CALISE BELIN v. NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY (L-2278-19, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1329-20
CALISE BELIN and KIM BELIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS
INSURANCE COMPANY and
MELINDA YOUNG,
Defendants-Respondents.
_______________________________
Argued December 7, 2021 – Decided August 5, 2022
Before Judges Messano and Accurso.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-
2278-19.
Timothy J. Foley argued the cause for appellants
(Foley & Foley, attorneys; Sherry L. Foley and
Timothy J. Foley, of counsel and on the briefs).
Derek G. Timms argued the cause for respondents
(Parker Young & Antinoff, attorneys; Brad A. Parker,
of counsel; Derek G. Timms, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Calise Belin and her mother Kim Belin, appeal from summary
judgment in favor of New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company
dismissing their claim for underinsured motorist coverage. Because we agree
with Judge Belgard that there were no material facts in dispute regarding
liability for the accident, making NJM entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
we affirm.
The facts of this two-car accident are uncomplicated and easily
summarized. Plaintiff Calise Belin was driving to a basketball game after
work in a car owned by her parents. It was dark and raining and plaintiff had
her lights and windshield wipers on. She stopped at a stop sign on Lafayette
Road in Voorhees preparing to make a lefthand turn onto southbound
Haddonfield-Berlin Road. Looking both ways and not seeing anyone coming,
plaintiff made her turn.
Debra Lawless-Gattone was traveling northbound on Haddonfield-Berlin
Road on her way to pick up her son from hockey practice. According to her,
Haddonfield-Berlin Road widens from a two-lane to a four-lane road just south
of Lafayette Road. She was in the left lane with her lights and windshield
wipers on, deciding whether to move to the right lane as she saw plaintiff's car
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approach the stop sign on Lafayette Road. Lawless-Gattone claimed she
slowed, not sure whether plaintiff was going to stop. Satisfied plaintiff wo uld
stop, Lawless-Gattone, whose travel was not controlled by any traffic sign or
signal, checked her rearview mirror and looked around to see if it was safe to
move into the right lane. When she turned back, plaintiff was coming out of
Lafayette Street on her right, turning in front of her. According to Lawless-
Gattone, she braked and turned the wheel in an attempt to avoid plaintiff but
didn't have enough time to stop before crashing into plaintiff's driver-side
door.
Lawless-Gattone gave a statement shortly after the accident that the
speed limit on Haddonfield-Berlin Road increased from 25 to 40 miles per
hour when the road widened to four lanes, and that she was traveling between
35 and 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident. At her deposition,
however, she testified the speed limit at the scene of the accident was 25 miles
per hour and she was traveling the speed limit. Plaintiff at her deposition
testified she was "not to blame for this accident" because she "did what was
necessary and what was needed" and the fault lay with Lawless-Gattone
because "she hit me." Asked what she thought Lawless-Gattone could have
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done to avoid the accident, plaintiff responded, "she could have paid better
attention."
Confronted with those facts on the motion, plaintiff insisted a jury could
find Lawless-Gattone was speeding, or at least driving too fast for the weather
conditions, was distracted by looking around to determine whether she should
change lanes and, that by the time she turned back to look at the road, plaintiff,
who was in the midst of her turn, had the right of way. Judge Belgard
disagreed.
Noting the parties agreed it was plaintiff's burden to establish Lawless-
Gattone was at least fifty percent responsible for the accident to permit
plaintiff to recover against NJM, see Stabile v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 263 N.J.
Super. 434, 439-41 (App. Div. 1993), the judge found plaintiff failed to carry
her burden to establish a prima facie case of Lawless-Gattone's greater liability
for the accident. Although the judge acknowledged Lawless-Gattone's
different statements about the speed limit on Haddonfield-Berlin Road where
the accident happened, she found the discrepancy immaterial for purposes of
the motion. While Lawless-Gattone may have been confused about the speed
limit at her deposition, her testimony was consistent that she was not speeding .
Plaintiff offered no evidence to the contrary on the motion.
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Besides there being no evidence in the record suggesting Lawless-
Gattone was speeding, the judge also found no evidence Lawless-Gattone was
distracted as plaintiff alleged. The judge noted "motorists make lane changes
regularly," plaintiff offered no proof Lawless-Gattone was distracted in
contemplating such, and "[t]he fact is that here [it was] plaintiff, who was
making the left turn, [and] . . . is responsible for yielding to oncoming traffic,
making observations before leaving her stopped position and entering into
oncoming traffic." Viewing the facts on the motion in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, the judge found them — in the absence of an accident
reconstructionist who might have been able to cast doubt on the credibility of
Lawless-Gattone's testimony — "so one-sided in favor of the defendant here
and against the plaintiff" — the party making the left turn — that no rational
jury could resolve the case in her favor.
Plaintiff appeals, reprising the arguments she made to the trial judge that
the inconsistency in Lawless-Gattone's statements about the speed limit put
Lawless-Gattone's credibility in issue requiring evaluation by a jury, a
reasonable jury could find Lawless-Gattone was "distracted from the roadway
in front of her" by considering whether she should change lanes, and that an
accident reconstruction expert was not necessary for a jury to "understand that
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a speeding and distracted driver could cause an accident." She adds the trial
court's inquiries at argument and the reasoning of her decision reflect she
"undeniably and impermissibly weighed the evidence" on the motion "and did
so in a light most favorable to defendant." We disagree.
We review summary judgment using the same standard that governs the
trial court. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). Thus,
we consider "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must
prevail as a matter of law." Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., Inc. v. Nowell
Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)).
Here, we agree with Judge Belgard that plaintiff did not adduce evidence
on the motion sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude Lawless-
Gattone was speeding or distracted or that plaintiff, who was making a left turn
in front of Lawless-Gattone from a side street controlled by a stop sign, had
the right of way, even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
See Brill, 142 N.J. at 540. In order to stave off summary judgment here, it was
incumbent on plaintiff "to demonstrate by competent evidential material that a
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genuine issue of fact exist[ed]." Robbins v. Jersey City, 23 N.J. 229, 241
(1957). Her failure to do so required the entry of summary judgment for NJM.
Affirmed.
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