CHRISTOPHER CASUCCI AND KERRI CASUCCI v. KEVIN VALAN AND MARASCIO BROTHERS ELECTRIC (L-3784-18, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0323-21
CHRISTOPHER CASUCCI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
KERRI CASUCCI,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN VALAN and MARASCIO
BROTHERS ELECTRIC,
Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________
Submitted September 13, 2022 – Decided October 5, 2022
Before Judges Geiger and Berdote Byrne.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Monmouth County, Law Division, Docket No. L-3784-
18.
Jeffrey S. Mandel, LLC, attorney for appellant.
Garvey Ballou, PC, attorneys for respondents (Robert
A. Ballou, Jr., on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a unanimous jury verdict of zero damages, plaintiff 1 appeals,
requesting we consider whether the trial court erred in: 1) failing to enter a
directed verdict on proximate cause where defendants stipulated to liability
before trial and both parties' experts opined plaintiff incurred some injury as a
result of a motor vehicle accident; 2) providing an incorrect jury instruction
including proximate cause; 3) adding proximate cause to the jury verdict sheet;
or 4) failing to grant additur or a new trial after the jury returned a verdict of no
damages. Because plaintiff requested jury instructions prior to trial on the issue
of proximate cause, and proofs were presented at trial by both experts regarding
the cause and extent of plaintiff's injuries, plaintiff fails to demon strate the trial
court erred in instructing the jury on proximate cause and denying his motion
for a directed verdict. Given the proofs presented, the jury's conclusion that
plaintiff did not suffer a compensable injury as a result of the accident is
reasonable and entitled to significant deference. We affirm.
1
Prior to trial, plaintiff Kerri Casucci withdrew her per quod claim.
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Plaintiff was stopped while driving his vehicle on February 16, 2017,
when he was struck from behind by a commercial vehicle. 2 He was wearing a
seatbelt and did not strike his body on any part of the car. Plaintiff stated he
was "jostled" by the impact and admits the "impact depicted in the . . . [dashcam]
video [was] minor." He did not request an ambulance or treatment at the scene.
Plaintiff testified he suffered neck pain, headaches, and tingling in his hands as
a result of the accident, and began seeing a chiropractor approximately one
month later, whom he had seen previously for lower back pain. After treatment
for three months and reporting improvement, he saw an orthopedist three times
over a one-year period and had an MRI. On the last visit, the orthopedist noted
plaintiff's cervical range of motion lacked five degrees but was otherwise
"normal."
Defendants admitted liability for causing the accident at trial and
stipulated during opening argument the only issue before the jury was "whether
or not [plaintiff was] entitled to damages." Plaintiff's medical expert opined,
based on plaintiff's examination, which took place on July 1, 2019, his self -
report of pain, and his medical records, plaintiff sprained his neck and suffered
a disk herniation as a result of the accident. On cross-examination, he conceded
2
Plaintiff has a no threshold automobile insurance policy.
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plaintiff suffered from pre-existing arthritis, which may have caused the disk
herniation. He also testified neither he nor the treating orthopedist could find
objective evidence of the tingling sensation plaintiff complained of in his hands
through objective testing.
Defendants' expert opined plaintiff suffered a soft tissue sprain of the neck
because of the accident. He too was unable to find objective evidence of tingling
in the hands and did not find functional impairment of the neck. After reviewing
the MRI, defendants' expert opined the disc herniation was the result of
plaintiff's long-standing degenerative disease, cervical spondylosis, and there
was no evidence of a permanent injury caused by the accident.
Plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on proximate cause, arguing both
doctors testified "there are injuries in this case" and the proposed verd ict sheet
asked the jury only the quantum of damages, not proximate cause. The trial
judge inquired as to what undisputed evidence demonstrated the injury was
"caused by the accident and not from age, [or] degeneration?" Plaintiff claimed
a jury could not award zero damages or "throw everything out and say there
[was] no injury" because "all of the evidence clearly [demonstrated] there [was
an injury]."
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Defendants argued the jury could make credibility determinations of the
witnesses, including the experts, reject all the testimony, and determine there
was no compensable injury. Further, even if the jury found both experts had
opined the accident proximately caused some injury, it had to determine whether
the herniation and lasting injuries resulted from the accident, requiring jury
instructions on proximate cause. They argued the jury could conclude there was
an injury, but it was not worth any amount of compensation.
We review a motion for a directed verdict de novo by applying the same
standard governing trial judges. Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373,
397 (2016). A motion for a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 4:40-1 shall
be granted "only if, accepting as true all evidence supporting the party opposing
the motion and according that party the benefit of all favorable inferences,
reasonable minds could not differ." Edwards v. Walsh, 397 N.J. Super. 567, 571
(App. Div. 2007) (citing Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969)); see R. 4:37-
2(b)).
We conclude the trial judge correctly denied plaintiff's motion for a
directed verdict because the experts disagreed on the cause and extent of
plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff erroneously conflates the admission of an injury
with irrefutable proof of damages. "[Plaintiff] bears the burden to 'introduce
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evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more
likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the
result.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 60-61 (2015) (quoting Davidson v.
Slater, 189 N.J. 166, 185 (2007)). The stipulation as to liability reached by the
parties did not relieve plaintiff of this obligation to prove he suffered
compensable injuries proximately caused by the accident; a burden he clearly
did not meet.
The trial judge specifically noted, although defendants stipulated to
liability, their expert's testimony regarding the existence of an injury resulting
from the accident was not the "silver bullet" plaintiff believed it to be.
Defendants' expert employed qualifying language throughout his testimony,
stating "I think he sprained his neck". . . "I'm seeing him two years later, so my
opinion was based on the history that he provided of the accident" and "I think
he . . . has a soft tissue strain of his cervical spine." Given these qualified
statements the trial court correctly found the jury was free to reject all or some
of his testimony. See Kozma v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 412 N.J. Super. 319, 325
(App. Div. 2010).
Defendants' expert also specifically opined plaintiff's injuries were not
related to the accident, placing proximate cause directly at issue. In response to
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a question regarding whether plaintiff's physical ailments were related to the
accident, the defense expert stated "[n]o. I [do not] believe they were. T here
was no evidence . . . of increased fluids, which might represent a fracture or
tissue anything you can see fluid very easily and there was none. So, I had no
evidence that it was new."
Proximate cause is ordinarily a fact issue to be resolved by a jury. Perez
v. Wyeth Lab'ys Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 27 (1999). The trial court found, even if the
jury accepted plaintiff sustained an injury as a result of the accident, it must
determine whether any compensable damages resulted. Plaintiff's contention,
that an admission of liability and a statement from defendant's expert that
plaintiff suffered an injury is tantamount to a stipulation of proximate causation
and requires the jury to award at least one dollar in damages, is not supported
by fact or law. There was sufficient evidence in the record to submit the question
of whether plaintiff's current physical condition was proximately caused by the
accident, and the trial court properly denied the motion for a directed verdict,
allowing the issue to go to the jury. After deliberating approximately thirty
minutes, the jury returned a unanimous verdict awarding zero damages.
Although plaintiff twice submitted draft jury charges containing
proximate cause language to the court prior to trial, he objected to the i nclusion
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of proximate cause in the jury charge during the charge conference. He did not
object to the inclusion of proximate cause language on the verdict sheet.
Because plaintiff objected to proximate cause language in the jury charge, we
review for harmless error.3 We review defects in the verdict sheet under the
same standard that governs the jury charge "[b]ecause a verdict sheet constitutes
part of the trial [judge's] direction to the jury." State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364,
388 (2012). As here, where an objection to the verdict sheet was not raised at
trial, we review the verdict sheet for plain error. Willner, 235 N.J. at 79.4
3
"The proper standards of review of jury instructions are well-settled: if the
party contesting the instruction fails to object to it at trial, the standard on appeal
is one of plain error; if the party objects, the review is for harmless error."
Willner v. Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 80 (2018). "[T]he error will not
be grounds for reversal [on appeal] if it was harmless." Id. at 79 (second
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. J.R.,
227 N.J. 393, 417 (2017)). "An error cannot be harmless if there is 'some degree
of possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.'" Ibid. (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26 (2012)). "For an error to be
reversible under the harmless error standard, '[t]he possibility must be real, one
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether [the error] led the jury to a
verdict it otherwise might not have reached.'" Ibid. (quoting Lazo, 209 N.J. at
26).
4
"Under that standard, '[a]ny error or omission shall be disregarded by the
appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of
producing an unjust result.'" Willner, 235 N.J. at 79 (quoting R. 2:10-2).
"Without an objection at the time a jury instruction is given, 'there is a
presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the
defendant's case.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017).
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Regardless of the standard employed, no error occurred. Defendant's stipulation
as to liability did not include a stipulation as to proximate cause or damages. A
jury is always at liberty to find there are no "compensable" damages sustained
as a result of the accident, even if both experts admit an injury was sustained.
The jury had substantial, credible evidence to determine plaintiff did not
suffer a compensable injury. The jury could reasonably determine plaintiff
suffered a mild injury from the accident that resolved itself based on the
evidence presented. The judge properly submitted the issue of proximate cause
to the jury in both the jury charge and the verdict sheet.
Our review of the denial of a motion for a new trial or additur pursuant to
Rule 4:49 is limited. We will not disturb the trial judge's ruling "unless it clearly
appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." R. 2:10-1; Cuevas
v. Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 501 (2016); Risko v. Thompson Muller Auto.
Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 521 (2011). We begin with a recognition of the
fundamental principle: jury trials are a bedrock of our system of civil justice,
see N.J. Const. art. I, ¶9, and the factfinding functions of a jury deserve a high
degree of respect and judicial deference see, e.g., State v. Lodzinski, 249 N.J.
116, 143 (2021); Caldwell v. Haynes, 136 N.J. 422 (1994). In terms of its
assessment of the relative strength of the proofs, a jury verdict is "impregnable
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unless so distorted and wrong, in the objective and articulated view of a judge,
as to manifest with utmost certainty a plain miscarriage of justice." Doe v. Arts,
360 N.J. Super. 492, 502-03 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Carrino v. Novotny, 78
N.J. 355, 360 (1979)).
Moreover, we must give due deference to the trial judge's "feel of the
case," that is, their regard for "the jury to pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses" and whether "it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a
miscarriage of justice under the law." Carrino, 78 N.J. at 361 (quoting R. 4:49-
1(a)); see also Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 501. ("A jury verdict, including an award of
damages, is cloaked with a 'presumption of correctness.'") (quoting Baxter v.
Fairmont Food Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977)). "The presumption of correctness
that attaches to a damages award is not overcome unless [the movant for a new
trial or additur] can establish, 'clearly and convincingly,' that the award is 'a
miscarriage of justice.'" Cuevas, 226 N.J. at 501 (quoting Baxter, 74 N.J. at
596).
Our Supreme Court has discussed the miscarriage of justice standard:
[A] motion for a new trial should be granted only where
to do otherwise would result in a miscarriage of justice
shocking to the conscience of the court. . . . Thus, a trial
judge is not [to] substitute his [or her] judgment for that
of the jury merely because he [or she] would have
reached the opposite conclusion . . . .
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[Risko, 206 N.J. at 521 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).]
Plaintiff claims a miscarriage of justice is demonstrated by the judge's
comment, wherein he stated in his "feel of the case" plaintiff was entitled to
damages in the "high four figures, or very low five figures." Plaintiff also
renews his directed verdict argument, stating "uncontradicted evidence"
demonstrated "there were damages," so "the jury's verdict of zero should shock
the judicial conscience" because "the jury lacked a rational basis to conclude
that [plaintiff] suffered no compensable damages."
Juries are always free to award no damages despite a finding of liability.
Even if defendants had stipulated to proximate cause, which they did not do, and
the jury had found a permanent injury proximately caused by defendants, a
permanent injury may not be significant enough in its severity to warrant
compensation. Pursuant to the model jury charges, a jury has no obligation to
award positive damages where it has determined a plaintiff's injuries, although
they may never vanish, are not sufficiently pronounced to warrant financial
recovery. The law does not require a remedy for de minimis harm. Pasternoster
v. Shuster, 296 N.J. Super. 544, 599 (App. Div. 1997); see Kozma, 412 N.J.
Super. at 325 (Where the jury found plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused
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by the accident but awarded zero monetary damages because "the evidence was
susceptible to an interpretation that minimized the monetary equivalent of
plaintiff's pain and suffering to its vanishing point.").
The jury's award was reasonable considering: 1) the minimal impact
depicted in the dashcam video of the accident; 2) plaintiff's ability to drive away
and not seek treatment for nearly a month after the accident; 3) his limited
treatment after the accident; 4) his previous treatments with a chiropractor for
back pain over a sustained period of time; 5) both experts' inability to find
objective evidence of some self-reported symptoms; 6) defendants' expert
opinion plaintiff's injuries were caused by his degenerative disease; and 7) that
same expert's opinion plaintiff did not suffer a permanent injury as a result of
the accident.
The jury had ample reasonable basis to determine plaintiff did not suffer
a compensable injury as a result of the accident, and the trial judge did not err
in denying plaintiff's motions for a new trial or additur. Although the judge
commented on the likely worth of plaintiff's injuries, he ultimately concluded
there was no miscarriage of justice, a judgment to which we owe deference. See
Risko, 206 N.J. at 521.
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We conclude the trial judge properly denied plaintiff's motion for a
directed verdict on proximate cause and submitted the issue to the jury with
adequate instruction in both the jury charge and on the verdict sheet.
Additionally, we find no reason to disturb the judge's denial of a motion for a
new trial or additur.
Affirmed.
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