STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. KAMAL EDGE (14-05-0443, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4034-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KAMAL EDGE, a/k/a
RICO EDGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted November 15, 2018 – Decided December 31, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Reisner.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 14-05-0443.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Marc A. Festa, Senior
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Tried by a jury, defendant Kamal Edge was convicted of third-degree
possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(1); 1 second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b); and fourth-degree resisting arrest by flight, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2).
He was acquitted of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). The following day, the same jury convicted
defendant of second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7(a). On March 31, 2017, the judge merged the weapons offenses, and
imposed a sentence of five years subject to a five-year parole bar, concurrent to
concurrent terms of three years on the drug possession and eighteen months on
the resisting arrest. He now appeals, and we affirm.
The incident that led to the indictment requires only a brief description.
Defendant, who was outside his home, spotted police approaching, intending to
serve an arrest warrant upon him. He began to run while holding onto his
waistband. Despite being ordered to stop, defendant continued running, vaulting
over a six-foot fence. Shortly thereafter, other officers cut him off and he was
1
Prior to trial, the State dismissed the following charges: possession of CDS
with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1); possession of CDS on school
property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7; and
attempt to cause injury to another with a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2).
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apprehended. When searched incident to the arrest, officers found eleven
glassines of heroin as well as a loaded handgun.
The trial, however, the source of the alleged errors raised on appeal,
requires more discussion. In closing, defense counsel suggested that the
officers' lack of detailed recollection of the arrest should cause the jurors to
question the reliability of their testimony and acquit defendant.
In response, during his summation, the prosecutor stated that the officers
remembered the important "details that you would expect to -- a credible witness
to recall." He went on to challenge the suggestion that the officers were
"outright l[ying] or fabricat[ing]" as they did not fill in the blanks to make the
case seem stronger. The prosecutor continued:
We . . . need our police officers to perform certain
functions, perform certain services for us. Above all,
we need them to protect us, to serve the public. We also
need them to uphold and enforce the law, investigate
crimes and to arrest the people that they do. To do this
difficult job, we give them great authority and
impressive power. We entrust with them that authority
and power so that they can do their job well. We give
them uniforms to show their authority, badges, we give
them marked police cars with lights and sirens so that
we know that the person inside is a law enforcement
officer. We know that if those lights go on, they can
pull us over. We give them weapons. We give them
service weapons so that they can protect themselves and
protect others. These are awesome powers. Again, this
is a relationship between us and them built on trust and
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it's why on certain select instances when we see that
trust abused, when we see that power overused, when
we see that discretion we vest in them used recklessly,
it's so frustrating and it's so infuriating. It's also why
when we see that power used properly, it's so
rewarding, so inspiring. It's the way Detective-
Seargent Esposito and Officer Mineo use and wielded
their authority. It's the way we expect them to act.
Defense counsel objected. Outside the presence of the jury, he explained
his concerns and asked for a mistrial based on the fact that the prosecutor had
improperly vouched for the credibility of the officers. The prosecutor responded
that his comments were proper comment because they "highlight[ed] facts and
evidence that the jury should consider in finding those witnesses credibl e. I'm
allowed to advocate. I'm allowed to say that witnesses are credible." After
hearing the playback and listening to some additional on-the-record discussion,
the court charged the jury as follows:
If an attorney on either side is to give his opinion about
the testimony of a witness, whether it should be
believable, not believable, credible, not credible, okay,
does not count. What you believe is credible or not
credible is what counts.
You'll hear me describe in a little bit, probably
after lunch, the ways you judge the credibility and
believability of a witness and it's just any different from
how you judge people's credibility in your everyday
lives. In any event, it's your opinion, it's your
determination, it's what you thought was credible or not
credible that counts here. Okay? So if a lawyer
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expresses an opinion and maybe comment on the
evidence, that is not evidence, and it's only your
opinion that counts.
Presumably because the court did not clearly indicate whether it sustained
the objection, or for some other reason, the prosecutor continued his summation:
The defendant's moving rapidly, he's moving towards
him, he can't see his hands, but he doesn't escalate the
situation. This is how we expect our officers to wield
the authority we vest in them.
Think about what Officer Mineo did. He arrested
an armed fleeing suspect safely without him or the
defendant being injured. These are the actions of a
trustworthy officer. Another word for trustworthy is
credible.
Sometimes the simplest explanation is the best.
We are here today because when police went to arrest
the defendant, he ran. The defendant is guilty of
resisting arrest. We're here today because when the
defendant was arrested, he had on his person these
drugs, this heroin. The defendant is guilty of
possession of heroin. We're here because when he was
arrested he had in his right front pocket this unlicensed,
loaded, fully operational handgun with a round in the
chamber and the hammer cocked back. Kamal Edge is
guilty.
The judge repeated in his closing general charge the relevant language
regarding the fact that attorney arguments are not evidence. The judge also
included the instruction providing that the jury can consider flight as evidence
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of consciousness of guilt. See Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Flight" (rev. May
20, 2010).
Towards the end of the model jury charge on the substantive crime of
resisting arrest by flight, the judge added:
Not the -- not the flight that I -- the other flight that I
spoke about earlier has to do with a consideration of the
evidence that was presented. In this particular case,
you have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there
was flight.
He then continued:
The -- the defendant denies flight. Mere . . .
departure from a place where a crime has been
committed does not constitute flight. The State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant,
fearing that he would be arrested, fled for the purpose
of evading that arrest. The State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant, fearing that he
would be arrested, fled for the purpose of evading that
arrest.
If you find that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt all five elements of the offense, then
you must find the defendant guilty of resisting arrest by
flight. If the State has failed to prove the fifth element
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant
guilty only of the basic offense of resisting arrest.
[See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), Resisting Arrest-
Flight Alleged (N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)) (rev. May 7,
2007).]
Neither attorney objected to the judge's instructions.
A-4034-16T1
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On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
POINT I
IN THIS CASE, WHICH CENTERED ON THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE POLICE OFFICERS, THE
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS IN
SUMMATION VOUCHING FOR THE OFFICERS AS
"TRUSTWORTHY" AND "CREDIBLE";
REFERRING TO THE "RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THEM AND US BUILT ON TRUST"; AND
EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL [OPINION] THAT
THEIR ACTIONS IN THIS CASE WERE
"REWARDING" AND "INSPIRING." THE
PREJUDICE TO DEFENDANT WAS NOT
MITIGATED DUE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
FAILURE TO GIVE A MEANINGFUL LIMITING
INSTRUCTION.
POINT II
IN A CASE WHERE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED
WITH RESISTING ARREST BY FLIGHT, THE
JUDGE'S DECISION TO CHARGE FLIGHT AS
CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, WITHOUT
SPECIFICALLY INFORMING THE JURY THAT
THAT CHARGE DID NOT APPLY TO THE
RESISTING ARREST COUNT, LIKELY HAD THE
EFFECT OF CONFUSING THE JURY AND
REQUIRES THAT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION
FOR RESISTING ARREST BE VACATED.
I.
When reviewing a prosecutor's summation, the court must examine
questionable comments "in the context of the entire trial." State v. Morton, 155
N.J. 383, 419 (1998). This necessarily includes statements made by the defense
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counsel, such as their "opening salvo" or prosecutorial comments attempting to
"right the scale" in response. State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 379 (App.
Div. 1991) (citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985)). In order to
justify reversal, the prosecutor's summation must have been "clearly and
unmistakably improper," and must have "substantially prejudiced defendant's
fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense." State
v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 438 (2007).
Moreover, with regard to summations addressing testimony of State
witnesses, the prosecution may never vouch for their credibility, nor imply
mandatory acceptance by virtue of their profession. State v. Bradshaw, 195 N.J.
493, 510 (2008); State v. Staples, 263 N.J. Super. 602, 606 (App. Div. 1993).
For summations addressing comments by police officers in particular, the State
must be careful in its comments because police "occupy a position of authority
in our communities," and it is possible that ordinary citizens will be more likely
to believe them than others. State v. Hawk, 327 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div.
2000). If however, the trial court directly addressed the issue with "a timely and
effective limiting instruction," the potential prejudice may be cured. State v.
Jackson, 211 N.J. 394, 413 (2012).
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In Bradshaw, the Court made clear that although a prosecutor is afforded
considerable leeway in closing, he is limited to comments based solely on the
evidence and solely upon reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. 195
N.J. at 510. In this case, like in Bradshaw, the State had no basis in the record
whatsoever for any broad brush discussion of the purported reasonableness of
the police officers' response to defendant's conduct. A discussion about the
power vested in police, society's reliance on police officers, and the trust we
repose in them when we arm them, went far beyond anything in the record. By
engaging in generalities regarding the officers' professionalism in this case, and
expressing his own opinion about it in order to bolster the officers' credibility,
the prosecutor did exactly what is forbidden. His approving language regarding
their performance had little to do with whether they were credible witnesses.
See State v. Blakney, 189 N.J. 88, 95-96 (2006).
It is a prosecutor's duty, as Blakney stated, not to obtain convictions "but
to see that justice is done." Id. at 96 (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123,
320 (1987)). In this case, where the facts were so clear, and the officers'
testimony was undisputed except by defense counsel's weak argument that the
failure to recall minutia meant they were incredible, the State's inflammatory
closing was entirely unnecessary. It seems particularly egregious that after the
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court's instruction, the prosecutor continued in the same flag-waving vein as if
defense counsel's objection had been overruled, without acknowledging in any
manner that his statements went beyond the limit.
The judge's instruction, although it may have ameliorated the harm
somewhat, did not directly address the problem. He should have sustained the
objection and stricken the comments from the record.
Because this is such a straightforward case in which the State's proofs
were so strong, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor's improper comments
prevented the jury from rendering a just verdict based solely on the evidence.
See State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 161 (1991). We hold this error, which is not
insignificant, harmless in the context of the entire trial. State v. Morton, 155
N.J. 383, 419 (1998).
II.
Defendant's next argues that the trial court confused the jury, because it
failed to properly distinguish flight as consciousness of guilt from flight in
resisting arrest. We do not agree.
It is well-settled that "appropriate and proper jury charges are essential to
a fair trial." State v. Savage, 172 N.J. 374, 387 (2002). The standard for
assessing the soundness of a challenged jury instruction is "how and in what
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sense, under the evidence before them, and the circumstances of the trial, would
ordinary . . . jurors understand the instructions as a whole." Ibid. Even though
a defendant generally waives the right to appeal an unchallenged instruction, an
appellate court may still reverse pursuant to the plain error standard. State v.
Adams, 194 N.J. 186, 206-07 (2008); R. 2:10-2. Under the plain error standard,
an appellate court will only reverse if a mistake is "clearly capable of producing
an unjust result," and a reasonable doubt exists "as to whether the error led the
jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Funderburg, 225
N.J. 66, 79 (2016).
With regard to specific flight instructions, "evidence of flight or escape
from custody by an accused generally is admissible as demonstrating
consciousness of guilt, and is therefore regarded as probative of guilt." State v.
Mann, 132 N.J. 410, 418 (1993). Additionally, if the trial court deems evidence
of flight admissible, "it must instruct the jury carefully regarding the inferences
the jury may draw from that evidence." Id. at 420. In doing so, the court must
"carefully consider whether it is appropriate to charge flight, and, if so, must
tailor the charge to the facts of the case to prevent juror confusion." State v.
Randolph, 441 N.J. Super. 533, 563-64 (App. Div. 2015).
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The flight as consciousness of guilt charge applied only to the possessory
offenses, while the resisting arrest by flight charge explained an actual offense
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant now argues that the
instruction confused the jury because it did not unambiguously clarify the
distinction. Defendant's argument is based in part on two unpublished cases that
have no precedential value. R. 1:36-3. Defense counsel did not raise an
objection at the time, thus we examine the issue under the plain error standard.
See Adams, 194 N.J. at 206-07; R. 2:10-2.
Faced with two flight charges, the trial court separated them to avoid
confusion. He instructed the jury as to flight as consciousness of guilt as part
of his general closing charge. Only much later, at the end of all the substantive
instructions, did he define the crime of resisting arrest by flight. The judge
inserted his own words into the model charge, stating that, "the other flight that
I spoke about earlier has to do with a consideration of the evidence that was
presented. In this particular case, you have to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that there was flight."
Although the judge could have explained the distinction more explicitly,
he informed the jury that the instruction about the substantive crime differed
from that which was a circumstance indicating consciousness of guilt. Telling
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the jury that the flight instruction he gave earlier "has to do with a consideration
of the evidence that was presented[]" sufficed in context and because the model
charge on resisting arrest came at the end of all the substantive charges.
Therefore, we find no merit to this claim of error either.
Affirmed.
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