DENTAL CARE OF STRATFORD VS. SANDRA HARMON, DMD (L-0640-17, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3065-17T2
    DENTAL CARE OF
    STRATFORD,
    Plaintiff-Respondent, 1
    v.
    SANDRA HARMON, DMD,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    __________________________
    Submitted December 6, 2018 – Decided January 7, 2019
    Before Judges Simonelli and O'Connor.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Cumberland County, Docket No. L-0640-17.
    Sandra Harmon, DMD, appellant pro se.
    Respondent has not filed a brief.
    PER CURIAM
    1
    The caption on the order subject to this appeal incorrectly listed the
    defendant as the plaintiff.
    Defendant Sandra Harmon, DMD, appeals from a January 31, 2018 Law
    Division order directing plaintiff Dental Care of Stratford to pay her $3,622.50.
    We remand for further proceedings.
    We glean the following from the record. Harmon, a dentist, provided
    dental services to plaintiff's patients from October 2013 to August 2016.
    Pursuant to a compensation contract the parties entered, plaintiff agreed to pay
    Harmon thirty-five percent of the income defendant received from the patients
    Harmon treated, minus certain costs and expenses. 2 Harmon claims she was not
    fully compensated for two pay periods, specifically, July 16, 2016 to July 31,
    2016 and August 1, 2016 to August 15, 2016. As a result, Harmon terminated
    her position with plaintiff.
    Harmon filed a wage and hour complaint 3 with the Department of Labor
    and Workforce Development, alleging plaintiff wrongly failed to compensate
    her a total of $15,431.20. On August 16, 2017, a wage collection referee found
    Harmon was entitled to and awarded her $10,350.              Plaintiff appealed the
    referee's award to the Law Division, arguing Harmon was entitled to only thirty-
    five percent of $10,350, or $3,622.50.
    2
    A copy of the contract was not included in the record.
    3
    A copy of the complaint was not included in the record.
    A-3065-17T2
    2
    A trial court reviews wage collection referee decisions de novo. See Marr
    v. ABM Carpet Serv., Inc., 
    286 N.J. Super. 500
    , 504 (Law Div. 1995); see also
    N.J.S.A. 34:11-65 (providing that "[u]pon the trial of any appeal either party
    may produce any witness not produced or sworn in the court below, or any
    documentary evidence not offered or admitted in the court below"). Here,
    consistent with this standard of review, the trial court admitted evidence from
    both parties.
    During the trial, Harmon contended she did not receive any pay for the
    two subject pay periods and, contrary to what she asserted before the wage
    collection referee, contended she was entitled to a total of $7,793.92 in
    compensation. Plaintiff again asserted it owed Harmon only thirty-five percent
    of $10,350, or $3,622.50. When the court asked plaintiff's representative at the
    hearing whether plaintiff gave Harmon any compensation for the disputed pay
    periods, plaintiff's representative testified he needed to check defendant's
    records.
    The court ordered plaintiff to file and serve a copy of the records showing
    what plaintiff paid to Harmon for these two pay periods. Defendant was ordered
    to file and to serve such documentation within seven days, and Harmon was
    permitted five days to respond to plaintiff's documentation.
    A-3065-17T2
    3
    Nine days after the hearing, the court issued an order directing plaintiff to
    pay Harmon $3,622.50. In its written decision, court stated:
    I have reviewed the documentation provided by both
    parties, and though it is impossible for me to make a
    factual determination whether the credits and/or debits
    are accurate, at least the calculations make sense and
    are consistent with the arguments advanced by the
    employer. The arguments advanced by Ms. Harmon is
    [sic] not supported by anything she has supplied.
    Thereafter, Harmon sent an email to the court stating she did not receive any
    documentation from plaintiff. Plaintiff did not contest this assertion. This
    appeal ensued.
    On appeal, Harmon essentially contends the trial court's order directing
    plaintiff to pay her only $3,622.50 is not supported by the evidence. She also
    states she did not receive documentation from plaintiff showing she received
    compensation during the subject pay periods. Plaintiff did not file a brief.
    As an appellate court, our task is confined to determining whether there is
    sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the Law Division's decision.
    State v. Johnson, 
    42 N.J. 146
    , 162 (1964). We will not disturb the court's
    findings in a non-jury trial "unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly
    unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
    credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]" Seidman v. Clifton
    A-3065-17T2
    4
    Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 
    205 N.J. 150
    , 169 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting In
    re Tr. Created By Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 
    194 N.J. 276
    , 284 (2008)). Moreover, under the "two-court rule" applicable to
    review of municipal appeals, the trial court's de novo findings of fact in a wage
    collection matter are entitled to greater deference when they coincide with those
    of the original agency fact-finder. See State v. Locurto, 
    157 N.J. 463
    , 474
    (1999) (stating "two-court rule" related to municipal appeals). However, to
    enable us to exercise our review, the trial court in a non-jury civil action must
    set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Curtis v. Finneran, 
    83 N.J. 563
    , 569-70 (1980); R. 1:7-4(a).
    Here, first, it appears plaintiff did not forward, as ordered, to either the
    court or to Harmon documentary proof of what it paid Harmon for the subject
    pay periods. The court does not comment upon the fact plaintiff failed to
    provide any proof to refute Harmon's claim she did not receive any
    compensation for these pay periods. Second, the court's decision does not make
    clear what Harmon earned, what deductions were permitted to be taken from her
    earnings, and what she was entitled to receive as a result of the work she
    performed. The court also did not identify the arguments Harmon advanced for
    which the court claims there was no support.
    A-3065-17T2
    5
    Because the court omits findings of fact and conclusions of law to support
    the conclusions it reached, its decision falls short of the requirements of Rule
    1:7-4(a) and impedes appellate review. Accordingly, we remand this matter to
    the trial court for forty-five days to afford it an opportunity to make the findings
    of fact and conclusions of law required by the Rule. Harmon shall have ten days
    from the date she receives the court's decision to file a brief, which shall not
    exceed five pages in length. If it chooses to respond, plaintiff shall have ten
    days from the date it receives Harmon's brief to file its brief, which also shall
    not exceed five pages.
    Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We retain
    jurisdiction.
    A-3065-17T2
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3065-17T2

Filed Date: 1/7/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019