In Re: B.G.K., a minor, Appeal of: K.K. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S22044-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: B.G.K, A/K/A N/K., A MINOR              IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    APPEAL OF: K.K.                                No. 2047 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Order entered November 26, 2014,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil
    Division, at No(s): TPR 145 of 2014
    BEFORE: PANELLA, LAZARUS, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                       FILED MAY 15, 2015
    K.K. (Mother) appeals from the order entered November 26, 2014, in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which terminated
    involuntarily her parental rights to her minor daughter, B.G.K, a/k/a N/K
    (Child), born in March of 2013.1 We affirm.
    At the time Child was born, both she and Mother tested positive for
    crack cocaine.    As a result, Child was placed in the care of the Allegheny
    County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) immediately upon her
    release from the hospital. Mother has a lengthy prior history with CYF, and
    her parental rights have been terminated as to seven other children.2 Child
    was adjudicated dependent by order dated May 3, 2013.
    * Retired Senior Judge specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    The parental rights of Child’s unknown father were terminated by a
    separate order entered that same day. Child’s father is not a party to the
    instant appeal.
    2
    The record indicates that Mother’s parental rights to her seven older
    children were terminated by voluntary consent decree due to Mother’s
    mental health and substance abuse issues.
    J-S22044-15
    On August 18, 2014, CYF filed a petition to terminate involuntarily the
    parental rights of Mother. A hearing was held on November 26, 2014. The
    trial court entered its order terminating Mother’s rights that same day.
    Mother timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal.
    Mother now raises the following issue for our review.        “Did the trial
    court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that
    termination of [Mother’s] parental rights would serve the needs and welfare
    of the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §[]2511(b)?” Mother’s Brief at 5.
    We consider Mother’s claim mindful of our well-settled standard of
    review.
    The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
    requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
    credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
    by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
    abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
    court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
    because the record would support a different result. We have
    previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
    have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
    hearings.
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    -2-
    J-S22044-15
    Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
    Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
    analysis.
    Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
    grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
    the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
    termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
    the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
    determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
    standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
    needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
    emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
    paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
    bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
    In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
    pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).       On appeal, Mother
    concedes that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that her parental
    rights should be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a). Mother’s Brief at 9
    (“CYF, the petitioner, did clearly and convincingly establish threshold
    grounds for termination pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §[]2511(a)(2).”). Thus, we
    need only consider whether the court abused its discretion by terminating
    Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b), which provides as
    follows.
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
    child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
    -3-
    J-S22044-15
    the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
    furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
    beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
    filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
    consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
    described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
    giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
    Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
    rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
    emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 
    884 A.2d 1284
    , 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,
    “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
    involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”
    In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern
    the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost
    attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
    bond. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond
    between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
    exists.   Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
    necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
    In re Adoption of J.M., 
    991 A.2d 321
    , 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some
    citations omitted).
    Here, the trial court concluded that terminating Mother’s parental
    rights would be in Child’s best interest. Mother argues that the court abused
    its discretion because it was not provided with sufficient evidence concerning
    the impact that terminating her parental rights would have on Child.
    Mother’s Brief at 12. Mother also contends that the court relied improperly
    on Mother’s failings as a parent, rather than the needs and welfare of Child,
    when conducting its Section 2511(b) analysis. 
    Id. at 12-13.
    -4-
    J-S22044-15
    After a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude that
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating involuntarily
    Mother’s parental rights to Child. Child has been out of Mother’s care for the
    entirety of her life. The court emphasized that Child is bonded with her
    foster parents, and that Child has no bond with Mother. Trial Court Opinion,
    1/20/2015, at 7-10.     Further, the court found Child’s foster parents to be
    attentive to Child’s medical needs, including strict management of her
    severe food allergies. 
    Id. at 8.
    During the termination hearing, CYF caseworker, David Underwood,
    testified that a Family Service Plan (FSP) was prepared for Mother, under
    which she was required to, inter alia, maintain recovery from substance
    abuse.   N.T., 11/26/2014, at 10.     Mr. Underwood noted that Mother was
    incarcerated from April 3, 2013, until July 8, 2013, and that Mother
    participated in the House of Hope drug and alcohol program during this time.
    
    Id. at 14.
       Mother again was incarcerated from August 23, 2013 until
    October 18, 2013, after which she attended a dual-diagnosis program. 
    Id. Mother was
    released to POWER halfway house on December 10, 2013,
    where she received additional drug and alcohol treatment. 
    Id. Mother was
    discharged from the halfway house on May 27, 2014, and “disappeared”
    shortly thereafter.   
    Id. at 15.
      Mr. Underwood last heard from Mother on
    June 6, 2014. 
    Id. at 16.
    Mother again was incarcerated on July 26, 2014.
    
    Id. at 17.
      CYF did not discover that Mother had been incarcerated until
    -5-
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    approximately September of 2014.        
    Id. at 30.
       Mother reported to Mr.
    Underwood that she was in a drug and alcohol program while incarcerated.
    
    Id. at 32.
      When Mother was discharged from incarceration on November
    11, 2014, she was sent to Delaware House, “which is a three-quarter drug
    and alcohol home.” 
    Id. at 15.
    With respect to visitation, Mr. Underwood testified that Mother first
    visited with Child on June 15, 2013. 
    Id. at 20.
    Mother then had 20 visits
    with Child during her time at POWER. 
    Id. Mother had
    two visits while she
    most recently was incarcerated, on October 4, 2014, and November 1, 2014.
    
    Id. Mother also
    participated in visits through the Three Rivers Adoption
    Council from March of 2013 through May of 2014.          
    Id. Mr. Underwood
    testified that there had been no visits between Mother and Child from May
    2014 to October 2014. 
    Id. Mr. Underwood
    noted that Mother’s interactions
    with Child were “appropriate,” but that Mother would sometimes feed Child
    food that Child was allergic to. 
    Id. at 21-22.
    When asked whether Mother and Child are bonded, Mr. Underwood
    opined that Mother had not “been around consistently for [Child] to fully
    understand [M]other’s role in her life ….”       
    Id. at 25.
       In contrast, Mr.
    Underwood noted that Child has been in a pre-adoptive foster home since
    shortly after her birth, and that Child has a bond with her foster parents.
    -6-
    J-S22044-15
    
    Id. at 25-26.
    Mr. Underwood stated that it would be in Child’s best interest
    to be adopted.3 
    Id. at 27.
    Mother testified that she most recently was incarcerated from July 25,
    2014, until November 11, 2014.      
    Id. at 46.
      According to Mother, she
    relapsed in June of 2014, and was charged with prostitution. 
    Id. at 46-47,
    53. Mother stated that she has not been convicted of that charge, and that
    she intended on going to trial.    
    Id. at 47.
       Mother indicated that she
    completed a drug and alcohol program while in jail, as well as a cognitive
    behavioral therapy program. 
    Id. at 48-49.
    In addition, Mother testified that
    she is addressing her drug and mental health issues at Delaware House, and
    that she anticipated being discharged on February 8, 2015. 
    Id. at 49-50.
    Mother stated that she wants to parent Child, and that she is capable of
    doing so. 
    Id. at 51.
    Thus, the testimony presented during Mother’s termination hearing
    confirms that it is in Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental
    rights.   Child is bonded with her foster parents, who provide her with
    appropriate care and support. In contrast, Mother has never cared for Child,
    nor does she appear to grasp the severity of Child’s dietary restrictions.
    Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that Child is bonded with
    3
    CYF also entered into evidence a bonding evaluation as to Child and the
    foster parents performed by psychologist Neil Rosenblum. See CYF Exhibit
    4. In his evaluation, Dr. Rosenblum noted that Child refers to her foster
    parents as “mamma” and “da-da,” and that [t]here is no question that
    [Child] is very strongly attached to [the] foster parents.” 
    Id. at 2-3.
                                       -7-
    J-S22044-15
    Mother. See 
    J.M., 991 A.2d at 324
    (“[I]n cases where there is no evidence
    of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
    exists.”) (citing In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 762–63 (Pa. Super. 2008)).
    Further, Mother previously has lost her parental rights to seven other
    children. She has a considerable history of drug use and incarceration, and
    it is not likely that Mother ever will be able to care for Child.   It is not in
    Child’s best interest to be denied permanence and stability any longer. 
    Id. at 325
    (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 
    901 A.2d 502
    , 513 (Pa. Super.
    2006)) (“‘The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
    need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
    for the future.’”).
    Moreover, Mother’s argument that the trial court focused improperly
    on Mother’s failings as a parent, rather that Child’s best interest and welfare,
    does not entitle her to relief.      Mother is correct that “[t]he focus in
    terminating parental rights under [S]ection 2511(a) is on the parent, but the
    focus turns to the children under [S]ection 2511(b).” In re M.T., 
    101 A.3d 1163
    , 1181 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (citing In re Adoption of C.L.G.,
    
    956 A.2d 999
    , 1008 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)). However, it is clear that
    a parent’s inability to care for his or her child is a relevant consideration in
    determining whether termination will serve a child’s needs and welfare.
    See, e.g., 
    M.T., 101 A.3d at 1182
    (quoting favorably from a trial court
    opinion addressing the parents’ “inability to consistently provide a safe and
    -8-
    J-S22044-15
    secure environment for their children” as part of its Section 2511(b)
    analysis).
    Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by terminating involuntarily Mother’s parental rights to Child, we
    affirm the order of the trial court.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/15/2015
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2047 WDA 2014

Filed Date: 5/15/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021