TERRY PEIFER VS. CLARENCE MESDAY (L-1019-17, MERCER COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5287-17T2
    TERRY PEIFER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CLARENCE MESDAY,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    __________________________
    Submitted March 26, 2019 – Decided May 1, 2019
    Before Judges Yannotti and Gilson.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-1019-17.
    Markowitz Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for appellant
    (Joshua L. Markowitz, on the briefs).
    Sweet Pasquarelli, PC, attorneys for respondent
    (Donald A. Mahoney, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff Terry Peifer appeals from an order entered by the trial court on
    April 13, 2018, which granted a motion by defendant Clarence Mesday for
    summary judgment and dismissed the complaint and all cross-claims against
    him. Plaintiff also appeals from an order dated May 25, 2018, which denied her
    motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
    This dispute arises from the following facts. On June 11, 2015, while
    walking her dog, plaintiff tripped and fell on the sidewalk bordering the front
    yard of defendant's residential property. Plaintiff sustained injuries to her face,
    lip, teeth, jaw, arms and legs. Defendant's daughter was inside defendant's home
    when plaintiff fell. After hearing a noise and seeing plaintiff lying on the
    ground, she went outside to help. She assisted plaintiff and drove her home.
    On May 15, 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law Division. She
    alleged that defendant "negligently and carelessly own[ed], occup[ied],
    operate[d], and/or maintain[ed] the . . . sidewalk" bordering his property "so as
    to cause a dangerous condition to exist thereon." She claimed that her injuries
    "occurred as a result of and w[ere] proximately caused by the careless, negligent,
    grossly negligent, and reckless conduct of . . . [d]efendant[.]"
    On March 1, 2018, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On
    April 13, 2018, the judge heard oral arguments on the motion. During the
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    arguments, defendant's attorney noted that plaintiff had alleged that a tree had
    been planted in defendant's front yard, but the sidewalk adjacent to the place
    where the tree had been located was not in a raised condition. Defendant's
    attorney argued that even assuming defendant or a prior owner of the property
    had planted the tree, there was no evidence that the roots of the tree "caused or
    contributed to the" alleged dangerous condition of the sidewalk.
    Plaintiff's attorney responded by noting that in the complaint, plaintiff had
    not "tied the tree to the defect in the sidewalk." Plaintiff's attorney said this was
    an issue defendant had raised. He stated, "that's not our theory[.]" He also said,
    "[o]ur theory was just that there was a defect on the sidewalk that . . . the
    defendant never fixed[,] . . . even though the defendant knew of the defect[.]"
    In an oral opinion placed on the record, the judge noted that he had
    considered the evidence, including photographs of the sidewalk. The judge
    found that the evidence showed the sidewalk "was buckled," and that "[i]t's got
    about an inch or an inch and a half lip on it." The judge stated that plaintiff
    claimed she tripped on the buckled sidewalk and was injured.
    The judge concluded, however, that plaintiff failed to present any
    evidence that would permit a fact-finder to determine defendant was negligent.
    The judge noted that a tree had been located near the sidewalk, but it had been
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    3
    removed in 2013. The judge observed that there was no evidence indicating
    whether the tree had been planted by defendant, the previous homeowner, the
    builder of the home, or the neighborhood.
    The judge stated that "if [plaintiff's] theory [was] that the sidewalk was
    put into a dangerous position as a result of the tree, there would be no way to
    attach liability to . . . defendant[] because there's no indication [he] actually did
    anything wrong." The judge also stated that although the sidewalk was buckled
    and raised about one and one-half inches, there was no evidence that the
    condition of the sidewalk was due to any negligence on the part of defendant.
    The judge entered an order dated April 13, 2018, granting summary
    judgment in favor of defendant.          Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for
    reconsideration. On May 25, 2018, the judge heard oral arguments on the
    motion.
    Plaintiff's attorney argued that a photo taken two years before the accident,
    which defendant's attorney had referred to during the argument on the summary
    judgment motion, showed a tree adjacent to the sidewalk. Plaintiff's counsel
    argued that it was reasonable to infer that the roots from the tree would extend
    to the sidewalk. Counsel asserted that if defendant planted the tree, he would
    be liable for plaintiff's injuries.
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    In response, defendant's attorney noted that during the prior arguments,
    plaintiff's counsel did not claim that the tree roots caused the sidewalk to be
    raised. Defendant's attorney asserted that another photo, which plaintiff had
    taken after the accident, showed that tree roots did not have anything to do with
    the condition of the sidewalk when plaintiff fell.
    The judge placed an oral decision on the record. The judge found that
    plaintiff had not shown any basis for reconsidering the order granting summary
    judgment to defendant.     The judge stated that aside from the fact that the
    sidewalk slab was raised, there was no evidence to support the imposition of
    liability on defendant. The judge entered an order dated May 25, 2018, denying
    the motion. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting
    defendant's motion for summary judgment. She contends there is a genuine
    issue as to whether defendant was negligent in failing to fix a dangerous
    condition he allegedly created.
    In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we apply the same
    standard that the trial court applies when ruling on the motion. Globe Motor
    Co. v. Igdalev, 
    225 N.J. 469
    , 479 (2016) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 
    217 N.J. 22
    , 38 (2014)). The court should grant summary judgment when the evidence
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    5
    before the court on the motion "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or
    order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).
    "An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of persuasion
    at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together with all
    legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non-moving party, would require
    submission of the issue to the trier of fact." 
    Ibid.
     The trial court should not
    hesitate to grant summary judgment "when the evidence 'is so one-sided that one
    party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
    
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540 (1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 252 (1986)).
    To succeed in a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the
    defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty,
    (3) the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) the
    plaintiff suffered actual damages. Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 
    199 N.J. 381
    , 400 (2009) (quoting Polzo v. Cty. of Essex, 
    196 N.J. 569
    , 584 (2008)).
    Generally, a residential homeowner is not liable for a dangerous natural
    condition of a sidewalk that borders his or her property. See Luchejko v. City
    of Hoboken, 
    207 N.J. 191
    , 201-05 (2011). A residential property owner may,
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    however, be liable where the owner's actions create an artificial, dangerous
    condition on the abutting sidewalk. See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 
    87 N.J. 146
    , 152 (1981).
    Furthermore, a residential property owner may be liable if "he plants a
    tree at a location which he could readily foresee might result in the roots of the
    tree extending underneath the sidewalk causing it to be elevated." Deberjeois v.
    Schneider, 
    254 N.J. Super. 694
    , 703 (Law Div. 1991) (footnote omitted), aff'd
    o.b., 
    260 N.J. Super. 518
     (App. Div. 1992). In these circumstances, a fact-finder
    could determine that by planting the tree, the property owner caused a
    dangerous, artificial condition of the sidewalk. Id. at 703-04.
    Here, plaintiff claims she tripped and fell on the sidewalk abutting
    defendant's residential property, which was raised about one and one-half
    inches. As the motion judge determined, however, plaintiff failed to present any
    evidence showing why the sidewalk buckled. Plaintiff suggested that defendant
    might have created an artificial, dangerous condition of the sidewalk because a
    tree had been planted near the sidewalk, but the tree had been removed several
    years before plaintiff fell. Plaintiff presented no evidence showing that the tree
    roots caused a dangerous condition to the sidewalk.
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    Plaintiff argues, however, that the motion judge erred by granting
    summary judgment because defendant conceded that he planted a tree on his
    property and that the tree's roots caused the sidewalk to buckle. She argues that
    these "admissions" alone are sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether
    defendant was negligent by failing to fix the sidewalk. We disagree.
    The record shows defendant conceded that he planted a tree in the front
    yard of his property solely for purposes of the motion for summary judgment.
    Defendant did not, however, concede that the tree's roots caused a dangerous
    condition to exist on the sidewalk.
    Plaintiff further argues that defendant admitted causation in an answer to
    Question 4 of Form C(2) interrogatory, which asked:
    If prior to the accident or occurrence, you had actual
    notice or knowledge of the conditions, artificial or
    natural, alleged by the plaintiff to have caused or
    resulted in the accident or occurrence, state: (a) on what
    date you had such actual notice or first acquired such
    knowledge; and (b) the manner in which such notice or
    knowledge was received or acquired.
    Defendant responded: "The plaintiff alleges that she fell over a rise in the
    sidewalk near the driveway of [defendant].        There was a tree in front of
    [defendant's] residence which was removed in October, 2013, prior to the
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    8
    plaintiff's accident."   This was not an admission that defendant caused a
    dangerous condition to exist on the sidewalk.
    In addition, plaintiff presented the trial court with several photographs
    that depict the sidewalk where she fell. These include: two photos that plaintiff
    took after the accident; a photograph taken in 2011 of defendant's property that
    is publicly-available through the website Google and its Google Maps feature;
    and an undated photo that depicts a portion of the sidewalk. None of these
    photos would permit a fact-finder to draw a reasonable inference that the tree's
    roots caused the sidewalk to rise, thereby creating the alleged dangerous
    condition that existed in June 2015 when plaintiff fell.
    In further support of her argument that the trial court erred by granting
    defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff relies upon a statement that
    defendant's daughter made when she assisted plaintiff after plaintiff fell.
    According to plaintiff, defendant's daughter stated that "she had tripped on [the
    sidewalk] herself and . . . they knew it was a problem." This is not, however,
    evidence that would support an inference that the roots of the tree on defendant's
    property caused the sidewalk to become elevated.
    Affirmed.
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