STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JAZMINE HOLLOWAY (14-03-0230, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0107-20
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JAZMINE HOLLOWAY, a/k/a
    JAZMINE D. HOLLOWAY,
    HALLOWAY, and JAZMINE D,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________
    Submitted September 20, 2022 – Decided October 14, 2022
    Before Judges Messano and Gilson.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Union County, Indictment No. 14-03-0230.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Zachary Markarian, Assistant Deputy Public
    Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
    James O. Tansey, First Assistant Prosecutor of Union
    County, Designated Prosecutor for the purpose of this
    appeal, attorney for respondent (Joseph M. Nielsen,
    Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    In 2014, Jazmine Holloway pled guilty to third-degree resisting arrest,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a), and was admitted into the Pretrial Intervention Program
    (PTI). Shortly before completing PTI, Holloway was cited for violations of the
    program's conditions and, in July 2015, she was terminated from PTI when she
    failed to appear at a hearing.
    In 2019, Holloway learned of her termination and moved for readmission
    into PTI. After that motion was denied, she was sentenced to one year of
    probation. She now appeals. We are constrained to vacate the order denying
    her readmittance into PTI and remand for an evidentiary hearing on (1) whether
    her PTI was improperly terminated in 2015; and (2) whether she should be
    readmitted into PTI.
    I.
    In September 2013, when Holloway was eighteen years old, she had an
    encounter with police officers and was charged with three crimes: third-degree
    eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
    1(b)(5); and third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a).
    In July 2014, Holloway pled guilty to third-degree resisting arrest and was
    admitted into PTI. At the plea, she was represented by a private attorney. The
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    PTI order of postponement stated that Holloway was to be in PTI for twelve
    months. During that time, she had to comply with conditions, including to
    remain arrest-free, to regularly report to her probation officer, to perform sixty
    hours of community service, to maintain full-time employment, to complete a
    G.E.D. program, and to undergo a drug abuse evaluation.
    In May 2015, a probation officer filed a report asserting that Holloway
    had violated her PTI conditions. The report stated that Holloway had failed to
    (1) remain arrest-free; (2) report to her probation officer on five occasions; (3)
    complete her hours of community service; and (4) reschedule a drug abuse
    evaluation. A PTI termination hearing was scheduled for July 10, 2015, and
    notice was sent by regular and certified mail to Holloway's last-known address.
    At the July 10, 2015 hearing, neither Holloway nor any lawyer
    representing her appeared. A probation officer informed the court that the notice
    had been mailed to the address Holloway had given the probation office, the
    certified mail had been returned unclaimed, but the regular mail had not come
    back. The court then issued a bench warrant for Holloway's arrest.
    At the hearing on July 10, 2015, the court did not address whether the
    alleged violations had occurred; whether Holloway had willfully violated the
    PTI conditions; or whether Holloway remained a viable candidate for PTI. See
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    N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(e).     That same day, an order was entered terminating
    Holloway from PTI.      There is nothing in the record showing that another
    hearing, separate from the July 10, 2015 hearing, was conducted.
    In 2019, Holloway moved to be readmitted into PTI. She represented that
    she never received notice of the PTI violation charges or the July 10, 2015
    hearing. Holloway explained that she had learned of the warrant for her arrest
    in 2019, when she applied for a job and a background check revealed the
    outstanding warrant. She immediately contacted the public defender's office,
    turned herself in to the court, was released, and thereafter filed for readmittance
    into PTI.
    In seeking readmittance, Holloway represented that since 2015 she has led
    a law-abiding life.1 Holloway has also been employed full time and she has
    continued to pursue educational opportunities, received a high school diploma
    in 2018, and enrolled in a program to become a certified nurse's aide in 2019.
    1
    While no evidentiary hearing was conducted, when Holloway was sentenced
    in 2020, a pre-sentence report was prepared. That report indicates that Holloway
    was arrested on November 3, 2014, and she pled guilty to a disorderly-persons
    offense of hindering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3. Her criminal record also reflects that in
    2017 she pled guilty to municipal court charges of disruption of lawful activities
    and littering. Apart from Holloway's resisting arrest conviction, she has no other
    indictable convictions.
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    On January 9, 2020, a judge heard oral argument on the motion for
    readmittance into PTI. The judge did not conduct an evidentiary hearing.
    Instead, the judge explained that he had read and reviewed the motion papers,
    he then heard very brief arguments from the public defender representing
    Holloway, and the State informed him that it would rely on its papers. That
    same day, the judge issued a written opinion and order denying the motion.
    In the written opinion, the judge relied on the 2015 report of the probation
    officer to find that Holloway had violated her PTI conditions. In that regard,
    the judge accepted the allegations that Holloway had been arrested in November
    2014 for a disorderly-persons offense; she had failed to report to probation on
    five occasions; she had failed to complete her community service; and she had
    failed to reschedule and obtain a drug abuse evaluation. Based on the papers
    submitted with the motion, the judge found that Holloway had not adequately
    explained why she failed to complete her PTI conditions, and the judge reasoned
    that Holloway's non-compliance had been willful. Finally, the judge concluded
    that Holloway was no longer a viable candidate for PTI. Although the judge
    acknowledged Holloway's efforts to improve her life, including her years of
    pursuing various education programs and full-time employment, he reasoned
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    that because Holloway had not adequately explained her failure to comply with
    PTI in 2015, she would not be successful in PTI in 2020.
    Following the denial of her motion to be readmitted into PTI, Holloway
    was sentenced on her resisting arrest conviction to one year of probation. She
    now appeals from that judgment of conviction and the order denying her motion
    to be readmitted into PTI.
    II.
    On appeal, Holloway argues that her 2015 termination from PTI was
    improper because it was not based on a showing that she had violated her
    conditions. She also argues that she should have been readmitted into PTI.
    Because there was no hearing conducted in 2015 that addressed the factors
    governing the termination of PTI, we reverse the order denying her readmittance
    into PTI and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
    "PTI 'is a diversionary program through which certain offenders are able
    to avoid criminal prosecution by receiving early rehabilitative services expected
    to deter future criminal behavior.'" State v. Oguta, 
    468 N.J. Super. 100
    , 107
    (App. Div. 2021) (quoting State v. Nwobu, 
    139 N.J. 236
    , 240 (1995)). A
    participant approved for PTI enters into written agreements, signed by the
    prosecutor and the participant, which set forth the terms and duration of the
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    supervisory treatment. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(a). A participant's enrollment in PTI,
    however, should not be conditioned upon a guilty plea. See State v. Randall,
    
    414 N.J. Super. 414
    , 416 (App. Div. 2010) (recognizing that the "Prosecutor's
    Office erred in attempting to make a guilty plea a condition of defendant's
    admission into [PTI]"); Guidelines for Operation of Pretrial Intervention in New
    Jersey, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. on Guideline 4,
    following R. 3:28 at 1148 (2014);2 see also State v. Maddocks, 
    80 N.J. 98
    , 107
    (1979) (noting that a "prosecutor may not condition PTI entrance upon an
    admission of guilt").
    A participant who violates his or her PTI conditions can be terminated
    from the program.       N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(e).    Before a participant can be
    terminated, "minimum due process requires the State" to provide the participant
    with "an opportunity to be confronted with evidence in support of or to present
    evidence against the conclusion" that the participant should be removed from
    PTI. State v. Devatt, 
    173 N.J. Super. 188
    , 194 (App. Div. 1980).
    2
    Defendant pled guilty and was admitted into PTI in 2014. Accordingly, we
    cite to the rule and comment in effect at that time. The current rule contains
    nearly identical language to Guideline 4 of former Rule 3:28. See R. 3:28-
    5(b)(1), which replaced former R. 3:28. The current rule only permits the State
    to condition admission into PTI on entry of a guilty plea under limited
    circumstances, including certain domestic violence offenses or where the
    defendant is charged with a first- or second-degree offense. See R. 3:28-5(b)(2).
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    A court considering a defendant's termination from PTI for alleged
    violations "shall determine, after summary hearing, whether said violation
    warrants the participant's dismissal from the supervisory treatment program or
    modification of the conditions of continued participation in that or another
    supervisory treatment program." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-13(e). That review requires
    the court to "undertake a 'conscientious judgment' to (1) adequately consider
    whether the participant willfully violated the PTI conditions; and (2) determine
    whether the defendant remains a viable candidate for PTI under the original or
    modified PTI terms." State v. A.S.-M., 
    444 N.J. Super. 334
    , 339 (App. Div.
    2016) (quoting Devatt, 
    173 N.J. Super. at 194-95
    ). The court's "decisions and
    reasons" ordering defendant's termination from PTI "must be reduced to writing
    and disclosed to [the] defendant."      Guidelines for Operation of Pretrial
    Intervention in New Jersey, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
    Guideline 8, following R. 3:28 at 1174 (2015).3
    "[A] defendant terminated from [PTI] may be reinstated upon
    reconsideration."   A.S.-M., 444 N.J. Super. at 338.      "[R]econsideration is
    especially permissible when circumstances show the initial order terminating a
    3
    Again, we cite to the rule in place at the time that Holloway was terminated
    from PTI in 2015.
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    defendant from PTI failed to adhere to the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:43-
    13(e)." Id. at 338-39. A motion for readmission into PTI is committed to the
    sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 346. Appellate courts will generally
    refrain from reversing discretionary decisions unless the exercise of discretion
    was "'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances." Newark Morning Ledger Co.
    v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 
    423 N.J. Super. 140
    , 174 (App. Div. 2011)
    (quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 
    392 N.J. Super. 141
    ,
    149 (App. Div. 2007)).      Nevertheless, if a trial judge "misconceives the
    applicable law or misapplies it to the factual" situation, an abuse of discretion
    can be found. State v. Madan, 
    366 N.J. Super. 98
    , 110 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting
    Wasserstein v. Swern & Co., 
    84 N.J. Super. 1
    , 6 (App. Div. 1964)).
    Applying the law governing PTI and the termination of PTI, we discern
    two issues that require a reversal and remand.         First, we remand for an
    evidentiary hearing to address whether Holloway's PTI was properly terminated.
    The record before us establishes that in 2015, neither the State nor the probation
    office presented evidence establishing the PTI violations.        Accordingly, a
    hearing must be conducted, and it will be the obligation of the State or the
    probation office to establish the alleged PTI violations.
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    Second, based on the resolution of the first issue, the trial court should
    reconsider whether Holloway should be readmitted into PTI. In reviewing the
    motion in 2020, the judge accepted, without an evidentiary basis, that PTI had
    been properly terminated. Accordingly, the judge did not have the opportunity
    to properly exercise his discretion in determining whether Holloway had
    willfully failed to comply with her PTI conditions and whether Holloway
    remains a viable candidate for PTI under the original or modified conditions.
    Given the procedural context of the order entered in January 2020, we are not
    convinced that the judge had the opportunity to fully appreciate the undisputed
    representations by Holloway that for the past several years she has led a law -
    abiding life, been employed full time, supported a family, and has pursued
    various educational goals. The judge reconsidering the readmittance motion
    should have the opportunity to consider those facts and weigh them against the
    burden of having a criminal record.
    Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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