STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF A.J. (FJ-20-0886-18, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2018 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4506-16T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE INTEREST OF A.J.,
a Juvenile.
_________________________________
Submitted October 10, 2018 – Decided November 1, 2018
Before Judges Hoffman and Firko.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket
No. FJ-20-0886-18.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (James C. Brady,
Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
A.J.1 appeals from a May 25, 2017 adjudication of delinquency for acts
that, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree aggravated sexual
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), disorderly-persons lewdness, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
4(a), and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-
4(a)(1).2 We affirm.
At a dispositional hearing conducted on June 15, 2017, Judge John Hudak
imposed: three years of probation to be served in a residential sexual offender
specialized care program; no contact with the victims or their families; no
unsupervised contact with children under the age of thirteen; and payment of
requisite fines and penalties. As part of his sentence, A.J. 3 was subject to
Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23. This appeal followed.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. In 2016, victims J.F.,
born in 2007, and B.F., born in 2008, resided with their mother. For two weeks
in April of 2016, the children stayed with A.J.'s grandmother, Y.G. During this
1
We use initials to protect the identity of the juvenile and minor victims
involved in these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d).
2
The judge found A.J. not guilty of fourth-degree sexual contact, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-1 and 2C:14-3(b).
3
A.J. was born on May 24, 2001.
A-4506-16T4
2
time, J.F. began urinating on himself at school. After Y.G. questioned him about
these incidents, J.F. told her that his teacher would not allow him to use the
restroom. When he began urinating on himself at her home, stopped playing,
and appeared anxious, Y.G. questioned him and he reported that his cousin, A.J.,
"penetrated him with his penis and covered his mouth." J.F. also told Y.G. that
A.J. had done the same to B.F., his brother, and J.P., his half-sister. Being
unsure of what to do, Y.G. brought J.F. to a friend's house two days later for a
second opinion concerning his allegations, and the friend recommended that
Y.G. take him to the police station. That day, Y.G. did, in fact, take J.F. to the
Elizabeth police station where officer Romulo Meneses (Meneses) conducted a
forensic interview of him. J.F. told Meneses that A.J. "touched his private parts
on two occasions, once in December 2015 and another time in January of 2016,"
and that A.J. did the same thing to J.P., B.F., and C.M., who is A.J.'s sister. The
events occurred at A.J.'s house according to J.F., however, he could not recall if
anyone was home during these instances. Following J.F.'s interview, Meneses
referred the matter to the Union County Prosecutor's Office.
Following the interview with Meneses, and in the presence of Y.G., J.F.
told B.F. that he confided in Y.G. about "everything." In response, B.F. stated,
"yes Grandma, me too."
A-4506-16T4
3
On April 13, 2016, J.F. underwent a forensic interview by Detective Brian
O'Malley at the Union County Child Advocacy Center. During the interview,
J.F. described that his cousin A.J., "was like, putting his balls [in] [his] butt."
Furthermore, J.F. reported that A.J. removed his pants and underwear and
forced himself on J.F., describing the feeling as "hard." J.F. additionally stated
that he observed A.J. penetrate B.F. and J.P in a similar manner. B.F. was
interviewed by Detective Kayla Live (Live) and told her that A.J. "put his balls
in his rear private parts, on his butt. And felt it move in and out," and it "hurt
him." B.F. further informed Live that the sexual assault began when he was six
years old and continued on a daily basis.
Both boys testified at trial. B.F. testified that A.J. pushed him to the floor,
pulled down his pants and underwear, and put his "dick" inside B.F.'s "butt."
This happened "many times" according to B.F.'s testimony. A.J. also showed
him pornography on his phone. Further, B.F. recalled A.J. threatening him not
to say anything or he would "kill" him.
Similarly, J.F. testified that A.J. forced himself upon him. On one
occasion when he was seven years old, A.J. locked J.F. in a bedroom at his aunt's
house, pushed him to the floor, removed his pants, and sodomized him. He
A-4506-16T4
4
testified that it "hurt," tried to cry, and told A.J. to stop. J.F. was shown
pornography by A.J. on his phone.
J.P. also testified that A.J. tried to pull down her pants in front of her
brothers when she was eleven years old but she was able to pull them back up.
When she was nine, A.J. removed her pants and underwear and "put" his "front
private part" in her "front private part." She also corroborated her brothers'
testimony that A.J. watched pornography with them.
A.J. sought to discredit the victims by introducing evidence pursuant to
N.J.R.E. 608(b) 4 that the children and others falsely accused certain individuals
of abusing them as toddlers. The judge precluded this evidence finding it did
not meet the standard for admission under that rule. Although he did not conduct
a N.J.R.E. 104(a) hearing, Judge Hudak analyzed the allegations and found them
dissimilar and vague; inconsistent with the crimes A.J. was charged with; and
the declarants' mental states were unclear because A.J.'s mother asserted the
4
N.J.R.E. 608(b) provides as follows:
The credibility of a witness in a criminal case may be
attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior false
accusation against any person of a crime similar to the
crime with which defendant is charged if the judge
preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to
[N.J.R.E.] 104(a), that the witness knowingly made the
prior false accusation.
A-4506-16T4
5
claims, and she seemed motivated to change the focus of the trial. The boys'
mother never reported any of the purported allegations and stated that "they lie
all the time." The judge also found that J.P.'s allegation dating back to 2007 was
too remote in time to be considered. J.F. had not yet been born at the time of
this allegation, and B.F. was not born until the following year, thus making the
timeline questionable. As duly noted by Judge Hudak, A.J.'s mother should have
remembered what year it was since she was the one the allegations were made
to. Lastly, the judge found that an excessive number of witnesses and time
would be devoted to this issue, and any prejudice associated with these claims
far outweighed any probative value as there were no investigative reports and
no motivation to fabricate by the children.
On appeal, A.J. argues:
POINT I
THE MOTION JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING THE
JUVENILE'S MOTION TO ADMIT PRIOR
ACCUSATIONS OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS
PURSUANT TO N.J.R.E. 608([b]), WITHOUT
CONDUCTING A N.J.R.E. 104 HEARING.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FINDING THE
JUVENILE GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED SEXUAL
ASSAULT PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2A(l),
A-4506-16T4
6
WITHOUT FINDING THAT HE ACTED
KNOWINGLY, AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE. (Not raised below)
POINT III
THE BLANKET BAN ON JURY TRIALS FOR
JUVENILES PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-40
DEPRIVED THE JUVENILE OF THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AND
EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER BOTH THE
UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTIONS. (Not Raised Below)
A. As with the Kansas Decision in In the Matter
of L.M., 186 P.3d 164 (Kan. 2008), Since Recent
Amendments to the Juvenile Code Have
Diminished the Rehabilitative Purposes and
Goals of the Code, the Rationale for Nonjury
Trials No Longer Applies and Consequently, the
Blanket Jury Ban Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-40
Abridges the United States Constitution.
B. The N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-40 Blanket Jury Ban for
Juveniles Violates the Plain and Unequivocal
Language of the New Jersey Constitution's
Guarantee of a Jury Trial.
C. Alternatively, the Harmonization of the
Remaining Rehabilitative Aspects of the Juvenile
Code with the Jury Trial Right Should at Least
Give a Trial Court the Discretion of Providing
Jury Trials for Juveniles Charged with Serious
Offenses.
A-4506-16T4
7
II.
Our standard of review in juvenile delinquency bench trials "is narrow and
is limited to evaluation of whether the trial judge's findings are supported by
substantial, credible evidence in the record as a whole." State in the Interest of
J.P.F., 368 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 2004) (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J.
463, 471 (1999)). As an appellate court, we further owe special deference to
those findings which are substantially influenced by the judge's feel of the case.
State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007).
A.J.'s appellate counsel contends, in Point I, that because defendant
established the five factors in State v. Guenther, 181 N.J. 129 (2004), the judge
erred in precluding the prior false accusations.
We review a trial court's evidentiary determinations under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. J.D., 211 N.J. 344, 354 (2012). "We afford
considerable deference to a trial court's findings based on the testimony of
witnesses." State v. Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 260 (2013). However, we owe no
special deference to a trial court's interpretation of the law, and review issues of
law de novo. Id. at 260-61.
N.J.R.E. 608(a) precludes evidence of specific instances of conduct, other
than by a prior conviction, to prove a witness's character for truthfulness or
A-4506-16T4
8
untruthfulness. Our Supreme Court created a narrow exception to this rule, in
limited cases and under very strict controls, permitting a defendant to show that
a victim-witness made a prior false criminal accusation for the purpose of
challenging the witness's credibility. Guenther, 181 N.J. at 154. However, the
false prior accusation "cannot become such a diversion that it overshadows the
trial of the charges itself." Id. at 156.
In deciding whether to admit evidence of a prior false accusation, the trial
court should conduct an N.J.R.E. 104 hearing and then determine by a
preponderance of the evidence whether defendant has proven that the
victim/witness made a prior accusation charging criminal conduct and whether
that accusation was false. Id. at 157. The trial court may consider the following
factors in making its determination:
1. whether the credibility of the victim-witness is the
central issue in the case;
2. the similarity of the prior false criminal accusation
to the crime charged;
3. the proximity of the prior false accusation to the
allegation that is the basis of the crime charged;
4. the number of witnesses, the items of extrinsic
evidence, and the amount of time required for
presentation of the issue at trial; and
A-4506-16T4
9
5. whether the probative value of the false accusation
evidence will be outweighed by undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, and waste of time.
[Ibid.]
If the court concludes that evidence of the prior false accusation is
admissible, it "has the discretion to limit the number of witnesses who will
testify concerning the matter at trial. The court must ensure that testimony on
the subject does not become a second trial, eclipsing the trial of the crimes
charged." Ibid.Following Guenther, in 2007, the Legislature amended N.J.R.E. 608 to
include paragraph (b), which provides as follows:
The credibility of a witness in a criminal case may be
attacked by evidence that the witness made a prior false
accusation against any person of a crime similar to the
crime with which defendant is charged if the judge
preliminarily determines, by a hearing pursuant to Rule
104(a), that the witness knowingly made the prior false
accusation.
[N.J.R.E. 608(b).]
Thereafter, elaborating on its holding in Guenther, our Supreme Court
explained:
Guenther recognizes that a witness's prior false
criminal allegations may be relevant to the witness's
credibility. That logic applies with equal force to false
criminal allegations made soon after the primary
allegation. As defendant aptly observes, a false
A-4506-16T4
10
accusation after an event, if closer in time, can be even
more probative than a prior false allegation.
[State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69, 93 (2009).]
We do not conclude that the failure of the judge, sitting as the trier of fact,
to conduct a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104 here is so violate of N.J.R.E.
608(b) as to warrant reversal. We conclude that the elements of N.J.R.E. 608(b)
were met and that A.J.'s constitutional rights were not denied. There was no
abuse of discretion and we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by
Judge Hudak in his thorough oral opinion.
III.
In Point II, counsel contends that the judge erred in adjudicating A.J.
delinquent on two charges of aggravated sexual assault without making a finding
as to his mental state. Judge Hudak found:
In regard to the charges dealing with [B.F.] and [J.F] of
aggravated sexual assault under 2C:14-2(a)(1), the
elements of the act require an act of sexual penetration
where the victim is less than [thirteen] year[s] old.
Both boys were under the age of [thirteen]. In fact, at
the time of trial, they were only nine and eight.
Further, the [c]ourt finds the testimony of both boys is
credible. Consistent with their prior statements to both
detectives, their grandmother, and the police officer.
The [c]ourt finds that [A.J.] did, on more than one
occasion, commit an act of anal sexual penetration on
A-4506-16T4
11
each of the boys, constituting sexual assault, one count
for each of [B.F.] and [J.F].
The mental culpability for aggravated sexual assault is "knowingly,"
which requires a perpetrator to be aware of the nature of his or her conduct.
State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 270 (1970); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2).
In State v. Bryant, 419 N.J. Super. 15, 23 (App. Div. 2011), this court held
that it is not necessary to provide proof that a defendant "knowingly" engaged
in sexual conduct, because:
Some forms of sexual contact with a child, such as
sexual intercourse, or touching the child's intimate
parts, are by their nature, so obviously of a sexual
nature that it would seem superfluous to require proof
that the actor knew he was engaging in 'sexual
[penetration]' . . . Almost by definition, one cannot
engage in such conduct without a recognition that it is
sexual in nature.
[Bryant, 419 N.J. Super. at 24.]
Bryant discusses "sexual conduct" in relation to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)
(endangering welfare of children). See Bryant, 419 N.J. Super. at 23-24. The
court held that "knowingly" only needs to be applied to the first element of the
crime, that defendant engaged in sexual conduct with a child, and not the second
element, that defendant knowingly impaired or debauched the morals of a child.
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1) states "an actor is guilty of aggravated sexual
A-4506-16T4
12
assault if he commits an act of sexual penetration with another person." N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2(a)(1). In his decision, Judge Hudak found that A.J. "did[,] on more
than one occasion, commit an act of anal sexual penetration on each of the boys,
constituting sexual assault . . . ." Applying Bryant, A.J.'s sexual penetration of
B.F. and J.F. is sufficient to prove that he did so knowingly, as the conduct is
sexual in nature.
Furthermore, when the intent of the accused is important and material,
circumstantial evidence may be used to prove intent. State v. Rogers, 19 N.J.
218, 228 (1955). The record supports the judge's finding that A.J. pushed B.F.
and J.F. to the ground and forced himself upon them on multiple occasions.
A.J.'s actions during and after the abuse allowed the judge to correctly conclude
A.J. "knowingly" sexually assaulted his cousins. While "knowingly" is certainly
an aspect of the subject crimes, A.J.'s mental culpability was fundamentally
stated in Judge Hudak's opinion insofar as he found that A.J. committed those
acts.
IV.
A.J.'s third point, asserting his right to a jury trial on federal and state
constitutional grounds, is not properly before us on this appeal, because his
counsel did not request a jury trial or raise the jury trial issue in the trial court.
A-4506-16T4
13
See Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973). Generally,
appellate courts will decline to consider allegations not raised before the trial
court, unless it concerns substantial public interest. Nieder, 62 N.J. at 234; see
also State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009). We rejected the same
arguments in State ex rel. A.C., 424 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 2012) affirming
the trial court's comprehensive opinion on the jury trial issue; State in re A.C.,
426 N.J. Super. 81 (Ch. Div. 2012). We stated:
As an intermediate appellate court, we are bound by the
decisions of our Supreme Court in State in the Interest
of J.W., 57 N.J. 144, 145-46 (1970), and In Re
Registrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 338-39 (2001), and by the
United States Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971), all of which
hold that juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to a
jury trial "in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage."
[A.C., 424 N.J. Super at 254 (citation omitted).]
We decline to revisit the issue here.
To the extent we have not addressed A.J.'s remaining arguments, we find
them without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-4506-16T4
14