R.K. VS. P.M. (FV-02-0932-17, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2018 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3043-16T2
R.K.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
P.M.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued May 30, 2018 – Decided June 25, 2018
Before Judges Moynihan and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
Docket No. FV-02-0932-17.
Elton John Bozanian argued the cause for
appellant (Rotolo, Bozanian & Yi, LLC,
attorneys; Elton John Bozanian, on the brief).
Michael J. Evans argued the cause for
respondent (Weinberger Divorce & Family Law
Group, LLC, attorneys; Michael J. Evans, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant P.M. appeals from a final restraining order (FRO)
entered in favor of plaintiff R.K., pursuant to the Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35 (the Act). We affirm.
Plaintiff and defendant are married and have one child, a son,
J.M. At the time plaintiff obtained her temporary restraining order
(TRO), the parties were involved in a pending divorce action in
Pennsylvania and simultaneously embroiled in a contested custody
dispute in New Jersey that resulted in plaintiff being awarded legal
custody of J.M. with defendant exercising parenting time. Judge
James X. Sattely, Jr., presided over the parties' custody dispute and
plaintiff's application for an FRO.
In her complaint in support of the TRO, plaintiff recounted
escalating acts of harassment. She alleged that on October 26, 2016,
defendant dropped off J.M., argued with plaintiff and yelled at J.M.
to call 911 to report that she was hurting the child. Plaintiff
further alleged that defendant contacted J.M.'s daycare center to
inquire if plaintiff was neglecting him. Plaintiff also claimed that
defendant called her employer with the purpose of getting her fired.
She expressed particular distress with respect to that call because
she is a non-resident working pursuant to an H-1B visa and feared
that if she was fired, she would get deported and lose custody of
J.M.
Plaintiff also alleged defendant had committed a prior act of
domestic violence during the marriage four years earlier. She
maintained that defendant assaulted her when she was pregnant by
pushing her towards a wall.
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Both parties appeared with counsel over the course of four days
for the FRO hearing. Judge Sattely heard testimony from plaintiff
and defendant, along with plaintiff's employer and workers from
J.M.'s daycare center. The trial judge also considered documentary
evidence introduced by the parties, including a series of text and
email messages, a police report stemming from the October 26 incident,
and financial information and pay stubs produced in the custody
litigation.
Plaintiff testified consistent with the statement in the TRO
that, at the October 26 drop off, defendant falsely instructed J.M.
to call 911 to report that plaintiff was hurting him. She also stated
that the next day she learned defendant called J.M.'s daycare center
and told them that she was "not taking care of the child, . . . [and]
not taking the child to the doctor." She testified that, as a result
of these communications, she was "alarmed and . . . felt harassed."
She stated that she similarly felt "harassed, . . . very alarmed[,]
and insecure" when she learned that defendant had contacted her
employer and told him plaintiff was not taking proper care of their
child. She stressed to the trial judge that, if fired, she will lose
her work visa and will be required to leave the United States putting
her custody of J.M. at risk. Plaintiff also testified regarding the
alleged prior act of domestic violence.
3 A-3043-16T2
Further, plaintiff testified that defendant emailed her asking
whether the misalignment of J.M.'s front teeth resulted from
plaintiff or her mother putting "physical pressure" on his teeth and
whether she had a plan to address the issue. Plaintiff advised that
at the time the email was sent, J.M. visited the dentist and defendant
was in possession of J.M.'s dental report and future dental plan.
Defendant also testified. With respect to the October 26
incident, he defended his direction to J.M., a four year old at the
time, to call 911 by claiming plaintiff was shouting at the child.
He also admitted he called the Division of Child Protection and
Permanency the next day because he "wanted them to know how [the
child] was yelled at[,] . . . [h]ow he was shouted at and how he was
handled." According to defendant, he called and emailed J.M.'s
daycare center to inquire about his well-being and behavior and to
see if J.M. "was alive." Defendant emphasized that his communications
with plaintiff and the daycare center involved only J.M. and his
health and well-being.
Defendant further explained that he called plaintiff's employer
to "verify that the information that [plaintiff] gave [him], that she
[was] not working," was accurate. He testified that he neither asked
nor intended for plaintiff's employer to take action against
plaintiff. However, on cross-examination, defendant acknowledged
that prior to calling plaintiff's employer he was aware of plaintiff's
employment status and earnings through the end of October 2016.
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Defendant also indicated that he knew that plaintiff was on H-1B visa
status. As he had been an H-1B visa employee at one point in time,
defendant understood the significance of plaintiff maintaining
employment by a sponsoring employer. Defendant denied telling the
daycare representative and plaintiff's employer that plaintiff does
not take their child to the doctor.
Plaintiff's employer confirmed that he is plaintiff's sponsor
for her H-1B work visa. He testified that he received an unsolicited
phone call from defendant at around 7:00 a.m. on November 18, 2016.
Defendant advised him of the parties' divorce proceedings and stated
that he wanted to talk about the inadequate care that plaintiff was
providing their child. Plaintiff's employer stated that defendant
was soliciting his help on "humanitar[ian] grounds" and asked if he
could come to his office to show him supporting documentation.
Plaintiff's employer told defendant he did not want to get involved
in the parties' personal life but would do whatever he is legally
obligated to do. When defendant called plaintiff's employer twice
later that day, he purposely did not take the calls.
Plaintiff's employer testified that he informed plaintiff of
the phone call and instructed her that he was "not happy" and did not
want to get involved in her personal life. Plaintiff's employer
confirmed that defendant did not ask him to take any action against
plaintiff and that he did not take action against plaintiff as a
result of the call.
5 A-3043-16T2
The daycare representative testified that defendant called her
and stated that J.M. had not gone to the doctor very often. Defendant
requested that the daycare representative ask J.M. if he was unhappy,
but she declined the request and indicated that, while in school, he
does not exhibit signs of unhappiness. The daycare representative
also testified that she received another phone call from defendant
in November 2016. She stated that defendant claimed plaintiff was
verbally abusing the child.
In his oral decision, the trial judge found that plaintiff
testified in a "straightforward manner" and had a "good recall of the
facts" that led to the TRO and the prior act of domestic violence.
He characterized her testimony as "persuasive and credible."
Conversely, Judge Sattely stated defendant's testimony "lacked
credibility," and was "inconsistent" as to his motivation behind his
actions that led to plaintiff filing for a temporary restraining
order. He characterized defendant's explanation that he contacted
plaintiff's employer only to verify her employment status as
"disingenuous." After considering the trial testimony and
documentary evidence, Judge Sattely issued detailed factual findings
and legal conclusions and found that the plaintiff met her burden of
establishing a predicate act of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c)
because defendant "committed a course of alarming conduct of
repeatedly commit[ting] acts with the purpose to alarm and seriously
annoy the plaintiff." The trial judge found that the alarming conduct
6 A-3043-16T2
began with the October 26 incident and culminated with defendant's
telephone call to plaintiff's employer.
The trial judge outlined defendant's acts of harassment in
October and November 2016. In particular, the trial judge found
defendant’s contact with plaintiff's employer alone "constitutes a
form of non-physical domestic violence with an equally harmful
purpose." While defendant indicated that he called plaintiff's
employer to verify plaintiff's employment, he acknowledged that
documents he received in the custody litigation contained plaintiff’s
financial and employment information. In granting the FRO, the trial
judge also held that it was clear that defendant "cannot and will not
cease bothering or threatening the plaintiff in light of the pending
and ongoing custody and parenting time disputes."
Finally, in his oral decision, the trial judge considered that
the parties were engaged in contested custody and parenting time
litigation that resulted in the court ordering a best interests
evaluation on October 13, 2016. Judge Sattely recognized that,
while it is possible in a given case that a
party has filed a [d]omestic [v]iolence
[c]omplaint to gain an advantage in other
litigation, it may be equally plausible in a
given case that as a . . . direct result of
such other litigation defendant improperly
committed domestic violence against the
plaintiff.
Here, it was . . . the defendant and his course
of conduct during the pendency of the custody
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and parenting time evaluation that was trying
to obtain an advantage against the plaintiff.
On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence did not support
the trial judge's finding of harassment, and that the trial judge
made erroneous evidentiary rulings and did not correctly apply the
law.
When reviewing "a trial court's order entered following trial
in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial deference to
the trial court's findings of fact and the legal conclusions based
upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596
(App. Div. 2013). We do not disturb the "factual findings and
legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced
that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with
the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to
offend the interests of justice." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
412 (1998) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co.,
65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Deference is particularly appropriate
when the evidence is testimonial and involves credibility issues
because the judge who observes the witnesses and hears the
testimony has a perspective the reviewing court does not enjoy.
Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988). Moreover, substantial
deference is given to a Family Part judge's evidentiary rulings.
8 A-3043-16T2
See State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 453 (1998); Dinter v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J. Super. 84, 92 (App. Div. 1991).
The Act defines domestic violence by referring to a list of
predicate offenses found within the New Jersey Criminal Code. J.D.
v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 473 (2011). "[T]he commission of a
predicate act, if the plaintiff meets the definition of a 'victim
of domestic violence,' N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d), constitutes domestic
violence." Ibid. Harassment is a predicate offense under the
Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13).
Before an FRO is entered, the trial court must make specific
findings consistent with our opinion in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.
Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). The court "must determine
whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the
credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. The
court should make this determination "in light of the previous
history of violence between the parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare,
154 N.J. at 402). Next, the court must determine whether a
restraining order is required to protect the party seeking
restraints from future acts or threats of violence. Id. at 126-
27.
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Here, the trial judge concluded defendant harassed plaintiff.
A person commits the petty disorderly persons offense of harassment
if, with purpose to harass another, he or she:
a. Makes, or causes to be made, a
communication or communications anonymously
or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in
offensively coarse language, or any other
manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
b. Subjects another to striking, kicking,
shoving, or other offensive touching, or
threatens to do so; or
c. Engages in any other course of alarming
conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with
purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other
person.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) to (c).]
For a finding of harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, defendant
must have had the purpose to harass plaintiff. Corrente v.
Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 249 (App. Div. 1995). Finding a
party had the purpose to harass must be supported by "some evidence
that the actor's conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere
awareness that someone might be alarmed or annoyed is
insufficient." J.D., 207 N.J. at 487. "A finding of a purpose
to harass may be inferred from the evidence presented." State v.
Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997). "Common sense and experience
may inform that determination." Ibid.10 A-3043-16T2
Applying these standards, we are satisfied the record
supports the trial judge's credibility determinations, factual
findings, and legal conclusions. There was credible evidence
before the trial court that defendant harassed plaintiff and that
the FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from further acts of
abuse.
The trial judge rejected defendant's request to review his
communications to plaintiff, the daycare employees and plaintiff's
employer in isolation and for the purported legitimate basis that
they were made not to alarm or annoy plaintiff but merely to
address J.M.'s health and safety. Rather, the trial judge, with
the benefit of "see[ing] and observ[ing] the witnesses," see Gallo
v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961), properly viewed
the communications in their appropriate context with the other
trial evidence. In this light, we cannot determine that the trial
judge abused his discretion when he concluded that defendant's
communications were made with the purpose "to alarm or seriously
annoy" plaintiff. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c).
In particular, there is sufficient evidence from which to
infer that defendant's false statements that plaintiff was harming
J.M. and his direction to their child to call 911, his inaccurate
comments to an employee of the daycare facility that plaintiff was
not taking the child to the doctor and was verbally abusive, and
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his completely unnecessary call to plaintiff's employer, were
motivated by his intention to harass plaintiff. See C.M.F. v.
R.G.F., 418 N.J. Super. 396, 404 (App. Div. 2002).
Defendant also claims that the trial judge erred when he
relied on Murray v. Murray, 267 N.J. Super. 406 (App. Div. 1993).
We disagree. In Murray, 267 N.J. Super. at 410, we expressed
concern about parties in matrimonial litigation improperly
employing the Act "to secure rulings on critical issues such as
support, exclusion from marital residence and property
disposition." Here, the parties were entangled in contested
custody litigation and defendant maintained that the TRO was filed
in response to Judge Sattely's ordering of a best interest
evaluation. Thus, the trial judge correctly took into
consideration these facts when rendering his decision.
By factoring into his analysis the custody litigation and
defendant's claims, the trial judge adhered to Judge (later
Justice) Long's comments that "[t]he domestic violence law was
intended to address matters of consequence, not ordinary domestic
contretemps," Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. at 250, and that improper
use of the Act could have a "secondary negative effect: the
potential for unfair advantage to a matrimonial litigant[,]"
Peranio v. Peranio, 280 N.J. Super 47, 56 (App. Div. 1995).
12 A-3043-16T2
In granting the FRO, the trial judge implicitly acknowledged
that neither Corrente nor Peranio stands for the proposition that
parties in the throes of custody proceedings are free to engage
in acts of domestic violence. Just as the Act should not be used
as a sword to gain advantage in matrimonial litigation, parties
similarly may not use those contested actions as a shield from the
application of the Act.
Similarly, we reject defendant's challenge to the FRO based
on the trial judge's purported reliance on a trial court decision.
First, Judge Sattely did not cite the decision in his oral decision
and he noted during the trial proceedings that the decision was
not "binding on this [c]ourt." However, to the extent Judge
Sattely's oral decision was nevertheless based on the reasoning
in that trial court opinion, we find no error. Indeed, Judge
Sattely's decision that defendant's contact with plaintiff's
employer constituted economic harassment and represented a "non-
physical domestic violence with an equally harmful purpose" was
amply supported by his factual and credibility findings. The
trial judge's comments merely recognized that not every harassing
communication must contain coarse language or vituperative
epithets for it to "alarm or seriously annoy."
The record also supports the trial judge's conclusion that
the second Silver factor was satisfied and an FRO was needed to
13 A-3043-16T2
protect plaintiff against further abuse. In this regard, the
trial judge concluded that defendant's harassing behavior posed a
risk to plaintiff's employment. He noted plaintiff's fear
regarding her employability due to defendant's conduct. The
previous history of domestic violence when defendant shoved the
pregnant plaintiff towards a wall was an appropriate factor
warranting the entry of an FRO. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1).
We also disagree that the trial judge's evidentiary rulings
warrant reversal. Defendant claims that Judge Sattely improperly
excluded evidence regarding J.M.'s medical history that would have
informed the judge's consideration regarding defendant's intent
and plaintiff's and her brother's business relationship with
plaintiff's employer that would have revealed plaintiff's employer's
bias.
First, our review of the trial record reveals that Judge
Sattely permitted extensive testimony on both points. Indeed,
defendant testified regarding his concerns about J.M. because of
his prior hospitalization in December 2014, his urinary tract
infection, and his need for speech therapy. Defendant also
testified regarding a prior business relationship between
plaintiff and her employer. On this point, the trial judge stated
that it is "[s]tipulated that they had a relationship." When
limiting cross-examination of plaintiff's employer on any prior
14 A-3043-16T2
business relationship, the trial judge noted that the subpoena
compelling his trial testimony was expressly limited to
communications between himself and defendant concerning plaintiff.
We give substantial deference to the trial judge's rulings.
Morton, 155 N.J. at 453.
To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining arguments
lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).1
Affirmed.
1
Defendant's notice of appeal seeks review of only the FRO. In
his merits brief, defendant advised that the trial judge later
issued an order awarding counsel fees to plaintiff in accordance
with N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4). Defendant further stated that he
"does not specifically" appeal the award of counsel fees and only
asks that the award be rendered moot if his appeal is granted.
Because we have affirmed the FRO, defendant's argument that the
later counsel-fee order would be impacted or groundless if we were
to reverse has not ripened. Consequently, we need not consider
whether the counsel-fee order is properly before us for review.
15 A-3043-16T2