MARY E. BRESLIN VS. NORTHGATE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. (C-000276-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3464-16T2
    MARY E. BRESLIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    NORTHGATE CONDOMINIUM
    ASSOCIATION, INC.; THE BOARD
    OF TRUSTEES OF NORTHGATE
    CONDOMINIUM, INC.; and
    WILKIN MANAGEMENT GROUP,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    Submitted November 1, 2018 – Decided November 30, 2018
    Before Judges Haas, Sumners and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. C-
    000276-15.
    Michael J. Breslin, Jr., attorney for appellant.
    Kates Nussman Ellis Farhi & Earle LLP, attorneys for
    respondents (Mariya Gonor, of counsel and on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This matter comes before us on defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's
    appeal as moot. In the underlying (as yet undecided) appeal, plaintiff Mary
    Breslin challenges a February 24, 2017 Chancery Division order dismissing her
    complaint against defendants Northgate Condominium Association, Inc. ("the
    Association"), The Board of Trustees of Northgate Condominium, Inc. ("the
    Board"), and Wilkin Management Group ("Wilkin"). We dismiss the appeal as
    moot.
    By way of background, the Northgate Condominiums are seventy-one
    units located in Washington Township, New Jersey. They were established in
    1984 by the recording of the Master Deed in the Bergen County Clerk's Office
    in accordance with the New Jersey Condominium Act, N.J.S.A. 46:8B-1 to -28.
    ("the Act"). Defendant Northgate Condominium Association, Inc. is the entity
    responsible for the administration of the condominiums and is governed by its
    bylaws.
    In October 2001 the Association learned of a proposal by Caliber Builders
    ("Caliber") to construct senior citizen housing on an adjacent property. The
    Board determined that water runoff from the proposed development would
    damage Northgate's common elements and thereby diminish property values.
    The Northgate unit owners vehemently opposed the proposed construction and
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    at their annual meeting in 2003 voted unanimously to hire an engineering expert
    to explore possible ways to derail the Caliber project. By letter dated December
    10, 2004, the Board advised the unit owners of its ongoing legal and engineering
    review of the Caliber project. In that same letter, the Board noted that an
    additional monthly fee of $50 would be necessary to fund Northgate's review of
    the Caliber project. The $50 "special assessment" was considered a "non-
    budgeted expense" that could not be charged against the Association's reserve
    fund.
    In 2008, the Board filed suit against Caliber after the municipality
    approved the project.      In 2013, the Board announced that it required an
    additional assessment of $1500 per owner to "refund the reserves" from which
    $130,000 had been withdrawn to pay legal fees for the ongoing litigation. Less
    than a year later, plaintiff purchased her unit. By the time the years-long Caliber
    litigation settled, the Association had incurred substantial legal and engineering
    fees. Accordingly, on April 28, 2015 the Board voted to impose an equal
    $10,000 "annual/common assessment" on each unit owner to be paid in six
    installments through 2018.
    On September 16, 2015, Plaintiff instituted this action. The issue at trial
    was whether the Board had the authority to impose a $10,000 assessment on
    each unit owner. Plaintiff's position was that the assessment imposed was a
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    "special assessment" that required a vote of the owners, and because the unit
    owners never approved the assessment, the Board had no authority to impose it .
    After a six-day trial, the judge entered an order of judgment in favor of
    defendants.   In her accompanying opinion, the trial judge found that the
    Association's involvement in the Caliber litigation was rooted in its duty to
    protect condominium property under N.J.S.A. 46:8B-14 and the Master Deed.
    The court found that because the Caliber Project would cause water runoff to
    damage Northgate's "[g]eneral [c]ommon [e]lements," the Board properly
    incurred litigation costs in opposing the project. The court further determined
    that the assessment was properly characterized as a common assessment as the
    legal fees were incurred to protect the common elements of the property, so long
    as the assessment was imposed proportionally. After the judgment in their favor,
    the Board passed a resolution imposing two additional common assessments:
    one for $710,000 to pay legal fees associated with the Caliber and Breslin
    litigations payable in installments through 2020; and a second for $35,000 to
    cover the costs of the Breslin appeal.
    This appeal ensued. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred
    in concluding that the assessment was a common, rather than a special,
    assessment.
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    While the appeal was pending, and in the face of substantial outstanding
    legal fees, a newly installed Board retained new legal counsel to negotiate a
    reduction in legal fees with prior counsel, Beattie Padovano, LLC ("Beattie").
    In that regard, in addition to the legal and engineering expenses incurred in the
    Caliber litigation, the Association incurred over $425,000 in legal fees at the
    trial level to defend the Breslin litigation.
    Those negotiations resulted in a very favorable proposed reduction of
    Beattie's fees from $605,633.99 to $262,496.03. The Board, however, was
    concerned that the settlement would be paid using funds from the recently
    imposed $710,000 common assessment because the Board's imposition of the
    common assessments are subject to attack in this appeal. Accordingly, the
    Board decided to request that the unit owners approve and ratify as "special
    assessments" all of the prior assessments and that portion of the $710,000
    assessment sufficient to cover the settlement.
    In that regard, on July 25, 2018 an informational "Town Hall" meeting
    was held wherein legal counsel presented the proposed settlement with Beattie
    and outlined the strategy of seeking unit owner ratification and approval of the
    prior assessments so as to moot this appeal. On August 14, 2018, a Notice of
    Special Meeting of the unit owners was mailed to all unit owners of record,
    scheduling a Special Meeting for September 13, 2018, for the sole purpose of
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    voting to approve and ratify the prior assessments, together with a detailed
    "Resolution of the Unit Owners of Northgate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Ratifying Prior Assessments and Approving a Special Assessment to Fund a
    Settlement with Beattie Padovano."
    On September 13, 2018, the unit owners voted by an overwhelming
    margin (48 in favor, 14 against) to approve and ratify the old Board's
    assessments as "special assessments," and to fund the legal fee settlement with
    Beattie. Immediately following the announcement of the results, the Board held
    a Board meeting open to attendance by unit owners, which was noticed in
    accordance with N.J.A.C. 5:20-1.2. The agenda for the meeting was to approve
    the special assessments ratified by the unit owners and to approve the proposed
    settlement with Beattie. The Board approved the agenda items by a vote of 6-0.
    With this development, the issues presented in this appeal are now clearly
    moot. "A case is moot if the disputed issue has been resolved, at least with
    respect to the parties who instituted the litigation." Caput Mortuum, L.L.C. v.
    S&S Crown Servs., Ltd., 
    366 N.J. Super. 323
    , 330 (App. Div. 2004) (citation
    omitted).   "[C]ontroversies which have become moot or academic prior to
    judicial resolution ordinarily will be dismissed." Cinque v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr.,
    
    261 N.J. Super. 242
    , 243 (App. Div. 1993) (citation omitted). Dismissal for
    mootness is appropriate where "a judgment cannot grant effective relief, or there
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    is no concrete adversity of interest between the parties." Caput Mortuum, 
    366 N.J. Super. at 330
     (citations omitted). A court may consider events that occur
    subsequent to the filing of an appeal in determining that an appeal is moot. 
    Ibid.
    (holding that the appeal was moot after the court was advised at oral argument
    that the controversy had been resolved subsequent to the filing of the appeal).
    Here, plaintiff's concern that the assessments were in fact special
    assessments has been resolved by virtue of the unit owners' retroactive approval
    and ratification of the prior assessments as special assessments.        It is well
    established that even if the acts of a corporate board were infra vires due to a
    failure to obtain shareholder approval and/or failure to follow procedural
    formalities, such as voting in a properly noticed board meeting, same can be
    ratified after the fact.
    "Acts that are ultra vires are void and may not be
    ratified, while infra vires acts may be. An act is ultra
    vires if the municipality [was] utterly without capacity
    to act. On the other hand, an intra vires act is one that
    is merely voidable for want of authority."
    [Grimes v. City of E. Orange, 
    288 N.J. Super. 275
    , 279
    (App. Div. 1996) (internal citations omitted).]
    The ability to retroactively ratify an infra vires act has expressly been
    extended to Condominium Associations. See Port Liberte II Condo. Ass'n, Inc.
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    v. New Liberty Residential Urban Renewal Co., LLC, 
    435 N.J. Super. 51
    , 66
    (App. Div. 2014).
    Ratification must be accomplished with the same
    formalities required for the original exercise of power.
    If so accomplished, the ratification relates back to the
    date of the original action.
    [Ibid. (internal quotations and citations omitted).]
    In this case, Article VI, Section 7 of the bylaws states, in pertinent part,
    that
    [T]he Board is authorized to levy, in any assessment
    year, a special assessment(s) applicable to that year
    only, for any lawful purpose necessary for the benefit
    of The Condominium or the health, safety or welfare of
    the Unit Owners, provided said special assessment has
    first been approved by a majority of the members
    present and voting at a members meeting at which a
    quorum is present. Written notice of said meeting shall
    have been sent to all Unit Owners at least thirty days in
    advance . . . .
    Because the required thirty-day notice was provided, and the
    overwhelming majority of the unit owners were present and voted in favor of
    the special assessments, the approval and ratification of the special assessments
    were validly adopted and relate back to the date of the first and all subsequent
    assessments. Therefore, this appeal is now moot.
    Plaintiff asserts that if we do not decide the merits of the appeal, future
    unit owners may be subject to improper assessments, and, therefore, she asks
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    that we issue an advisory opinion delineating the parties' future rights and
    responsibilities under Northgate's Master Deed and bylaws. However, "[t]he
    notion that a court of appeals willy-nilly can decide issues unnecessary to the
    outcome of the case results in the wholesale issuance of advisory opinions, a
    practice our judicial decision-making system categorically rejects." State v.
    Rose, 
    206 N.J. 141
    , 189 (2011) (Rivera-Soto, J., concurring in part and
    dissenting in part) (citation omitted). We are not persuaded that this is a matter
    of significant public importance warranting our determination of abstract legal
    issues where there is no longer a controversy between the parties. See Zirger v.
    Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 
    144 N.J. 327
    , 330 (1996) (noting that "[o]rdinarily, our
    interest in preserving judicial resources dictates that we not attempt to resolve
    legal issues in the abstract").
    Dismissed.
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