STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. K.D.C. (15-09-1224 AND 16-04-0547, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2022 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2905-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
K.D.C.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted May 18, 2022 – Decided June 15, 2022
Before Judges Hoffman and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment Nos. 15-09-1224
and 16-04-0547.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Karen A. Lodestra, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Stephanie Davis Elson, Assistant
Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the June 9, 2021 Law Division order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). After reviewing the record, we affirm.
I.
We glean the following facts from the record. In 2015, defendant resided
in an apartment he shared with L.G.,1 who rented the three-bedroom apartment
on the lower floor of a two-story duplex on Grant Avenue in Jersey City. On
February 19, 2015, Lieutenant Honey Spirito of the Special Victims Unit (SVU)
of the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office received a referral from the Jersey
City Police Department (JCPD). According to the referral, J.C., defendant's
girlfriend, reported that she found "child pornography or pictures of [defendant]
doing sexual acts to a child." J.C. identified the child in the videos and
photographs as the niece of defendant's roommate. Specifically, she recounted
watching a video on defendant's cell phone where defendant pulled the pants
down on a child and "fondle[d] her buttocks"; in another video, she observed
"the same child on a bed and [defendant] touching her vagina." J.C. recognized
defendant's bedroom as the setting of the videos and photographs, as well as
defendant's hand appearing in the video.
1
We use initials to protect the identity of child victims of sexual assault and
abuse. R. 1:38-3(d)(11).
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2
After receiving this referral, Lieutenant Spirito spoke with Detective Solte
of the JCPD, and requested that he transport J.C. to her office for questioning.
Detective Solte then learned that there were "two young children" in defendant's
apartment; at that point, she requested that Detective Solte proceed to
defendant's apartment and transport everyone living in the apartment to the
SVU.2 Lieutenant Spirito further advised Detective Solte to "secure" any
cellular device on defendant's person, but not to search through the devices.
In the interim, Lieutenant Spirito planned to obtain a search warrant for
defendant's home. J.C. and the two children went to the SVU for interviews.
According to Lieutenant Spirito, she sent officers to defendant's home, before
obtaining an arrest warrant, to assure the safety of the young children. Had there
been no young children in the home, Lieutenant Spirito testified she would have
interviewed J.C. before preparing an arrest warrant for defendant.
Sergeant Dino Nerney, one of four JCPD officers dispatched to
defendant's apartment, testified that upon arriving, L.G. allowed them to enter.
After entering the apartment, the officers informed defendant of the allegations
2
According to Lieutenant Spirito, it is SVU protocol to transport to the SVU
office the victims of a sexual assault case and any children living in a home
where child sexual abuse is suspected.
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of child pornography on his cell phone and asked him and L.G. to drive to the
police station for questioning. They both agreed.
Sergeant Nerney testified that Officer Mark Shaver followed defendant to
his bedroom, after defendant "asked if he can get some clothes." As defendant
entered the bedroom, he attempted to close the door behind him; at that point,
Officer Shaver prevented defendant from closing the door and handcuffed him.
Defendant responded, "You need a search warrant. You can't come in here. And
I wanna lawyer."
After defendant showed where the jacket was in the bedroom, Officer
Shaver put the jacket on defendant, zippered up the jacket, and then patted
defendant down, locating and removing a cell phone from the jacket pocket.
Defendant requested the officers give his cell phone to L.G.; instead, they put it
in an evidence bag.
Sergeant Nerney testified that he had Officer Shaver follow defendant to
his bedroom because the room had not been checked. At that point,
[w]e don't know if there's kids inside the room, if there's
evidence in there, if there's a weapon in there, and we
just wanted to make sure that we followed him, you
know, to make sure that nothing could be discarded or
destroyed. . . . [When defendant] stopped [Officer
Shaver] from closing the door . . . he was taken into
custody at that time.
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Later that morning, Officer Mark Sojak obtained the passcode for
defendant's cell phone from J.C.; however, he did not search the contents of the
cell phone immediately. Officer Sojak accessed defendant's phone using the
pattern lock, placed the phone in "airplane mode" and disabled the pattern lock.
Officer Sojak explained that he wanted to "protect data on the phone" and
"prevent anyone from remotely gaining access to the phone to delete any
contents of evidentiary value."
Lieutenant Spirito eventually obtained a Communications Data Warrant
(CDW) for defendant's cell phone. Upon executing the CDW, Lieutenant Spirito
saw several photos corroborating J.C.'s concerns. Lieutenant Spirito then
obtained an arrest warrant for defendant.
On September 2, 2015, a Hudson County grand jury returned an
indictment charging defendant with three counts of first-degree aggravated
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), three counts of second-degree sexual
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), three counts of third-degree endangering the
welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a), three counts of fourth-degree child
abuse, N.J.S.A. 9:6-1 & 9:6-3, eight counts of third-degree endangering the
welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b), and one count of obstruction, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-1.
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Defendant moved to suppress the photo evidence obtained from his cell
phone. The judge denied defendant's motion in an oral opinion, finding the
officers went to defendant's home only to investigate, to secure the children, and
to preserve evidence, not to search for evidence. Moreover, the judge found the
police lawfully searched defendant and seized his cell phone incident to his
arrest for obstruction.
On October 28, 2016, defendant pled guilty to two counts of first -degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(3), one count of second-
degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b(5)(a)(i), and one
count of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4b.
During the plea colloquy, defendant and the judge had the following exchange:
Judge: Have you had enough time to speak with Miss
Aldrich about these cases?
Defendant: Yes.
Judge: Has she answered all of your questions and
reviewed the discovery with you?
Defendant: Yes.
Judge: Has anybody forced you, threatened you,
promised you anything to make you plead guilty?
Defendant: No. A lot of pressure, but nobody forced
me.
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Judge: But it's a lot of pressure because it's a hard
decision to make. But did anybody pressure you, force
you, or threaten you to make a decision?
Defendant: No.
Judge: Okay. So the pressure came from yourself and
the fact that this is a difficult thing, or did someone else
pressure you?
Defendant: The pressure came from the whole
situation.
Judge: Okay.
....
Judge: It's just a stressful situation?
Defendant: Yes, it's stressful.
Judge: But nobody's pressured you, forced you, or
threatened you to plead guilty?
Defendant: No. Nobody's forcing me to do anything.
On September 15, 2017, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of
twenty-five years of imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole
ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA).3 The court
sentenced defendant to fifteen years imprisonment for first-degree endangering
3
In accordance with defendant's plea agreement, the court also subjected him
to Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and parole supervision for life.
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the welfare of a child, consecutive to a ten-year sentence for first-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, with both sentences subject to NERA.
On July 6, 2020, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. After hearing
oral argument on defendant's petition, the PCR court denied defendant's petition
on January 27, 2021. The PCR court found that when defendant's counsel used
abbreviations when she assisted him with his plea form, she did not provide
ineffective assistance. Finding no evidence that defendant plead guilty
involuntarily, that he failed to understand the duration of his sentence during the
plea hearing, or that he was confused, alarmed, or that he was somehow
inadequately informed, the PCR court denied defendant's petition without an
evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed, with defendant raising the following
arguments:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR.
CAMPBELL'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF WITHOUT GRANTING AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING AS TESTIMONY IS NEEDED FROM
PRIOR COUNSEL REGARDING HER FAILURE TO
CALL THREE POLICE OFFICERS TO TESTIFY AT
THE SUPPRESSION MOTION.
POINT II
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR.
CAMPBELL'S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
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RELIEF WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
AS TESTIMONY IS NEEDED FROM PRIOR
COUNSEL REGARDING WHY SHE PRESSURED
MR. CAMPBELL TO PLEAD GUILTY AND FAILED
TO EXPLAIN TO HIM THE TERMS OF HIS PLEA
OFFER AND HIS SENTENCE EXPOSURE.
II.
We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing
this appeal. When a PCR judge does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we review
de novo both the PCR court's factual inferences from the record and its lega l
conclusions. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016).
A defendant is generally entitled to a PCR evidentiary hearing upon
showing a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Porter,
216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013). To establish a prima facie claim, the petitioner "must
allege specific facts and evidence supporting his allegations." Id. at 355. In
other words, "to establish a prima facie claim, a petitioner must do more than
make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel."
State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).
In determining whether a defendant has established ineffective assistance
of counsel, the claim must be evaluated under the two-prong Strickland 4 test,
4
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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where "a reviewing court must determine: (1) whether counsel's performance
'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,'. . . and if so, (2) whether
there exists a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Castagna, 187
N.J. 293, 313-14 (2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694); see
also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland test in New
Jersey).
A defendant may satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test "by a
showing that counsel's acts or omissions fell outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances
of the case." State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 366 (2008) (quoting Castagna, 187
N.J. at 314). Moreover, the second prong requires defendant show that he was
prejudiced by counsel's deficient representation. Fritz, 15 N.J. at 341-42
(explaining that the prejudice prong "requires showing that counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial."). Moreover, there is a
strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Complaints of matters relating to trial strategy will
not establish a valid ineffective assistance claim. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 54 (quoting
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State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)). Mere improvident strategy,
mistakes or bad tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance. State v. Bonet,
132 N.J. Super. 186, 191 (App. Div. 1975).
We first address defendant's contention that his counsel was ineffective
by not calling Officers Solte, Graham, and Shaver as witnesses to testify at
defendant's motion to suppress. Deciding which witnesses to call is
quintessential trial strategy, and therefore counsel's decision, even if
"improvident," cannot sustain a claim for ineffective assistance. Fritz, 105 N.J.
at 54; see also Bonet, 132 N.J. Super. at 191. Defendant provides no support for
his contention. Indeed, Lieutenant Spirito and Sergeant Nerney testified at
defendant's motion to suppress. Sergeant Nerney was present at defendant's
apartment and testified to the events the lead to the officers' seizing of
defendant's cell phone, which contained incriminating photos. The record lacks
any evidence suggesting that the testimony of these officers would dispute
Sergeant Nerney's testimony. Counsel's decision not to call the other three
officers was therefore "objectively reasonable." Castagna, 187 N.J. at 313-14(2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694). Defendant failed to establish
a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Defendant also argues his counsel was ineffective by pressuring him to
plead guilty and failing to explain his sentencing exposure adequately. We
disagree. The plea colloquy establishes that defendant plead guilty because of
"the situation," which caused him to feel pressure to plead guilty, not the actions
or words of his counsel. Defendant's claim that his counsel pressure him into
pleading guilty finds no credible support in the record. Accordingly, there is no
support for defendant's argument that counsel's actions "outside the wide range
of professionally competent assistance" caused defendant to plead guilty.
Allegro, 193 N.J. at 366 (quoting Castagna, 187 N.J. at 314).
Defendant also claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel
because he did not understand the terms "concurrent" and "consecutive," his
counsel inappropriately used the abbreviations "c/c" and "c/s" on the plea form,
and he did not understand he would receive a twenty-five-year sentence. The
record does not support this argument. After having heard in detail the terms of
the aggregate sentence, defendant stated that he understood those terms of the
plea agreement. Additionally, defendant advised the plea judge that his counsel
had answered all of his questions.
Defendant's claim that counsel failed to provide an explanation is nothing
more than a bald assertion. As noted by the PCR court, the transcript of
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defendant's plea hearing reflects that the court went through "painstaking
efforts" to address the consecutive sentences and "the amount of years and the
months and even the days" that defendant would have to serve before he was
eligible for parole, for each sentence. Accordingly, defendant cannot tie his
alleged misunderstanding of his sentence length to counsel's actions that fall
"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Ibid.(quoting Castagna, 187 N.J. at 314).
Counsel's usage of the abbreviations "c/c" and "c/s" to mean "concurrent"
and "consecutive" was also not ineffective. Indeed, defendant acknowledged
that counsel discussed his sentence with him. Further, the record provides no
basis to find counsel's discussion with defendant regarding his sentencing
exposure fell "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance."
Because defendant did not establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. R. 3:22-10(b).
Any arguments not addressed lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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