STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. TIMMA KALIDINDI (14-01-0065, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5192-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TIMMA KALIDINDI,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted September 14, 2021 – Decided October 14, 2021
Before Judges DeAlmeida and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 14-01-
0065.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Darcy J. Baboulis-Gyscek, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Amanda Frankel, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After a jury trial, defendant Timma Kalidindi appeals from a verdict
convicting him of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, and third-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d). After
merging the weapons conviction, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term
of fifty-five years' incarceration on the murder conviction, with defendant parole
ineligible for eighty-five percent of that term. On appeal, defendant argues that
the trial court committed plain error in three separate aspects of its jury charge.
We affirm for the reasons set forth below.
I.
In 2013, Janaki Dantuluru filed for divorce from her husband, defendant
Timma Kalidindi. He soon moved out of the marital home in Bridgewater;
Janaki continued to reside there with their sixteen-year-old daughter. On
November 14, 2013, the couple's daughter arrived home around 7:00 p.m., after
an afterschool program, and found defendant inside the home, which surprised
and scared her because defendant was barred by a civil order in the matrimonial
action from being in the home. Defendant marched his daughter upstairs to her
room; out of concern, she texted her mother, telling her not to come home.
Defendant discovered the warning text on his daughter's phone and took the
phone from her. Around 8:00 p.m., she heard the garage door open, suggesting
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Janaki was entering the garage. The daughter heard defendant run downstairs,
followed by screams from her mother. She called 9-1-1, and police arrived to
find Janaki on the garage floor, unresponsive and without a pulse. Paramedics
briefly restored Janaki's pulse and transported her to the local hospital, however
she never regained consciousness and was pronounced dead at 1:49 a.m. Police
observed about three feet of knotted "twiny rope" was wrapped around Janaki's
neck. Defendant was arrested.
After being Mirandized, defendant gave a statement to police. He told
detectives that before November 14, the last time he spoke with or saw Janaki
was about two months prior. He explained that he went to the family home the
day in question to get his luggage and that he was able to enter the home through
a door that was always unlocked for the dog. Defendant stated that he had
breakfast at the hotel on the morning of November 14 and went to a storage
facility to arrange a place for his possessions. He told detectives that he rented
a red Ford Escape, which he parked near the family home "somewhere near the
pond" because he did not want his wife or daughter to know that he was there.
The car was later located approximately a half mile away from their home.
Defendant stated that he bought a flower for Janaki, but he could not remember
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whether it fell out on his way into the house. He also could not remember
bringing the rope inside the house from the car.
Defendant's version of the events in the home leading to Janaki's death
was consistent with his daughter's version. Defendant encountered her when
she returned from school and he instructed her to tell her friend to leave "just in
case there is a fight." Defendant also told her that she should stay in her room
and "[c]lose the door and stay inside," even if she heard noises or fighting. He
admitted to the detectives that he confiscated his daughter's phone when he saw
the warning text to Janaki.
Defendant told detectives that he "just want[ed] to have a conversation
[with Janaki,] that's all," but that she kicked him in the leg and screamed once
she discovered him in the kitchen. He explained that while there was a struggle
in the kitchen, he could not remember chairs being thrown. Defendant told
detectives he "had to control the screaming" and did so by grabbing Janaki's
throat with two hands, at which point he was kneeling towards the laundry room
and Janaki was on the ground, facing up. He told detectives that he just wanted
to talk, but that Janaki kept screaming. He could not remember how hard he
was squeezing her neck because it was "too stressful [of a] situation," but he
recognized that he "shouldn't [have been] doing that . . . ." He told detectives
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while he was strangling Janaki, he was listening for his daughter to see if she
was crying, but did not hear anything. While his hands were squeezing Janaki's
neck, he told her that he just wanted to talk to her and in response, "[s]he wasn't
doing anything actually. She wasn't doing anything except . . . holding onto my
hand and doing the scratching kind of thing. . . . [on] my pants." Defendant
stated that he did not remember using the rope but did recall an officer knocking
on the door while he was still in the laundry room. At that point, Janaki "was
quiet already." Defendant recalled surrendering himself to the officer, telling
him that he "pull[ed] [her] into . . . the garage." Defendant told detectives that
he did not actually know why he moved Janaki's body or if he was trying to hide
her, but then stated he did it because the police were knocking on the door.
Defendant did not know whether Janaki was still breathing, explaining to
detectives, "I am not a doctor or something like that[,] I just don't know why I
was doing that . . . because I love my wife . . . ." Defendant told the detectives
that he understood that squeezing someone's neck could result in death. When
asked if he understood "that by choking [his] wife [he] could have killed her,"
he told the detectives that he understood.
When questioned about whether he told his daughter only one parent
would survive, defendant could not recall saying that, but did acknowledge he
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was angry. He told detectives that he "badly want[ed] to talk" to his family
because the divorce was to be finalized the following Monday and he was
against it.
In the ensuing investigation, police searched the rental car and recovered
a white trash bag on the floor on the passenger side, which contained a two-foot
piece of nylon rope. In the back, police located a black bag with court orders
inside, as well as numerous receipts, defendant's Indian and United States
passports, the storage facility rental agreement, wooden stakes, and empty
packaging for a knife. A search of the family home revealed another rope in the
basement, matching the one found in the garage. The rope was in a plastic Home
Depot bag along with a razor knife. Investigators found a rose outside the house
near the backyard. Police also searched defendant's hotel room on November
15, 2013. They located notes on a desk in his room, one of which said: "It is
Timma. I love you my dear wife" and had Janaki's name written on it as well.
Officers located the rental car receipt inside a casino shopping bag. Also seized
from the bag were numerous receipts from various establishments, tickets, a
separate rental agreement, and a $10,000 electronic money transfer
confirmation, all of which were dated between October 2013 and November
2013.
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II.
At trial, several witnesses testified, including psychiatric experts for the
State and the defense. Each psychiatrist gave an expert opinion as to the
defendant's state of mind on November 14, the day of the murder. Dr. Harold
Gilman, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist, testified for the State. He
diagnosed defendant with a personality disorder, with schizotypal narcissistic
features. Dr. Gilman testified that his examination of the defendant did not
reveal symptoms of psychosis before or after the crime. Finally, Dr. Gilman
testified as to specific acts by defendant which caused the doctor to conclude
that defendant acted with knowledge and purpose when he killed his wife. Dr.
Gilman listed: defendant parking his rental car out of sight of his wife and
daughter on November 16; his desire to avoid being seen by his neighbor as he
approached the family home; his understanding that a restraining order which
barred him from the home was in effect; his deliberate choice to enter his home
through a pet door he knew would be open; his instruction to his daughter to
send her friend away and to stay in her room even if she heard her parents
arguing; his bringing a rope into the house along with a knife; and his
recognition of wrongdoing as exemplified by his prompt surrender to police.
Upon making these observations, Dr. Gilman concluded that defendant was not
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suffering from mental illness which would have impaired his ability to act
purposefully or knowingly at the time of Janaki's murder.
Dr. Martin Weinapple, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist, testified for
the defense. The doctor examined defendant and made several observations,
including: defendant's paranoid thinking about what he believed were the causes
of his marital difficulties; defendant's stress and confusion at the time of the
murder; and the presence of several triggering events for defendant which led to
a brief psychotic episode resulting in Janaki's death at defendant's hands.1 Dr.
Weinapple ultimately diagnosed defendant with a generalized psychosis, as well
as severe obsessive-compulsive disorder, explaining that "people with very
severe OCD can have moments where they go over the edge and become
psychotic" because the obsession "blends into almost paranoid delusional
thinking, the obsession, it gets so strong." Dr. Weinapple testified that, in his
opinion, defendant had experienced a brief psychotic episode, caused by
obsessive-compulsive disorder and generalized psychosis. Dr. Weinapple
1
Dr. Weinapple gave examples of events in defendant's life which, in his
opinion, represented events that could have contributed to triggering a psychotic
episode on November 16, 2013. The examples included: defendant being
kicked by his wife upon her arrival in the garage; his wife's screams during their
struggle; the divorce; and his daughter's chronic illness.
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further testified that defendant did not have the ability to act knowingly and
purposely at the time he killed his wife.
At the charge conference, the court reviewed the proposed charge for
murder with counsel. Counsel and the court jointly settled on use of the standard
model jury charge for murder, which included instructions for
passion/provocation and aggravated and reckless manslaughter. 2 After hearing
the evidence, closing arguments, and the trial court's instructions, the jury
convicted defendant.
Defendant appeals, making the following arguments:
POINT I
THE JURY CHARGE WAS FUNDAMENTALLY
FLAWED BECAUSE IT FAILED TO INCLUDE IN
ITS EXPLANATION OF THE LAW ANY
REFERENCE TO THOSE ASPECTS OF THE
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT SUPPORTED
DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT HE HAD A
MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT THAT
PREVENTED HIM FROM ACTING
PURPOSEFULLY OR KNOWINGLY.
COMPOUNDING ITS ERROR, THE TRIAL COURT
UNFAIRLY EMPHASIZED IN ITS CHARGE FACTS
AND EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTED ONLY THE
STATE'S CONTENTION THAT DEFENDANT DID
ACT PURPOSELY AND KNOWINGLY.
2
See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Murder, Passion/Provocation and
Aggravated/Reckless Manslaughter (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); 2C:11-4a,
b(1) and b(2))" (rev. June 8, 2015).
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(Not Raised Below)
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S CHARGE ON PASSION-
PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER FAILED TO
EXPLAIN TO THE JURY THAT WHETHER OR
NOT DEFENDANT ACTUALLY WAS
IMPASSIONED AND WHETHER OR NOT HE
ACTUALLY COOLED OFF ARE SUBJECTIVE
FACTORS THAT MUST BE VIEWED FROM THE
PERSPECTIVE OF THE DEFENDANT, NOT FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF AN ORDINARY PERSON
(Not Raised Below)
Point III
THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON
THE DEFENSE OF MENTAL DISEASE OR
DEFECT, N.J.S.A. 2C: 4-2, PRELIMINARILY AND
COMPLETELY SEPARATE AND OUT OF
CONTEXT FROM ITS CHARGE ON PURPOSEFUL
AND KNOWING MURDER AND PASSION-
PROVOCATION MANSLAUGHTER.
INEXPLICABLY, THE TRIAL COURT THEN
SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED INSTRUCTIONS ON
MENTAL DISEASE AND DEFECT IN ITS
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON THE OFFENSE
OF POSSESSION OF A WEAPON FOR AN
UNLAWFUL PURPOSE, LEADING THE JURY TO
POSSIBLY INFER THAT THE DEFENSE ONLY
APPLIED TO THE LATTER CRIME, BUT NOT TO
MURDER OR PASSION PROVOCATION
MANSLAUGHTER. THAT DEFECT, COMBINED
WITH THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INCLUDE IN
ITS CHARGE ANY REFERENCE TO THE
EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT SUPPORTED
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF MENTAL DISEASE OR
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DEFECT CONSTITUTED PLAIN AND
PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND REQUIRES
REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
(Not Raised Below)
III.
When a defendant fails to object to a jury charge at trial, "there is a
presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the
defendant's case." State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012). In cases like
this, the standard of review is plain error. State v. Nero, 195 N.J. 397, 407
(2008) (citing State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 288-89 (2006)). "[P]lain error
requires demonstration of 'legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting
the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to justify notice
by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed
a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'" Ibid. (quoting Chapland, 187
N.J. at 288-89). The alleged error is viewed in totality of the entire charge and
the error is considered in light of the strength of the State's overall case. Ibid.(citing Chapland, 187 N.J. at 288-89).
An essential ingredient of a fair trial is that a jury receive adequate and
understandable instructions. Correct instructions are "at the heart of the proper
execution of the jury function in a criminal trial." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J.
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41, 54 (1997) (quoting State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563, 571 (1994)). The
instructions must be accurate and provide a "comprehensible explanation of the
questions that the jury must determine, including the law of the case applicable
to the facts that the jury may find." Singleton, 211 N.J. at 181-82 (2012)
(quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287-88 (1981)). In assessing the propriety
of a jury charge, an appellate court should examine the entire charge to see
whether it was ambiguous or whether it misinformed the jury of the law. See
State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2007) (citations omitted).
Defendant argues first that the trial court's jury charge failed to include
evidence that defendant lacked the mental capacity to commit murder, or one of
the lesser included offenses. We disagree. The record shows the trial court gave
thorough general instructions to the jury regarding its role in evaluating fact and
opinion testimony adduced at trial. During the court's jury instruction regarding
the offenses of murder, passion/provocation manslaughter, and possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose, it specifically addressed the defendant's mental
state at the time of the murder as follows:
Evidence alleging that . . . [d]efendant suffered from a
mental disease or defect, specifically psychosis not
otherwise specified, and obsessive-compulsive
disorder, OCD, have been provided through the
testimony of Dr. Weinapple. In considering the State's
burden of proof which is to prove every element of a
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charge presented beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
consider and weigh all of the evidence as to the
Defendant's mental state, including that offered as
evidence of psychosis not otherwise specified, and
obsessive-compulsive disorder, OCD, in determining
whether or not the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that Timma Kalidindi acted purposely
or knowingly, which are elements of the offenses of
murder, passion-provocation manslaughter, and
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.
The trial court expressly incorporated the defense expert's medical
diagnosis into the charge, providing the jury a clear roadmap from which they
could make findings regarding the defendant's mental state. The jury evidently
heard and rejected Dr. Weinapple's expert testimony. When we consider
defendant's argument in the totality of the entire charge, we find no plain error.
See Nero, 195 N.J. at 407.
Defendant's second argument regarding the trial court's
passion/provocation charge has little merit. At defendant's request during the
charge conference, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the
model jury charges as to murder and passion/provocation. The
passion/provocation charge specifically addresses the four elements that a jury
must evaluate to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of
passion/provocation manslaughter. The four factors are:
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(1) There was adequate provocation;
(2) The provocation actually impassioned defendant;
(3) Defendant did not have a reasonable time to cool off
between the provocation and the act which caused
death; and
(4) Defendant did not actually cool off before
committing the act which caused death.
[State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 412-13 (1990).]
The model charge language on passion/provocation is clear and
unambiguous. Its plain language guides and directs the jury regarding its use of
objective and subjective considerations in analyzing each of the four factors.
The jury considered the entirety of the evidence and found the state met its
burden in proving absence of at least one of the factors in rendering a verdict of
murder. We presume juries will adhere to a trial court's instructions. State v.
Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 390 (1996). Where the trial court gave the murder,
passion/provocation, aggravated/reckless manslaughter model jury charge at
defendant's request, we find no plain error. See State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325
(2005).
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by giving separate
instructions on the mental disease or defect defense in different places in the
jury instruction. Defendant argues this was confusing to the jury, and that it
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could have caused them to conclude that the lack of mental capacity defense did
not apply to all of the charged crimes. We reject this argument. Again, the trial
court utilized the model jury charges, with appropriate "modifi[cations] to meet
the facts adduced at trial . . . ." Ibid.3 Not only did the defendant not object to
this charge, but the record shows an extensive colloquy between counsel and the
court on this topic during the charge conference. Defendant has failed to show
plain error here. Any other arguments made by defendant lack sufficient merit
to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
3
Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Evidence of Mental Disease or Defect
(N.J.S.A. 2C: 4-2)" (rev. June 5, 2006).
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