 646-47 (App. Div.
2000) (declining to find that a non-owner occupied home, leased by the owner's
adult daughter, was residential for sidewalk liability purposes); Avallone v.
Mortimer, 252 N.J. Super. 434, 438 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that owner-
occupied rental homes are commercial for purposes of sidewalk liability if
residency by the owner is not the predominant use); Hambright v. Yglesias, 200
N.J. Super. 392, 394-95 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that a non-owner occupied,
two-family home, is a commercial property due to the "nature of the
ownership"). Plaintiff further argues that sidewalk liability still attaches to
vacant commercial properties. Gray, 425 N.J. Super. at 501-02.
Plaintiff finally argues the judge improperly decided issues of fact because
he found that "[a]lthough . . . defendants had undertaken renovations, the
renovations had not reached a point where the property was commercially
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viable." Claiming the property was in fact habitable, as the prior owners had
lived in it prior to defendants purchase, plaintiff urges the property could have
been leased immediately, if not for defendants' decision to undertake
renovations to increase the property's rental value.
We review a ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo, applying the
same standard governing the trial court. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346
(2017) (citing Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016)). Thus, we consider, as the motion judge
did, "whether 'the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational
factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving
party.'" Holmes v. Jersey City Police Dep't, 449 N.J. Super. 600, 602-03 (App.
Div. 2017) (citation omitted) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we
must then 'decide whether the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'"
DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super.
325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J.
Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). We review issues of law de novo and accord
no deference to the trial judge's legal conclusions. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213
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N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (citing Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581,
584 (2012)).
Applying this standard of review, we discern no basis to set aside the grant
of summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint. It is well-settled law that
residential homeowners are not liable for injuries caused by the condition of
sidewalks abutting their property, but are liable "for the negligent construction
or repair of the sidewalk by himself or by a specified predecessor in title or for
direct use or obstruction of the sidewalk by the owner in such a manner as to
render it unsafe for passersby." Yanhko v. Fane, 70 N.J. 528, 532 (1976),
overruled in part by Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146 (1981); see
also Liptak v. Frank, 206 N.J. Super. 336, 337-39 (App. Div. 1985).
We conclude, as did Judge O'Dwyer, defendants are not subject to
sidewalk liability because the record established the property was not used for
commercial purposes. As we made clear in Briglia v. Mondrian Mortg. Corp.,
sidewalk liability turns on the status of the property at the time of the accident
in question. 304 N.J. Super. 77, 82 (App. Div. 1997). The record convinces us
that the property was not being used for a commercial purpose and was not
intended to be used in that capacity at the time of plaintiff's accident. There was
no indication that either defendant derived any economic benefit from the
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property. The mere fact that the property was not owner-occupied does not lead
to the conclusion that it was used as a commercial property. There are no facts
suggesting defendants attempted to repair the sidewalk or caused it to be
defective, therefore, they are "protected by common-law public sidewalk
immunity." Lodato v. Evesham Twp., 388 N.J. Super. 501, 507 (App. Div.
2006).
In addition, we find no merit to plaintiff's argument that the property
should be considered commercial because it was capable of being rented at the
time of her accident. Plaintiff's speculative assertion that the property was
habitable and could have been rented when she tripped and fell on the adjoining
sidewalk, does not justify classifying it as commercial. The mere fact that
someone lived in the property seven years before her accident is not dispositive
that the property was fit for rental, thereby making it commercial and subject to
sidewalk liability for defendants. Moreover, defendants had not leased the
property to tenants or advertised the property for rent prior to the accident.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed arguments raised by
plaintiff, we find they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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