United States v. Kenneth D. Edwards , 447 F. App'x 43 ( 2011 )


Menu:
  •                                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________               FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-11035
    NOVEMBER 2, 2011
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________            CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20266-UU-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                          Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    KENNETH D. EDWARDS,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                          Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (November 2, 2011)
    Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Kenneth D. Edwards appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of a
    firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(e)(1).
    Edwards raises four challenges to his conviction: (1) that the district court’s
    issuance of a flight instruction to the jury was unduly misleading and prejudicial,
    (2) that § 922(g), the statute criminalizing possession of a firearm and ammunition
    by a convicted felon, violates the Commerce Clause both on its face and as applied
    to him, (3) that § 922(g) violates the Tenth Amendment both on its face and as
    applied to him, and (4) that the Armed Career Criminal Act sentencing
    enhancement contained in 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1) violates Edwards’s Fifth and
    Sixth Amendment rights because his triggering prior convictions were neither
    alleged in the indictment nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. We
    affirm.
    DISCUSSION
    I. Flight Instruction
    With respect to Edwards’s claim that the district court’s issuance of a flight
    instruction was unduly misleading and prejudicial, we review the district court’s
    jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Williams,
    
    541 F.3d 1087
    , 1089 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). District courts have broad
    discretion in crafting jury instructions, provided that the charge accurately reflects
    2
    the law and the facts. United States v. Kennard, 
    472 F.3d 851
    , 854 (11th Cir.
    2006). “We examine whether the jury charges, considered as a whole, sufficiently
    instructed the jury so that the jurors understood the issues and were not misled.”
    United States v. Fulford, 
    267 F.3d 1241
    , 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Evidence of flight is admissible and probative to demonstrate
    “consciousness of guilt and thereby guilt.” Untied States v. Blakely, 
    960 F.2d 996
    ,
    1000 (11th Cir. 1992); Kennard, 
    472 F.3d at 855
     (“evidence of flight is admissible
    and probative”).
    We have held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a
    flight instruction when the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to
    reasonably conclude that the defendant fled to avoid apprehension for the charged
    crime. Williams, 
    541 F.3d at 1089
    . We also found a flight instruction proper that
    “cautioned the jury that it was up to them to determine whether the evidence
    proved flight, and the significance, if any, to be accorded such a determination . . .
    .” United States v. Borders, 
    693 F.2d 1318
    , 1328 (11th Cir. 1982).
    In this case, the circumstantial evidence supported the district court’s
    issuance of a flight instruction to the jury. The government offered testimony and
    evidence regarding Edwards’s possession and use of a firearm and his subsequent
    3
    flight from police apprehension, first as a passenger in a vehicle, and then on foot.
    One witness, Breanna Doe, testified that she saw Edwards standing in the street,
    leaning over a dark four-door car holding a long, wooden and black gun. R3 at
    191, 201, 204. Officer Bain testified that he followed a dark car driving erratically
    which accelerated and switched lanes when he turned his sirens on. Id. at 224-28.
    Officer Bain testified that after the dark car collided with another vehicle, he
    observed a male exit the passenger-side door of the dark car and flee on foot. Id.
    at 229, 231. Later, Officer Bain identified this male as Edwards after he was
    discovered hiding in a shed on a nearby property. Id. At 243-44. Officer Bain
    then approached the car and the driver of the vehicle, later identified as Xavier
    Outler, was arrested and an assault rifle was found in the passenger side of the car.
    Id. at 237-38, 241. A reasonable jury could have concluded, based on this
    evidence, that Edwards fled the police in order to avoid apprehension for his
    possession and use of a firearm. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury
    that, if proved, intentional flight in itself was not sufficient to establish guilt. The
    Court instructed the jury to “consider that there may be reasons for [flight] which
    are fully consistent with innocence.” R5 at 501-02. Whether and why Edwards
    fled police apprehension were issues for the jury to determine. Because the
    circumstantial evidence presented at trial supported the issuance of a flight
    4
    instruction to the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing such
    an instruction.
    II. Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment Challenges to 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)
    Edwards argues for the first time on appeal that § 922(g) violates the
    Commerce Clause both facially and as applied to him because intrastate
    possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not have a substantial effect on
    interstate commerce. Edwards also argues that § 922(g) violates the Tenth
    Amendment, because the suppression of crime is traditionally a police power left
    to the states. Edwards acknowledges that our precedent forecloses these
    arguments, but he seeks to preserve the issues for further review.
    We generally review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United
    States v. White, 
    593 F.3d 1199
    , 1205 (11th Cir. 2010) . However, when the issue
    is raised for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. United States v.
    Peters, 
    403 F.3d 1263
    , 1270 (11th Cir. 2005). Plain error review provides federal
    appellate courts limited power to correct error, and they may not act unless there is
    (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v.
    Turner, 
    474 F.3d 1265
    , 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). If all three
    conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to notice the error only when it
    seriously affects “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
    5
    proceedings”. 
    Id.
     (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). An error
    cannot be “plain” unless it is “clear under current law.” United States v.
    Humphrey, 
    164 F.3d 585
    , 588 (11th Cir. 1999) citing United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 734, 
    113 S. Ct. 1770
    , 1777 (1993). Our law is emphatic in that only the
    Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc can judicially overrule a prior panel
    decision. United States v. Marte, 
    356 F.3d 1336
    , 1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation
    omitted).
    Pursuant to § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a convicted felon “to ship or
    transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,
    any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
    been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) (2006). We have repeatedly held that § 922(g)(1) is not facially an
    unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. See
    e.g. United States v. Scott, 
    263 F.3d 1270
    , 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the
    jurisdictional element of the statute, i.e., the requirement that the felon ‘possess in
    or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition,’ immunizes § 922(g)(1) from
    [a] facial constitutional attack”); United States v. Dupree, 
    258 F.3d 1258
    , 1259-60
    (11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the argument that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, both
    facially and as applied, because the jurisdictional element of § 922(g) brought it
    6
    within Congress’ Commerce Clause powers); United States v. McAllister, 
    77 F.3d 387
    , 389-90 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that as long as the weapon in question has a
    “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce, § 922(g) is constitutional). We have also
    held that § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutional as applied to a defendant who only
    possessed a firearm intrastate because Ҥ 922(g) is an attempt to regulate guns that
    have a connection to interstate commerce” and the government demonstrated that
    the firearm in question “had traveled in interstate commerce.” McAllister, 
    77 F.3d at 390
    . A “minimal nexus to interstate commerce” is all that § 922(g) requires.
    Dupree, 
    258 F.3d at 1260
     (holding that brandishing a firearm that was
    manufactured in another state suffices to establish the required “minimal nexus to
    interstate commerce”). This Court has consistently held that § 922(g) is
    Constitutional both on its face and as applied to defendants possessing firearms
    intrastate which had previously traveled in interstate commerce.
    With respect to the Tenth Amendment, we have held that Congress does not
    violate the Tenth Amendment when it enacts legislation through the
    constitutionally permissible exercise of its Commerce Clause power. Cheffer v.
    Reno, 
    55 F.3d 1517
    , 1521 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Because the [challenged legislation]
    is within Congress’[s] Commerce Clause power, it does not violate the Tenth
    Amendment.”).
    7
    The binding precedent of this Circuit forecloses Edwards’s arguments that
    Congress violated the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in enacting
    § 922(g)(1). Since this binding precedent is “clear under current law,” the district
    court did not plainly err in convicting Edwards of violating § 922(g)(1).
    III. Fifth and Sixth Amendment Challenges to 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1)
    Edwards also argues for the first time on appeal that the armed career
    criminal sentencing enhancement contained in § 924(e)(1) violates his Fifth and
    Sixth Amendment rights. Since this argument is first raised on appeal, we review
    this issue for plain error. Peters, 
    403 F.3d at 1270
    . Edwards acknowledges that
    our precedent forecloses these arguments, but he seeks to preserve the issues for
    further review.
    The Armed Career Criminal Act, as contained in § 924(e)(1), increases the
    sentence of imprisonment under § 922(g) by requiring a mandatory minimum
    sentence of 15 years for anyone who violates § 922(g) by illegally possessing a
    firearm after three convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense. 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1). In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court held that the
    government need not allege in its indictment nor prove beyond a reasonable doubt
    that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use those convictions
    to enhance a sentence. 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 226-27, 239, 
    118 S. Ct. 1219
    , 1222, 1228
    8
    (1998). In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court explicitly declined to
    overrule Almendarez-Torres. 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 490, 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    , 2362-63 (2000).
    Post-Apprendi, we have held that a defendant’s constitutional rights did not
    include having the three predicate felonies charged in an indictment or proven to a
    jury, even if they trigger application of § 924(e)(1) . United States v. Thomas, 
    242 F.3d 1028
    , 1034-35 (11th Cir. 2001) (“we are bound to follow Almendarez–Torres
    unless and until the Supreme Court itself overrules that decision.”) (citation
    omitted). In United States v. Shelton, we held that the decision in
    Almendarez-Torres was “left undisturbed by Apprendi” and that “a district court
    does not err by relying on prior convictions to enhance a defendant’s sentence.”
    
    400 F.3d 1325
    , 1329 (11th Cir. 2005).
    In this case, the district court properly looked to evidence of Edwards’s
    prior convictions according to § 924(e)(1) to enhance his sentence under § 922(g),
    even though the prior convictions were neither charged in the indictment nor
    proven at trial.
    Edwards’s argument that his enhanced sentence under § 924(e)(1) was
    unconstitutional is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent.
    Thus, the District Court did not err by enhancing Edwards’s sentence under §
    924(e)(1), based on a finding that he qualified as an armed career criminal.
    9
    CONCLUSION
    Upon careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs,
    we affirm Edwards’s conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm and
    ammunition by a convicted felon. The circumstantial evidence in Edwards’s case
    supported the issuance of a flight instruction, and his arguments as to the
    constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e)(1) are foreclosed by the binding
    precedent of this Circuit.
    AFFIRMED.
    10