C.G. VS. MARGARET L. CHEHELI (L-1779-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4184-19
C.G., a minor, by his mother
Y.E.-M. a/k/a Y.G., and J.G.,
a minor, by his mother Y.E.-M.
a/k/a Y.G.,
Plaintiffs,
and
B.G., individually,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARGARET L. CHEHELI,
HADDI CHEHELI,
CHRISTOPHER PEERSEN,
ELRAC, LLC, ALLSTATE NEW
JERSEY PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants,
and
NEW JERSEY
MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Argued November 30, 2021 – Decided December 14, 2021
Before Judges Rothstadt and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-1779-18.
John V. Mallon argued the cause for appellant (Chasan,
Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, PC, attorneys; John
A. Camassa, of counsel and on the briefs).
Daniel N. Epstein argued the cause for respondent
(Epstein Ostrove, LLC, attorneys; Jasmine Brown
Seabrooks, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company (NJM) appeals
from an August 30, 2019 order denying its motion for summary judgment. In
addition, NJM appeals from two December 6, 2019 orders: (1) denying its
motion for reconsideration and (2) granting a cross-motion for summary
judgment filed by plaintiff B.G. 1 In granting the cross-motion, the motion judge
1
The matter became ripe for appeal as a result of a July 8, 2020 consent
judgment. Under the consent judgment, B.G. settled his claim against NJM for
a specified dollar amount and "the parties agreed to litigate the legal question of
insurance coverage under the NJM policy (occupancy) . . . ."
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found B.G. was "occupying" his vehicle when he suffered his injury and
therefore entitled to underinsurance motorist (UIM) coverage. We reverse.
We summarize the facts. On May 2, 2016, B.G. drove his two children to
school and parked his car adjacent to the curb and across the street from the
school building. B.G. got out of his car and helped his children exit the car.
B.G. believed he left the engine in his car running. B.G. then walked his children
to a crosswalk staffed by a crossing guard. The crosswalk was about one block
from where B.G. parked his car. While standing on the sidewalk and watching
his children cross the street in the designated crosswalk, B.G. saw the driver of
a car strike his children. B.G. suffered emotional distress after witnessing his
children get hit by the car.
At the time of the accident, B.G.'s car was insured under a commercial
automobile policy issued by NJM for B.G.'s business vehicle. Under NJM's
policy, UIM benefits are available to "anyone occupying a covered auto." The
term "occupying" under NJM's policy is defined as "in, upon, getting in, on, out
or off."
A-4184-19
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B.G. filed suit against various defendants, alleging he suffered emotional
distress based on his witnessing the children being struck by a car.2 B.G. sought
UIM benefits from NJM under his business automobile policy.3
NJM filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the children and B.G.
were not entitled to UIM benefits because they were not occupying the vehicle
at the time of the accident. The court granted the motion as to the children ,4 but
denied the motion as to B.G. without prejudice, pending further discovery.
Upon completion of discovery, NJM refiled a motion for summary
judgment as to B.G.'s claim. NJM argued B.G. was not occupying the car at the
time of his injury. In a written statement of reasons, the judge found B.G. "had
every intention of returning to his running car after briefly walking his childr en
to the cross-walk." The judge explained "the evidence, and/or the reasonable
inferences arising therefrom, reflect[] that [B.G.] had a substantial nexus to his
2
B.G.'s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is based on Portee
v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980). The children asserted their own personal injury
claims.
3
The driver of the car that injured B.G.'s children had only $15,000 in
automobile insurance coverage. Thus, B.G. filed a UIM claim against his own
automobile insurance carrier.
4
The order denying UIM coverage for the children is not the subject of this
appeal.
A-4184-19
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running vehicle, which was insured by NJM." Based on finding B.G. satisfied
the substantial nexus test, the judge determined B.G. was entitled to UIM
benefits under NJM's policy. The judge entered an August 30, 2019 order
denying NJM's motion for summary judgment.
NJM moved for reconsideration and B.G. filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. A different judge heard the motion for reconsideration and
the cross-motion for summary judgment. After hearing the arguments of
counsel, the subsequent motion judge denied NJM's motion for reconsideration
and granted B.G.'s cross-motion for summary judgment. In denying
reconsideration, the judge declined to review anew a summary judgment
determination rendered by a co-equal trial judge. After reviewing the earlier
motion transcript and written submissions, the reconsideration judge explained
he found nothing overlooked or clearly erroneous in the original motion judge's
determination.
On appeal, NJM argues B.G.'s use of the car was coincidental to his arrival
at the location where the injury occurred. Additionally, NJM claims the original
motion judge erred in holding B.G.'s use and occupancy of the vehicle continued
despite his arrival at the children's school, which was his intended destination.
It also contends there was no substantial nexus between the insured vehicle and
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B.G.'s injury. NJM further asserts B.G. was not engaged with his car at the time
of his injury and therefore he failed to satisfy the substantial nexus test for
entitlement to UIM coverage. We agree.
We review a trial judge's decision on a motion for summary judgment de
novo. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). A motion for
summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-
2(c). The parties agree there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding
our review of B.G.'s entitlement to UIM coverage under NJM's policy.5
For B.G. to be entitled to UIM coverage, he had to be "occupying" the car
at the time of the accident as that term is defined under NJM's policy. The
determination "whether a person is 'occupying' a motor vehicle for purposes of
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage 'must be determined on a case -by-
case basis, depending on the facts of the accident and the use of [the] vehicle.'"
5
For purposes of the summary judgment motion, NJM accepted B.G.'s
contention his car's engine remained running while he walked the children to the
crosswalk.
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Thompson v. James, 400 N.J. Super. 286, 292 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Torres
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 171 N.J. 147, 149 (2002)).
In Thompson, the plaintiff driver drove his employer's car to a gas station
to refuel, left the car at the station, and walked several hundred feet away from
the car to a grassy median to search for lost jewelry. Id. at 289. While away
from the car, he was struck by an uninsured motorist. Id. at 289-90. Based on
those specific facts, we found "there was nothing about plaintiff having
'occupied' the covered vehicle that was directly, much less substantially, related
to the incident in which he was injured." Id. at 295-96.
In Severino v. Malachi, 409 N.J. Super. 82, 86 (App. Div. 2009), a case
similar to the matter on appeal, three men travelled from New York City to
Jersey City in a car owned by Severino's financé, Muniz. The driver, Severino,
parked the car in a parking space near his apartment. Ibid. Severino and a
second man got out of the car. Id. at 86-87. A third person, who remained in
the car, leaned "over to the floor to pick up his sandwich and, a few seconds
later, heard a 'boom.'" Id. at 87. According to the man who remained inside the
car, another driver struck the two men while they were crossing the street several
feet from where the car was parked. Ibid.A-4184-19
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In Severino, we held the plaintiffs "failed to establish the requisite
'substantial nexus' between the accident and the Muniz vehicle." Id. at 92. We
concluded Severino completed the journey from New York City to Jersey City
when he parked the car in the parking lot and exited the car with the second man.
Ibid. Under the specific facts in that case, Severino intended to return to the car
to drive his passengers to their respective homes. Id. at 86. Despite that, we
held Severino's use and occupancy of the car ended at the time he sustained his
fatal injuries. Id. at 93.
B.G. asserts Macchi v. Connecticut General Insurance Co., 354 N.J.
Super. 64 (App. Div. 2002), supports his substantial nexus claim and establishes
his occupancy of the insured vehicle for entitlement to UIM coverage.
Applying the required fact sensitive, case-by-case analysis, we note several
factual differences between Macchi and this matter, rendering Macchi
distinguishable. In Macchi, the injured plaintiff driver stopped her car to assist
the driver of a car that had overturned. Id. at 66. The plaintiff was struck by an
uninsured motorist. Ibid. When the plaintiff driver in Macchi stopped her car
to render aid to the injured driver, she had not reached her intended destination.
Id. at 70. Under those facts, we found a nexus between the plaintiff driver,
acting as a good Samaritan, and the injury she sustained based on her
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unanticipated exiting of her car to aid an injured driver. Id. at 72. Because the
plaintiff driver made an unintended stop and had not reached her destination, we
held she was occupying the vehicle and was entitled to UIM coverage. Ibid.Unlike the plaintiff driver in Macchi, B.G.'s injury was not so inexorably
related to his use of the car to create a substantial nexus to his occupancy of the
car for UIM coverage. Here, B.G. would have witnessed the same accident
involving his children if he had walked to the school or travelled to the school
by other means. Nothing about his driving of the covered vehicle was connected
to B.G.'s emotional distress injury.
The motion judge's finding of a substantial nexus between B.G.'s use of
the insured car on the date of the accident and his Portee emotional distress
injury constituted an overexpansion of the doctrine and was inconsistent with
existing case law. In the cases finding a substantial nexus between the injury
and the insured vehicle, Torres v. Travelers Insurance Co., 171 N.J. 147 (2002)
and Bogey's Trucking & Paving, Inc. v. Indian Harbor Insurance Co., 395 N.J.
Super. 59 (App. Div. 2007), the injuries plaintiffs suffered were directly
connected to their use of the vehicles.
In Torres, the injured plaintiff drove his company van to look for a
delivery truck upon discovering a package had not been delivered. 171 N.J. at
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148. In searching for the missing package, the plaintiff stopped his van behind
the double-parked delivery truck and asked the truck driver if he could search
for the package. Ibid. Unable to locate the package, the plaintiff exited the
delivery truck, entered the roadway to return to his own van, and was truck by
an approaching truck. Ibid.In Bogey's, the injured plaintiff left the truck in which he was a passenger
to assist the truck driver in making a turn. 395 N.J. Super. at 63. While assisting
the driver, plaintiff was struck by an oncoming car. Ibid. Unlike B.G., the
plaintiffs in Torres and Bogey's were actively engaged with their vehicles at the
time of their respective injury.
Having reviewed the record and the undisputed facts, B.G. was not
occupying the insured vehicle at the time he witnessed an oncoming car strike
his children. Nor did B.G. establish the requisite "substantial nexus" between
the accident and insured vehicle. B.G. parked his car, exited the vehicle with
his children, and walked with his children to a nearby crosswalk. At the time
B.G. saw his children struck by an oncoming car, B.G. was a block away from
his own car. B.G.'s insured vehicle was simply coincidental to the injury he
suffered. Not every act of driving to a location, parking, and exiting a car
satisfies the definition of "occupying" a car to be entitled to UIM coverage. At
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best, B.G. emotional distress claim was "merely coincidental" to the use of his
car. See Mondelli v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 102 N.J. 167, 172 (1986)
(holding a merely coincidental connection between the covered vehicle and the
accident insufficient to constitute "occupying").
Because B.G. was not occupying the insured vehicle at the time he
witnessed the accident, he was not entitled to UIM coverage under NJM's policy.
Thus, the motion judge erred in denying NJM's motion for summary judgment
and granting B.G.'s cross-motion for summary judgment.
Reversed.6
6
Because the underlying matter concluded upon the entry of the July 8, 2020
consent judgment, the trial court need not enter any further orders in this matter.
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