JUAN C. GARCIA VS. MARIA F. GARCIA (FM-09-1817-16, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0169-17T4
JUAN C. GARCIA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARIA F. GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted November 5, 2018 – Decided December 10, 2018
Before Judges Messano and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FM-09-1817-16.
Malcolm Blum, attorney for appellant.
Santo V. Artusa, Jr., attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant (mother) appeals
from the provision of the August 2, 2017 Chancery Division order, emancipating
the parties' daughter, J.G., born August 1996. We affirm.
The parties married in 1995 and divorced in 2016. The Dual Judgment of
Divorce (DJOD) incorporated a property settlement agreement (PSA) that
designated defendant the parent of primary residence and obligated plaintiff to
pay child support for J.G., the parties' only child. When the parties signed the
PSA, J.G. had "graduated from high school" and was attending "Hudson County
Community College." According to the PSA, each party agreed to contribute
fifty percent towards J.G.'s "tuition and college related costs."
Regarding emancipation, the PSA provided in pertinent part that "the child
shall be deemed emancipated, and the parties' legal obligation to support her
shall end, upon the first to occur of the following events:"
[1] The child engaging in or having the ability to
engage in full-time employment and is therefore not
[in] full-time attendance at college or a recognized
post-secondary educational/training program, unless
for good cause shown, except and provided that:
(a) Engagement of the child in partial
employment shall not be deemed an
emancipating event[;]
(b) Engagement by the child in full[-]time
employment during vacation and summer
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periods shall not be deemed an
emancipating event . . . .
[2] The completion of four . . . years of full-time
undergraduate college studies or the attainment of a
Bachelor's degree by the child, whichever shall occur
first. It is the parties' intention that emancipation of the
child shall only be deferred for four . . . consecutive
years of college whether or not the child has graduated
within that four year period[.]
On June 9, 2017, plaintiff moved to emancipate J.G. and terminate child
support, asserting that J.G. was "working full[-]time" and "not in school." In
opposition, defendant certified that J.G. was only "working part[-]time," and her
"work hours [varied] between [eight] to [twelve] hours per week." Further,
according to defendant, J.G. was "taking a full[-]time curriculum towards an
Associate Degree," after which "she intends to continue with her college
education to obtain a four (4) year degree." In support, defendant provided a
copy of J.G.'s grades from Hudson County Community College. However, the
document indicated that for the Fall 2016 and Spring 2017 semesters, J.G. failed
to maintain a full-time credit load, resulting in her receiving less than twelve
credits per semester.
On July 7, 2017, the parties appeared for oral argument on the motion.
The motion judge adjourned the motion to allow defendant to "provide an
official transcript" for J.G. Upon receipt of the records, on August 2, 2017, the
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judge granted the motion on the papers, emancipating J.G. effective the date
plaintiff filed the motion. In a written decision accompanying the August 2
order, the judge determined that defendant "ha[d] not met her burden of proof"
and "failed to show [J.G.] ha[d] been attending Hudson [County] Community
College uninterrupted on a full[-]time basis" as required by the PSA. According
to the judge, "if [J.G.] enrolled in the Fall of 2016, she should have [four]
semesters of courses with [twelve] credits per semester." Instead, she "[did] not
provide [proof of enrollment for] more than [two] semesters." This appeal
followed.1
On appeal, defendant argues she adduced sufficient facts to meet her
burden of proof and the judge erred in determining otherwise. In the alternative,
defendant asserts that "[a]t a minimum, the facts presented . . . amounted to
contested material facts," necessitating a plenary hearing. We disagree.
We generally defer to the Family Part's fact-finding because of the court's
expertise in family matters and ability to make credibility determinations. N.J.
1
On October 17, 2018, we granted defendant's motion to supplement the record
with J.G.'s transcript from Bergen County Community College where she
apparently transferred for the Fall 2017, Spring 2018, and Fall 2018 semesters.
We now conclude that the motion was improvidently granted because the motion
judge adjudicated the motion that is the subject of this appeal without the benefit
of those transcripts.
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Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). We defer to
a judge's findings of fact unless they lack support in the record or are
inconsistent with the substantial, credible evidence. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.
Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). However, where "no hearing takes
place, no evidence is admitted, and no findings of fact are made," we owe no
deference to the trial court's conclusions. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 396 (2009). Likewise, we owe no special deference to a
trial court's "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from
established facts." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140
N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
Here, defendant challenges the court's determination that J.G. was
emancipated. There is a rebuttable presumption against emancipation for
individuals under the age of eighteen. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543
(1982); Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 17 (App. Div. 2006). While
attaining the age of eighteen "establishes prima facie, but not conclusive, proof
of emancipation," Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543, emancipation "does not occur . . .
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automatically, by operation of law, simply by reason of the dependent child
reaching the age of" eighteen. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 17. 2
"Whether a child is emancipated at age [eighteen], with the correlative
termination of the right to parental support," requires a fact-sensitive inquiry,
Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543, to determine if "the child has moved 'beyond the
sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an
independent status of his or her own.'" Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 17-18 (quoting
Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997)). Thus, "[a] court's
emancipation 'determination involves a critical evaluation of the prevailing
circumstances including the child's need, interests, and independent resources,
the family's reasonable expectations, and the parties' financial ability, among
other things.'" Llewelyn v. Shewchuk, 440 N.J. Super. 207, 216 (App. Div.
2015) (quoting Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 18).
2
Effective February 1, 2017, under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67, "a child support
obligation shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court when
a child reaches [nineteen] years of age," N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(a); however, "a
custodial parent . . . [may] seek[] the continuation of child support beyond the
date the child reaches [nineteen] years of age" by demonstrating that "the child
is a student in a post-secondary education program and is enrolled for the
number of hours or courses the school considers to be full-time attendance
during some part of each of any five calendar months of the year[.]" N.J.S.A.
2A:17-56.67(b)(1)(b).
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The court must also consider whether there is an agreement between "the
parties to voluntarily extend the parental duty of support beyond the presumptive
age of emancipation." Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 18. Where a parent
"undertak[es] to support a child beyond the presumptive legal limits of parental
responsibility[,]" the "parental obligation is not measured by legal duties
otherwise imposed, but rather founded upon contractual and equitable
principles." Ibid. (citations omitted).
Indeed, "[s]ettlement of disputes, including matrimonial disputes, is
encouraged and highly valued in our system." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44
(2016). "Therefore, 'fair and definitive arrangements arrived at by mutual
consent should not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed.'" Ibid. "As contracts,
PSAs should be enforced according to the original intent of the parties," J.B. v.
W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013), and "a court should not rewrite a contract or
grant a better deal than that for which the parties expressly bargained." Quinn,
225 N.J. at 45. Thus, "absen[t] . . . unconscionability, fraud, or overreaching in
the negotiations of the settlement," Miller v. Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 419 (1999),
"when the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and
unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so
would lead to an absurd result." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45.
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Here, the PSA extended J.G.'s emancipation beyond the presumptive age.
The parties do not dispute that the PSA was entered into "by consensual
agreement, voluntarily and knowingly," was "fair and equitable," and was
therefore binding. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. at 18. Plaintiff sought a determination
that J.G. was emancipated under the terms of the agreement. We are satisfied
there was substantial, credible evidence supporting the judge's determination
that J.G. did not attend four semesters of college with at least twelve credits per
semester, and was therefore not a full-time college student as required under the
PSA. Accordingly, the judge correctly concluded plaintiff established the
agreed upon condition for the emancipation of J.G. under the PSA.
Affirmed.
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