STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHAMECA BROWN (16-06-1331, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2106-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHAMECA BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued November 13, 2018 – Decided December 5, 2018
Before Judges Fasciale and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 16-06-1331.
Susan L. Romeo, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Susan L. Romeo, of counsel
and on the brief).
Shiraz I. Deen, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
for respondent (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County
Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief
Appellate Attorney, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
After her appeal of the prosecutor's rejection of her application for
admission into the pre-trial intervention program (PTI) was denied by the trial
court, defendant pled guilty to third-degree hindering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(3),
and was sentenced to a one-year probationary term. "PTI is a 'diversionary
program through which certain offenders are able to avoid criminal prosecution
by receiving early rehabilitative services expected to deter future criminal
behavior.'" State v. Roseman, 221 N.J. 611, 621 (2015) (quoting State v.
Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 240 (1995)). "[A]cceptance into PTI is dependent upon
an initial recommendation by the Criminal Division Manager and consent of the
prosecutor." Ibid. "The assessment of a defendant's suitability for PTI must be
conducted under the Guidelines for PTI provided in Rule 3:28, along with
consideration of factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)." Ibid.Challenging her rejection from the program, defendant appeals from the
judgment of conviction entered by the court on December 20, 2017, raising the
following arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
RECONSIDERATION BY THE PROSECUTOR
BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH NEITHER THE PTI
DIRECTOR NOR THE PROSECUTOR EVER
EXPLICITLY CITED THE STATUTORY OR
GUIDELINE FACTORS PERTAINING TO
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2
DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH CRIMES OF
VIOLENCE, THEY NEVERTHELESS
EMPHASIZED THE SUPPOSEDLY VIOLENT
NATURE OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT
THROUGHOUT THE APPLICATION PROCESS,
AND SHE WAS IMPROPERLY REQUIRED TO
PRESENT COMPELLING REASONS AND TO
ESTABLISH THAT DENIAL OF HER
APPLICATION WOULD NOT BE ARBITRARY
AND UNREASONABLE.
POINT II
THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
RECONSIDERATION BY THE PROSECUTOR
BECAUSE THE ASSESSMENT OF DEFENDANT'S
APPLICATION IGNORED A KEY STATUTORY
FACTOR AND CRITICAL, UNDISPUTED FACTS
THAT MILITATED IN FAVOR OF DIVERTING
DEFENDANT INTO PTI.
POINT III
THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
RECONSIDERATION BY THE PROSECUTOR
BECAUSE IT WAS ARBITRARY AND
IRRATIONAL TO REJECT DEFENDANT'S
APPLICATION BY RELYING ON THE
INAPPLICABILITY OF ONLY ONE OF THE FIVE
INDEPENDENT PURPOSES OF THE PTI STATUTE,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(A)(3), PERTAINING TO
"'VICTIMLESS' OFFENSES," TO EXCLUDE
DEFENDANT FROM THE PROGRAM, RATHER
THAN EXAMINING WHETHER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES HERE FELL WITHIN ANY OF
THE FOUR OTHER LEGISLATIVELY DEFINED
PURPOSES.
A-2106-17T1
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After considering these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal
standards, we affirm.
The charge underlying this appeal stemmed from defendant's sister,
Shatima Brown, stabbing an individual in the upper left hand side of his chest
during an altercation in the front courtyard area of an apartment complex. After
the stabbing, Shatima handed the knife to defendant, who then left the scene
with the knife. The entire incident was captured on video surveillance. During
the ensuing police investigation, which involved conducting witness interviews
and searching some of the apartments for evidence, defendant denied any
involvement in the stabbing by either herself or her sister. However, after police
viewed the video surveillance, defendant's sister was charged with attempted
murder and related charges, and defendant was charged with hindering.
In a September 26, 2016 letter, the PTI Director rejected defendant's
application. The Director acknowledged that defendant was "a twenty[-]eight[-
]year[-]old high school graduate who [had] worked as a Certified Home Health
Aide for the past six years," had "four children in [her] custody, and [was]
expecting" a fifth. Further, the Director noted defendant had no prior criminal
history in the Superior Court, and "denied ever using any alcohol or drugs."
However, the Director's rejection was based on N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1) (the
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nature of the offense); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(2) (the facts of the case); N.J.S.A.
2C:43-12(e)(7) ("[t]he needs and interests of the victim and society"); N.J.S.A.
2C:43-12(e)(14) ("[w]hether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value
of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public need for
prosecution"); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(15) ("[w]hether or not the applicant's
involvement with other people in the crime charged . . . is such that the interest
of the State would be best served by processing this case through traditional
criminal justice system procedures"); and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(16) ("[w]hether
or not the applicant's participation in pretrial intervention will adversely affect
the prosecution of codefendants").
After acknowledging that "one of the purposes of the program [was] to
provide a mechanism for permitting the least burdensome form of prosecution
possible for defendants charged with 'victimless' offenses" pursuant to N.J.S.A.
2C:43-12(a)(3), the Director explained that:
This offense [was] by no means victimless. . . .
[Defendant's] involvement was hindering to law[-
]enforcement's ability to immediately apprehend
Shatima Brown and could have been detrimental to the
prosecution of the correct suspect. Officers had to
obtain search warrants for multiple dwellings in order
to retrieve evidence due to [defendant] removing the
weapon from the scene of the crime. Accepting
[defendant] into the pre-trial intervention program
would depreciate the severity of the crime and could
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adversely affect the prosecution of co-defendant,
Shatima Brown. Although [defendant's] involvement
was not physically assaultive, the harm done to the
victim must be taken into consideration. Considering
the potential ramifications of [defendant's] actions and
the indifference towards the life of another, it is
apparent that society would most definitely benefit
from [defendant's] criminal case being channeled
through the traditional court process. In addition, it
appears [defendant] ha[s] a pending municipal court
case charging [her] with [h]arassment and there is an
outstanding warrant for [her] arrest . . . for failure to
appear. Not only do these charges display a tendency
towards an indifference towards the use of violence,
they also demonstrate a lack of compliance with court
orders, rendering [defendant] to be an unfit candidate
for the pre-trial intervention program.
In an October 20, 2016 letter, the prosecutor also rejected defendant's PTI
application. Specifically, the prosecutor "agree[d] with and adopt[ed] the . . .
reasons contained in the PTI Director's letter of rejection." The prosecutor
added that
although the defendant [was] not charged with a violent
crime per se, she covered up a very violent crime
committed by her sister. To permit someone into PTI
under these facts would make a mockery out of . . .
supervisory treatment as contemplated in State v.
Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85 (1976).
Defendant appealed the denial to the trial court. In a supporting
certification, defense counsel stated that Shatima Brown's guilty plea to
aggravated assault on July 10, 2017, constituted a "change of circumstances"
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warranting "reconsideration of [defendant's] PTI rejection." Defense counsel
also submitted a character letter written by a Lakewood police officer who was
also the grandfather of one of defendant's children. In response, the State
acknowledged considering the character letter as well as the other mitigating
factors, including defendant's attempts to further her education. However, the
State asserted that even absent N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(15), and N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
12(e)(16), the other four factors on which the rejection was based still fully
supported the decision to reject defendant's application and outweighed the
mitigating factors.
Following oral argument, on October 4, 2017, the trial court denied
defendant's appeal, concluding that defendant failed to establish "by clear and
convincing evidence" that the prosecutor's rejection amounted to "a patent and
gross abuse of discretion." In rejecting defendant's contention that "the
[p]rosecutor's decision . . . was not based on the appropriate factors or the
appropriate weighing of those factors," the court determined that "the State did
consider and weigh . . . all the relevant factors." The court explained that the
prosecutor considered
not only the factors that were weighed against the
defendant's admission into the program, but also those
factors that weighed in favor of the defendant's
admission and those factors included the defendant's
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age, the fact that the crime as alleged was not assaultive
in nature, the defendant's lack of a prior record, lack of
history of known violence[,] and lack of involvement
with organized crimes.
. . . [T]he State specifically noted that while [it
was] commendable that this defendant wants to further
her education, has family that she needs to support and
additional family members that support her and have
provided . . . a character letter to show this, that this
does not mitigate the fact that this defendant was
involved in a very dangerous activity, regardless of the
fact she did not cause direct harm[,] but that she was
instrumental in helping to advance a violent crime. And
the State paid particular attention to the video . . . that
. . . depicted . . . the defendant show[ing] indifference
to the injured victim by . . . concealing the weapon and
then leaving the scene with it.
The court entered a memorializing order and this appeal followed.
Deciding whether to permit a defendant to divert to PTI "is a
quintessentially prosecutorial function," State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582
(1996), for which a prosecutor is given "broad discretion," State v. K.S., 220
N.J. 190, 199 (2015). It involves the consideration of the non-exhaustive list of
seventeen statutory factors, enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e), in order to
"make an individualized assessment of the defendant considering his or her
amenability to correction and potential responsiveness to rehabilitation. "
Roseman, 221 N.J. at 621-22 (internal quotation marks omitted). "These factors
include 'the details of the case, defendant's motives, age, past criminal record,
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standing in the community, and employment performance[.]'" Id. at 621
(alteration in original) (quoting Watkins v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008)).
The Supreme Court's Guidelines accompanying Rule 3:28 work in harmony with
the seventeen individual factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e).1
That said, the scope of our review of a PTI rejection is severely limited
and designed to address "only the 'most egregious examples of injustice and
unfairness.'" State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 82 (2003) (quoting State v.
Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 384 (1977)). "In order to overturn a prosecutor's
rejection, a defendant must 'clearly and convincingly establish that the
prosecutor's decision constitutes a patent and gross abuse of discretion,'"
meaning that the decision "has gone so wide of the mark sought to be
accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice require judicial
intervention." Watkins, 193 N.J. at 520 (first quoting State v. Watkins, 390 N.J.
Super. 302, 305-06 (App. Div. 2007); and then quoting Wallace, 146 N.J. at 582-
83).
An abuse of discretion has occurred where it can be proven "that the [PTI]
denial '(a) was not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was
1
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 was amended in 2015. As amended, the eligibility
requirements were expanded to allow defendants who plead guilty to certain
violent crimes to be admitted to the program. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(g)(3).
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based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c)
amounted to a clear error in judgment. '" State v. Lee, 437 N.J. Super. 555, 563
(App. Div. 2014) (quoting State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979)). "In order for
such an abuse of discretion to rise to the level of 'patent and gross,' it must
further be shown that the prosecutorial error complained of will clearly subvert
the goals underlying Pretrial Intervention." Roseman, 221 N.J. at 625 (quoting
Bender, 80 N.J. at 93). "The extreme deference which a prosecutor's decision is
entitled to in this context translates into a heavy burden which must be borne by
a defendant when seeking to overcome a prosecutorial veto of his [or her]
admission into PTI." State v. Kraft, 265 N.J. Super. 106, 112 (App. Div. 1993).
Applying these principles, we discern no patent or gross abuse of
discretion in the prosecutor's denial of defendant's PTI application. Thus, there
is no basis to disturb the trial court's decision sustaining the prosecutor's denial ,
a decision we review de novo. See State v. Denman, 449 N.J. Super. 369, 375-
76 (App. Div. 2017). We reject defendant's argument that she "never received
the required individualized assessment of her amenability to correction and
rehabilitation." Although defendant certainly had a number of mitigating factors
in her favor, all of which were considered by the prosecutor, the reasons for the
A-2106-17T1
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prosecutor's denial were premised on consideration of relevant factors, several
of which weighed against her admission.
We also reject defendant's contention that her "hindering conduct was
improperly treated as though she had committed a violent crime." The record
clearly refutes such a contention. Equally unavailing is defendant's assertion
that the prosecutor "arbitrarily and irrationally relied on the inapplicability of
only one of the five alternate purposes of the PTI statute to reject [her]
application." "Absent evidence to the contrary, it is [to be] presumed that the
prosecutor considered all relevant factors before rendering a decision." State v.
Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 509 (1981). Like the trial court, we conclude that
defendant failed to clearly and convincingly establish that the prosecutor's
decision went so wide of the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that
fundamental fairness and justice require judicial intervention.
Affirmed.
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