STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SIWAN R. BROWN (15-09-1253, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2838-16T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SIWAN R. BROWN, a/k/a
SHAWN BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued November 26, 2018 – Decided December 27, 2018
Before Judges Sabatino, Sumners and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 15-09-1253.
Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Daniel S. Rockoff, of
counsel and on the brief).
Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel and on
the briefs).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SABATINO, P.J.A.D.
Tried by a jury, defendant Siwan R. Brown was found guilty of various
drug offenses. The State's case was largely based on the seizure of over one
thousand bags of heroin and other drug paraphernalia from a residence that
defendant shared with other relatives.
Among other things, defendant argues on appeal the trial court erred in
declining the jury's request during their deliberations to have the court play back
defense counsel's closing argument for them. The court denied that request on
the basis that, as the Model Criminal Jury Charges state, the summations of
counsel do not comprise evidence. The propriety of granting such a playback
request from jurors has not been addressed before in any published New Jersey
opinion, although the issue has arisen in case law from a few other jurisdictions.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that trial courts in our State have the
discretion in appropriate circumstances to grant jury requests to have the closing
arguments of all counsel played back or read back to them, in full or in part . In
recognizing that discretionary authority, we follow other jurisdictions that have
acknowledged the discretion of judges to allow such playbacks or readbacks.
We reject, however, defendant's contention that the denial of the jury's playback
request in his own case was unduly prejudicial and requires a new trial.
In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we affirm the trial court's
pretrial ruling to admit incriminating statements that defendant made to police
2
A-2838-16T1
officers after they stopped his car for a traffic violation and smelled marijuana.
However, with the State's acquiescence, we remand this case to the trial court to
reevaluate, under the multi-factor voluntariness test of State v. King, 44 N.J. 346(1965), whether the police obtained defendant's valid consent to search his
residence after the motor vehicle stop. We also remand this matter for the trial
court to reevaluate whether the police had a sufficient lawful basis at the time
of the motor vehicle stop to request defendant's consent to search his residence.
I.
This prosecution of defendant arose out of the following circumstances.
We detail in particular the facts and allegations relating to the search of
defendant's car and his residence.
A.
The Car Stop
At about 8:00 p.m. on April 30, 2015, Jersey City police officers Dennis
DeJesus and Gabe Moreano observed a white Ford Taurus fail to stop at a stop
sign. The officers pulled over the Taurus. Defendant, the Taurus driver,
lowered the windows. A female, later identified as defendant's aunt, was next
to him in the passenger's seat. Officer DeJesus approached the car on the
passenger side and Officer Moreano approached on the driver's side. Defendant
rolled down his window and Moreano asked him to produce his documentation.
3
A-2838-16T1
According to the officers' testimony, once defendant rolled down the
windows, they immediately smelled the odor of raw marijuana emanating from
the car. Moreano asked defendant about the smell of marijuana. Defendant
admitted to Moreano he had smoked marijuana earlier that day.
Moreano then asked defendant to step out of the vehicle. As defendant
began to do so, Moreano asked him, "if he ha[d] anything on him . . . that could
poke me, stab me, anything that could cause me harm." According to Moreano,
defendant replied, "Yeah, I have two bundles on me." Moreano's partner,
Officer DeJesus, testified that, based on his training and experience, he
understood this comment to mean defendant had two bundles of heroin on his
person. Defendant told Moreano the heroin was in his right-side back pocket.
Officer Moreano retrieved the two bundles from defendant's pants pocket.
Each bundle contained ten small bags of heroin.
The police then placed defendant under arrest, handcuffed him, and read
him a Miranda warning.1 The officers searched defendant's person incident to
his arrest and seized his keys. The officers also searched the aunt, but found no
contraband.
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4
A-2838-16T1
The Car Search
The officers then asked defendant if he would be willing to consent to a
search of his car. Defendant denied there was any contraband in the car, but
nevertheless agreed to the car search. Defendant signed a consent form,
reflecting his agreement. The police then searched the car and recovered a clear
plastic bag of marijuana from the center console.
The aunt called her brother (defendant's uncle), who lived about ten blocks
away. The uncle arrived and sought to drive the Taurus away so it would not be
towed. However, the officers would not release the vehicle to him.
Meanwhile, a police sergeant arrived at the scene. After witnessing
defendant sign the form consenting the search of the car, the sergeant asked
defendant if he had any more narcotics at his residence. Defendant said no. The
sergeant then asked defendant if he would consent to a search of his residence.
According to the police testimony, defendant orally consented.
The Home Search
The police drove defendant, who was still in handcuffs, in a patrol car to
his residence on Armstrong Avenue where he resided with his uncle and cousin.
The police separately drove the Taurus back to the home as well. In the
meantime, defendant's uncle returned to the residence and met the officers at the
5
A-2838-16T1
door. The uncle opened the door. 2 The officers escorted defendant into the
residence, and they went into the kitchen. Defendant's uncle was present in the
apartment for the entirety of the search.
The officers briefly removed defendant's handcuffs and, at 8:47 p.m., he
signed a consent form. The word "room" was handwritten in parentheses next
to defendant's signature.
Once the consent form was signed, officers used a key that was on
defendant's key ring to unlock what defendant had initially identified as his
bedroom. The officers had difficulty unlocking the door. Concerned that they
would break the key or the lock, the officers had defendant unlock the bedroom
door. The officers removed one of defendant's handcuffs, and he opened the
lock. The officers then searched the room in defendant's presence.
Once inside the room, the officers noticed a mattress on the floor, clothes
strewn about, and stacks of storage bins. After searching this room, the officers
seized numerous items of drug paraphernalia, including empty vials and empty
bags. The police did not find any drugs in that room.
The police then asked defendant if that was truly his room, or whether
there were other rooms he used. Defendant replied that he did not use any other
2
Defendant has not contested the uncle's authority to let the officers inside the
shared residence.
6
A-2838-16T1
rooms. Officers then asked the uncle if there were any other rooms defendant
used. The uncle pointed to another room and advised it was defendant's bedroom
as well. The police asked defendant if this second room was also his, and he
acknowledged that it was.
The police once again temporarily removed defendant's handcuffs. They
handed him the key ring, and defendant unlocked the second bedroom. The
officers searched the bedroom and found more drug paraphernalia, including a
plate with a razor that had drug residue, empty vials, and empty bags. Again,
no drugs were found.
The Search of the Safe
After the police had discovered a considerable amount drug paraphernalia,
an officer asked defendant, "Where's the narcotics?" Defendant replied that
there were no drugs in the house.
Meanwhile, Officer DeJesus spoke separately with the uncle, who orally
agreed to let the police search a third bedroom. Inside that third bedroom the
police discovered a black safe. The officers questioned defendant and the uncle
about the contents of the safe. The uncle said he had not known that a safe was
in that bedroom, and he denied owning it. The officers then asked defendant if
he owned the safe. Initially, he denied owning it, but then eventually conceded
the safe was his.
7
A-2838-16T1
Officer DeJesus asked defendant what was in the safe. According to
DeJesus, defendant replied, "Whatever you find in there . . . then that's really it
. . . there's no gun, nothing else in the house."
At about 9:40 p.m., defendant signed another consent-to-search form, this
one authorizing the search of the safe. The police opened the safe and found
1,050 bags of heroin, divided into twenty-one bricks. The heroin in the safe had
the same logo as the heroin found earlier in defendant's pocket.
B.
The Indictment
Based on this evidence, a Hudson County grand jury charged defendant
with multiple crimes. The charges included first-degree operation of a facility
for manufacturing heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (count one); second-degree
possession of heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(l) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2) (count two); third-degree possession of heroin with
intent to distribute while within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35 -7
(count three); second-degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute while
within 500 feet of a public park, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.l (count four); third-degree
possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(l) (counts five and six); and fourth-
degree possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A.
2C:36-3 (count seven).
8
A-2838-16T1
C.
The Pretrial Suppression Motions
Prior to trial, defendant filed a series of suppression motions. First, he
moved to suppress the physical evidence, including the drugs and drug
paraphernalia, which the police had seized from his residence without a warrant.
After a two-day hearing, the motion judge denied that application, issuing a
detailed written opinion. In essence, the judge concluded that defendant had
voluntarily provided his consent, both orally and in written form, to search the
two rooms and the safe.
Thereafter, defendant moved to suppress the oral statements he made to
the police at the scene of the motor vehicle stop before the Miranda warning had
been given, including his admission that he had the "two bundles" on his person.
The motion judge denied this application as well. In his oral opinion, the judge
concluded defendant was not yet in custody when he made these statements, and
thus no Miranda violation occurred.
The case was taken over by a second judge ("the trial judge"). Defendant
moved before that judge to suppress the statements he made to the police after
he was read his Miranda rights. The trial judge granted this motion, finding no
valid waiver of defendant's rights against self-incrimination as to the post-
9
A-2838-16T1
warning statements. Consequently, those statements were excluded from the
State's evidence at trial.
D.
The Trial and Verdict
The case was tried over the course of several days in September 2016.
The State presented testimony from several police officers who had been
involved in the arrest and search, a forensic chemist who tested the drugs, and a
narcotics expert. Defendant did not testify in his own behalf, but he presented
testimony from his aunt who had been the passenger in the Taurus. The
defense's theme at trial suggested that someone else other than defendant owned
the drugs and paraphernalia found within the residence.
On the second day of their deliberations, the jurors found defendant not
guilty of the first-degree manufacturing charge, but guilty on the remaining
counts in the indictment.
Sentencing
The trial judge imposed an eighteen-year custodial term with a nine-year
parole disqualifier on count four, and a concurrent five-year term on count six.
All other convictions merged.
10
A-2838-16T1
E.
The Appeal
In his brief on appeal, defendant presents these arguments for our
consideration:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS
ALLEGEDLY MADE BY [DEFENDANT] PRIOR TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF MIRANDA
WARNINGS. U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V, XIV.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE
MOTION TO SUPPRESS NARCOTICS SEIZED
AFTER OFFICERS EXPANDED A VEHICLE STOP
INTO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
[DEFENDANT'S] HOME. U.S. CONST., AMENDS.
IV, XIV; N.J. CONST., ART. I, PAR. 7.
A. Despite finding drugs in [defendant's] vehicle,
officers lacked a reasonable and articulable basis for
asking [defendant] to authorize a search of his home.
B. Moreover, [defendant's] nominal consent to search
his home, given after his arrest during the vehicle stop,
was involuntary.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD, AND
RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE,
WHEN IT REFUSED, OVER THE DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION, THE JURY'S REQUEST TO RE-HEAR
11
A-2838-16T1
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S SUMMATION. U.S.
CONST., AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST., ART.
I, PARS. 1, 9, 10.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT IMPOSED AN EXCESSIVE
18-YEAR DISCRETIONARY PRISON TERM,
SUBJECT TO A 9-YEAR DISCRETIONARY
PAROLE DISQUALIFIER. THIS COURT SHOULD
REMAND FOR RESENTENCING.
A. The lower court failed to assign weights to the
sentencing factors.
B. The lower court failed to make any findings about
the specific factual circumstances of the instant offense
before imposing a discretionary extended term and
discretionary parole disqualifier at the high end of each
respective range.
II.
We first consider defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying
the suppression of statements he made to the police at the roadside before they
issued Miranda warnings to him. We reject this claim, although based on a
somewhat different analysis than the motion judge.
We review a trial court's factual findings from a suppression hearing
involving a defendant's self-incrimination claims under "a deferential standard."
State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 48 (2012). Our appellate function, as it relates to the
facts, is to consider "'whether the findings made could reasonably have been
reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.'" Id. at 49 (quoting
12
A-2838-16T1
State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1991)). Even so, we review the trial court's
legal analysis de novo. State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011).
Several basic principles of constitutional law guide our review of this self-
incrimination issue. The procedural safeguards of the Miranda doctrine attach
when a criminal suspect is subject to a custodial interrogation. Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). "Custodial interrogation" means
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Custody does "not necessitate a formal arrest,
nor does it require physical restraint in a police station, nor the application of
handcuffs, and may occur in a suspect's home or a public place other than a
police station." State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J. Super. 168, 175 (App. Div. 1974)
(citations omitted). "The critical determinant of custody is whether there has
been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on th e
objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the
status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors." State
v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 103 (1997) (citations omitted).
The determination of whether a person was in custody is an objective one,
independent of "'the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating
officers or the person being questioned.'" State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 622
13
A-2838-16T1
(2007) (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)). Judicial
assessment of whether a suspect has been placed in custody is fact-sensitive.
The issue must be considered through "a case-by-case approach," in which the
totality of the circumstances is examined. Ibid. (quoting Godfrey, 131 N.J.
Super. at 175-77).
Applying these standards, we respectfully disagree with the motion
judge's legal conclusion that defendant was "free to leave" and thereby not in
custody, when he was asked by Officer Moreano at the traffic stop about whether
he possessed anything injurious. After the police smelled marijuana in the car,
defendant voluntarily informed officers that he had smoked marijuana earlier
that day. Before that point in the sequence of events, defendant was not in
custody. However, once defendant admitted he had smoked marijuana, coupled
with the detected odor of marijuana in the car, the police had a sufficient basis
to detain defendant. The police then appropriately ordered defendant out of the
car. Objectively, defendant was not free to leave by the time the police ordered
him to do so. No reasonable person would think otherwise. See, e.g., O'Neal,
190 N.J. at 616.
The motion judge mistakenly concluded a person in defendant's situation
would have reasonably felt free to walk away from the scene. The marijuana
odor emanating from the car and defendant's admission to the police of
14
A-2838-16T1
marijuana smoking elevated this situation beyond a "routine traffic stop."
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
Nevertheless, as the situation at the roadside developed, the police were
authorized to ask defendant if he had anything in his possession that might injure
them. Such a query is authorized, even before the reading of Miranda warnings,
to assure the safety of the police officers who are on the scene. See State v.
Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 631-32 (App. Div. 2000) (recognizing the right
of police to pose such an inquiry concerning contraband or weapons); see also
State v. Toro, 229 N.J. Super. 220-22 (App. Div. 1988).
In response to Officer Moreano's safety-oriented question about having
anything that might "poke," "stab," or "harm" the officer, defendant chose to
reply with a non-responsive admission that he had "two bundles" on his person.
This admission was voluntary in the context presented.
We stress the officers did not ask defendant at the scene if he possessed
any drugs. Defendant blurted out his revelation of drug possession on his own
volition. His revelation was not the product of police interrogation. Instead, it
was a self-initiated disclosure. No Miranda violation occurred. Consequently,
defendant's "two bundles" statement did not have to be suppressed. The
statement was properly admitted at trial.
15
A-2838-16T1
III.
Defendant next contends that the motion judge erred in denying his motion
to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia discovered through the warrantless
search of his residence. In particular, defendant argues he did not provide
voluntary consent to those searches, either orally or on the forms presented to
him while he was already arrested and in handcuffs. Defendant maintains the
trial court incorrectly deemed the searches to be consensual, and that the
circumstances that produced his supposed consent were inherently coercive.
The State disagrees, and urges that we uphold the motion judge's factual findings
and legal conclusions on this consent issue.
The United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution both
guarantee the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure
in their home. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. Warrantless
searches are presumptively unreasonable unless, among other exceptions,
voluntary consent to the search, without coercion or duress, is provided. State
v. Domicz, 188 N.J. 285, 308 (2006); see also State v. Bryant, 227 N.J. 60, 69
(2016). The State has the burden of demonstrating that the consent -to-search
exception applies. State v. Legette, 227 N.J. 460, 472 (2017). Moreover, "[t]he
State's burden is particularly heavy when the search is conducted after
warrantless entry into a home." Ibid. (recognizing that the home "bears special
16
A-2838-16T1
status"). See also Bryant, 227 N.J. at 69 ("Indeed, 'we accord the highest degree
of protection to privacy interests within the home' . . . because 'the sanctity of
one's home is among our most cherished rights.'") (first quoting State v. Johnson,
193 N.J. 528, 532 (2008); and then State v. Frankel, 179 N.J. 586, 611 (2004)).
Our Supreme Court has held that in order for a search "[t]o be voluntary, the
consent must be unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given."
King, 44 N.J. at 352 (internal quotations omitted).
An "essential element" of such consent is the individual's "knowledge of
the right to refuse [it]." State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975). Whether
spoken or written, such "assent . . . is meaningless unless the consenting party
understood his or her right to refuse" to give it. State v. Suazo, 133 N.J. 315,
323 (1993) (citing Johnson, 68 N.J. at 353-54). Consent is generally a factual
question, determined by an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. State
v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 264 (1988). However, trial courts must adhere to
established legal principles in evaluating those circumstances.
In its seminal opinion on this subject in King, the Supreme Court
articulated several factors to guide courts in our State as to whether a person's
supposed consent for police to search a dwelling without a warrant is voluntary.
As the Court stated, these following five "King factors" weigh against
voluntariness, and tend to show that a person's consent was coerced:
17
A-2838-16T1
(1) that consent was made by an individual already
arrested; (2) that consent was obtained despite a denial
of guilt; (3) that consent was obtained only after the
accused had refused initial requests for consent to
search; (4) that consent was given where the subsequent
search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the
accused must have known would be discovered; and (5)
that consent was given while the defendant was
handcuffed.
[Id. at 352-53.]
Additionally, the Court in King delineated three offsetting factors that can
weigh in favor of a finding of voluntariness. Those offsetting factors are
whether: "(1) consent was given where the accused had reason to believe that
the police would find no contraband; (2) defendant admitted his guilt before
consent; (3) defendant affirmatively assisted the police officers." Id. at 353.
The Court in King explained that the "existence or absence of one or more
of the above factors in not determinative of the [voluntariness] issue." Ibid.Because the factors "are only guideposts to aid a trial judge in arriving at his
conclusion," a trial judge should determine the issue of voluntary consent by
considering "the totality of the particular circumstances of the case before him."
Ibid. Ultimately, the Court concluded in King, that "the trial judge is in a better
position to weigh the significance of the pertinent factors than is an appellate
tribunal." Ibid. (emphasis added).
18
A-2838-16T1
Recently, in State v. Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 42 (2018), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the continued applicability of the King voluntariness factors. As the
Court reiterated in Hagans, the King factors should not be applied mechanically,
and that, ultimately, the totality of circumstances dictate the outcome. Id. at 42-
43.
Here, the motion judge's April 6, 2016 written opinion upholding the
residential search on consent grounds recited the five King factors that tend to
show coercion and involuntary conduct. Unfortunately, the opinion did not
apply those individual factors expressly to the evidence. Moreover, the opinion
does not list or apply the three offsetting King factors at all.
To be sure, the motion judge's opinion discusses the "totality of
circumstances" conceptually. But unfortunately no factor-by-factor King
analysis to guide that assessment for each stage of the residential search appears
in the opinion. See R. 1:7-4(a) (mandating adequate statements of reasons that
support trial court rulings to enable future appellate review).
At oral argument on the appeal, we asked counsel about the implications
of the omission of a King analysis from the trial court's suppression decision.
Following that argument, the Attorney General submitted a letter to this panel
advising that "[t]he State agrees that a limited remand would be appropriate to
allow the [motion] judge the opportunity to consider the issue, and set forth a
19
A-2838-16T1
more robust record as to his analysis of the King factors." Defense counsel
thereafter submitted a letter opposing a remand for this purpose. The defense
essentially maintains it is self-evident that the "consents" provided by defendant
to the search of the residence and the safe manifestly were coerced under a King
analysis.
With the State's acquiescence, we choose to remand this matter for the
motion judge to perform a complete factor-by-factor King analysis as to each
successive oral and written consent-to-search provided by defendant. We do so
because the motion judge retains the unique ability to connect those legal factors
to his credibility assessments and the testimony that he heard from multiple
witnesses at the two-day suppression hearing. This deference to a trial court's
"feel" for the evidence is consistent with the Court's direction in King itself,
which recognized, as we have already noted, that trial judges usually are in "a
better position" than an appellate tribunal to "weigh the significance o f the
pertinent [King] factors." King, 44 N.J. at 353.
To accommodate the remand, we request the parties to provide courtesy
copies of their appellate briefs, appendices, and pertinent transcripts to the
motion judge. Following those submissions, the judge shall have discretion to
hear oral argument or request any further submissions.
20
A-2838-16T1
We do not forecast in advance what conclusions the motion judge is likely
to draw. If, on closer examination, the judge concludes the King factors weigh
against the State and the totality of circumstances reflect involuntariness, the
drug evidence must be suppressed and defendant is entitled to a new trial, with
the State preserving its appellate rights from that ruling. Conversely, if the judge
finds the King factors weigh in the other direction and the totality of
circumstances indicate defendant's voluntary consent, the denial of the
suppression motion shall be renewed, and defendant may bring a new appeal
from that post-remand decision.
To assist the motion judge in this endeavor, we note that several (but not
all) of the factors in the King analysis are clearly present or absent. As to the
five involuntariness factors, the State concedes that King factor one (defendant
was "under arrest when his consent was sought") is established. The State also
concedes the presence of factor four ("consent was give where the subsequent
search resulted in a seizure of contraband which the accused must have known
would be discovered"). Indeed, that point is the very heart of the State's trial
theory: that defendant knowingly possessed the drugs and paraphernalia found
in the residence.
Although the State disagrees, we also hold that King factor five ("consent
was given while the defendant was in handcuffs") is patently clear. The mere
21
A-2838-16T1
fact the officers temporarily removed the handcuffs several times from
defendant to enable him to turn a key or to sign a consent form does not matter.
As to the offsetting King factors, we hold that offsetting factor two
("defendant admitted his guilt before consent") is not established here. To the
contrary, even by the officers' accounts, defendant kept insisting that the police
would not find anything in the residence to incriminate him.
The remaining positive and offsetting King factors are left to the motion
judge's careful reassessment.
In light of our remand on these grounds, we further request the motion
judge to reexamine whether the police had the right at the scene of the motor
vehicle stop – after arresting and handcuffing defendant – to ask him to consent
to a search of his residence located several blocks away. This reexamination
should proceed in light of pertinent case law, including State v. Carty, 170 N.J.
632, 635 (2002) (invalidating certain suspicionless consent searches i n motor
vehicle stops) and Domicz, 188 N.J. at 285 (distinguishing the context of
consent to search a home provided at the home from consent to search a motor
vehicle at the roadside). In light of this case law and a comparison of the present
facts to those in the reported cases, the motion judge should reexamine his
finding that the residence was known to police as a place of drug activity
justified the police in requesting defendant's consent and in transporting him in
22
A-2838-16T1
handcuffs there. Again, we do not prescribe or forecast the result on remand
that may come from such a deeper analysis.
We respectfully request that the trial court complete the remand within
120 days. In the meantime, defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence
shall remain unaltered.
IV.
We turn to the novel legal issue of whether the trial judge had the authority
to grant the deliberating jurors' request to have defense counsel's closing
argument played back or read back to them. This issue has not yet been the
subject of any reported opinions in our State.
A.
The chronology pertinent to this playback issue is as follows. The jurors
were read the court's charge on Friday, September 16, 2018. After some
deliberations, the jurors submitted a question to the court that day that r ead:
"The jury wants to confirm if [defendant] admitted and officially [sic] that he
had two bundles in his pocket. Who alleges that [defendant] said this?" The trial
judge informed the jurors that he could not answer this question, and instead
they had to rely on their own recollection of the evidence presented.
Later that day, the jurors sent another note to the court that read: "We don't
have unanimous votes. Are we going to wait for your advice?" The judge
23
A-2838-16T1
summoned the jurors back into the courtroom and told them that, because it was
nearly 5:00 p.m. on a Friday, he was going to discharge them for the weekend.
The judge instructed the jurors to return to court Monday morning to continue
deliberations.
On Monday, September 19, the court started the day by replacing a juror,
with no objection from counsel, with an alternate juror. The reconstituted jury
then resumed its deliberations.
After a lunch order was arranged, the deliberating jurors sent a note to the
court that read: "We would like to hear the defense summation again." Before
calling the jurors back into the courtroom, the trial judge advised the prosecutor
and defense counsel that he intended to respond to this request by telling the
jurors that "openings and summations are not evidence [and] . . . they're going
to have to rely upon their recollections."
Defense counsel urged the court to reconsider playing back the
summations, even though they are not evidence. Counsel advised that a judge
in the same vicinage had recently granted such a request, although that case was
not precedential. The State objected, arguing that summations are not
considered evidence and therefore should not be replayed.
The judge agreed with the State's position. The jurors were brought back
into the courtroom. The judge explained to them that he would not replay
24
A-2838-16T1
summations because they are not considered evidence. He instructed them to
rely on their recollections of the evidence to guide their decision.
The jurors also asked the court to replay the trial testimony of Officer
DeJesus. The judge agreed to do so. He informed the jury the playback of the
officer's direct and cross-examination would take about seventy minutes. The
court took a short recess to arrange the playback. Before the playback occurred,
the jurors sent back another note that said, "The jury is already satisfied with the
answer given. We decided to withdraw the other request. The jury has reached
a unanimous decision."
The jurors returned to the courtroom and issued their verdict, finding
defendant not guilty on the manufacturing charge in count one, but guilty of the
remaining charges. The judge polled the jurors individually and confirmed their
verdict was unanimous.
B.
The core issue posed to us is whether a trial judge may – as at least one
judge in the vicinage had apparently done – grant a jury's request to have all or
parts of counsel's closing arguments played or read back to the jury a second
time. To resolve this question, we consider the important functional role that
closing arguments can have in trial practice, particularly in a jury trial.
25
A-2838-16T1
Unlike an opening statement from trial counsel, which can only preview
what evidence is anticipated, a closing argument provides an important chance
for all counsel to highlight and analyze the proofs that were actually presented
at the trial. An effective summation can helpfully tie together for the trier of
fact the various pieces of evidence, and explain how those pieces do or do not
fit into the advocate's theory of the case.
In a criminal case such as this one, summations can supply an organized
and focused explanation of how the evidence does or does not satisfy the
elements of an offense, and how those proofs do or do not establish a defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Closing arguments can also spotlight the
testimony of certain witnesses, and address how cross-examination or other
evidence either impeached (or, conversely, bolstered) the credibility of those
witnesses. In essence, the summation has an important function of providing a
coherent analysis of the evidence for the jury, or for the judge in a non-jury case.
The United States Supreme Court expounded upon these important
principles in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). In that case, the Court
struck down as unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment a New York statute
that gave trial judges the discretion to disallow closing arguments of counsel in
non-jury criminal cases. The Court reasoned in Herring that such closing
26
A-2838-16T1
arguments are a vital part of trial counsel's advocacy role. We repeat here
portions of the Court's insights concerning that role:
The widespread recognition of the right of the
defense to make a closing summary of the evidence to
the trier of the facts, whether judge or jury, finds solid
support in history. In the 16th and 17th centuries, when
notions of compulsory process, confrontation, and
counsel were in their infancy, the essence of the English
criminal trial was argument between the defendant and
counsel for the Crown. Whatever other procedural
protections may have been lacking, there was no
absence of debate on the factual and legal issues raised
in a criminal case. As the rights to compulsory process,
to confrontation, and to counsel developed, the
adversary system's commitment to argument was
neither discarded nor diluted. Rather the reform in
procedure had the effect of shifting the primary
function of argument to summation of the evidence at
the close of trial, in contrast to the "fragmented" factual
argument that had been typical of the earlier common
law.
[Id. at 860-61 (emphasis added).]
As the Court further elaborated:
It can hardly be questioned that closing argument
serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution
by the trier of fact in a criminal case. For it is only after
all the evidence is in that counsel for the parties are in
a position to present their respective versions of the
case as a whole. Only then can they argue the
inferences to be drawn from all the testimony, and point
out the weaknesses of their adversaries' positions. And
for the defense, closing argument is the last clear
chance to persuade the trier of fact that there may be
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
27
A-2838-16T1
The very premise of our adversary system of
criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides
of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that
the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free. In a
criminal trial, which is in the end basically a fact
finding process, no aspect of such advocacy could be
more important than the opportunity finally to marshal
the evidence for each side before submission of the case
to judgment.
[Id. at 862 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).]
Having emphasized these fundamental principles, the Court in Herring
acknowledged that an attorney's right to present a closing argument is not
unbounded:
This is not to say that closing arguments in a
criminal case must be uncontrolled or even
unrestrained. The presiding judge must be and is given
great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting
the scope of closing summations. He may limit counsel
to a reasonable time and may terminate argument when
continuation would be repetitive or redundant. He may
ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the
mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct
of the trial. In all these respects he must have broad
discretion.
....
Some cases may appear to the trial judge to be
simple – open and shut – at the close of the evidence.
And surely in many such cases a closing argument will,
in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, be "likely to leave
[a] judge just where it found him." But just as surely,
there will be cases where closing argument may correct
a premature misjudgment and avoid an otherwise
erroneous verdict. And there is no certain way for a
28
A-2838-16T1
trial judge to identify accurately which cases these will
be, until the judge has heard the closing summation of
counsel.
[Id. at 863 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).]
See also Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques 387 (8th ed. 2010) ("Closing
arguments are the chronological and psychological culminations of a jury trial.
They are the last opportunity to communicate directly with the jury.").
New Jersey case law has recognized these general principles. See R. 1:7-
1(b) (granting counsel a right to present closing statements at the end of a case
"except as may be otherwise ordered by the court"); see also State v. Briggs, 349
N.J. Super. 496, 500-01 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Herring by analogy in
upholding defense counsel's right to present "meaningful argument" at
sentencing).
In keeping with these concepts, our trial courts have been granted the
discretion to allow counsel to present supplemental closing arguments in
appropriate circumstances, particularly where there has been a significant gap
in time between deliberations stopping and resuming, or where a legal issue has
arisen that might warrant further advocacy. See, e.g., State v. Rovito, 99 N.J.
581, 588 (1985) (finding no error when a trial court granted an additional ten
minutes to both parties to present supplementary summations after the court
decided to charge the jury on an additional provision after the completion of
29
A-2838-16T1
summations); see also State v. Speth, 324 N.J. Super. 471 (Law Div. 1997), aff'd,
323 N.J. Super. 67 (App. Div. 1999) (in which the trial court permitted both
sides to supplement any summations after deliberations were underway, in a
complex case where lengthy deliberations over several weeks had been
interrupted by religious holidays and a weekend).
C.
Mindful of the well-established important function of summations, we
now turn to the principles that pertain to the process of playing back or reading
back portions of a trial, when requested by a jury.
Our courts have long recognized that juries sometimes will ask to review
testimony when they are in the midst of deliberations. The Supreme Court has
held that "[a]bsent 'some unusual circumstance,' those requests should be
granted." State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 119-20 (2011) (quoting State v.
Wolf, 44 N.J. 176, 185 (1965)). The Court reasoned in Miller that "[t]he
requests are a clear sign that the evidence sought is important to the deliberative
process" and therefore, "the 'true administration of justice' requires that judges
typically accede to jury requests to review testimony." Miller, 205 N.J. at 120.
Comparably, judges who have reserved decision in a case sometimes play
back the recorded arguments of counsel. They do so in order to refresh or clarify
30
A-2838-16T1
their recollections before issuing a ruling. Jurors understandably may want a
similar opportunity before rendering a verdict.
Trial courts have "broad discretion as to whether and how to conduct read-
backs and playbacks." Id. at 122; see also State v. Wilson, 165 N.J. 657, 660
(2000) ("It is well-established that 'the reading of all or part of the testimony of
one or more of the witnesses at a trial, criminal or civil, at the specific request
of the jury during their deliberations is discretionary with the trial court.'")
(quoting Wolf, 44 N.J. at 185). A party opposing the playback of testimony has
the burden to object and demonstrate prejudice. Miller, 205 N.J. at 124; see also
State v. Ortiz, 202 N.J. Super. 233, 245 (App. Div. 1985).
The trial judge in the present case rightly noted that, unlike trial testimony,
the arguments of counsel are not evidence, and should not be treated by a jury
as such. Our Model Jury Charges reinforce that principle. See, e.g., Model Jury
Charges (Criminal), "Criminal Final Charges" (rev. May 12, 2014). This does
not mean, however, that jurors categorically are prohibited from hearing once
again the closing arguments of counsel on appropriate terms and conditions – if,
for some reason that arises in their deliberations, they wish to have those
arguments repeated or replayed.
Jurors may have difficulty remembering exactly what counsel said in
summations about a hotly disputed aspect of the evidence. Jurors also may not
31
A-2838-16T1
have heard the words of counsel in summation clearly if counsel spoke softly or
mumbled, or they might not have understood them.
In such rare circumstances when they arise, we discern no reason why a
playback or readback of closing arguments should be categorically disallowed,
provided, of course, the summations of both sides are presented. Instead, trial
courts should maintain the discretion to allow or disallow such requests, in the
interests of justice. 3
Other jurisdictions, most notably California, have recognized a trial
court's discretionary authority to allow such readbacks or playbacks. As the
California Supreme Court stated in People v. Gordon, 792 P.2d 251, 274 (Cal.
1990), "We do not doubt that a trial court's inherent authority regarding the
performance of its functions includes the power to order argument by counsel to
be reread to the jury or to be furnished to that body in written form. The exercise
of such power must be entrusted to the court’s sound discretion." (Emphasis
added). See also People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643, 680 (Cal. 1992) (noting the trial
court correctly concluded that it had discretion to deny the jury's request to
playback summation and "expressed appropriate concern over diverting the
3
By analogy, our Rules of Court have been amended to require a written copy
of the court's instructions in criminal cases to be provided to jurors in the jury
room, in recognition that jurors may have trouble remembering the precise
words of those instructions. See R. 1:8-8(b)(2).
32
A-2838-16T1
jury's attention from proper consideration of the evidence and instructions");
People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992, 1021 (Cal. 1993) (noting the "trial court erred in
suggesting that it lacked authority to order the reading back of defense counsel's
closing summation," but concluding the error was not prejudicial); People v.
Gurule, 51 P.3d 224, 286 (Cal. 2002) (finding no abuse of discretion where a
trial court declined a request for readback of closing argument, particularly
when defense counsel's closing arguably had misstated the law).
New York courts likewise have recognized this principle. See, e.g.,
People v. Jones, 483 N.Y.S.2d 89, 89 (App. Div. 1984) (noting the trial court's
discretion to grant such a jury request, but finding no "improvident" exercise of
that discretion in denying the request in that case); People v. Foster, 499
N.Y.S.2d 808, 808 (App. Div. 1986) (finding no error in the court's denial of a
similar jury request).
The only jurisdiction we know of that disallows the playback or readback
of counsel's summations is Vermont, which perceived a risk of prejudice in
engaging in such a procedure where only the State's summation was read back.
State v. Fitzgerald, 449 A.2d 930, 932 (Vt. 1982) (criticizing a trial court for
allowing a rereading of only a prosecutor's summation without the defense
summation, but finding no "clear error" requiring the jury's verdict to be
overturned).
33
A-2838-16T1
Consistent with the practice in California and New York, we hold that trial
courts in New Jersey have the discretion to grant requests from juries to play
back or read back closing arguments. In exercising that discretion, courts may
consider such factors as: (1) whether counsel made improper or inflammatory
remarks in summation; (2) whether counsel materially misstated the evidence;
(3) whether multiple objections to the closing arguments had been interjected,
and whether they were sustained or overruled; (4) the length and complexity of
the trial; (5) whether deliberations had been lengthy or significantly interrupted;
and (6) other practical and equitable considerations.
Applying these precepts of discretion to the present case, we find no
reason to grant defendant a new trial on this basis. The trial was not particularly
lengthy. The issues were not especially complex. The jurors' deliberations only
covered portions of two days. The weekend gap between those two days was
not protracted. Although defense counsel was interrupted in summation a few
times by the prosecutor with objections, none of those interruptions was
exceptional.
While it may have been helpful, in retrospect, for the trial court to have
accommodated the jurors' request to hear the closing arguments again, the denial
of their request was not an abuse of discretion, nor a reversible error mandating
a new trial. Notably, the jurors decided to forego a playback of Officer
34
A-2838-16T1
DeJesus's testimony, after being told that his playback would consume about
seventy minutes. A playback of both counsel's summations presumably would
have taken considerable time, and it is possible the jurors would have eschewed
that playback as well. We will not speculate that the denial of the playback
request was prejudicial to either party.
In sum, although we agree with defendant that the trial court did possess
the inherent authority to grant the jurors' playback request, the court did not
misapply its discretion in denying it. Moreover, the denial did not manifest ly
prejudice defendant, certainly not to a degree warranting a new trial. R. 2:10-2.
V.
Defendant's final contention – that his sentence is excessive – requires
little comment. As the sentencing judge noted, defendant had seven prior
indictable convictions, several of them for narcotics offenses and one of them
for aggravated manslaughter. The judge's assessment of the aggravating and
mitigating factors, while not expressed in expansive terms, does not warrant our
second-guessing of those factors on the record presented. The sentence imposed
by no means shocks our conscience. State v. Bienick, 200 N.J. 601, 612 (2010).
Affirmed in part, and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
35
A-2838-16T1