STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHARLES T. LEDBETTER (14-09-0508, SALEM COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                  NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1527-15T4
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    CHARLES T. LEDBETTER, a/k/a
    CHARLES T. LEADBETTER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Submitted October 17, 2018 – Decided January 29, 2019
    Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 14-09-0508.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Alicia J. Hubbard, Assistant Deputy Public
    Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
    John T. Lenahan, Salem County Prosecutor, attorney
    for respondent (David M. Galemba, Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Tried by a jury, defendant Charles Ledbetter was convicted of second,
    third, and fourth-degree aggravated assault (counts two, three, and four of the
    indictment), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1)-(3); third-degree endangering an impaired
    or helpless person (count five), N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a); and third-degree
    possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (count seven), N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-4. Defendant was sentenced October 30, 2015, as a persistent offender,
    to fourteen years subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A.
    2C:43-7.2, and a consecutive term of five years, two years without parole, on
    the endangering count. Thus defendant's aggregate sentence was nineteen years
    imprisonment, with a fourteen-year parole disqualifier. We affirm.
    The victim, M.W., was acquainted with defendant from the neighborhood.
    She was friendly with defendant's girlfriend, Natonya Lusby, and had previously
    seen defendant, both day and night, over a dozen times. The evening the incident
    occurred, M.W. had been drinking and smoking marijuana with friends in the
    neighborhood, including Timothy Taylor.       Despite her intoxication, M.W.
    testified that she was "fine" and "coherent." At around 11:00 p.m., when M.W.
    heard "a commotion," she went outside and saw Taylor arguing with defendant
    and others. M.W. told the men to take it elsewhere. A few minutes later, when
    M.W. walked outside, she saw Taylor on the ground while defendant and two
    A-1527-15T4
    2
    others stood over him. M.W. attempted to intercede, and during the ensuing five
    to ten-minute altercation, M.W. was "face to face" with defendant. Eventually,
    defendant and his friends walked away. M.W. and Taylor went back inside her
    home.
    After midnight, Lusby and one of her friends encountered defendant on
    the street. He told Lusby, as she recounted during trial, that he had just had a
    fight with Taylor and M.W., and that M.W. had hit and grabbed him, and pulled
    his hair. He told Lusby to "handle that." Defendant and his companions walked
    down the street.
    M.W. was seated outside of a duplex where Lusby's mother lived, waiting
    for the delivery of cigarettes she had paid for when she suddenly felt a punch to
    the back of her head. When she turned around, she saw Lusby, and the two
    women fell to the ground. Lusby's friend started kicking both women. As she
    tried to get up, M.W. said Lusby also started kicking her, as were two others.
    She noticed defendant walking quickly towards her around the side of the house
    with a gray pitbull by his side. He had the leash wrapped around his hand to the
    collar.
    Defendant held the pitbull to M.W.'s face, repeatedly punching her and
    the dog until finally the dog began to bite her. The dog locked onto the left side
    A-1527-15T4
    3
    of her face, and M.W. said despite the attack, she was still being kicked. When
    M.W. turned her face, the dog then locked onto the other side. Police were
    called, and the attack ended abruptly. M.W. was immediately taken to the
    emergency room. One of the officers who arrived could see M.W.'s teeth and
    jawbone through a sizable hole in her face. Although she could not speak, when
    the officer asked her if she knew who had done this to her, she nodded.
    M.W.'s injuries were extensive, disfiguring, and resulted in the paralysis
    of one side of her face and multiple reconstructive surgeries, with more to come.
    The following morning, an investigator arrived who had known M.W. for
    twenty-three years. She was lethargic and in obvious pain. Because she did not
    want to become the subject of retaliation, she initially told the officer she did
    not know the identity of her attacker. Eventually, however, M.W. admitted that
    "Cheddar," defendant's nickname, was the person who forced the dog on her.
    The officer, who had known defendant for over a decade, immediately connected
    the nickname to defendant, who lived one street over from the location of the
    incident. The following day, the officer returned to the hospital with another
    investigator.
    Although heavily medicated and still in much pain, M.W. again identified
    "Cheddar" as the attacker, and described his physical appearance and attire that
    A-1527-15T4
    4
    night. The following day, approximately three days after the assault, the officer
    showed M.W. a photograph of defendant with his identifiers folded underneath
    and asked if she knew who he was. She responded that it was Cheddar, "that's
    him."    The officer testified at the Wade1 hearing that no photo array was
    presented because M.W. knew the suspect.          Defendant and Lusby were
    eventually arrested. When asked about the dog, Lusby said to ask defendant
    because she had nothing to do with it. She later entered into a plea agreement,
    and then said that defendant had a black pitbull on a leash, and was hitting it
    while it bit M.W. At trial, Lusby modified her account. She then said defendant
    was punching the dog in order to stop him from biting M.W.
    On January 16, 2015, in response to defendant's motion, Judge Timothy
    G. Farrell conducted a hearing to suppress the out-of-court identification. He
    concluded that showing M.W. one photograph was impermissibly suggestive
    within the meaning of State v. Henderson, 
    208 N.J. 208
     (2011). At the close of
    the hearing, at which the police officers who interviewed M.W. and Lusby
    testified, the judge concluded that because M.W. was socially acquainted with
    defendant prior to the incident, the manner in which she was shown his
    photograph "would not likely lead to a mistaken identification." Judge Farrell
    1
    U.S. v. Wade, 
    388 U.S. 218
     (1967).
    A-1527-15T4
    5
    analyzed each prong of Henderson as it applied to the evidence, including the
    neutral fashion in which the officers presented the photograph to M.W. and the
    fact all of M.W.'s interviews were tape recorded while she was hospitalized.
    Judge Farrell stated that not only had defendant failed to establish a likelihood
    of irreparable misidentification, the identification by the victim was
    "sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial; and, would [warrant] both th e out-
    of-court identification and if appropriate, an in-court identification[,] to be
    admitted."
    The last day of trial, Judge Benjamin C. Telsey advised counsel that draft
    charges would be provided for their review before closing arguments. Only the
    prosecutor requested a special charge, that being a tailored aggravated assault
    instruction. When trial resumed, the court provided a second set of the jury
    instructions as modified after the charge conference.         Defendant made no
    requests.
    The following day, after closing arguments, Judge Telsey advised that he
    would be issuing in-court and out-of-court identification instructions, although
    not requested by the attorneys. Defendant approved the draft of the instruction.
    The court therefore delivered a ten-page identification charge substantially
    conforming to the model jury charge for in-court and out-of-court identification
    A-1527-15T4
    6
    drafted post-Henderson. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Identification:
    In-Court And Out-Of-Court Identifications" (Rev. July 19, 2012).
    When defendant was sentenced, the court granted the State's persistent
    offender extended-term application pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3. Defendant
    had an extensive juvenile history beginning in 1996, and at least six prior
    indictable convictions as an adult. The judge therefore found that defendant met
    the baseline qualifications under the statute. In sentencing, Judge Telsey found
    aggravating factor one, the nature and circumstances of the offense, N.J.S.A.
    2C:44-1(a)(1); three, the risk that defendant will commit another offense,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six, the extent of defendant's prior criminal record and
    the seriousness of the offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and nine, the need to
    deter defendant and others from violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).
    Judge Telsey also found in mitigation factor four, that substantial grounds
    tending to excuse or justify defendant's conduct existed based on defendant's
    unspecified mental health issues. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4). Those mental
    health issues established defendant's eligibility for Social Security disability
    benefits. The judge also found factor six in mitigation, that defendant would
    compensate the victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(6).      Because he concluded the
    aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating, Judge Telsey
    A-1527-15T4
    7
    sentenced defendant to a NERA fourteen years, in the mid-range of first-degree
    offenses. As required by the mandatory provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(d), he
    sentenced defendant to a consecutive mandatory five-year term subject to two
    years of parole ineligibility.
    On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
    POINT I
    THE COURT ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONSIDER
    AN        UNRELIABLE              OUT-OF-COURT
    IDENTIFICATION, DESPITE THERE BEING A
    SUBSTANTIAL            LIKELIHOOD           OF
    MISIDENTIFICATION, AND COMPOUNDED THE
    PROBLEM BY FAILING TO PROVIDE THE FACT
    FINDERS       WITH     APPROPRIATE        JURY
    INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO CONSIDER THE
    EVIDENCE. (U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, VI, XIV;
    N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I, ¶¶ 9, 10)
    A. Admission of an Unreliable Identification.
    B. Failure to Provide Appropriate Jury Instructions.
    POINT II
    THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO
    PROVIDE THE JURY WITH AN INSTRUCTION ON
    HOW TO CONSIDER WHAT WEIGHT, IF ANY, TO
    ATTRIBUTE TO [DEFENDANT]'S ALLEGED
    STATEMENT THAT HE TOLD HIS CO-
    DEFENDANT THAT [M.W.] HAD ACCOSTED HIM
    AND THEN ASKED THE CO-DEFENDANT TO
    "HANDLE" MS. M.W., DENIED [DEFENDANT] A
    FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS. (U.S. CONST.
    A-1527-15T4
    8
    AMEND. V, VI AND XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947), ART.
    I, ¶ 10)
    POINT III
    THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS
    DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.
    POINT IV
    AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE WAS IMPOSED
    AFTER THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER
    APPLICABLE MITIGATING FACTORS.
    POINT V
    THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER TO PAY
    RESTITUTION WITHOUT FIRST CONSIDERING
    [DEFENDANT'S] ABILITY TO PAY AND THE
    ORDER TO PAY OUT OF FUNDS DERIVED
    WHOLLY FROM SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
    BENEFITS VIOLATED THE NEW JERSEY
    CRIMINAL CODE AND THE FEDERAL ANTI-
    ALIENATION    PROVISIONS     CONCERNING
    SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS (U.S. Const. art. IV,
    c1.2).
    A. The Court Failed To Make A Determination Of
    [Defendant's] Ability To Pay, As Required by N.J.S.A.
    2C:44-2.
    B. The Court's Imposition of Restitution from Income
    De[riving] Wholly from Social Security Disability
    Benefits Contravened Federal Law.
    A-1527-15T4
    9
    I.
    In order to demonstrate that he or she is entitled to a Wade hearing, a
    defendant must offer some evidence of impermissible suggestiveness.
    Henderson, 208 N.J. at 238. That evidence may be linked to system variables,
    in other words, those factors within the control of the criminal justice system.
    Id. at 247; 288-89. This is in contrast to estimator variables, which are factors
    over which the legal system has no control. Id. at 247. In order to decide
    whether a hearing is warranted, a court must first assess whether the
    identification procedures may have resulted in a mistaken identification. Id. at
    288. Once a judge decides to conduct a hearing, the issue becomes whether the
    procedure   resulted   in       a    "very    substantial   likelihood   of   irreparable
    misidentification." State v. Micelli, 
    215 N.J. 284
    , 287 (2013) (citation omitted).
    The burden shifts to the State to prove by "clear and convincing evidence
    that the identification[] . . . had a source independent of the police-conducted
    identification procedures." State v. Madison, 
    109 N.J. 223
    , 245 (1988) (citing
    Wade, 
    388 U.S. at 240
    ).             However, "the ultimate burden remains on the
    defendant    to   prove     a       very     substantial    likelihood   of   irreparable
    misidentification." Henderson, 208 N.J. at 289.
    A-1527-15T4
    10
    In this case, the Wade hearing was necessary. Defendant demonstrated
    some evidence of suggestiveness in that only one photograph was shown to
    M.W.    Id. at 288.   But, once the court heard the officers' testimony, and
    considered each and every Henderson factor, his conclusion that no possibility
    of irreparable misidentification existed was unassailable.
    M.W.'s use of marijuana and alcohol on the night in question, did not,
    according to her testimony, affect her ability to identify defendant. It is sheer
    speculation to suggest that it would have led her to misidentify an acquaintance.
    Furthermore, even the administration of powerful anti-pain killers subsequent to
    the attack would not have caused such confusion.
    As the judge said, M.W. was acquainted with defendant, knew with whom
    she was dealing, stated from the onset that she knew the person who forced the
    dog to attack her even though she did not know his last name, and although she
    was shown only one photograph, was shown that photograph in a neutral
    manner. The issue is not whether defendant's picture should have been included
    in a photo array. The issue is whether in the manner in which it was shown, any
    possibility of misidentification arose. The court's findings, supported by the
    record, should not be disturbed.     The interests of justice do not demand
    intervention or correction.   See State v. Elders, 
    192 N.J. 224
    , 244 (2007)
    A-1527-15T4
    11
    (quoting State v. Johnson, 
    42 N.J. 146
    , 162 (1964)). There is no merit to
    defendant's contention that the court erred by admitting an unreliable
    identification.
    II.
    If an error has not been brought to the trial court's attention, we will not
    reverse unless the appellant shows plain error, or error "clearly capable of
    producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. In relation to jury instructions, plain
    error is "legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial
    rights of the defendant sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing
    court and to convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity
    to bring about an unjust result." State v. Nero, 
    195 N.J. 397
    , 407 (2008) (quoting
    State v. Chapland, 
    187 N.J. 275
    , 289 (2006) (quoting State v. Hock, 
    54 N.J. 526
    ,
    538 (1969))).
    It is beyond dispute that proper identification instructions are essential in
    all cases, and particularly those upon which the prosecution is based on
    identification evidence:
    [w]hen identification is a "key issue", the trial court
    must instruct the jury on identification, even if a
    defendant does not make that request. Identification
    becomes a key issue when "[i]t [is] the major . . . thrust
    of the defense," particularly in cases where the State
    relies on a single victim-eyewitness.
    A-1527-15T4
    12
    [State v. Cotto, 
    182 N.J. 316
    , 325-26 (2005) (citations
    omitted).]
    Moreover, "[t]he charge to the jury must be read as a whole in determining
    whether there was any error."      State v. Adams, 
    194 N.J. 186
    , 207 (2008).
    Additionally, "[a]lthough arguments of counsel can by no means serve as a
    substitute for instruction by the court, the prejudicial effect of an omitted
    instruction must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances —
    including all the instructions to the jury, [and] the arguments of counsel." 
    Ibid.
    (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Marshall, 
    123 N.J. 1
    , 145 (1991)).
    Defendant argues that the "trial court compounded the problem of the
    admission of the unreliable identification by giving inadequate jury instructions
    on the issue of identification." Defendant contends that the model jury charge
    for identification, which includes the "double-blind," "showup," and "fillers"
    language, should have been presented to the jury. Defendant also maintains that
    the "court never tailored the identification instruction about how the ingestion
    of substances can affect reliability to include drugs, as footnote twelve in the
    model instruction states the court may do."
    The trial court gave the jury comprehensive, relevant instructions on in-
    court and out-of-court identifications, which were reviewed and approved by
    A-1527-15T4
    13
    defendant. See State v. McGraw, 
    129 N.J. 68
    , 80 (1992) (finding that trial
    counsel's acceptance of the charge drafted by the court indicates that counsel did
    not view the alleged error on appeal as prejudicial to the defense).
    Further, as a plain reading of the "double-blind" and "fillers" charges
    reveals, these charges are reserved for cases in which a lineup is used. They are
    not intended for the identification procedure employed here, where M.W.
    initially identified the suspect by nickname, and where the officer's act of
    showing M.W. a photo of the person associated with that nickname was simply
    a confirmation process.
    Defendant's claim that the court should have charged the jury on "showup"
    is also unpersuasive. The process the officers followed here was not a showup
    as relevant to the instruction. The showup instruction, which advises that "the
    witness identified the defendant during a 'showup,'" would have been misleading
    and prejudicial to the State. It would have suggested that M.W. could not
    identify her assailant until his picture was shown to her, when the opposite was
    true.    She supplied defendant's nickname, and the officers showed her a
    photograph of that person for confirmation.
    In any event, in both his opening and closing statements, defendant
    stressed the potential for a mistaken identification because the police only
    A-1527-15T4
    14
    presented M.W. with a single photograph. A jury charge must be considered "in
    light of the arguments made by trial counsel, as those arguments can mitigate
    prejudice resulting from a less-than-perfect charge." State v. Robinson, 
    165 N.J. 32
    , 47 (2000) (citing State v. Morton, 
    155 N.J. 383
    , 423 (1998)). In arguing
    "unreliable identification" in his opening statements, defendant maintained that
    the State "implanted [defendant] in [M.W.'s] brain" by only showing one
    photograph instead of an array. In closing, defendant emphasized the lack of a
    photo array, the "power of suggestion" from showing a single photograph, the
    "social" connection between M.W. and the officer who interviewed her, and
    M.W.'s bias against defendant as a result of the fight with Taylor. Thus, any
    possible prejudice from the omission of the above instructions was mitigated by
    defendant's comments.
    Finally, defendant maintains that the court should have tailored the
    identification instruction to M.W.'s alcohol and drug use. The court gave the
    standard "intoxication" instruction, which states that
    [t]he influence of alcohol can affect the reliability of an
    identification. An identification made by a witness
    under the influence of a high level of alcohol at the time
    of the incident tends to be more unreliable than an
    identification by a witness who drank a small amount
    of alcohol.
    A-1527-15T4
    15
    [Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Identification: In-
    Court and Out-of-Court Identifications" (rev. July 19,
    2012).]
    With regard to M.W.'s use of powerful painkillers, they were not administered
    until after the offense. The intoxication instruction focuses on intoxication "at
    the time of the incident." Indeed, "intoxication" is a sub-factor to the factor
    "witness's opportunity to view and degree of attention," which "assess[es] the
    witness's opportunity to view the person who committed the offense at the time
    of the offense and the witness's degree of attention to the perpetrator at the time
    of the offense."
    Moreover, defendant repeatedly referenced M.W.'s drug use.        During
    opening, defendant argued that M.W. smoked marijuana before the incident,
    "inducing an altered state of consciousness, which has a[n] impact on your
    perception."     In summation, defendant again maintained that drinking and
    smoking marijuana could have impacted M.W.'s perception, particularly at
    night.     Counsel's arguments mitigated the minimal possibility that the jury
    would not have considered marijuana use when assessing the reliability of
    M.W.'s identification. See Robinson, 
    165 N.J. at 47
    . The argument that the
    omission of marijuana from the instruction prejudiced the outcome has no merit.
    A-1527-15T4
    16
    Defendant also contends that the State's remark minimizing the
    significance of M.W.'s use of alcohol and marijuana was an improper and unfair
    response to defendant's repeated assertions. However, the State is permitted to
    give a "measured response" to allegations made by defendant in summation.
    State v. Murray, 
    338 N.J. Super. 80
    , 88 (App. Div. 2001); see also State v.
    Darrian, 
    255 N.J. Super. 435
    , 454-55 (App. Div. 1992); State v. Engel, 
    249 N.J. Super. 336
    , 379-80 (App. Div. 1991). Here, the State's remarks were "invited"
    as a response to the summation offered by defendant and did no more than "right
    the scale." Engel, 
    249 N.J. Super. at 379
    ; United States v. Young, 
    470 U.S. 1
    ,
    12-13 (1985); State v. Munoz, 
    340 N.J. Super. 204
    , 216 (App. Div. 2001). The
    prosecutor's remark that the alcohol and marijuana did not affect her thinking
    was also a fair comment on the evidence, as M.W. testified that she was "fine"
    and "coherent" after having a couple of alcoholic drinks and sharing a blunt.
    There was no error in the jury charge. Certainly not error "clearly capable of
    producing an unjust result." See R. 2:10-2.
    III.
    Nor did the trial court err in omitting the Hampton/Kociolek charge.
    Defendant contends the trial court should have given a jury instruction on
    defendant's alleged oral statement to his co-defendant that she "handle that."
    A-1527-15T4
    17
    Such omissions constitute reversible error "only when, in the context of the
    entire case, the omission is 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" State
    v. Jordan, 
    147 N.J. 409
    , 425 (1997) (quoting R. 2:10-2). If "the defendant's
    statement is unnecessary to prove defendant's guilt because there is other
    evidence that clearly establishes guilt, . . . the failure to give a Hampton charge
    would not be reversible error." 
    Id. at 425-26
    .
    In this case, defendant did not request either a Hampton or Kociolek
    instruction. Since no objection was heard at the time the charge was given, we
    presume no error occurred likely to prejudice defendant's case.            State v.
    Singleton, 
    211 N.J. 157
    , 182 (2012). The presumption controls here. Defense
    counsel was involved in at least two formal on-the-record charge conferences,
    and given at least two separate drafts of the jury instructions. During closing,
    defendant actually used the statement he made to Lusby that she "handle" M.W.
    to his benefit.      He argued that by making the request, he gave Lusby the
    responsibility to obtain revenge. Defendant made a strategic decision to use the
    statement to his benefit. He cannot now successfully maintain that the omission
    of the instructions, which call upon juries to examine such statements very
    closely because of the possibility they were not made or misheard, was
    prejudicial error.
    A-1527-15T4
    18
    The court did charge the jury regarding witness credibility and prior
    contradictory statements. The court instructed the jury on how to evaluate the
    testimony. The court delivered the general credibility instruction advising the
    jury to consider a number of factors, including the witness's appearance and
    demeanor, bias, power of discernment, ability to observe and recollect, and
    whether the witness's testimony was supported or unsupported by other
    evidence. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "General Information as to
    Credibility of Witnesses" (revised May 12, 2014). The final charge included
    specific instructions as to the witnesses' prior inconsistent statements.       See
    Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Credibility: Prior Contradictory Statements of
    Witnesses (Not Defendant) " (approved May 23, 1994). The final charge also
    instructed the jury to consider the witnesses' prior convictions. See Model Jury
    Charges (Criminal), "Credibility: Prior Conviction of a Witness" (revised
    February 24, 2003). The charge adequately conveyed to the jury the information
    necessary to evaluate each witness's testimony.
    IV.
    We do not address defendant's cumulative error argument as we consider
    it to be so lacking in merit as to not warrant discussion in a written opinion. See
    R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
    A-1527-15T4
    19
    V.
    In challenging his sentence, defendant focuses upon mitigating factor
    eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(11). Clearly, as the judge said, nothing about this
    defendant's relationship to his family warranted consideration of that factor ,
    which requires extraordinary circumstances.          Every defendant who is
    incarcerated causes great hardship to his family and loved ones due to his
    imprisonment. See State v. Dalziel, 
    182 N.J. 494
    , 505 (2005).
    Moreover, a defendant's sentence is subject to "limited appellate review"
    where the trial judge "properly identifies and balances aggravating and
    mitigating factors that are supported by competent credible evidence in the
    record." State v. Cassady, 
    198 N.J. 165
    , 180 (2009) (quoting State v. O'Donnell,
    
    117 N.J. 210
    , 215 (1989)). This court must not "second-guess a trial court's
    finding of sufficient facts to support an aggravating or mitigating factor if that
    finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record." O'Donnell, 
    117 N.J. at 216
    .
    In the end, where the sentence is reasonable, we are "bound to affirm a
    sentence, even if [the appellate court] would have arrived at a different result."
    Cassady, 
    198 N.J. at 180
     (quoting O'Donnell, 
    117 N.J. at 215
    ). We do not
    "substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting State v.
    A-1527-15T4
    20
    Evers, 
    175 N.J. 355
    , 386 (2003)). If the sentencing court's findings of facts are
    grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence and the court has applied
    correct legal principles in exercising its discretion, then we modify the sentence
    only if application of the facts to the law is such a clear error of judgment that
    it "shocks the judicial conscience." State v. Roth, 
    95 N.J. 334
    , 363-65 (1984).
    The sentence in this case was supported by aggravating and mitigating
    factors, which in turn were supported by evidence in the record. No error of
    judgment occurred, much less a clear error of judgment. The court correctly
    applied legal principles to the facts.
    VI.
    Finally, defendant contends that defendant should not have been orde red
    to pay restitution as his sole source of income was his Social Security disability
    benefits, which are not subject to garnishment. We do not reach that argument
    as in fact according to 
    42 U.S.C. § 402
    (x), incarcerated persons who receive
    disability benefits generally forfeit their benefits during incarceration. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.468
     (2017).       Even if that were not the case, the amount of
    restitution that the court ordered, $8593.69 was payable to the Violent Crimes
    Compensation Board (VCCB), as it had paid that amount to M.W. for medical
    and dental treatment.     Under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2), a sentencing court is
    A-1527-15T4
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    required to order a "defendant to pay any restitution ordered for a loss previously
    compensated by the Board to the [VCCB]." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-2(c)(2). Thus,
    defendant is obligated to pay restitution, not to the victim, but to the VCCB.
    This point also lacks merit.
    Affirmed.
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