DINA M. KAUL VS. RICHARD A. KAUL (FM-18-0254-08, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2201-16T1
DINA M. KAUL,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICHARD A. KAUL,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Argued May 9, 2018 – Decided June 13, 2018
Before Judges Koblitz, Manahan and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket No.
FM-18-0254-08.
Richard Arjun Kaul, appellant pro se.1
Jessica Ragno Sprague argued the cause for
respondent (Weinberger Divorce & Family Law
Group, LLC, attorneys; Jessica Ragno Sprague,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Richard A. Kaul appeals from a December 19, 2016
order denying his request to modify his support, assessing $1719
1
Although defendant requested oral argument, he did not appear
to argue.
in counsel fees against him, and denying his request for an order
directing the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners to reinstate
his medical license.
Defendant presents the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED BY EITHER WILLFULLY
OR NEGLIGENTLY FAILING TO FIND THE FACTS, AND
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO REPORT THE
ALLEGATIONS OF FORGED TRANSCRIPTS TO FEDERAL
AUTHORITIES.
POINT II: THE COURT HAS INCORRECTLY
INTERPRETED THE LAW OF GENERAL JURISDICTION,
AND HAS WITHOUT LEGAL FOUNDATION, TRUNCATED
ITS EQUITABLE AUTHORITY.
POINT III: THE COURT HAS INCORRECTLY PREMISED
ON ITS FLAWED PRECEDING CONCLUSIONS [SIC], ITS
GRANT OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION TO DENY
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION.
POINT IV: THE COURT HAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY NOT DENYING WITH PREJUDICE THE PLAINTIFF'S
REQUEST THAT THE DEFENDANT'S FUTURE MOTIONS
ARE SCREENED.
POINT V: THE COURT ERRED BY NOT PERFORMING
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PARTIES, BEFORE
ENTERING ORDERS OF LEGAL COST.
POINT VI: THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FAILING TO CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S REPLY
PAPERS, AND ERRED BY IGNORING APPELLATE
AUTHORITY.
POINT VII: THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ORDER
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PLAINTIFF AND
FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS
COHABITED SINCE 2014.
POINT VIII: PARAGRAPH SPECIFIC CRITIQUE OF
COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS OF
FACT.
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After reviewing the record in light of the contentions
advanced on appeal, we affirm substantially for the reasons
incorporated by Judge Hany A. Mawla into his December 2016 order.
We add the following.
The parties entered into a Property Settlement Agreement
(PSA) in August 2005, but were not divorced until October 2009.
Plaintiff Dina Kaul was awarded counsel fees by an October 7, 2009
order. Plaintiff appealed the enforcement of the PSA, and
defendant cross-appealed the award of counsel fees. We affirmed
both orders. Kaul v. Kaul, No. A-0177-09 (App. Div. Aug. 15,
2011) (slip op. at 14).
On April 2, 2012, defendant's medical license was suspended,
and on February 12, 2014, his license was revoked. Plaintiff
successfully filed for support enforcement three times. Defendant
appeals from the denial of his second motion to modify unallocated
support of $10,000 per month, although the parties agreed in the
PSA that there would be no modification regardless of future
"increases or decreases in their income."
The parties were married in 2003. Two children were born of
the marriage. Defendant was a doctor with a hugely successful
minimally invasive surgery practice. He claims that his success
caused professional jealousy that led other specialists in his
field to bribe then-Governor of New Jersey, Chris Christie, who
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arranged for defendant's medical license to be revoked.2 He also
claims that the record of his medical license revocation contains
many forged transcripts and seeks intervention from the Family
Court.
Defendant alleges that after his medical license was revoked,
his income decreased by 90% and many parties filed lawsuits against
him. His business declared bankruptcy and he sought to reduce his
support payments from $10,000 a month to $500 a month. At the
time he filed his first motion seeking a reduction, he was $280,000
in arrears. He claimed at that time that his income had been
reduced from many millions to $500,000 per year. He presently
claims that, as of July 2014, he has no income. He asked the
Family Court to reinstate his medical license, arguing that the
Superior Court has jurisdiction to do so and that he needs his
license to support his family. He filed a case information
statement (CIS) alleging that he was fully supported by others and
has no assets, income or expenses. He did not attach a tax return,
financial records or his prior CIS. See R. 5:5-4(a).
Judge Mawla found that "[d]efendant has provided no financial
documentation necessary to demonstrate a substantial and permanent
change in circumstances" and denied the motion "without
2
He adds that insurance companies have a policy of coercing
medical boards or politicians into revoking a person's medical
license so the companies do not have to pay the doctors.
4 A-2201-16T1
prejudice." The judge noted the deficiencies in defendant's CIS
and stated that letters from his relatives and friends did not
constitute objective proof that he unsuccessfully sought
employment, or was fully supported by others.
Plaintiff points out that the PSA contained an anti-Lepis3
clause precluding modification regardless of defendant's loss of
income. See Kaul, No. A-0177-09 (slip op. at 4); Morris v. Morris,
263 N.J. Super. 237, 241 (App. Div. 1993). The PSA, however, does
not entirely prevent modification.
Paragraph 14 of the PSA calls for a termination of support
in the event of "the [w]ife's cohabitation with another person in
accordance with existing case law." Of course, cohabitation would
not affect the child support component of this agreed-upon
unallocated support.
Defendant filed a reply certification in support of his
modification motion one day before oral argument. The judge did
not consider this certification, in which defendant alleged that
plaintiff had been cohabiting for several years with "a male,
whose income, it is believed, is derived from the operation of a
privately held business." The obligor has the burden of proof to
make a prima facie showing that cohabitation exists. Ozolins v.
Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1998). Additionally,
3
Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980).
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new issues are not the proper subject matter of a reply
certification, which should only respond to opposing affidavits
or certifications. R. 1:6-3(a).
Judge Mawla granted plaintiff's "request [to] compel
[d]efendant to pay for her legal fees and costs associated with
this [m]otion," totaling $1719. He stated: "Defendant has acted
in bad faith by filing the same [m]otion he filed in May 2016.
Defendant is self-represented and [p]laintiff has incurred $1719
in legal fees in connection with this [m]otion." He continued:
"Pursuant to the May 1, 2014 Order, [p]laintiff was awarded
$5972.65 in attorney's fees, which he has not paid. Defendant was
not successful in any of his requests and [p]laintiff was
successful as to all of her requests."
Awards of counsel fees are within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 147
(App. Div. 2002). Judge Mawla considered the Rule 5:3-5(c)
factors, finding that the current incomes are unknown, defendant
has not previously paid court-ordered attorney's fees, he was
unsuccessful in his requests, and this motion was repetitious of
a previously filed motion.
Judge Mawla soundly exercised his discretion in denying the
application filed by defendant, who is highly educated, for lack
of supporting documentation. Self-represented litigants are
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expected to follow the Court Rules. See, e.g., Clifton v.
Cresthaven Cemetery Ass'n, 17 N.J. Super. 362, 364 (App. Div.
1952) (observing that compliance with a particular court rule
should not be dispensed with when a non-lawyer appears pro se);
see also Trocki Plastic Surgery Cent. v. Bartkowski, 344 N.J.
Super. 399, 405 (App. Div. 2001) (pro se litigants are regarded
as lawyers for the purposes of Rule 1:4-8). "[P]ro se litigants
are not entitled to greater rights than litigants who are
represented by counsel." Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437
N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014).
We add that our decision does not preclude defendant from
filing a future motion, accompanied by appropriate documentation,
seeking modification. In that event, the court, in the exercise
of its equitable authority and subject to opposition by plaintiff,
may allow that any relief afforded be retroactive to the original
filing of the motion under review, October 21, 2016.
Affirmed.
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