DCPP VS. S.S. AND A.H., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF S.A.R.H. (FG-01-0043-17, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2388-17T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
S.S.,1
Defendant-Appellant,
and
A.H.,2
Defendant.
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF S.A.R.H.,
a Minor.
1
We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the parties' privacy. R. 1:38-
3(d)(12).
2
A.H. is the biological mother of S.A.R.H. A.H.'s parental rights were
terminated upon the entry of a judgment of guardianship after default and a proof
hearing conducted on January 11, 2018. A.H. is not participating in this appeal.
_________________________________
Argued December 19, 2018 – Decided January 17, 2019
Before Judges Ostrer, Currier, and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County,
Docket No. FG-01-0043-17.
Catherine F. Reid, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Catherine F. Reid, on the briefs).
Michelle D. Perry-Thompson, Deputy Attorney
General, argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Michelle D.
Perry-Thompson, on the brief).
Damen J. Thiel, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney; Meredith A. Pollock, Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel; Damen J. Thiel, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant S.S. appeals from a January 11, 2018 order terminating his
parental rights to his daughter, S.A.R.H. (Sara), born in June 2016. We affirm.
Just after Sara's birth, hospital staff contacted the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (Division) with concerns regarding the mental
health of the child's mother, A.H., and her ability to care for Sara. The Division
A-2388-17T4
2
conducted an investigation and executed an emergency removal of Sara three
days after her birth. Sara was placed with resource parents who she remains
with today.
Defendant was not present for Sara's birth because he was incarcerated in
May 2016. Shortly before Sara's birth, defendant was charged with distributing
controlled substances, receiving stolen property, resisting arrest, and possess ing
a weapon for an unlawful purpose. When defendant was charged with these
crimes, he was aware of Sara's imminent birth.
To avoid a prison term and attend the birth of his child, defendant entered
into a plea in which he agreed to attend a drug treatment program. If he violated
the terms of the plea agreement, defendant understood he would be incarcerated.
Five days after entering the drug treatment facility, defendant was caught
smoking marijuana and discharged from the program. Based on his violation of
the plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to serve three years in prison.3
On July 12, 2016, a Division case worker met with defendant at the county
jail and explained Sara had been removed from her mother and was living with
3
During oral argument, defendant's counsel advised the panel that defendant
was released from prison in June 2018. In October 2018, defendant was charged
with three new crimes. The new charges remain pending as of December 2018.
A-2388-17T4
3
a resource family. Defendant expressed a desire to have custody of Sara and
asked the case worker for a picture of the child.
The case worker also contacted defendant's probation officer. The
probation officer discussed defendant's gang-related activities and past criminal
history. The probation officer confirmed defendant was discharged from the
drug treatment facility for smoking marijuana and engaging in inappropriate
behavior. The probation officer informed the case worker that defendant had
mental health issues.
After the meeting in July 2016, the Division was unable to contact
defendant again until August 2017. Although it attempted to contact defendant,
he transferred between prison facilities frequently, making it difficult for the
Division to meet with him.
The Division proceeded with the custody litigation. In September 2016,
the family court issued an order continuing the Division's custody of Sara and
scheduling a fact-finding hearing. Defendant was not present at this conference,
but was represented by counsel. In October 2016, the court held a hearing
attended by defendant's counsel and determined Sara should remain in the
Division's custody.
A-2388-17T4
4
On January 30, 2017, the court conducted a permanency hearing, at which
the Division presented a plan to terminate the parents' rights. The maternal
grandmother was asked where A.H. lived and whether A.H. sought custody of
Sara. Counsel for defendant was present at this hearing, but defendant himself
was not. No testimony regarding termination of defendant's parental rights was
taken during this hearing. Defendant contends the Division misadvised the
judge during this hearing regarding the length of his incarceration. Defendant
asserts if he had been present in court that day, he would have corrected the
record as to the length of his incarceration.
The next permanency hearing occurred on April 10, 2017. Neither
defendant nor his attorney were in court on this date. The Division resubmitted
its permanency plan because the time limit for completing the plan was about to
expire.
Additional permanency hearings occurred on May 30 and 31, 2017.
Defendant and his counsel were not in court on these dates. No fact-findings
were presented to the court. The hearing merely resulted in the resubmission
and reapproval of the Division's prior permanency plan.
On August 29, 2017, the court held a hearing to determine the steps needed
to complete the guardianship litigation. The Division met with defendant that
A-2388-17T4
5
day to discuss the guardianship proceeding and served him with the guardianship
complaint. Defendant was present at this hearing, but was not represented by
counsel. The judge ordered the Division to continue custody of Sara. In
addition, the judge ordered defendant to undergo a psychological evaluation and
sign a release allowing the Division to review any services completed while
incarcerated.
On September 26, 2017, the court held a final conference before the
guardianship trial. Defendant and his counsel participated in this conference.
The Division reaffirmed its commitment to terminate defendant's parental rights
and reported that defendant's psychological and bonding evaluations were
scheduled. The judge scheduled the guardianship trial for December 2017.
When the evaluations were completed, the judge commenced the
guardianship trial. The testifying witnesses included the Division's expert, Dr.
Ronald S. Gruen, a Division case worker, and defendant.
Dr. Gruen testified defendant understood the situation related to custody
of Sara. Defendant admitted to Dr. Gruen it would be difficult for Sara if she
were removed from her resource parents.
Based on his interview with defendant, Dr. Gruen provided background
information about defendant's childhood. Defendant explained to the doctor he
A-2388-17T4
6
was left alone frequently as a child because his mother worked and his father
had substance abuse problems. Defendant told Dr. Gruen he received
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) as a child because he was diagnosed with
depression and paranoia. As of the date of his evaluation, defendant was taking
medication for depression and anxiety. Based on defendant's personal history,
including his juvenile detentions and criminal activities, Dr. Gruen concluded
defendant was not deterred from criminal activity and "lived a lifestyle of acting
out, [and] irresponsible behavior."
Dr. Gruen diagnosed defendant with a personality disorder and substance
abuse issues. The doctor testified these disorders reduced defendant's ability to
improve his lifestyle and care for his daughter. According to Dr. Gruen,
individuals with a dual diagnosis may succeed over a short time period, but were
likely to fail over the long term because such patients are unable to overcome
their issues, grow desperate, and ultimately return to criminal life.
Dr. Gruen concluded defendant presented with "[p]ersonality [d]isorder
with [n]arcissistic and [d]epressive traits[,]" struggles with interpersonal
relationships, has low self-esteem, and his "feelings of failure may lead to
suicidal ideation." Based on these findings, Dr. Gruen advised against removing
A-2388-17T4
7
Sara from her resource parents. Dr. Gruen explained defendant was not in a
position to care for Sara without significant rehabilitation and parenting classes.
Dr. Gruen also explained defendant required extensive treatment for his
mental health issues. According to the doctor, defendant had to complete
substance abuse treatment and engage in individual therapy prior to caring for
Sara. Dr. Gruen testified defendant required at least one year of intense
treatment after his release from prison. Based on that timetable, Dr. Gruen
opined removal of Sara from her resource parents would have a significant
negative impact on the child.
Dr. Gruen testified no bond existed between Sara and defendant. Sara was
fifteen months old at the time of the bonding evaluation. Despite defendant's
best efforts to sooth Sara, she cried throughout the bonding evaluation.
Defendant attempted to calm Sara and told Dr. Gruen "[i]t hurt[ ] to see her cry."
Based on the bonding evaluation, Dr. Gruen expressed no harm would come to
Sara if her relationship with defendant was severed.
Dr. Gruen also conducted a bonding evaluation between Sara and her
resource parents. The evaluation revealed a secure bond between Sara and her
resource parents. The resource parents expressed their love for Sara and
intention to adopt Sara at the conclusion of the litigation. Dr. Gruen testified
A-2388-17T4
8
Sara had a high level of comfort and trust with her resource parents. He opined
there would be significant emotional harm if Sara were removed from her
resource parents, and defendant would not be able to ameliorate the harm if he
gained custody.
The Division's case worker testified regarding the Division's efforts to
meet with defendant. According to the case worker, the Division only met with
defendant twice over a thirteen-month period because he moved frequently
between prison facilities. When the Division eventually contacted defendant,
he offered his mother, his brother, and his sister as potential placements for Sara.
He also told the Division about services offered in prison, but explained he could
not participate in the services due to a long waiting list. 4
The Division's case worker testified there was no contact or
communication between defendant and his daughter while defendant was in
prison. The case worker told the judge that defendant never asked the Division
to deliver letters he may have written to Sara or if he could meet Sara while he
was incarcerated.
4
Other than defendant's own testimony regarding the availability of services in
prison, there was no other evidence supporting his claim.
A-2388-17T4
9
The case worker also explained the Division's efforts to investigate
placement of Sara with defendant's relatives. The Division ruled out the paternal
grandmother and defendant's brother because they had criminal histories and
could not be certified as resource parents. Defendant's sister declined to care
for Sara.
In explaining the relationship between Sara and her resource parents, the
case worker testified the child was thriving in their care and wished to adopt her.
Defendant also testified during the guardianship trial. Defendant told the
court he expected to be released from prison in June 2018 and described his plan
post release. Defendant explained he would live with a family member or friend
until he saved enough money for his own residence. Defendant stated he would
apply for a job at Dunkin' Donuts upon his release. 5 Defendant admitted he
never had a steady job.
Defendant also told the judge about the services he completed while in
prison. Defendant completed a group therapy program focused on anger
management and substance abuse. Defendant also acknowledged it would take
time for him to learn to parent his daughter after he was released from prison.
5
Defendant's brother worked at Dunkin' Donuts. Defendant conceded he did
not have a job offer from Dunkin' Donuts.
A-2388-17T4
10
In addition, defendant advised he was in isolation while in prison due to
his involvement in several prison fights. Defendant claimed being in isolation
made it difficult for him to receive services.
The judge rendered an oral decision based on the testimony and evidence.
The judge concluded the Division satisfied its burden of proof under each of the
prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence and
terminated defendant's parental rights.
The judge found defendant was incarcerated due to his failure to complete
the drug treatment program as part of his plea agreement, and Sara suffered as a
result. The judge emphasized defendant's inability while in prison to partake in
"services to put him in a position to provide parenting" to Sara had also caused
her harm. The judge highlighted defendant's lack of housing, lack of a definite
job upon release from prison, and absence of a stable support system would
cause harm to Sara, and defendant could not ameliorate that harm.
The judge also relied on Dr. Gruen's testimony, which he found credible.
Based on that testimony, the judge concluded defendant required at least one
year of services after his release from prison to be able to parent Sara. The judge
believed permanency was the most important issue for Sara, and the absence of
a concrete plan for permanency would harm the child. While the judge
A-2388-17T4
11
acknowledged defendant tried to improve himself and his circumstances,
defendant required significant services, including mental health and drug
counseling, to care for Sara. According to the judge's findings, the time needed
for defendant to be able to parent his child would only add to Sara's harm.
The judge also reviewed Sara's placement. The judge concluded the
Division made reasonable efforts to investigate placing Sara with relatives, but
those family members were ruled out for valid reasons. He noted Sara's resource
parents cared for her since she was three days old and wanted to adopt her.
The judge further concluded the Division was limited in the services it
could provide to defendant due to his incarceration. The judge found the
Division did what it could considering defendant's placement in isolation while
in prison.
The judge determined there was no bond between Sara and defendant, and
no harm would come to Sara if the relationship with defendant was severed. On
the other hand, the judge found severe harm would occur if the relationship
between Sara and her resource parents were severed. The judge concluded
defendant would be unable to ameliorate the harm from severing Sara's
relationship with her resource parents.
A-2388-17T4
12
On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred in terminating his parental
rights because: (1) the Division failed to provide him with due process after
taking custody of Sara; and (2) the Division failed to prove all four prongs of
N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by clear and convincing evidence.
A parent has a fundamental constitutional right "to enjoy a relationship
with his or her child." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999).
Courts "have consistently imposed strict standards for the termination of
parental rights." Id., at 347. However, the "constitutional protection
surrounding family rights is tempered by the State's parens patriae responsibility
to protect the welfare of children." Ibid. A parent's interest must yield to the
State's interest in protecting children from harm. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009).
When terminating parental rights, the court must consider the "best
interests of the child." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 347. Termination of parental rights
may only be granted if the requirements set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), also
known as the best interests standard, are established by clear and convincing
evidence:
(1) The child's safety, health or development has been
or will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
A-2388-17T4
13
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to
provide a safe and stable home for the child and the
delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.
Such harm may include evidence that separating the
child from his resource family parents would cause
serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm
to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide
services to help the parent correct the circumstances
which led to the child's placement outside the home and
the court has considered alternatives to termination of
parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more
harm than good.
"The four criteria enumerated in the best interests standard are not discrete
and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a
comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." Id. at 348.
"[T]he cornerstone of the inquiry [under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)] is not whether
the biological parents are fit but whether they can cease causing their child
harm." In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992).
"Our review of a trial judge's decision to terminate parental rights is
limited." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)
(citing In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). "The general
rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by
A-2388-17T4
14
adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411–
12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)). Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and
expertise in family matters," we accord even greater deference to the judge's fact
finding. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201 N.J. 328, 343
(2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413). Unless the trial
judge's factual findings are "so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been
made[,]" they should not be disturbed, even if the reviewing court would not
have made the same decision. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189
N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (quoting C.B. Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,
233 N.J. Super. 65, 69 (App. Div. 1989)).
When determining whether parental rights of an incarcerated defendant
should be terminated, the court must evaluate the impact of defendant's
incarceration as to each prong of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). See N.J. Div. of Child
Prot. & Permanency v. P.D.¸ 452 N.J. Super. 98, 119 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting
In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 38 (1992)).
When dealing with a parent whose incarceration is concurrent with a
child's placement, the Division is "impeded by 'the difficulty and likely futility
of providing services to a person in custody[.]'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
A-2388-17T4
15
Servs. v. T.S., 417 N.J. Super 228, 242 (App. Div. 2010) (alteration in original)
(quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.H., 389 N.J. Super. 576, 621
(App. Div. 2007)). The Division is required to explore services that are feasible
and appropriate for an incarcerated parent and make an effort to provide such
services. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 557–
58 (2014).
The failure to produce an incarcerated defendant for hearings is also
analyzed under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. L.M., 430 N.J. Super. 428, 445–46 (App. Div. 2013). In L.M., we reversed
termination of the defendant's parental rights because the Division and the
family court failed to produce the defendant for "critical stages" of the litigation.
Id. at 448–49. If the right to protect a parent's constitutional entitlement is to be
effective, "then the right must exist not only at the trial itself but at all critical
stages after formal proceedings have begun." Id. at 448. The Division and the
family court should make every effort to ensure an incarcerated parent is
produced, either in court or electronically, for all critical proceedings
concerning the best interests of the child. 6
6
During oral argument, the Division's attorney explained defendant, at some
point during the litigation, expressed he did not want to be transported to court
A-2388-17T4
16
While defendant was not present at some hearings, he was represented at
hearings where critical information and testimony were presented to the judge.
At the hearings at which defendant and his counsel were neither present nor
represented, the judge engaged in the purely ministerial task of reapproving the
Division's original permanency plan or conducted proceedings during which no
testimony was taken. Based on our review of the record, defendant was present
and represented during the "critical stages" of the litigation, and was not
deprived of due process.
Similarly, we reject defendant's contention the Division failed to make
reasonable efforts to place Sara with relatives. Family reunification includes
the long-standing policy to place children with relatives when possible. N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.H., 389 N.J. Super. 576, 619 (App. Div.
2007). However, there is no presumption of placement with a family member
over a non-family member. Ibid. The Division explored potential relatives who
might care for Sara, and all were ruled out by the Division because of their own
criminal histories or declining to care for the child.
proceedings because the ride to the courthouse was long and uncomfortable.
Based on defendant's statement, he appeared telephonically at subsequent court
proceedings.
A-2388-17T4
17
Nor was it improper for the judge to consider the testimony of the
Division's expert and case worker regarding the resource parents' desire to adopt
Sara. The Division may submit reports by staff personnel "prepared from their
own first-hand knowledge of the case, at a time reasonably contemporaneous
with the facts they relate, and in the usual course of their duties with the
[Division]." A.W., 103 N.J. at 595 n.1 (quoting In re Guardianship of Cope, 106
N.J. Super. 336, 343 (App. Div. 1969)). Reports by qualified Division personnel
"charged with the responsibility for overseeing the welfare of children in the
State, supply a reasonably high degree of reliability as to the accuracy of the
facts contained therein." Ibid. (quoting Cope, 106 N.J. Super. at 344). The
information regarding the intention of the resource parents to adopt Sara was
not inadmissible hearsay. The reports were based on first-hand knowledge,
contemporaneous with discussions with the resource parents, and part of the
Division's usual duties.
Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the judge conducted the
requisite analysis of the statutory factors and there is sufficient credible evidence
supporting the judge's findings as to each of the four prongs of the best interests
test. We discern no basis to reverse the order terminating defendant's parental
rights.
A-2388-17T4
18
Affirmed.
A-2388-17T4
19