Crawford County Oil, LLC v. Weger , 2014 IL App (5th) 130382 ( 2014 )

NOTICE
2014 IL App (5th) 130382
Decision filed 08/15/14. The
text of this decision may be NO. 5-13-0382
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
IN THE
the same.
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
CRAWFORD COUNTY OIL, LLC, and ) Appeal from the
LaCROSS, INC., ) Circuit Court of
) Crawford County.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) No. 11-CH-8
)
FLOYD WEGER, MICHAEL WORTHY, )
PAULA WORTHY, and CHARLENE )
CORNWELL, ) Honorable
) Mark L. Shaner,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE SPOMER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Goldenhersh and Cates concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Upon the motion of the plaintiffs, Crawford County Oil, LLC, and LaCross, Inc.,
the circuit court of Crawford County certified the following questions for interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010): (1) Are factual
allegations in a complaint which are not denied deemed admitted? (2) If a fact is deemed
admitted in the pleadings, is the admission a judicial admission making it unnecessary for
the party to introduce evidence in support thereof? and (3) Does a trial court have
discretion to order a defendant, after the close of the plaintiffs' case-in-chief, to make an
initial answer to the plaintiffs' complaint when the defendant had not previously
1
answered the allegations in the complaint? For the following reasons, we find that
answering the certified questions, as written, will not materially advance the ultimate
termination of this litigation, and as such, we limit the scope of our answer to these
questions to the facts of this case, in which the defendants have not filed an answer at all,
and the plaintiffs have sought judicial admission of the allegations of the complaint
pursuant to section 2-610 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS
5/2-610 (West 2012)). Under these circumstances, we hold that section 2-610 of the
Code is inapplicable in situations where there has been no answer filed, and as such,
answer the first question, as we have reframed it, in the negative, rendering the second
certified question moot. Furthermore, under these circumstances, where the plaintiffs, on
the day of trial, filed a motion pursuant to section 2-610 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-610
(West 2012)) seeking to have all of the allegations of the complaint deemed admitted for
the failure of the defendants to file an answer, we hold that the circuit court has the
discretion to allow the defendants to file an answer, and as such, answer the third
certified question, as we have reframed it, in the affirmative. Having answered the
certified questions as we have reframed them in order to materially advance the
termination of this litigation, in the interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an
equitable result, we remand these proceedings to the circuit court with directions that its
order be amended to require that the answer be in writing and contain a verification in
accordance with section 2-605 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-605 (West 2012)).
¶2 FACTS
¶3 On March 7, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of Crawford
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County against the defendants, Floyd Weger, Michael Worthy, Paula Worthy, and
Charlene Cornwell. According to the complaint, the plaintiffs own an interest in oil and
gas leases on the defendants' properties and have ceased production on certain wells
located on those properties, which requires the plaintiffs, under Illinois Department of
Natural Resources (IDNR) regulations, to plug those wells. The complaint alleges that
the defendants ejected the plaintiffs from their respective properties while the plaintiffs
were attempting to plug the subject wells and continue to deny the plaintiffs access to
their properties for this purpose. In the complaint, the plaintiffs request an injunction
requiring the defendants to grant them access to the properties so that they may plug the
wells. The complaint is verified pursuant to section 2-605 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-
605 (West 2010)).
¶4 On April 8, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and on
June 28, 2011, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. According to a
docket entry dated July 20, 2012, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion
for summary judgment, but the record contains no documentation to indicate that the
motion to dismiss was ever called for hearing or ruled upon.
¶5 On March 12, 2013, a bench trial commenced and both parties affirmed that they
were ready to proceed with the trial. Prior to beginning their case-in-chief, the plaintiffs
requested leave of court to read the allegations of the complaint into the record as judicial
admissions pursuant to section 2-610 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-610 (West 2010)),
because the defendants failed to file an answer. In response, the defendants noted that
there was no order directing that an answer be filed by a specific date. In addition, the
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defendants argued that the allegations of the complaint should be considered, at most,
evidentiary admissions that could be rebutted by contrary evidence, rather than judicial
admissions. In addition, the defendants offered to orally answer the complaint by
admitting or denying each allegation on the record. After a recess, the circuit court ruled
that it had discretion to consider the allegations of the complaint as evidentiary
admissions rather than judicial admissions, citing Hecht v. Hecht, 49 Ill. App. 3d 334
(1977). Because the circuit court wished to decide the case on substance, rather than
procedure, the circuit court announced it would exercise its discretion to allow for the
introduction of evidence to rebut the allegations of the complaint.
¶6 The plaintiffs limited their case-in-chief to providing evidence that they had no
adequate remedy at law for the defendants' refusal to allow them access to the wells. The
plaintiffs introduced testimony from an attorney who specialized in mineral law, as well
as the plaintiffs' corporate representatives, explaining that as the holders of the permits
from IDNR to operate the wells on the defendants' properties, IDNR holds them
responsible for compliance with IDNR regulations regarding the plugging of unused
wells regardless of the surrounding circumstances. According to the testimony, because
the defendants will not permit the plaintiffs to enter their properties to plug the wells, the
IDNR can issue a "permit block" against the plaintiffs for violating IDNR regulations,
essentially forcing the plaintiffs out of business. In addition, until the wells are plugged,
according to the plaintiffs' witnesses, the plaintiffs are subject to indefinite liability in the
form of civil penalties and potential liability for environmental damage. On cross-
examination, the witnesses admitted that if the plaintiffs chose to transfer the leases on
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the unplugged wells to another operator, and IDNR chose to issue permits to the
transferee operator, the plaintiffs would cease to have liability. Following the testimony
of these witnesses, the plaintiffs rested their case-in-chief and court was recessed for the
day.
¶7 On the next day of the bench trial, the plaintiffs made a motion to reconsider the
circuit court's ruling that the allegations of the complaint stand as evidentiary admissions
rather than judicial admissions based on the defendants' failure to file an answer to the
complaint. The plaintiffs argued that the circuit court's reliance on Hecht was misplaced
because the ruling in that case was based on provisions of the Divorce Act, then in effect,
which provided that the court shall not grant a divorce unless it is satisfied that the cause
of the divorce has been fully proven. 49 Ill. App. 3d at 339-40 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat.
1975, ch. 40, ¶ 9). The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, but
granted the defendants leave to read an answer into the record.
¶8 The defendants' counsel read an admission or denial of each allegation of the
complaint into the record, and called corporate representatives to provide verification of
the answer under oath. In response, the plaintiffs requested a continuance, explaining to
the court that based on what had transpired, they would have to conduct discovery that
they had not previously conducted due to what they characterized as the defendants'
admissions by failure to plead. The circuit court granted the continuance.
¶9 On March 25, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court's
ruling granting the defendants leave to orally answer the complaint after they had rested
their case-in-chief, or in the alternative, to certify questions for interlocutory appeal
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pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). On April 15, 2013, the
circuit court denied the motion to reconsider but granted the plaintiffs leave to draft
proposed certified questions for approval by the circuit court. On July 26, 2013, the
circuit court entered an order pursuant to Rule 308, certifying the aforementioned
certified questions for our review, and we subsequently granted the plaintiffs' petition for
leave to appeal.
¶ 10 ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Because this appeal concerns questions of law certified by the circuit court
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010), our standard of review
is de novo. In re M.M.D., 213 Ill. 2d 105, 113 (2004). Although the scope of our review
is generally limited to the questions that are certified by the circuit court, if the questions
so certified require limitation in order to materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, such limitation is proper. See De Bouse v. Bayer AG, 235 Ill. 2d 544, 557
(2009). In addition, in the interests of judicial economy and the need to reach an
equitable result, we may consider the propriety of the circuit court order that gave rise to
these proceedings. Id. at 558 (citing Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334,
354 (2007)).
¶ 12 The first certified question asks this court to determine whether factual allegations
in a complaint which are not denied are deemed admitted. The answer to this question, as
written, is clearly directed by section 2-610 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-610 (West 2012)),
which requires that every answer contain an explicit admission or denial of each
allegation of the complaint, and provides that every allegation, except allegations of
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damages, not explicitly denied, is admitted. However, we note that this section of the
Code, entitled "Pleadings to be specific," generally governs the consequences of not
explicitly denying a factual allegation in the answer. In this case, the defendants failed to
file an answer at all. Accordingly, in order to materially advance the termination of the
instant litigation, we limit our analysis of the first certified question to situations in which
a party has failed to answer the complaint.
¶ 13 In the case at bar, the plaintiffs moved the court, at the start of trial, to deem all
of the facts in the complaint to be judicial admissions pursuant to section 2-610(b) of the
Code (735 ILCS 5/2-610(b) (West 2012)), based on the defendants' failure to file an
answer. An isolated reading of section 2-610(b) would seem to suggest that it could be
applied in the manner in which the plaintiffs have requested, since by failing to file an
answer at all, the defendants failed to specifically deny any of the allegations in the
complaint. However, a reading of section 2-610 as a whole makes clear that the
legislature intended that it be applied in those situations where an answer or subsequent
pleading has been filed, but does not contain an explicit admission or denial of one or
more of the allegations of the pleading to which it relates. See 735 ILCS 5/2-610(a)
(West 2012).
¶ 14 Here, the plaintiffs are invoking the language of section 2-610 of the Code (735
ILCS 5/2-610 (West 2012)) in order to mandate that the circuit court find all allegations
of a complaint to be judicially admitted for the defendants' inadvertent failure to file an
answer. However, section 2-1301(d) (735 ILCS 5/2-1301(d) (West 2012)), which more
specifically addresses situations where there has been a failure to plead at all, makes such
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a determination discretionary. To permit the plaintiffs to invoke section 2-610 of the
Code (735 ILCS 5/2-610 (West 2012)) in this situation would be to circumvent the
legislature's intent that the Code "be liberally construed, to the end that controversies may
be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties." 735
ILCS 5/1-106 (West 2012). For these reasons, we find that under the circumstances
presented by the case at bar, where the defendants failed to file an answer at all, section
2-610 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-610 (West 2012)) is inapplicable, and that section does
not mandate a finding that all of the allegations of the complaint are deemed admitted.
Accordingly, we answer the first certified question, as we have framed it, in the negative,
rendering the second certified question moot for purposes of this appeal.
¶ 15 We turn to the final question certified on appeal, which asks this court for a
determination as to whether the circuit court has discretion to order a defendant, after the
close of the plaintiffs' case-in-chief, to make an initial answer to the plaintiffs' complaint
when the defendant had not previously answered the allegations in the complaint. Again,
we find that, in order to advance the ultimate termination of this litigation, it is
appropriate to limit our answer to this question to the context of the facts and
circumstances of this case (see De Bouse, 235 Ill. 2d at 557), where the plaintiffs, at the
start of trial, made a motion, pursuant to section 2-610 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-610
(West 2012)), to have all of the allegations of the complaint deemed admitted for the
defendants' failure to file an answer.
¶ 16 The time for answers and motions following service of a complaint is governed by
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 181 (eff. Jan. 4, 2013), which provides that the defendants
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must make an appearance within 30 days, and such an appearance may be made by filing
a motion within that 30-day period. If the defendants file a motion within the 30-day
period, the time for answer or other appropriate motion is required "within the time the
court directs in the order disposing of the motion." Ill. S. Ct. R. 181(a) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013).
¶ 17 Here, the defendants are correct that the order disposing of the defendants' motion
for a summary judgment did not indicate a time for the defendants to file an answer.
However, under local rules of the second circuit, "[u]nless otherwise ordered by the
court, a party who is required to plead further following denial of a motion shall do so
within 21 days" following entry of a docket or written order reflecting the decision of the
court. 2d Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 9(j) (Apr. 13, 2007). While section 1-104(b) of the Code
(735 ILCS 5/1-104(b) (West 2012)) permits the circuit courts to make rules regulating
their dockets, calendars, and business, such rules are subject to the rules of the supreme
court. Accordingly, although second circuit local rule 9(j) governs the time for pleading
after a motion is denied in the second circuit, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 181 mandates
that the deadline for filing the answer as computed by the local rule be included in the
order disposing of the motion. In that sense, the defendants are correct in their assertion
that they were not given proper notice of the deadline for filing their answer, although it
is axiomatic that an answer should have been filed prior to trial.
¶ 18 Regardless of the circumstances surrounding the defendants' failure to file an
answer in this case, the plaintiffs did not make their motion to have the allegations of the
complaint deemed admitted until after they opened their case-in-chief, and this was the
first time the defendants' failure to answer was brought to the attention of the circuit
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court. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 183 (eff. Feb. 16, 2011) gives the circuit court
discretion to permit the filing of late pleadings, and we find that the decision to grant the
defendants leave to file an answer is an appropriate exercise of that discretion in a
situation such as that in the case at bar. Accordingly, the answer to the third certified
question on appeal, as reframed by this court, is in the affirmative.
¶ 19 Having answered the certified questions, as limited by this court in order to
advance the ultimate termination of this litigation, in the interests of judicial economy
and the need to reach an equitable result, we next consider the propriety of the circuit
court order that gave rise to these proceedings (see De Bouse, 235 Ill. 2d at 558 (citing
Vision Point of Sale, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d at 354)), which is the order granting the defendants
leave to read an oral answer to the complaint into the record. Although this court
understands that the circuit court's order was its attempt to have the trial proceed on the
merits, the pleadings are, by definition, to be filed in writing. See 735 ILCS 5/2-602,
2-603 (West 2012). In addition, the complaint in this case was verified pursuant to
section 2-605 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-605 (West 2012)), and as such, any subsequent
pleadings are to be verified pursuant to that section. For these reasons, we remand with
directions that the circuit court amend its order to require that said answer must be filed,
in writing, and verified.
¶ 20 CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the foregoing reasons, and having answered the certified questions as we have
reframed them in order to materially advance the termination of this litigation, we remand
these proceedings to the circuit court with directions that its order be amended to require
10
that the answer be in writing and contain a verification in accordance with section 2-605
of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-605 (West 2012)).
¶ 22 Certified questions answered; cause remanded with directions.
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2014 IL App (5th) 130382
NO. 5-13-0382
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
CRAWFORD COUNTY OIL, LLC, and ) Appeal from the
LaCROSS, INC., ) Circuit Court of
) Crawford County.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. ) No. 11-CH-8
)
FLOYD WEGER, MICHAEL WORTHY, )
PAULA WORTHY, and CHARLENE )
CORNWELL, ) Honorable
) Mark L. Shaner,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding.
________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: August 15, 2014
________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable Stephen L. Spomer, J.
Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J., and
Honorable Judy L. Cates, J.,
Concur
________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Gregory K. Stewart, Conger & Elliott, P.C., 304 East Robinson,
for Farm Bureau Building, P.O. Box 220, Carmi, IL 62821
Appellants
________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Thomas G. Maag, Maag Law Firm, LLC, 22 West Lorena Avenue,
for Wood River, IL 62095
Appellees
________________________________________________________________________