STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CLYDE GAYLE (12-08-2273, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0575-14T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CLYDE GAYLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________
Submitted February 28, 2017 – Decided March 17, 2017
Before Judges Yannotti and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No.
12-08-2273.
Law Offices of Edward J. Crisonino, attorneys
for appellant (Edward J. Crisonino, on the
brief).
Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Jason Magid,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty of certain
persons not to possess a firearm, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b),
and other weapons-related offenses. The trial judge sentenced
defendant on the certain persons offense to an extended term of
fourteen years of incarceration, with seven years of parole
ineligibility, and imposed concurrent sentences on the other
offenses. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction dated
August 22, 2014. We affirm.
I.
Defendant was charged under a Camden County indictment with
second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, specifically, a .38
caliber handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count one); fourth-degree
unlawful possession of hollow-nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f)
(count two); and second-degree certain persons not to possess
weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) (count three). Defendant filed a
motion to suppress evidence obtained from a car in which defendant
was a back-seat passenger, and the trial court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the motion.
At the hearing, Sergeant Raphael Thornton of the Camden County
Police Department, who for the prior seventeen years worked for
the City of Camden's Police Department (CCPD),1 testified that in
March 2012, he was assigned to the CCPD's Real Time Tactical
Operations Command Center, which is the department's technological
1
The CCPD was replaced by the Camden County Police Department on
January 1, 2013. Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 102 (2015).
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arm. Thornton testified that on March 24, 2012, at approximately
4:30 a.m., he was conducting a virtual patrol using a video camera
located in an area around Louis and Sycamore Streets. Thornton
observed four individuals talking to a male, who was later
identified as defendant. Thornton described defendant as an
African-American male, who was wearing a white t-shirt and dark
jeans.
Thornton said defendant was on the porch of a residence
speaking with four persons. Thornton observed two of the four
individuals walk away, and a man and a woman remained. Defendant
left the porch and approached the two individuals. Thornton
testified that defendant and the male began having a very violent
argument.
Thornton said he observed the woman try to grab the man's arm
in an effort to get him to leave, but he evaded her and she walked
away. Defendant and the man continued to argue. The woman returned
and again grabbed the man. They both walked away, out of the range
of the camera.
Then, according to Thornton, ShotSpotter, the CCPD's gunshot-
alert system, was activated. Thornton explained that ShotSpotter
is a system that the military developed. He said the system
was used for snipers in Iraq to pinpoint a
sniper. We use it now in the city to pinpoint
firearms. It lets us pinpoint or close down
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an area where a firearm is being fired. It's
four acoustic systems set up throughout the
city and they intertwine. And when a firearm
is fired, [ShotSpotter will] pinpoint it by
echoing the sounds off the acoustic systems.
Thornton stated that ShotSpotter provides the address where a shot
was fired, whether it was fired in the back or front yard of a
residence, or whether the shot came directly out of a house.
Defense counsel did not object to Thornton's testimony regarding
ShotSpotter.
Thornton further testified that he then observed defendant
run back onto the porch and into the house. Several seconds later,
defendant exited the house with several other individuals. As
defendant exited the house, Thornton noticed that defendant's hand
was on the right-side of the waistband of his pants. Thornton
testified, "it looked like he was positioning something or holding
something. Once he got comfortable, he took his hand off his right
waistband and began to walk."
Thornton stated that when defendant "got to the foot of the
steps on the sidewalk, he gave another check[.]" Defendant then
walked toward a black Saturn. Thornton suspected that the
unidentified male and/or woman had fired a gun at defendant, which
prompted defendant to go into the house and retrieve a gun for his
own protection.
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Thornton believed that defendant was in possession of a
handgun, based upon the way defendant walked and adjusted his
hand. Thornton thought defendant's movements indicated he was
positioning a firearm in the waistband of his pants. Thornton
directed officers in the area to respond to the scene. He gave the
officers a description of defendant and told them defendant may
be in possession of a firearm.
Officer Harry Welch of the CCPD immediately responded to the
area near the intersection of Haddon Avenue and Sycamore Street.
He observed an African-American male in a white t-shirt entering
the black Saturn. Welch identified defendant as the person he
observed. Welch testified that the area was well-lit with
streetlights, and he had a clear view of defendant.
As Welch approached the Saturn, the occupants of the vehicle
noticed him coming towards them. Welch observed defendant sitting
in the backseat of the car behind the driver. He testified, "I saw
the defendant scurrying, like, bending over, like, grumbling [sic]
about, you know, just doing something behind the backseat of the
driver's side."
Welch ordered the occupants to show their hands. Other CCPD
officers arrived at the scene, and they began to ask the occupants
to exit the vehicle, one at a time. Defendant got out of the car,
after the officers instructed him to do so. As the occupants exited
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the Saturn, one of the officers saw a weapon underneath the
driver's seat.
The officer told Welch he saw a weapon. After Welch secured
one of the occupants, he looked and noticed the weapon. He
testified, "I know what a handgun looks like. I could see the
actual gun. You could see the gun underneath the seat. It wasn't
completely under the seat, but you could see it." After the
occupants were secure, Welch seized the weapon. The officers
secured the gun and determined that it contained hollow-point
bullets.
After the officers testified, a video recording of the stop
and seizure of the weapon was played. The judge observed that it
was not the best of recordings. The judge said he could see a
"flurry of activity," but he could not determine whether there was
anything in the record that was inconsistent with the officers'
testimony.
The judge then placed his decision on the record. The judge
noted that the officers had acted in "a fast-moving situation" in
which there were reports of a gun and gunfire. The judge stated
this was "the most lethal emergent situation that the police face
on the criminal front."
The judge rejected defendant's contention that the officers
made the investigatory stop based solely on the report of gunfire.
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The judge noted that the officers also had acted on the basis of
their observations of defendant. The judge pointed out that the
officers had observed defendant being involved in and/or around a
shooting.
The judge found that defendant was conducting himself in a
manner consistent with an individual who possessed a handgun. The
judge also noted that defendant was only wearing a t-shirt. The
judge observed that this was unusual attire for an early-March
morning, which is typically a cold time of the year. The judge
said one of the officers saw defendant engage in suspicious conduct
inside the car.
The judge concluded that the investigatory stop was valid
because the officers had reasonable suspicion of illegal conduct.
The judge also concluded that the officers validly seized the
weapon pursuant to the plain view exception to the warrant
requirement. Accordingly, the judge denied defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence found in the vehicle.
Thereafter, defendant was tried before a jury. At the trial,
Thornton and Welch presented testimony that was essentially the
same as the testimony they gave at the suppression hearing. On
cross-examination, Welch acknowledged receiving a call informing
him that shots had been fired in the area. The following colloquy
ensued between defense counsel and Welch:
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Q. And you're aware of something called
ShotSpotter, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And ShotSpotter, it pinpoints where a shot
was fired, is that right?
A. It is supposed to.
Q. Supposed to, okay. And you testified that
it was the area — the area that you were told
was the area of Haddon and Sycamore, is that
right? So you were dispatched to that area
because there was a shot fired?
A. I was dispatched to that area, yes.
Q. Okay. And you were dispatched to that area,
but were you told where the ShotSpotter went
off?
A. Negative.
In addition, Thornton testified that in March 2012, he was
assigned to a unit that conducts virtual patrols of areas of the
city, using approximately fifty surveillance cameras and
ShotSpotter. Thornton was asked to explain ShotSpotter. He
testified that ShotSpotter
is a system developed by the military. It was
originally developed to help our soldiers
combat snipers. It basically is a series of
microphones that triangulate soundwaves and
give you a grid coordinate. And if you can
imagine soundwaves intercepting in the sky,
and [it will] give you a longitude and
latitude of where that sound wave came from.
8 A-0575-14T4
Thornton added that ShotSpotter is "designed to pick up gunshots."
He said the system is capable of pinpointing the place where a
shot was fired, within a city block.
Certain stipulations and evidence were then placed on the
record. They included a ShotSpotter report; an affidavit from the
State Police indicating that defendant did not have a permit for
the weapon; documents pertaining to the Saturn; a report from the
State Police indicating that no identifiable fingerprints had been
found on the gun or the ammunition magazine; and a State Police
affidavit stating that the handgun was "safely capable of firing."
Defendant elected not to testify, and he did not call any
witnesses on his behalf.
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts of the
indictment. Thereafter, the court granted the State's motion for
imposition of an extended term. The court then sentenced defendant
on count three (certain persons not to possess weapons) to an
extended term of fourteen years of incarceration, with seven years
of parole ineligibility. The court imposed concurrent sentences
on the other counts, and entered a judgment of conviction dated
August 22, 2014. Defendant's appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues:
POINT ONE
THE TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE SHOTSPOTTER
SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AT TRIAL OR AT
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THE [HEARING ON THE] SUPPRESSION MOTION (NOT
RAISED BELOW).
POINT TWO
THE DEFENDANT'S SUPPRESSION MOTION SHOULD HAVE
BEEN GRANTED.
POINT THREE
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED
TO AN EXTENDED TERM.
II.
We turn first to defendant's argument that the testimony
about ShotSpotter should not have been admitted at the suppression
hearing or at the trial because Thornton was not qualified as an
expert witness, and there was never a hearing to determine whether
the ShotSpotter system is scientifically reliable.
As we noted previously, defendant did not object to Thornton's
testimony regarding ShotSpotter, either at the suppression hearing
or at trial. Moreover, at the trial, defendant agreed to the
admission of the ShotSpotter report. We therefore consider whether
the admission of the testimony regarding ShotSpotter constituted
plain error, that is, an error "clearly capable of producing an
unjust result." R. 2:10-2.
Here, the officers conducted an investigatory stop of
defendant, which is permitted if the officer has reasonable and
particularized suspicion that an individual has engaged in, or was
about to engage in, criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
10 A-0575-14T4
21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968). In assessing
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion, the court must
consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Stovall, 170
N.J. 346, 356 (2002) (citing Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.
Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906).
The admission of the testimony regarding ShotSpotter at the
suppression hearing was not erroneous. The State was not required
to have Thornton qualified as an expert. His testimony about
ShotSpotter was largely factual. His opinion that ShotSpotter
produces reliable results was proper lay opinion testimony under
N.J.R.E. 701. It was rationally based on his own perceptions.
Moreover, the State was not required to establish that
testimony about ShotSpotter was scientifically reliable for
admission under N.J.R.E. 702. The State only presented the
testimony to show the source of Thornton's knowledge that a shot
had been fired at approximately 4:30 a.m. on March 24, 2012, in
the area of Louis and Sycamore Streets in the city.
As noted previously, Thornton testified that ShotSpotter is
a reliable means for detecting gunshots and their location.
Thornton's testimony about ShotSpotter provided a sufficient
foundation for its admission on the question of whether Thornton
reasonably believed a shot had been fired in the area under
surveillance.
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Therefore, the testimony regarding ShotSpotter was admissible
at the suppression hearing. See State v. Doriguzzi, 334 N.J. Super.
530, 546 (App. Div. 2000) (noting that the horizontal gaze
nystagmus test is not sufficiently reliable for admission as proof
the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol, which
was "qualitatively different" from admitting the evidence to
establish probable cause to arrest).
We also reject defendant's contention that the admission at
trial of the ShotSpotter testimony constituted plain error. Even
if we agreed that testimony about ShotSpotter should not have been
admitted unless the State established that the ShotSpotter system
is scientifically reliable, the admission of the testimony was not
"clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.
Defendant was not charged with shooting the weapon. He was
tried on charges related to the possession of a handgun and hollow-
point bullets. The ShotSpotter testimony was not presented as
proof of any of the elements of the charged offenses.
Rather, the testimony regarding ShotSpotter was background
information, which had no direct bearing on whether defendant was
guilty of the charged offenses. The testimony was only presented
to show the reasons the officers stopped defendant, and to explain
how they came to seize the weapon and the ammunition. Furthermore,
even without the evidence regarding ShotSpotter, the State had
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presented more than enough evidence to show that defendant was
guilty of the charged offenses, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus, even if the admission of the ShotSpotter testimony was
erroneous, the error was harmless. See State v. Macon, 57 N.J.
325, 336 (1971) (noting that an error is harmless if it does not
"raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to
a result it otherwise might not have reached").
III.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to suppress the firearm and the hollow-point bullets
seized from the vehicle. Defendant again contends that the
testimony regarding ShotSpotter should not have been admitted at
the suppression hearing. He also argues that, without such
evidence, Welch did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion
of criminal activity to conduct the investigatory stop, and the
seizure of the firearm and ammunition was unlawful.
We are required to uphold the factual findings of the trial
court on a suppression motion if "those findings are 'supported
by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Elders,
192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007) (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463,
474 (1999)). We must defer to the trial court's findings "which
are substantially influenced by [the court's] opportunity to hear
and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a
13 A-0575-14T4
reviewing court cannot enjoy." Id. at 244 (quoting State v.
Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).
As stated previously, a law enforcement officer may conduct
an investigatory stop where the officer has reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the person has engaged or was about to
engage in unlawful activity. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.
Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906. In deciding whether the officer
had reasonable suspicion, the court considers the totality of the
circumstances. Stovall, supra, 170 N.J. at 356-57 (2002) (citing
Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at
906).
Here, there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to
support the trial court's determination that the officers had
reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant had engaged in,
or was about to engage in, criminal activity. As we have concluded,
the testimony regarding ShotSpotter was admissible at the
suppression hearing. Thornton determined, based on the activation
of the ShotSpotter system, that a shot had been fired from a gun
in the area under surveillance.
Using the surveillance camera, Thornton observed defendant
leave a residence and engage in actions consistent with an
individual who is in possession of a handgun. Thornton testified
that he had reached this conclusion based on the way defendant
14 A-0575-14T4
walked out of the house, the way defendant had positioned his
hand, and the belief that defendant had "just been fired at."
Thornton thought defendant may have retrieved the weapon for his
own protection, because defendant did not know if the individual
who fired the shot at him would return.
Furthermore, Thornton dispatched Welch to the area of Haddon
Avenue and Sycamore Street, and he provided Welch with a
description of defendant. Thornton described the clothes defendant
was wearing, including the white t-shirt. Welch testified that he
observed defendant enter a black Saturn. Defendant was sitting
behind the driver in the rear passenger seat. Welch saw defendant
"scurrying," "bending over," and "doing something behind the
backseat of the driver's side." He was engaging in actions Welch
thought suspicious.
The evidence therefore supports the trial court's finding
that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had
reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant had engaged
in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity. There is
sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the trial
court's determination that the investigatory stop was proper.
We note that defendant does not argue that the seizure of the
handgun was unlawful. In any event, the testimony presented at the
hearing shows that the weapon was lawfully seized pursuant to the
15 A-0575-14T4
plain view doctrine. See State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 236 (1983)
(citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-70, 91 S. Ct.
2022, 2037-40, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 582-84 (1971)).
IV.
Defendant further argues that he should not have been
sentenced to an extended term as a persistent offender pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a). He contends the trial judge failed to
undertake the analysis required to determine if an extended-term
sentence is appropriate.
An appellate court's review of the trial courts' "sentencing
decisions is relatively narrow and is governed by an abuse of
discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010).
We consider "whether the trial court has made findings of fact
that are grounded in competent, reasonably credible evidence and
whether the 'factfinder [has] appl[ied] correct legal principles
in exercising its discretion.'" Ibid. (alterations in original)
(quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984)).
We may not set aside a trial court's sentence unless (1) the
trial court did not follow the sentencing guidelines; (2) the
court's findings of aggravating and mitigating factors were not
based upon sufficient credible evidence in the record; or (3) the
court's application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts of
the case "shock[s] the judicial conscience." State v. Bolvito, 217
16 A-0575-14T4
N.J. 221, 228 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).
Here, the trial judge found aggravating factors three,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3) (risk that defendant will re-offend); six,
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6) (defendant's prior criminal record and the
seriousness of the offenses of which he has been convicted); and
nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) (need to deter defendant and others
from violating the law). The judge observed that defendant had
four prior Superior Court convictions and two previous municipal
court convictions. The judge found no mitigating factors.
The judge also found that, based on his prior criminal
convictions, defendant was eligible for an extended term pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a) as a persistent offender. The judge imposed
an extended term of fourteen years of incarceration on count three
(second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon), with a
seven-year period of parole ineligibility. The judge imposed
concurrent sentences on the other counts.
On appeal, defendant argues that, in deciding to impose the
extended-term sentence, the trial judge failed to engage in the
analysis prescribed in State v. Dunbar, 108 N.J. 80 (1987). Dunbar
requires the sentencing judge to determine whether the defendant
is eligible for an extended term; decide whether an extended term
should be imposed; weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors
17 A-0575-14T4
to determine the base term of the sentence; and decide whether to
impose a period of parole ineligibility. Dunbar, supra, 108 N.J.
at 89.
Here, the trial judge provided sufficient reasons for the
imposition of the extended term. The judge's findings of
aggravating factors were supported by sufficient credible
evidence, including defendant's prior criminal record. Moreover,
the judge weighed the aggravating factors and lack of any
mitigating factors in determining the base term of the sentence.
The judge also found that a seven-year period of parole
ineligibility was warranted. Simply put, the judge performed the
required analysis when imposing the extended-term sentence.
Affirmed.
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