VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK v. OUTFRONT MEDIA, LLC (L-1043-20, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1135-20
    VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD
    PARK,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    OUTFRONT MEDIA, LLC,
    and PLANNING/ZONING
    BOARD OF THE BOROUGH
    OF BOGOTA,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    __________________________
    Argued April 26, 2022 – Decided October 7, 2022
    Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-1043-20.
    Stephen F. Pellino argued the cause for appellant
    (Basile Birchwale & Pellino, LLP, attorneys; Stephen
    F. Pellino, on the briefs).
    Louis L. D'Arminio argued the cause for respondent
    Outfront Media, LLC (Price, Meese, Shulman &
    D'Arminio, PC, attorneys; Louis L. D'Arminio, of
    counsel and on the brief; Edward W. Purcell, on the
    brief).
    Kevin P. Kelly argued the cause for respondent
    Planning/Zoning Board of the Borough of Bogota
    (Kelly, Kelly, Marotta & Tuchman, LLC, attorneys;
    Kevin P. Kelly, on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    DeALMEIDA, J.A.D.
    Plaintiff Village of Ridgefield Park appeals from the November 16, 2020
    order of the Law Division upholding a decision of defendant Borough of Bogota
    Joint Zoning and Planning Board (Board) to approve the settlement of an
    application by defendant Outfront Media, LLC (Outfront) for a conditional use
    variance and final site plan approval to install a billboard on property along
    Interstate 80 (Route 80). We affirm.
    I.
    Outfront is an advertising company that owns and operates billboards. It
    leases a portion of property in a business/retail zone in Bogota. Billboards are
    a permitted conditional use in the zone. The property is triangular and narrow,
    abuts the twelve-lane Route 80, and contains a two-story commercial building,
    parking lot, and vacant area. A sound barrier wall separates the property from
    the eastbound lanes of the highway. The front of the property is on North
    A-1135-20
    2
    Avenue. A residential area of Ridgefield Park is on the other side of North
    Avenue.
    Outfront applied to the Board for three conditional use variances pursuant
    to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d)(3), and a final site plan approval to install a free-
    standing, static billboard, fourteen-feet wide and forty-eight-feet high,
    positioned on a pole fifty-seven feet above the ground. One side of the billboard
    would feature a non-digital advertisement and the rear of the sign would be
    painted a "flat" color. The pole would stand over the top of the building and the
    rear of the property and be angled so that it faced only the highway and not any
    buildings in the area. Ridgefield Park objected to the application.
    During a hearing before the Board, Outfront withdrew its request for two
    of the three conditional use variances it sought. The Board, however, ultimately
    concluded Outfront required four variances, all of which it denied in a resolution
    it adopted at the conclusion of the hearing.
    Outfront filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ in the Law Division
    challenging the Board's decision. Ridgefield Park intervened in that matter. The
    trial court affirmed the Board's resolution.
    We reversed. Outfront Media, LLC v. Plan./Zoning Bd., No. A-1654-17
    (App. Div. Jul. 19, 2019). We found that the Board failed to explain how it
    A-1135-20
    3
    arrived at its conclusions that the proposed billboard: (1) exceeded the maximum
    height permitted in the zone; (2) obstructed access to light and air of adjacent
    property or places of business; (3) was not entitled to a variance with respect to
    the rear yard setback requirement; and (4) encroached on the front yard setback
    requirement, an interpretation of the zoning ordinance disputed by Outfront. Id.
    (slip op. at 4-8). We found the Board's decision to be "conclusory in nature and
    untied to any of its factual findings." Id. (slip op. at 8).
    In light of our conclusion that "the Board's resolution impair[ed] our
    ability to evaluate the basis for and determine the propriety of its decision," we
    reversed the trial court's decision, vacated the Board's resolution, and remanded
    the matter "to the Board for reconsideration of its resolution in accordance with
    [our] opinion." Id. (slip op. at 11). We noted that "[o]f course, the Board is not
    precluded from reopening the hearing and considering additional evidence prior
    to rendering its final decision, if warranted." Ibid.
    On remand, at a public hearing held pursuant to Whispering Woods at
    Bamm Hollow, Inc. v. Twp. of Middletown Plan. Bd., 
    220 N.J. Super. 161
     (Law
    Div. 1987), the Board approved a settlement agreement between it and Outfront
    based on a revised application. At the hearing, Outfront explained several
    changes it made to its application. Outfront moved the proposed billboard fifty-
    A-1135-20
    4
    one feet from its original proposed location to the empty grass area of the
    property, closer to Route 80 and farther from the nearby residences.             As
    previously noted, the prior application placed the sign over the building, which
    the Board found required a variance. The settlement application eliminated that
    concern by moving the sign to the widest point on the property and pushing it
    up against the sound barrier. Placing the billboard against the sound barrier,
    however, required a variance from the seven-foot rear setback requirement (the
    only variance necessary). Although Outfront could have conformed the plan
    with the seven-foot rear setback from the highway, it chose to place the sign at
    the sound barrier to keep it farther from nearby residences, given that there was
    no detrimental impact on the highway from having the sign at the property line .
    Outfront also proposed additional landscaping between the property and nearby
    residences to improve the overall aesthetic of the neighborhood and add
    additional screening between the sign and the residences.
    Outfront presented expert testimony concerning: (1) the benefit of the
    additional landscaping; (2) the lack of an obstruction of access to light and air
    because the billboard was not a large building and the nearest neighboring
    property was the highway; (3) the superiority of the new location of the sign
    against the sound barrier as opposed to locating it seven feet from the rear of the
    A-1135-20
    5
    property; (4) the application of the fifty-seven feet maximum height requirement
    to permit the sign to clear the sound barrier while being out of the clear line of
    sight of nearby residences; and (5) the proposal's compliance with the front yard
    setback requirement because the billboard will be at least fifty feet from the
    nearest residence.
    Ridgefield Park opposed the settlement. Its planner testified that the
    proposal did not meet the front yard setback requirement and required a light
    and air variance. He also disagreed as to the viability and impact of other
    claimed variance relief.
    The Board unanimously adopted a comprehensive twenty-page resolution
    memorializing its approval of the settlement. The resolution refers to the expert
    testimony offered by Outfront. The Board found that the plan promoted a
    desirable visual environment and did not obstruct access to light and air within
    the meaning of the zoning ordinance. In addition, the Board concluded that the
    placement of the billboard achieves the overall planning goals of the Borough
    for the business/retail zone per its master plan, which includes visibility of
    billboards from Route 80 and lessening impact on residences.
    With respect to the rear yard setback deviation, the Board held that it
    offered a better zoning plan because the billboard will be closer to the sound
    A-1135-20
    6
    barrier, Route 80, and the motoring traffic, which will increase visibility and
    safety for the target audience, while ameliorating negative visual effects for
    nearby residences. The Board found that the plan complied with the front yard
    setback because the billboard would be more than fifty feet from the nearest
    residence. In reaching this conclusion, the Board rejected Ridgefield Park's
    argument that the ordinance requires a fifty-foot front yard setback from the
    nearest residence, as well as a thirty-foot setback from the property line. The
    Board concluded that argument ignores the size of the lot and the interpretation
    offered by Ridgefield Park would make it impossible to install a billboard
    anywhere in the zone, which clearly was not the intent of the governing bod y
    when it adopted the ordinance allowing billboards as a conditional use.
    Ridgefield Park filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writ in the Law
    Division challenging the Board's resolution approving the settlement.           The
    village argued: (1) res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent the Board from
    changing the interpretation of the zoning ordinance it applied to Outfront's initial
    application; (2) the Board's findings do not support the grant of a conditional
    use variance; (3) the Board failed to grant a necessary bulk variance; and (4) the
    Board, in effect, granted front yard setback and maximum height variances
    without proper zoning analysis.
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    Judge Christine A. Farrington issued a comprehensive written opinion
    upholding the Board's resolution. The judge concluded that res judicata and
    collateral estoppel do not apply because our decision vacated the Board's first
    resolution and remanded the matter for reconsideration. Thus, Judge Farrington
    found, the Board was not bound by its prior interpretation of the zoning
    ordinance or fact findings.
    In addition, the judge found that the Board complied with the holding in
    Whispering Woods when it held a hearing that met all of the statutory conditions
    necessary to vindicate the public interest, including notice, a public hearing, a
    public vote, and a written resolution explaining the Board's approval of the
    settlement. See Gandolfi v. Town of Hammonton, 
    367 N.J. Super. 527
     (App.
    Div. 2004).   The judge also noted that our courts favor the settlement of
    contested matters.
    Judge Farrington found that Outfront met its burden of proof to satisfy a
    section (d)(3) conditional use variance as set forth in Coventry Square, Inc. v.
    Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    138 N.J. 285
    , 300-01 (1994). The judge
    noted that the Board relied on expert testimony to conclude that the revised
    application relocated the billboard in a plan that was suitable for the
    conditionally permitted use, was not inconsistent with the zone plan or zoning
    A-1135-20
    8
    ordinance, and aesthetically suitable.       Of note, the judge found, was the
    borough's concession that there was no location in the municipality where a
    billboard could be installed in complete conformance with the zoning ordinance.
    The judge also rejected Ridgefield Park's arguments regarding the Board's
    interpretation of the front yard setback, height, and bulk variance provisions of
    the zoning ordinance.        A November 16, 2020 order memorialized Judge
    Farrington's decision.
    This appeal follows. Ridgefield Park repeats before us the arguments it
    raised in the trial court.
    II.
    When reviewing a planning board's decision, we use the same standard
    used by the trial court. Cohen v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
    396 N.J. Super. 608
    , 614-
    15 (App. Div. 2007). Like the trial court, our review is limited. Smart SMR of
    N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 
    152 N.J. 309
    , 327 (1998).
    Decisions of zoning boards are quasi-judicial actions of municipal
    administrative agencies, Willoughby v. Plan. Bd., 
    306 N.J. Super. 266
    , 273
    (App. Div. 1997), and they are presumed to be valid, Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v.
    Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    172 N.J. 75
    , 81 (2002). The Board's decision may
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    9
    be set aside only if it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Medici v. BPR
    Co., 
    107 N.J. 1
    , 15 (1987).
    A planning board's actions are presumed to be valid because of its
    "peculiar knowledge of local conditions," which entitle such boards to wide
    latitude in the exercise of discretion. N.Y. SMSA, LP v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
    370 N.J. Super. 319
    , 331 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Pierce Ests. Corp. v.
    Bridgewater Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 
    303 N.J. Super. 507
    , 514 (App.
    Div. 1997)). Further, "the Board 'has the choice of accepting or rejecting the
    testimony of witnesses. Where reasonably made, such choice is conclusive on
    appeal.'" Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, 
    45 N.J. 268
    , 288 (1965) (quoting
    Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 
    59 N.J. Super. 189
    , 201 (App. Div. 1960)).
    "The proper scope of judicial review is not to suggest a decision that may be
    better than the one made by the board, but to determine whether the board could
    reasonably have reached its decision on the record." Jock v. Zoning Bd. of
    Adjustment, 
    184 N.J. 562
    , 597 (2005).
    Having carefully reviewed Ridgefield Park's arguments in light of the
    record and applicable legal principles, we affirm the November 16, 2020 order
    for the reasons stated by Judge Farrington in her thorough and well-reasoned
    written opinion. We add a few comments.
    A-1135-20
    10
    "The term 'res judicata' refers broadly to the common-law doctrine barring
    relitigation of claims or issues that have already been adjudicated." Velasquez
    v. Franz, 
    123 N.J. 498
    , 505 (1991). "The application of res judicata doctrine
    requires substantially similar or identical causes of action and issues, parties,
    and relief sought." Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
    115 N.J. 451
    , 460 (1989). "In
    addition, there must be a 'final judgment by a court or tribunal of competent
    jurisdiction.'" 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Charlie Brown of Chatham v. Bd. of Adjustment,
    
    202 N.J. Super. 312
    , 327 (App. Div. 1985)).
    "As a general principle, [c]ollateral estoppel is that branch of . . . res
    judicata which bars relitigation of any issue which was actually determined in a
    prior action . . . ." In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 
    214 N.J. 51
    , 66 (2013)
    (quoting Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.D., 
    207 N.J. 88
    , 114 (2011)). For
    the doctrine to apply,
    the party asserting the bar must show that: (1) the issue
    to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the
    prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in
    the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior
    proceedings issued a final judgment on the merits; (4)
    the determination of the issue was essential to the prior
    judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine
    is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to
    the earlier proceeding.
    A-1135-20
    11
    [Olivieri v. Y.M.F. Carpet, Inc., 
    186 N.J. 511
    , 521
    (2006) (quoting In re Estate of Dawson, 
    136 N.J. 1
    , 20-
    21 (1994)).]
    Collateral estoppel is distinguishable from res judicata in "that it alone bars
    relitigation of issues in suits that arise from different causes of action."
    Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 
    327 N.J. Super. 168
    , 173 (App. Div. 2000).
    "Res judicata applies when either party attempts to relitigate the same cause of
    action. Collateral estoppel applies when either party attempts to relitigate facts
    necessary to a prior judgment." T.W. v. A.W., 
    224 N.J. Super. 675
    , 682 (App.
    Div. 1988). Application of collateral estoppel to bar a plaintiff's claims presents
    an "issue of law to be determined by a judge in the second proceeding after
    giving appropriate weight to the factors bearing upon the issues." Selective Ins.,
    
    327 N.J. Super. at 173
    .
    Ridgefield Park's reliance on res judicata and collateral estoppel is
    misplaced, given that the doctrines apply where a final substantive decision has
    been made in a prior proceeding. Here, the Board's first resolution was vacated
    by this court. We remanded the matter for reconsideration, noting that the Board
    could reopen the hearing and consider additional evidence, which it elected to
    do. Res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in these circumstances.
    The Board was not bound to interpret the zoning ordinance in the same manner
    A-1135-20
    12
    as it had at the first hearing, nor was it constrained to reject Outfront's revised
    application.
    With respect to the Board's decision to approve the settlement, which
    incorporated the variance the Board determined necessary, we, like Judge
    Farrington, conclude that the record contains ample evidence supporting the
    Board's discretionary action. To the extent Ridgefield Park raises any arguments
    not specifically addressed in Judge Farrington's opinion, we conclude they lack
    sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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