STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. GILBERTO VILLANUEVA (14-08-2601, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2754-15T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GILBERTO VILLANUEVA, a/k/a
GILBERTO VILLANUEVA, JR.,
GILBERT VILLANUEVA, and
GILBERTO VELLANUERA,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Argued May 15, 2018 – Decided July 17, 2018
Before Judges Reisner, Hoffman and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No.
14-08-2601.
Marcia Blum, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Marcia
Blum, of counsel and on the brief).
Arielle E. Katz, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Arielle E.
Katz, of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
In 2014, a grand jury charged defendant Gilberto Villanueva
with: (1) first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2)
(count one); (2) first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(a)(3) (count two); (3) second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-
2(a)(1) (count three); (4) first-degree criminal attempt/murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2) (count four);
(5) third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count five); and (6) fourth-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count six). During
pretrial proceedings, the trial court denied defendant's motion
to exclude statements he made to police during interrogation. The
court further granted the State's motion to admit text messages
defendant sent to his ex-girlfriend, K.D. (Karen),1 and evidence
of a domestic violence incident involving the couple.
Following a six-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty on
all counts. The judge sentenced defendant to an aggregate sixty
years in prison, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA),
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The judge also ordered defendant to pay
restitution of $8910. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
1
We use the victims' initials to protect their privacy. In
addition, for ease of reference, we refer to each victim by a
pseudonym.
2 A-2754-15T2
defendant's judgment of conviction, except for the provision
regarding restitution, which we vacate and remand for a restitution
hearing.
I
We derive the following facts from the trial testimony. On
October 27, 2013, Karen and defendant, her boyfriend at the time,
had an argument that ended with defendant hitting Karen in the
face. Defendant told Karen "he was the devil," and threatened he
"would hurt [Karen] and [her] family." Karen called the police,
and the police charged defendant with simple assault, criminal
mischief, and obstructing justice. Defendant pled guilty to at
least simple assault.2
The following day, defendant told Karen he had been drunk the
night before, and accidentally hit her. Karen ended the
relationship, but the two continued to exchange text messages.
Eventually, the text messages became threatening, and Karen feared
for her family's safety.
On November 13, 2013, defendant texted Karen, requesting to
sleep at her home. Karen repeatedly told defendant she did not
2
Defendant's brief indicates he pled guilty only to simple
assault; however, at the N.J.R.E. 404(b) hearing, the motion judge
stated defendant pled guilty to all three charges and defense
counsel did not challenge this statement.
3 A-2754-15T2
wish to see him. Defendant also called Karen four times, but she
did not respond.
Around 9:00 p.m. that same day, Karen and her mother, S.D.
(Sara), went upstairs to put Karen's daughter and nephew to bed.
Around 10:30 p.m., defendant entered Karen's bedroom with a
screwdriver. Karen ordered defendant to leave. Defendant
initially ignored her command, but eventually dropped the
screwdriver.
Sara entered Karen's bedroom, and also demanded defendant
leave. Sara then told Karen to remain upstairs while she escorted
defendant to the front door. Karen ran downstairs when she heard
her mother scream. She saw defendant's hand thrusting towards her
mother, and "[i]t appeared as if he was punching her." Karen
tried to intervene, but when defendant turned around, she saw he
had "a bloody knife in his hand." Karen further testified,
when I pushed him, he stabbed me twice in my
hip. I fell onto my knees. He stabbed me
twice in my back. And when I tried to get up,
he went to stab me in my heart, but I put my
arm up in defense and the blade went into my
forearm. And I tried to scramble up to catch
my balance and I looked over and my mom was
laid out on the floor completely unconscious
at this point.
Subsequently, defendant asked Karen for her car keys, and she
lied, telling him the keys were in the living room. When defendant
went to get the keys, Karen escaped and ran towards her neighbor's
4 A-2754-15T2
house. Defendant ran after Karen, but fled when she began
screaming. The neighbor then called the police.
First responders transported Sara to Cooper Hospital, where
she died at 11:21 p.m. Karen went to the same hospital, where she
received treatment for stab wounds to her neck (near her carotid
artery), collar bone, both sides of her abdomen, and defensive
wounds on her arms.
Merchantville police officer, Sergeant Greg Miller went to
the crime scene at 10:34 p.m. While there, he received a report
that the Camden City police had a suspect — later identified as
defendant — in custody at Lady of Lourdes Hospital. Defendant had
a knife wound in his hand.
Sergeant Miller arrived at the hospital around midnight,
November 14, 2013, and took custody of defendant. At that point,
defendant was sleeping and handcuffed to a gurney. Around 5:30-
6:00 a.m., defendant woke up, and a doctor stitched his hand. At
some point during defendant's stay at the hospital, staff gave him
Ativan and Haldol because he was "combative."
Around 6:00 a.m., Sergeant Miller transported defendant to
the Camden County Prosecutor's office for processing. Upon leaving
the hospital, defendant could walk on his own, and neither stumbled
nor leaned on anyone for support. Sergeant Miller further
testified, based upon his experience with "hundreds" of
5 A-2754-15T2
intoxicated individuals, that defendant appeared oriented, alert,
and not intoxicated.
Also on November 14, 2013, a neighbor of the victims found a
knife and believed it may have been involved in the homicide; the
neighbor called police who retrieved the knife. A lab technician
found both defendant's and Karen's DNA on the knife.
That same day, a medical examiner performed an autopsy on
Sara. He noted she had "seven stab and incise wounds." One stab
wound was around four inches deep and struck Sara's lung and aorta.
He opined this caused massive bleeding and rapid death. Sara also
had a stab wound to her stomach, which he believed could also have
caused death, either from bleeding or infection. The medical
examiner further opined Sara died from the stab wound to her aorta,
and no other preexisting injuries or disease contributed to her
death.
On November 14, 2013, at around 2:00 a.m., defendant's sister
Nancy provided a statement to the police, which the judge permitted
the State to play for the jury. In her statement, Nancy told
police her brother called her on the night of the homicide. He
stated "he was hurt," "bleeding," "dying," and "wanted to die."
When Nancy found defendant, he was bleeding, and told her that he
"and [Karen] got in a sword fight." He also said "something about
stabbing [Karen and her mom] in the lung." Nancy explained
6 A-2754-15T2
defendant "was drunk" and he "drinks a lot, a lot, a lot." Nancy
took defendant to the hospital, where police ultimately
apprehended him.
Detective Peter Longo, who interrogated defendant, testified
at the pretrial suppression hearing. He stated that at the
interrogation, defendant appeared "tired," "evasive," and
"cautious." He further testified he read defendant his Miranda3
warnings and defendant signed the Miranda form. The detective
stated defendant did not appear intoxicated or under the influence
of drugs during the interrogation, and defendant was able to
maintain a coherent conversation. However, he also acknowledged
that during the interrogation, he had to ask defendant to stay
awake, sit up, and repeat himself.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT I
THE ADMISSION OF THE INTERROGATION VIOLATED
DEFENDANT'S STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT. THE DRUGS HE WAS
GIVEN AT THE HOSPITAL SHORTLY BEFORE THE
INTERROGATION, COMBINED WITH THE EFFECTS OF
HIS DAY-LONG DRINKING, HIS INJURY, AND HIS
EXTREME FATIGUE[,] RENDERED HIM UNABLE TO
WAIVE HIS RIGHTS KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND
VOLUNTARILY.
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7 A-2754-15T2
POINT II
THE ADMISSION OF THE OCTOBER 27[, 2013]
INCIDENT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL AND
N.J.R.E. 404(b).
POINT III
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON THE MURDER — [FORTY-
FIVE] YEARS, [THIRTY-EIGHT] YEARS AND THREE
MONTHS WITHOUT PAROLE — IS EXCESSIVE.
POINT IV
THE IMPOSITION OF RESTITUTION VIOLATED
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL BY
JURY.
POINT V
THE IMPOSITION OF $[8910] IN RESTITUTION
WITHOUT A HEARING VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS
TO DUE PROCESS AND N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2.
In his pro se brief, defendant argues:
POINT I
APPELLA[NT] WILL ARGUE PROSECUTOR[IAL]
MISCONDUCT WHEN THE STATE VOUCHED FOR THE
CREDIBILITY OF . . . [KAREN] . . . TO THE
JURY DURING THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING
SUMMATION. (In Addition, Prosecutorial
Misconduct for Cumulatively Alleging the
defendant broke in with a screwdriver knowing
that defendant was paying rent to live at that
residence).
II
We first address defendant's contention that the trial court
erred in admitting his interrogation statements because the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly,
8 A-2754-15T2
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
Specifically, defendant argues, "at the time of the interrogation,
he was in the midst of sleeping off a heavy bout of drinking and
was in pain from his injured hand . . . . [and] he was given two
drugs at the hospital, Ativan and Haldol, both of which induce
sleep." He alleges these factors impaired his cognition, thereby
eliminating his ability to effectively waive his Miranda rights.
We "engage in a 'searching and critical' review of the record
to ensure protection of a defendant's constitutional rights" when
assessing the propriety of a trial court's decision to admit a
police-obtained statement. State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 381-82
(2014) (quoting State v. Pickles, 46 N.J. 542, 577 (1966)).
Nonetheless, we defer to the trial court's credibility and factual
findings because of the trial court's ability to see and hear the
witnesses, and thereby obtain the intangible but crucial feel of
the case. State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 543 (2015). To warrant
reversal, a defendant must show that the admission of the statement
was error "capable of producing an unjust result." Ibid."A suspect's waiver of his [or her] Fifth Amendment right to
silence is valid only if made 'voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently.'" State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 447 (1992) (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). The State bears the burden of
establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that a confession is knowing
9 A-2754-15T2
and voluntary. N.J.R.E. 104(c); State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383,
401 n.9 (2009). The determination of the voluntariness of a
custodial statement requires an assessment of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement. State v.
Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 227 (1996).
Contrary to defendant's assertion, his alleged intoxication
does not automatically dictate that he cannot knowingly or
intelligently waive his Miranda rights. See State v. Warmbrun,
277 N.J. Super. 51, 61-62, 64 (App. Div. 1994) (holding defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights despite his
intoxication). Rather, in applying the totality of the
circumstances test, the court must consider whether the defendant
spoke freely and with understanding, was able to correctly provide
pedigree information, and was capable of narrating the past events
and his or her participation in them. Id. at 62, 64; State v.
Bindhammer, 44 N.J. 372, 383-84 (1965).
Here, the judge thoroughly considered the totality of the
circumstances, including defendant's prior history with law
enforcement, his ability to coherently converse with Detective
Longo, and Detective Longo's testimony that defendant did not
appear intoxicated. Defendant remained capable of conversing and
lacked indicia of intoxication despite receiving two drugs before
the interrogation and his alleged hangover. Moreover, as the
10 A-2754-15T2
judge noted, Detective Longo found defendant engaged, inquisitive,
and "animated" during the interrogation. Accordingly, the record
supports the judge's findings, and we affirm on this issue.
III
Defendant next argues the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of the October 27, 2013 domestic violence incident. We
disagree.
N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides that evidence of one's prior crimes
or bad acts is inadmissible character evidence unless permitted
under N.J.R.E. 608(b) or, if it is proffered for a non-propensity
purpose, "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in
dispute." In State v. Cofield, our Supreme Court set forth the
following four-pronged test to govern the admission of such
evidence:
1. The evidence of the other crime must be
admissible as relevant to a material
issue;
2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably
close in time to the offense charged;
3. The evidence of the other crime must be
clear and convincing; and
4. The probative value of the evidence must
not be outweighed by its apparent
prejudice.
11 A-2754-15T2
[127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992) (citation omitted).]
We give "great deference" to a trial judge's determination
on the admissibility of "other bad conduct" evidence. State v.
Goodman, 415 N.J. Super. 210, 228 (App. Div. 2010) (citation
omitted). We apply an abuse of discretion standard, and require
a "clear error of judgment" to overturn the trial court's
determination. State v. Castagna, 400 N.J. Super. 164, 182-83
(App. Div. 2008).
In the instant matter, the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in admitting evidence of the domestic violence
incident. He appropriately determined the circumstances of
defendant's simple assault conviction were "highly relevant as
they go to the [S]tate's ability to show motive, intent, the
absence of mistake or accident, and perhaps . . . even a plan."
Additionally, he held the risk of prejudice "does not substantially
outweigh the probative nature of the evidence favoring
admissibility" because the risk could be "adequately addressed
through the use of a limiting instruction."
The judge appropriately found defendant's prior assault — and
his statements that he was "the devil" and would hurt Karen and
her family — were probative of defendant's motive, intent, absence
of mistake, and, potentially, plan. Particularly, these
statements — which were made less than three weeks before the
12 A-2754-15T2
night in question — were necessary in demonstrating the State's
theory that defendant intentionally and knowingly murdered Sara
and attempted to murder Karen. See, e.g., State v. Erazo, 126
N.J. 112, 131 (1991) (holding the defendant's prior statements
necessary because they demonstrated his mental state at the time
of the killing).
Moreover, the judge provided the jury a limiting instruction
to curtail any unfair prejudice to defendant. That the judge
provided that limiting instruction during the final jury charge,
as opposed to at the time of Karen's testimony, is not clearly
capable of producing an unjust result. See R. 2:10-2.
Accordingly, the record fails to reflect any prejudicial error,
and we affirm on this issue.
IV
Defendant next argues the trial court incorrectly applied
aggravating factor two under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a), resulting in an
excessive sentence. He contends the medical examiner testified
Sara died of one wound — her "sliced" aorta — and the stab wound
to her stomach would only have caused death had it been left
untreated and become infected. Moreover, defendant asserts that,
contrary to the trial judge's assertion, Sara was not
"substantially incapable of exercising normal or physical
13 A-2754-15T2
resistance." See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2). Defendant's arguments
lack persuasion.
"The critical focus of the appellate power to review and
correct sentences is on whether the basic sentencing determination
of the lower court was clearly mistaken." State v. Jarbath, 114
N.J. 394, 401 (1989) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2), a court must consider
[t]he gravity and seriousness of harm
inflicted on the victim, including whether or
not the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known that the victim of the offense was
particularly vulnerable or incapable of
resistance due to advanced age, ill-health,
or extreme youth, or was for any other reason
substantially incapable of exercising normal
physical or mental power of resistance.
Defendant stabbed Sara seven times, injuring her lung, aorta,
abdomen, hip, thigh, as well as causing defensive wounds across
her arms. The injury to her aorta alone would have caused Sara's
death; however, defendant continued to stab her numerous other
times. Those facts demonstrate the gravity of the harm defendant
caused. Moreover, as the trial judge found, defendant was
significantly younger and larger, both in height and weight, than
Sara. In fact, the judge noted, defendant "is not a small man.
The pre-sentence report would indicate he is five-seven and weighs
242 pounds. At the time of the offense, he was in his mid-
twenties. . . . [In contrast, Sara] stood at five three, was fifty
14 A-2754-15T2
years of age" and had recently "lost a substantial amount of
weight." Therefore, the record supports the judge's findings, and
the judge did not abuse his discretion in applying aggravating
factor two. We affirm the sixty-year NERA sentence.
V
Defendant next argues the trial judge ordered him to pay
restitution to the victims without making adequate factual
findings. We agree.
A "court shall sentence a defendant to pay restitution in
addition to a sentence of imprisonment" if: "(1) [T]he victim, or
in the case of a homicide, the nearest relative of the victim,
suffered a loss; and (2) [T]he defendant is able to pay or, given
a fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution." N.J.S.A.
2C:44-2(b). The amount of restitution may not exceed the victim's
loss. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3; State v. Newman, 132 N.J. 159, 167 (1993).
Before a court imposes restitution, it must make the required
findings under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(b), and it must place those
findings and reasons on the record. State v. Ferguson, 273 N.J.
Super. 486, 499 (App. Div. 1994). A hearing is generally required
unless there is no dispute as to the amount necessary to make the
victim whole or the defendant's ability to pay. State v.
McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242, 263-65 (App. Div. 1998); State
v. Orji, 277 N.J. Super. 582, 589-90 (App. Div. 1994).
15 A-2754-15T2
Here, the trial judge declined to hold a hearing regarding
restitution. He relied on representations from the Victims of
Crime Compensation Office (VCCO) in making his determination that
defendant owed $6510 in restitution to satisfy expenses related
to Sara's death and $2400 relative to Karen's injuries.
Importantly, however, the trial judge failed to consider
defendant's ability to pay the restitution award. In fact, he
explicitly stated: "The Court, certainly, questions
ultimately . . . defendant's ability to make that payment;
nonetheless, that's imposed." As such, the trial judge failed to
make a determination that "defendant is able to pay or, given a
fair opportunity, will be able to pay restitution." N.J.S.A.
2C:44-2(b)(2); see e.g., State v. Pessolano, 343 N.J. Super. 464,
479 (App. Div. 2001) (remanding for a restitution hearing because
"the judge held no hearing and made no comments during sentencing
about defendant's financial status or ability to pay"); State v.
Scribner, 298 N.J. Super. 366, 372 (App. Div. 1997) ("In order to
impose restitution, a factual basis must exist and there must be
an explicit consideration of defendant's ability to pay.").
Therefore, because the trial judge failed to consider defendant's
ability to pay, we remand for a restitution hearing.
16 A-2754-15T2
VI
Finally, in his pro se brief, defendant argues the "prosecutor
committed misconduct when she openly vouched for the credibility
of [Karen]" during summation. He further contends the prosecutor
perjured herself, and was biased "because she was a female
representing two female victims." Defendant's arguments lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
The judgment of conviction is affirmed except as to the
restitution ordered, and the matter is remanded for a restitution
hearing.
Affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part.
17 A-2754-15T2