JUAN HADDOCK VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1618-17T4
    JUAN HADDOCK,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Submitted October 30, 2018 – Decided November 8, 2018
    Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Juan Haddock, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Michael E. Vomacka,
    Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Juan Haddock, an inmate currently confined in Northern State Prison,
    appeals from a September 27, 2017 final administrative decision by the
    Department of Corrections (DOC) finding that he committed prohibited act
    *.204, use of any prohibited substance such as drugs, intoxicants , or related
    paraphernalia not prescribed for the inmate by the medical or dental staff,
    contrary to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). Haddock was sanctioned to 365 days of
    urine monitoring, 150 days of administrative segregation, 100 days loss of
    commutation time, twenty days loss of recreation privileges, and loss of
    contact visits. He was also referred to Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous. We
    affirm.
    Haddock was housed in a cell with another prisoner when a Correction
    Major ordered a search of the cell and also directed Haddock and his cellmate
    to provide a urine sample. Haddock's urine sample tested positive for opiates,
    a banned substance.
    As a result of the positive test result, Haddock was charged with the
    *.204 violation. Haddock pled not guilty and requested substitute counsel.
    The matter proceeded to a disciplinary hearing where Haddock challenged the
    proofs establishing continuity of the urine evidence and further claimed he was
    improperly ordered to submit to a urine sample without probable cause.
    A-1618-17T4
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    The hearing officer considered evidence from Haddock and the
    correctional facility.   The evidence submitted by the parties included
    Haddock's statement, a laboratory report confirming his positive urine test, and
    documentation that a Correction Major ordered Haddock and his cellmate to
    provide urine samples.
    In addition, the hearing officer considered a continuity of evidence
    (COE) form, which established that Haddock's urine was collected, labeled,
    tested on-site, transferred and retested at the DOC laboratory. Further, the
    form contained Haddock's and a corrections officer's signature confirming that
    Haddock's urine sample was "[c]losed, sealed and labeled in [their] presence."
    The hearing officer also considered written statements from two corrections
    officers clarifying that they mistakenly signed the COE form in the wrong
    section. Finally, the hearing officer noted that Haddock did not deny that the
    sample was his or that he used drugs.
    The hearing officer found Haddock guilty of the *.204 charge. After an
    administrative appeal, the Assistant Superintendent upheld the charges and
    sanctions.
    On appeal, Haddock argues, as he did before the hearing officer, that
    the "request for a urine specimen was not based on probable cause" and the
    A-1618-17T4
    3
    DOC "violated the provisions relating to the collection and storage of urine
    specimens." We are unpersuaded by these arguments and affirm because the
    record contains substantial credible evidence that the corrections officers
    ordered and secured Haddock's urine sample in accordance with the relevant
    regulations.
    We reverse an administrative agency decision "only if it is arbitrary,
    capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible
    evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 
    39 N.J. 556
    , 562
    (1963)). Substantial evidence is evidence that "furnish[es] a reasonable basis
    for the agency's action." McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 562 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Zachariae v. N.J. Real Estate Comm'n, 
    53 N.J. Super. 60
    , 62 (App. Div. 1958)). Substantial evidence has also been
    defined as evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion." Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    ,
    192 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 
    35 N.J. 358
    ,
    376 (1961)).    The burden rests on the challenging party to show the
    administrative agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    McGowan, 
    347 N.J. Super. at
    563 (citing Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs.,
    A-1618-17T4
    4
    Div. of Med. Asst., 
    210 N.J. Super. 276
    , 285 (App. Div. 1986)). We do not
    perform a perfunctory review of the agency findings but engage in a careful
    and principled examination. Williams v. Dep't of Corr., 
    330 N.J. Super. 197
    ,
    203-04 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting Mayflower Sec. v. Bureau of Sec., 
    64 N.J. 85
    , 93 (1973)).
    A prison disciplinary hearing "is not part of a criminal prosecution and
    thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant . . . does not apply." Avant v.
    Clifford, 
    67 N.J. 496
    , 522 (1975) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 
    408 U.S. 471
    ,
    480 (1972)).      We have recognized that "[p]risons are dangerous places,"
    Jackson v. Dep't of Corr., 
    335 N.J. Super. 227
    , 233 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting
    Blyther v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    322 N.J. Super. 56
    , 65 (App. Div. 1999)), so
    "courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to corrections officers
    trying to manage a volatile environment."       
    Ibid.
     (citing Blyther, 
    322 N.J. Super. at 65
    ). Further, we have held that “the requirement of probable cause,
    or even showing of reasonable suspicion prior to drug testing [may] be
    impractical in [the] prison context.” Hamilton v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    366 N.J. Super. 284
    , 291 (App. Div. 2004).
    Haddock claims a denial of his due process rights because the DOC
    lacked probable cause to order him to provide a urine sample. We disagree.
    A-1618-17T4
    5
    N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(8) provides that “[i]nmates shall be tested” for
    prohibited substances “[w]hen the Administrator, Associate Administrator,
    Assistant Superintendent, or a Correction Major orders all inmates of a
    particular housing unit . . . to be tested” (emphasis added). Here, the record
    confirms that a Correction Major ordered Haddock and his cellmate, part of a
    "housing unit," to provide a urine sample. See N.J.A.C. 10A:1-2.2 ("'Housing
    unit' means a cell . . . within a correctional facility.")
    Haddock's reliance on N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(6) is misplaced.              That
    provision permits an inmate to be tested only when "a custody staff member of
    the rank of Sergeant or above or a Special Investigations Division Investigator
    believes . . . there is a reasonable factual basis to suspect the inmate of using . .
    . a non-alcoholic prohibited substance . . . ."          N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.10(b)(6)
    (emphasis added). As we have concluded, the DOC properly ordered a test of
    Haddock's urine pursuant to sub-section (b)(8), which permits testing without
    the suspicion required by sub-section (b)(6).
    We similarly reject Haddock's challenge to the continuity of evidence.
    When testing for a prohibited substance, a "Continuity of Evidence-Urine
    Specimen or . . . Continuity of Evidence-On Site Urine Specimen Testing"
    form "shall be completed and maintained with the specimen." N.J.A.C. 10A:3-
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    6
    5.11(e). "For initial laboratory and confirmatory laboratory testing of a urine
    specimen, the labeled specimen shall immediately be closed and sealed in the
    presence of the inmate by the custody staff member or other authorized staff
    member." N.J.A.C. 10A:3-5.11(f)(4).
    We conclude the administrative decision was supported by substantial
    credible evidence. The correctional facility presented Haddock's positive urine
    test results and documentary evidence, including a fully executed COE form,
    that confirmed Haddock's sample was obtained, stored, transferred and tested
    consistent with applicable regulations that ensured the integrity of the sample
    and the test results.
    There is no evidence in the record to contest the findings by the DOC or
    support a conclusion that the final decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable.
    Affirmed.
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