THOMAS J. KELLY VS. ELIZABETH A. BRANNIN (FM-14-0495-05, MORRIS COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2020 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3997-18T1
    THOMAS J. KELLY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    ELIZABETH A. BRANNIN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Argued telephonically June 17, 2020 –
    Decided July 15, 2020
    Before Judges Koblitz and Gilson.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
    Docket No. FM-14-0495-05.
    Amy Frances Gjelsvik argued the cause for appellant
    (Paris P. Eliades Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Amy
    Frances Gjelsvik, on the briefs).
    James Clark Jensen argued the cause for respondent
    (Laufer, Dalena, Jensen, Bradley & Doran, LLC,
    attorneys; James Clark Jensen, of counsel and on the
    brief; Kory A. Crichton, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Elizabeth A. Brannin appeals from a March 8, 2019 order
    entered after an evidentiary hearing. Judge Noah Franzblau found she had been
    cohabitating since November 25, 2015 and eliminated her alimony as of that
    date, pursuant to the parties' marital settlement agreement (MSA). We affirm
    substantially for the reasons articulated in Judge Franzblau's March 8, 2019 oral
    opinion, deferring to his credibility assessments as we must. Cesare v. Cesare,
    
    154 N.J. 394
    , 412 (1998).
    The parties, who have no children, were married in 1989. In their MSA,
    which was incorporated into their 2005 judgment of divorce, the parties agreed
    that plaintiff would pay defendant permanent alimony of $1700 per month. The
    alimony provision also stated that alimony would cease if defendant cohabitated
    or remarried.
    In July 2017, plaintiff Thomas J. Kelly filed a motion to terminate alimony
    contending that defendant was cohabitating with Jeffrey Kastner, whom she
    acknowledged living with since November 2015.          The parties and Kastner
    testified at the hearing. Judge Franzblau found plaintiff to be credible and
    defendant and Kastner to be incredible. The judge found that defendant and
    Kastner rented a one-bedroom apartment in Cary, North Carolina and lived there
    A-3997-18T1
    2
    for twenty months from November 25, 2015 to June 2017. Thereafter, they
    moved back to New Jersey and lived together in a home, that Kastner had
    inherited from his deceased brother, for an additional twenty-one months by the
    time of the hearing, sharing one bathroom and all living expenses. Although
    generally reclusive, they attended a wedding together. Both defendant and
    Kastner testified that they were platonic roommates who lived together as
    friends out of convenience. Neither one was employed.
    Relying on the definition of cohabitation found in Konzelman v.
    Konzelman, 
    158 N.J. 185
    , 202 (1999), which both parties acknowledge is the
    relevant standard, Judge Franzblau explained his credibility determinations,
    finding plaintiff's "credibility was bolstered by his calm demeanor, his attempts
    to answer all questions directly and completely, the consistency between his
    testimony and supporting documentation, and by his potential admissions
    against interest." In contrast, the judge found defendant and Kastner's testimony
    incredible, finding the two, who had been sequestered during trial, contradicted
    each other, were "combative," "defied logic" and their "testimony [was]
    unsupported by documentary evidence." The judge gave numerous examples of
    their testimony that lent support to these findings.
    A-3997-18T1
    3
    On appeal, defendant makes two arguments, contending that the trial
    judge erred in holding a plenary hearing because another judge earlier found
    plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie showing of cohabitation, and that the
    judge abused his discretion in finding that defendant was cohabitating with
    Kastner.
    In a February 2, 2018 order another judge found insufficient prima facie
    evidence of cohabitation had been presented "given the rambling context of the
    exhibit to the [c]ertification of Jeffrey Kastner," but nonetheless ordered
    discovery, after which that judge ordered a plenary hearing. A prima facie case
    of cohabitation should be demonstrated prior to discovery proceeding. Donnelly
    v. Donnelly, 
    405 N.J. Super. 117
    , 131-32 (App. Div. 2009). The order also
    reflected that defendant conceded she lived with Kastner. Although the order
    was inartfully worded, it makes no practical sense to reverse the detailed ,
    thoughtful conclusions of a trial judge, based on a full plenary hearing due only
    to mistaken wording of a preliminary order. Such a decision would elevate form
    over substance, requiring the parties to bear the expense of a new hearing, which
    would undoubtedly result in the same outcome.
    Finally, defendant argues that the judge was presented with insufficient
    evidence of an "intimate romantic relationship" or intertwined finances. Kastner
    A-3997-18T1
    4
    and defendant lived together in two states located a significant distance apart for
    lengthy periods of time. Judge Franzblau had the opportunity to observe their
    demeanor and assess their credibility when they both denied a romantic
    relationship or intertwined finances. We accept his assessment for the sound
    reasons expressed in Judge Franzblau's decision. "Because a trial court 'hears
    the case, sees and observes the witnesses, [and] hears them testify,' it has a better
    perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses."
    Cesare, 
    154 N.J. at 412
     (alteration in original).       We defer to family court
    factfinding because of its "special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters."
    
    Id. at 413
    .
    Affirmed.
    A-3997-18T1
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3997-18T1

Filed Date: 7/15/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/13/2020